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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 07.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 15.01.2026
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ARB.P. 1115/2025
MR. MOHD. KHALID
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Mukesh Rana, Ms. Mamta,
Mr. Janesh Patherwal, Ms.
Bhawna Singh and Ms.
Vanshika Rastogi, Advocates.
versus
M/S JAI MATA DI PACKAGING THROUGH ITS
PARTNERS & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hemant Kothari and Mr.
Bharat Gupta, Advocates for
R-1, 3 & 4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR J.
1.
The present Petition, under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 19961, has been filed seeking the appointment of a
Sole Arbitrator in terms of Clause 152 of the Partnership Deed dated
23.02.20233 for adjudication of disputes inter se the parties.
2.
M/s Jai Mata Di Packaging4, which is Respondent No. 1 herein,
is a Partnership Firm, while the Petitioner, along with Respondent
Act
Arbitration Clause
Partnership Deed/Agreement
Respondent No. 1-Firm
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Nos. 2, 3 and 4, are equal partners with 25% equity share in
Respondent No.1-Firm.
3.
As stated in the Petition, the said partnership was entered into by
way of a Partnership Deed dated 23.02.2023. The various important
aspects of the Agreement are delineated below:
a. The Partnership Agreement was entered into and registered in
New Delhi.
b. Respondent No.1-Firm was formed to carry on the business of
Packaging Material and Mining/Excavation of river sand.
c. Clause 2 of the Agreement states that the Principal Place of
Business and the Registered Address of Respondent No.1Firm is at A-31/5, Ground Floor, Gali No. 4, A-Block,
Kaithwara, NR Engg. College, Delhi-110053.
d. The said business activities were also to take place through its
old Principal Place of Business, i.e., C-80, Shivaji Park, New
Delhi, and through its additional place of business in Uttar
Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh.
e. Clause 9 of the Agreement recognizes the right of every
partner to have access to the books of accounts of the firm and
to verify its correctness.
f. Clause 15 of the Agreement provides for the Arbitration Clause
for redressal of any difference of opinion or dispute between
the partners.
4.
It is stated in the Petition that Respondent No. 1-Firm was allotted
the Sand/Morram mining project at Yamuna River at Balu Ghat of
Dhaurahara, Chitrakoot, Uttar Pradesh, by the State Government vide
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Lease Agreement dated 11.06.20215, for a period of 5 years till
10.06.2026.
5.
It is further stated that on 01.05.2024, Respondent No. 2 visited
the mining site along with her gang and obstructed the work, hijacked
the operations and intimidated the staff as well as the Petitioner, forcing
them to leave. This led to being a point of conflict between the
Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and ultimately culminated into
the closure of the site.
6.
On 09.05.2024, a Show Cause Notice was issued to the
Respondent No. 1-Firm by the Office of District Magistrate, Chitrakoot
(Mining Section) for depositing the outstanding Royalty of Rs.
6,97,40,914/-, in order to prevent termination of their Lease Agreement
for Mining.
7.
The Petitioner vide letter dated 20.05.2024 expressed his readiness
and willingness to pay his proportionate share of dues and called upon
Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to pay their share of the amount with
respect to the dues payable to the Mining Section in the interest of
Respondent No. 1-Firm to keep the project site operational.
8.
However, none of the other partners consented to contributing
their share of dues payable, and thereby affected the operations of
Respondent No 1-Firm.
9.
Further, as stated, since the Petitioner was neither in operational
and final control of Respondent No. 1-Firm nor was the authorised
signatory to the bank account of it, vide letter dated 20.05.2024, he
called upon Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 to inform him about the then
current financial position of the Firm including details of funds
Lease Agreement
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available and received in the bank account and sought reasons for not
using such funds to clear the outstanding dues of the Mining
Department, Uttar Pradesh.
10.
It is alleged that Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 deliberately defaulted in
disclosing the Account statements called for by the Petitioner, which is
in contravention with Clause 9 of the Partnership Agreement, and
further did not take any steps to clear the dues of the Mining
Department.
