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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.P.VIVEKANANDA
WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS) NO.138 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
MR. PANKAJ NAINANI
S/O LAXMAN NAINANI
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT:
732-2343 KHALSA GATE
OAKVILLE, L3M5R6
ONTARIO, CANADA
EMAIL: pankajnainani@gmail.com
Digitally
signed by
PAVITHRA N
Location:
High Court of
(BY SRI. PRABHIJIT JAUHAR, ADV. FOR
Karnataka
SMT. DEEPA J., ADV.)
AND:
1.
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH SHO
VIJAYANAGAR POLICE STATION, MYSORE
BANGALORE
2.
NEHA TALRAJA
D/O MR. JAYANT TALRAJA
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS
R/O 241, C-BLOCK, 24TH MAIN
20TH CROSS, 3RD STATE
…PETITIONER
VIJAYANAGAR, MYSURU
KARNATAKA
EMAIL: neha.talreja77@gmail.com
3.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY SECRETARY
HOME DEPARTMENT
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BENGALURU-560 001
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RANJITH KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1 & R3;
SRI. ARUN GOVINDRAJ &
SRI. SIDDHANT S. DARIRA, ADVOCATES FOR R2)
THIS WP(HC) IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS ORDERING AND DIRECTING RESPONDENT NO.2
TO PRODUCE BEFORE THIS COURT THE SAID (DAUGHTER)
HIMANSHI AGED ABOUT 5 YEARS DATE OF BIRTH (04.12.2020)
AND CAUSE RETURN OF THE SAID MINOR CHILD TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE CANADA COURT IN COMPLAINCE WITH
THE ORDER DATED 27.10.2025 PASSED BY THE SUPERIOR
COURT
OF
JUSTICE,
ONTARIO,
CANADA
CASE
NO.FS-24-
00047056-0000 TO ENABLE THE MINOR DAUGHTER TO GO BACK
TO CANADA.
THIS WP(HC) HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT
ON
02.09.2026
AND
COMING
ON
FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.P.VIVEKANANDA
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
This Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) is filed seeking a
direction to respondent No.2 to produce the minor daughter
of the parties before this Court, direct the return of the
minor daughter to the jurisdiction of the Canadian Court in
compliance with Order dated 27.10.2025 passed by the
Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, Canada and set aside the
Order dated 12.06.2025 passed by the III Additional
Principal Judge, Family Court Mysuru in M.C.No.577/2025.
2.
We have heard Shri. Pabhijit Jauhar for Smt.
Deepa J. learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner,
Shri.
Ranjith
Kumar,
learned
High
Court
Government
Pleader, appearing for respondents No.1 and 3 and Shri.
Arun Govindraj and Shri. Siddhant S. Darira, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.2.
3.
The
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
writ
petitioner - father of the alleged detenue submits that
marriage between the petitioner and respondent No.2 was
solemnised in accordance with Hindu rites and customs on
21.05.2013 in Kota, Rajasthan. In the year 2020 the parties
moved to Oakville, Ontario, Canada. On 04.12.2020, the
minor daughter was born in Ontario, Canada. The parties
visited India in June 2022. Owing to matrimonial differences,
they decided to live separately, pursuant to which the
petitioner continued to reside in India, while respondent
No.2 returned to Canada along with their minor daughter.
4.
Respondent No.2, filed an application before the
Superior Court of Justice, Ontario (File No. FS-24-00047056)
on 03.06.2024 seeking divorce, sole custody of the minor,
damages of USD 2,00,000 and freezing of the petitioner's
assets. The petitioner entered appearance on 23.08.2024
and
filed
his
responsibility.
Answer
Thereafter,
seeking
joint
respondent
decision-making
No.2
filed
an
application seeking leave to relocate with the minor to the
United States of America. By Order dated 21.01.2025 the
Superior Court of Justice, Ontario granted decision-making
responsibility on a temporary, without-prejudice basis for
day-to-day matters alone, expressly barred respondent No.2
from taking any major decision concerning the minor or
travelling with her without advance notice to the petitioner,
and directed to disclose full particulars of the proposed
relocation by 31.01.2025 and the petitioner was granted
virtual parenting time with the minor.
5.
Respondent No.2 travelled to India on 12.03.2025
with the minor child citing a family medical emergency,
without giving any notice to the petitioner. On 05.06.2025,
the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario directed respondent
No.2 to file a return plan for the minor within two weeks.
However, on 10.06.2025 respondent No.2 filed a Notice of
Withdrawal of her Canadian proceedings and, on the same
day, filed M.C. No. 575/2025 for divorce and M.C. No.
577/2025 for custody before the Family Court at Mysuru.
Respondent No.2 obtained an ex parte Interim Order of
custody dated 12.06.2025 from the Family Court, Mysuru.
6.
On 02.07.2025, the petitioner filed an urgent
Motion before the Canadian Court praying for the return of
the minor daughter. The Superior Court of Justice, Ontario
held
that
the
Ontario
Court
retained
jurisdiction
notwithstanding the withdrawal, and directed respondent
No.2
to
forthwith
return
the
minor
to
Ontario.
On
14.08.2025, respondent No.2 informed the minor child's
school at Oakville that the child would continue her
schooling in India. On 27.10.2025, the Superior Court of
Justice, Ontario passed a Final Order holding that Ontario is
the habitual residence of the minor child, that respondent
No.2 had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Court,
and that her retention of the minor child in India was in
breach of the Consent Order dated 21.01.2025 and the
order dated 02.07.2025. Respondent No.2 was directed to
return the minor child to Ontario. The petitioner was granted
supervised
in-person
parenting
time
on
gradual
reintroduction and virtual parenting time on weekends. It is
submitted that respondent No.2 has failed to comply with
the order dated 27.10.2025 and continues to retain the
minor child in India. The petitioner has approached this
Court seeking for repatriation of the minor daughter to
Ontario, Canada.
7.
The
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
writ
petitioner contends that the minor daughter is a naturalborn Canadian citizen holding Canadian passport. Her
habitual residence is Oakville, Ontario and was enrolled in a
Canadian school. Therefore, the Superior Court of Justice,
Ontario is the forum having the closest and most intimate
connection
with
the
minor
child,
and
the
exclusive
jurisdiction to decide her care and custody. It is further
submitted that it is respondent No.2 who invoked the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, by filing
her application for divorce and custody in June 2024 has
submitted to that jurisdiction, and cannot abandon the
proceedings midway and refuse to abide by the orders
passed therein.
8.
It is further submitted that respondent No.2 is in
wilful disobedience of the Consent Order dated 21.01.2025,
requiring advance notice of any travel with the child and
prohibiting major unilateral decisions, the order dated
02.07.2025 directing the forthwith return of the minor to
Ontario, and the Final Order dated 27.10.2025 wherein the
Canadian Court held that Ontario is the habitual residence of
the minor, that respondent No.2 had attorned to the
jurisdiction of that Court by initiating the divorce and
custody proceedings, and that her removal and retention of
the minor in India was in breach of the Consent Order dated
21.01.2025 and the order dated 02.07.2025.
9.
It is further contended that the ex parte interim
order dated 12.06.2025 passed by the Family Court, Mysuru
in M.C.No.577/2025 was obtained by
suppressing the
pending Canadian proceedings and without notice to the
petitioner. As the minor is a Canadian citizen and not
ordinarily a resident of India, no Indian court has jurisdiction
over the custody dispute, and the said order is a nullity in
law. There is no material on record to suggest that
repatriation will cause any physical, mental or psychological
harm to the minor. On the contrary, the order dated
27.10.2025 provides for supervised in-person parenting time
with gradual reintroduction, and virtual parenting time on
weekends. The welfare of the minor is fully protected.
Respondent No.2 was given every opportunity to be heard
by the Canadian Court. Despite due service, she chose not
to appear at the trial in September and October 2025. She
cannot now complain of the orders which she herself invited.
10.