11. In view of the Non-payment of the outstanding Royalty by the
Respondent No. 1-Firm, the office of District Magistrate, Chitrakoot
(Mining Section), vide letter dated 31.05.2024, terminated the Lease
Agreement and Respondent No. 1-Firm was blacklisted, with dues
amounting to Rs.5,35,77,598, after adjusting the security amount of Rs.
1,61,63,316/-.
12. In view of the said breach of the Partnership Agreement by
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, cancellation of the project, non-payment of
royalty, loss of Goodwill and ousting the Petitioner from the operations
of Respondent No. 1-Firm, disputes arose between the Petitioner and
the Respondents.
13.
The Petitioner, in order to seek adjudication upon the said
disputes, served a Legal Notice dated 17.06.2024 under Section 21 of
the Act6 upon the Respondents seeking appointment of a sole
Arbitrator as according to Clause 15 of the Partnership Agreement. The
Legal Notice was duly served and delivered to the Respondents,
however, the Respondents did not agree for appointment of an
Arbitrator even after the statutory period of 30 days had elapsed.
Section 21 Notice
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14. In the meantime, on 31.05.2024, Respondent No.1 filed a Petition
bearing No. Misc. Civil Cases 16/20247 under Section 9 of the Act
before the learned District and Sessions Court, Chitrakoot8, seeking
an injunction against the Petitioner and Respondent No. 2 from
interfering in the mining work and related business of the mining site.
15. The Petitioner, thereafter, on 20.08.2024, filed a Petition before
this Court bearing number ARB .P. 1338/20249 under Section 11 of the
Act seeking appointment of a sole Arbitrator. However, the same was
dismissed vide Order dated 06.05.2025 for being in contravention of
Section 42 of the Act for want of jurisdiction. At that point in time, and
as is apparent, the said dismissal was occasioned by the pendency of
the Section 9 Petition before the learned Chitrakoot Court, and
therefore, rendering it the Court having jurisdiction over the
applications arising out of the same agreement.
16.
The said petition under Section 9 of the Act was, thereafter,
disposed of as uncontested and not pressed by the Respondent herein,
by the learned Chitrakoot Court vide Order dated 10.05.2025.
17.
The present Petition under Section 11 of the Act was then filed by
the Petitioner on 04.07.2025 seeking appointment of the sole Arbitrator,
in terms of Clause 15 of the Partnership Agreement.
18. It is pertinent to note that on the very next day, Respondent No. 1
filed an Application, under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code,
190810, on 05.07.2025 before the learned Chitrakoot Court, seeking
recall of the Order dated 10.05.2025 passed in Misc. Civil Cases
16/2024, thereby seeking restoration of the same.
Section 9 Petition
Chitrakoot Court
First Section 11 Petition
CPC
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19. The preliminary and the only ground of challenge that the learned
counsel for the Respondents has sought to orally raise is that the present
Petition under Section 11 of the Act is not maintainable since a Section
9 application was first filed before the learned Chitrakoot Court, and
therefore, as per the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, even though
the said Application came to be dismissed as withdrawn, the learned
Chitrakoot Court was the Court before which the Application first came
to be filed and resultantly all and any other proceedings preferred under
the Act, more specifically Part I, would have to be held to be
maintainable only before the learned Court in Chitrakoot, Uttar
Pradesh, and that the present Petition was not maintainable in Delhi.
20. Learned counsel for the Respondents would further place his
reliance on General Manager East Coast Railway Rail Sadan and
Anr. Vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.11 and BGS SGS SOMA
JV Vs. NHPC LIMITED12, to state that the first application was
preferred by the Respondents under Section 9 of the Act, and that,
consequently, the learned Court in Chitrakoot, Uttar Pradesh, would
have exclusive jurisdiction.
21. Heard learned counsel for the parties and, with their able
assistance, perused the paperbook and material on record.