The
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
writ
petitioner places reliance on the following judgments:•
Smt. Jeewanti Pandey v. Kishan Chandra Pandey,
reported in (1981) 4 SCC 517;
•
Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh Sandhu &
another, reported in (1984) 3 SCC 698;
•
Mrs. Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw and
another, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 42;
•
Paul Mohinder Gahun v. Selina Gahun, reported in 2006
(90) DRJ 77;
•
Ms. Shilpa Aggarwal v. Aviral Mittal & Another, reported
in (2010) 1 SCC 591;
•
Dr. V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India & Others,
reported in (2010) 1 SCC 174;
•
Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini, reported in (2013) 7 SCC
426;
•
Arathi Bandi v. Bandi Jagadrakshaka Rao & Others,
reported in (2013) 15 SCC 790;
•
Surya Vadanan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others,
reported in (2015) 5 SCC 450;
•
Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) &
another, reported in (2017) 8 SCC 454;
•
Ganamukkala Sirisha v. Tippa Srihari & Others, reported
in MANU/SCOR/23943/2019;
•
Lahari Sakhamuri v. Sobhan Kodali, reported in (2019) 7
SCC 311;
•
Varun Verma v. State of Rajasthan and Others, reported
in 2019 SCC Online Raj 5430;
•
Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan & Others, reported in
(2020) 3 SCC 67;
•
Tejaswini Gaud & Others v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad
Tewari & Others, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 42;
•
Nilanjan Bhattacharya v. State of Karnataka & Others,
reported in (2021) 12 SCC 376;
•
Vasudha Sethi & Others v. Kiran V. Bhaskar & Another,
reported in (2023) 17 SCC 478;
•
Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka &
Others, reported in (2022) 20 SCC 550;
•
Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of Tamil Nadu
and Others, reported in (2023) 12 SCC 472;
•
Neha Joshi v. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported
in SLP (Crl.) No.12866/2023;
•
Anupriya v. Abhinav Gyan & Another, reported in SLP
(Crl.) No.10381/2022;
•
Sunaina Rao Kommineni v. Abhiram Balusu, reported in
2025 SCC Online Del 4176;
•
Ashu Chopra v. Karan Chopra and Another, reported in
SLP (Crl.) No.14401/2026; and
•
Anusha Reddy Akepati v. Ghadiam Harshavardhan
Reddy and Others, reported in SLP (Crl.) No.1550/2022.
11.
The learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2 - mother contends that a writ of habeas corpus lies
only where a person is shown to be under illegal detention.
The petitioner does not even plead that respondent No.2's
custody of the minor is unlawful. The petition is therefore
liable to be dismissed in limine. It is further contended that
respondent No.2 is the natural mother, legal guardian and
primary caregiver of the minor since her birth. Even the
Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, by its Endorsement dated
27.10.2025, has refused to transfer custody to the petitioner
and has specifically recorded that the child recognizes the
mother as her only parent. The order dated 02.07.2025
relied upon by the petitioner did not declare the mother's
custody illegal, nor did it vest sole custody in the petitioner.
The custody of the minor with respondent No.2 cannot be
characterized as unlawful.
12.
It is further contended that in M.C.No.577/2025
filed by respondent No.2 before the III Additional Principal
Judge, Family Court, Mysuru, an order dated 12.06.2025
has been passed protecting her custody of the minor and
restraining the petitioner and his family from interference.
The said order is subsisting. It cannot be dislodged in
habeas corpus proceedings. If
the petitioner is aggrieved,
then his remedy lies in appellate or revisional proceedings,
and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is
further contended that a writ is issued only in the absence of
an alternative and efficacious remedy. The proceedings
adjudicating the welfare of the minor are already pending
before
the
competent
Family
Court
at
Mysuru.
The
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to
bypass those proceedings. It is further contended that
respondent No.2 returned to India in March 2025 owing to
compelling familial circumstances, namely the serious illness
of her mother, and the petitioner was duly informed. The
petitioner has since been meeting the minor in India and has
continued to have video call access every weekend in terms
of the parenting arrangement.
13.
It is further contended that in matters concerning
the custody of a minor, the paramount consideration is the
welfare of the child and not the enforcement of a foreign
decree. Even where a foreign court has assumed jurisdiction
first, once the child is within the territorial jurisdiction of an
Indian court, the said court is duty-bound to independently
assess the welfare of the child, and is not mechanically
bound to direct return solely on the basis of a foreign Court's
order. Comity of courts yields where welfare demands
otherwise.
14.
It
is
further
contended
that
in
any
event,
respondent No.2 is not in a position to return to Canada.
She has no financial stability, employment and support
infrastructure
there,
and
the
foreign
court
itself
has
continued the primary caregiving arrangement with her. The
petitioner, who is himself a resident of India and who moved
back to Canada only when respondent No.2 came to India,
cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for
strategic advantage.
15.
The learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.2 places reliance on the following decisions:•
Sameer Hamsa Ramla v. State of Karnataka and Others,
reported in 2022 SCC Online Kar 789;
•
Yasir Ayaz v. State of NCT Delhi and Another, reported in
2026 SCC Online Del 951;
•
Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
Another, reported in (2017) 8 SCC 454;
•
Sarita Sharma v. Sushil Sharma, reported in (2000) 3
SCC 14;
•
Ruchi Majoo v. Sanjeev Majoo, reported in (2011) 6 SCC
479;
•
Nirmala v. Kulwant Singh and Others, reported in (2024)
10 SCC 595;
•
Kanika Goel v. State of Delhi and Another, reported in
(2018) 9 SCC 578; and
•
Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde, reported in (1998) 1
SCC 112.
16.
The question that arises for consideration is
whether this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, is
bound to direct the repatriation of the minor to Ontario,
Canada in enforcement of the order dated 27.10.2025
passed by the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario.
17.
It is well settled that the paramount consideration
in each and every case is the welfare of the minor, and that
an order passed by a foreign court directing the return of
the minor is not a jurisdictional bar on the Indian Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The following decisions of the
Apex Court are relevant in this regard.
(i) In Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde reported in
(1998) 1 SCC 112, the Apex Court, dealing with a minor
who had been removed by the mother from the United
States to India in violation of an order of the American
Court,
held
that
the
Indian
Court
is
not
bound
to
mechanically enforce a foreign court order and that the
welfare of the minor remains the paramount consideration.
It was further held that the Court called upon to decide the
issue may either exercise summary jurisdiction and direct
the return of the minor, or hold an elaborate enquiry into
welfare, the choice depending inter alia upon the length of
time for which the minor has been in India and the extent of
the ties formed. The relevant paragraphs on this point is
extracted below:"30. We may here state that this Court in Elizabeth
Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw [(1987) 1 SCC 42] while
dealing with a child removed by the father from USA
contrary to the custody orders of the US Court directed
that the child be sent back to USA to the mother not only
because of the principle of comity but also because, on
facts, — which were independently considered — it was in
the interests of the child to be sent back to the native
State. There the removal of the child by the father and the
mother's application in India were within six months. In
that context, this Court referred to H. (infants), Re
[(1966) 1 All ER 886, CA] which case, as pointed out by
us above has been explained in L. Re [(1974) 1 All ER
913, CA] as a case where the Court thought it fit to
exercise its summary jurisdiction in the interests of the
child. Be that as it may, the general principles laid down in
McKee v. McKee [1951 AC 352] and J v. C [1970 AC 668]
and the distinction between summary and elaborate
inquiries as stated in L. (infants), Re [(1974) 1 All ER 913,
CA] are today well settled in UK, Canada, Australia and
the USA. The same principles apply in our country.
Therefore
nothing precludes
the
Indian courts
from
considering the question on merits, having regard to the
delay from 1984 — even assuming that the earlier orders
passed in India do not operate as constructive res
judicata.
31. The facts of the case are that when the respondent
moved the courts in India and in the proceedings of 1986
for habeas corpus and under Guardians and Wards Act,
the courts in India thought it best in the interests of the
child to allow it to continue with the mother in India, and
those orders have also become final. The Indian courts in
1993 or 1997, when the child had lived with his mother for
nearly 12 years, or more, would not exercise a summary
jurisdiction to return the child to USA on the ground that
its removal from USA in 1984 was contrary to orders of US
courts."
(ii) In Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of
Delhi) reported in (2017) 8 SCC 454, the principles laid
down in Dhanwanti Joshi's case (supra) have been
reaffirmed by the Apex Court. In the said case, dealing with
a minor daughter brought by the mother from the United
Kingdom to India, notwithstanding a return order passed by
the foreign court, it was held that the doctrine of comity of
courts does not oust the jurisdiction of the Indian Court,
does not compel the enforcement of the foreign court order,
and highlights that the welfare of the minor which is of
paramount consideration. Paragraph No.42 of the judgment
reads as follows:-
"42. The consistent view of this Court is that if the child
has been brought within India, the courts in India may
conduct : (a) summary inquiry; or (b) an elaborate inquiry
on the question of custody. In the case of a summary
inquiry, the court may deem it fit to order return of the
child to the country from where he/she was removed
unless such return is shown to be harmful to the child. In
other words, even in the matter of a summary inquiry, it is
open to the court to decline the relief of return of the child
to
the
country
from
where
he/she
was
removed
irrespective of a pre-existing order of return of the child
by a foreign court. In an elaborate inquiry, the court is
obliged to examine the merits as to where the paramount
interests and welfare of the child lay and reckon the fact
of a pre-existing order of the foreign court for return of
the child as only one of the circumstances. In either case,
the crucial question to be considered by the court (in the
country to which the child is removed) is to answer the
issue according to the child's welfare. That has to be done
bearing in mind the totality of facts and circumstances of
each case independently. Even on close scrutiny of the
several decisions pressed before us, we do not find any
contra view in this behalf. To put it differently, the
principle of comity of courts cannot be given primacy or
more weightage for deciding the matter of custody or for
return of the child to the native State."
(iv) In Kanika Goel v. State of Delhi reported in
(2018) 9 SCC 578, the Apex Court reiterated the above
mentioned principles and held that the order of the foreign
court must yield to the welfare of the child, and the remedy
of
writ
of
habeas
corpus
cannot
be
used
for
mere
enforcement of the directions given by the foreign court
against a person within its jurisdiction and to convert that
jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Where the
private respondent is none other than the natural guardian
of the minor being her biological mother, it can be presumed
that the custody of the minor with her mother is lawful, and
it is only in an exceptionable situation that such custody can
be ordered to be taken away from her in the exercise of writ
jurisdiction.
18.
The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, have been considered and explained by
the Apex Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan's case (supra).
In that case, the Apex Court came to the conclusion on facts
that summary return of the minor to the foreign jurisdiction
was in the welfare of the minor. We notice that in none of
the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner, any inflexible rule is laid down that a
foreign court order for return must be enforced by the
Indian Court in every case, irrespective of the welfare of the
minor.
19.
Therefore, in the instant case, we are of the
opinion that the jurisdiction to decide the question of
custody may lie with the courts in India, since there is
nothing available to suggest that the welfare of the minor is
better served by repatriating her to Canada. Further, as
recorded by the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario in its
Endorsement dated 27.10.2025, respondent No.2 is also the
primary caregiver whom the child recognises as her only
parent. The minor is presently only 6 years old and is in the
custody of her mother in India. She is attending school here
and is being brought up by her mother and maternal
grandparents. The petitioner has continued to have video
call access in terms of the parenting arrangement. There is
nothing on record to suggest that her continued stay with
respondent No.2 is in any manner prejudicial to her welfare.
20.
On the question of issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, we find that, in the facts and circumstances of the
present case, this Court cannot exercise its writ jurisdiction.
The Apex Court in Tejaswini Gaud's case (supra), held that
the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy and
that in matters of the custody of a minor the power to grant
the writ is confined to cases in which the minor is detained
by a person not entitled to his or her legal custody:"14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process
for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an
effective means of immediate release from an illegal or
improper detention. The writ also extends its influence to
restore the custody of a minor to his guardian when
wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a minor by a
person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as
equivalent to illegal detention for the purpose of granting
writ, directing custody of the minor child. For restoration of
the custody of a minor from a person who according to the
personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in
appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction.
19.
examine
Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or
the
legality
of
the
custody.
Habeas
corpus
proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the
child is addressed to the discretion of the Court. Habeas
corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary
remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of
the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is
either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will
not be issued. In child custody matters, the power of the
High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases
where the detention of a minor by a person who is not
entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement
on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High
Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of
habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the
detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal
and without any authority of law.
20.
In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy
lies only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or
the Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In cases
arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and
Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on
which the court exercises such jurisdiction. There are
significant differences between the enquiry under the
Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a
writ court which is summary in nature. What is important is
the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are
determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court
is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court
may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and
direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in
exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of
the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary
jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus."
21.
In Nithya Anand Raghavan's case (supra), the
Apex Court held that the custody of a minor with a natural
guardian is to be presumed lawful, and that it is only in an
exceptionable situation that such custody will be disturbed
in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction while the other parent
is ordinarily relegated to the substantive remedy.
22.
We are of the opinion that the decisions relied on
by either side are to be considered in the factual situation
available in each case. In the instant case, the custody of
the minor with respondent No.2 is protected by an ex parte
Temporary Injunction order dated 12.06.2025 passed by the
III Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Mysuru in
M.C.No.577/2025, which is subsisting as on date. Insofar as
the order dated 27.10.2025 passed by the Superior Court of
Justice, Ontario directing return of the minor is concerned,
the said order did not declare the custody of the minor with
respondent No.2 to be unlawful, nor did it vest sole custody
in the petitioner. The petitioner is exercising his visitation
rights regularly as is evident from the Orders passed by this
Court. In the said factual situation, we are of the opinion
that the question of jurisdiction or the lack thereof as also of
the best interest of the child are to be decided by the Court
where the parties have joined issues.
23.
We are therefore of the opinion, that the writ
petition filed seeking repatriation of the minor child cannot
succeed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
instant case.
24.
Accordingly, the Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus)
fails and the same is dismissed.
Pending interlocutory applications shall stand disposed
of.
Sd/(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/(T.P.VIVEKANANDA)
JUDGE
cp*
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