22. This Court is cognizant of the scope of interference at the stage
of a Section 11 Petition. The law with respect to the scope and
standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act has been
fairly well settled. A Coordinate bench of this Court, in Pradhaan Air
Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt Ltd13, has
(2022) SCC OnLine SC 907
(2020) 4 SCC 234
2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022
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extensively dealt with the scope of interference at the stage of Section
11. The Court held as under:“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning,1 while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 &
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re2 has held that scope of inquiry
at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent
of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no. 114 in the
case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. that observations made
in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn.,3 and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd.,4 that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facienon-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re :
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no. 114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd. reads as under:—
“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re : Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it
difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya
Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra)
that the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing
with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section
11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re : Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd.,5 however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated such
as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim through
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arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the limited
scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the interest
of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne
by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other
parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent
and malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts
of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:—
“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024
INSC 532], frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section 11
as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent to
adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11
must not be misused by parties in order to force other
parties to the arbitration agreement to participate in a
time consuming and costly arbitration process. This is
possible in instances, including but not limited to, where
the claimant canvasses the adjudication of non-existent
and mala fide claims through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial
interference of the referral courts with the interests of the
parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct
that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party
which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the
other party to the arbitration. Having said that, it is
clarified that the aforesaid is not to be construed as a
determination of the merits of the matter before us, which
the Arbitral Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to
determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section
11 proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to
the extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of the
referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act and
further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally
confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an
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arbitration agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural
safeguards but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the
arbitral process. Any transgression beyond this limited judicial
threshold would not only contravene the legislative intent
enshrined in Section 8 and Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk
undermining the sanctity and efficiency of arbitration as a
preferred mode of dispute resolution. The referral Court must,
therefore, exercise restraint and refrain from venturing into the
merits of the dispute or adjudicating issues that fall squarely within
the jurisdictional domain of the arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen that
the scope of enquiry at the referral stage is conservative in nature.
A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel6.”
23. At the outset, we deem it appropriate to extract the Arbitration
Clause as envisaged under the Agreement, which reads as follows:
“15. ARBITRATION
Whenever there by any difference of opinion or any dispute between
the partners the partners shall refer the same to an arbitration of
one person. The decision of the arbitrator so nominated shall be
final and binding on all partners. such arbitration proceedings shall
be governed by Indian Arbitration Act, which is in force.”
24. This Court finds itself unable to agree with the objections raised
by the learned counsel for the Respondents. The objections raised by
the Respondents fail on the following two grounds:
a. Section 11 would not attract the bar under Section 42 of the
Act;
b. The Section 9 Petition, having been disposed of on the ground
that the Respondent chose not to press the same, ceased to
exist in the eyes of law and therefore, cannot be considered to
be the „first application made‟ before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
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25.
A Division Bench of this Court in CP Rama Rao Sole
Proprietor v. National Highways Authority of India14, while relying
upon the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of W.B. v.
Associated Contractors15, has held the following:
“13. The issue of whether a Section 11 petition would fall
within the ambit of Section 42 is no longer res integra. We in this
regard bear in mind the following enunciation of the legal position
found in State of West Bengal. v. Associated Contractors9:
“16. Similar is the position with regard to applications
made under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
In Rodemadan India Ltd. v. International Trade Expo
Centre Ltd. [(2006) 11 SCC 651], a Designated Judge of
this Hon'ble Court following the seven-Judge Bench
in SBP and Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd. [(2005) 8 SCC 618],
held that instead of the court, the power to appoint
arbitrators contained in Section 11 is conferred on the
Chief Justice or his delegate. In fact, the seven-Judge
Bench held : (SBP and Co. case [(2005) 8 SCC 618], SCC
pp. 644-45 & 648, paras 13 & 18)
“13. It is common ground that the Act has
adopted the Uncitral Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration. But at
the same time, it has made some departures
from the Model Law. Section 11 is in the place
of Article 11 of the Model Law. The Model
Law provides for the making of a request
under Article 11 to „the court or other
authority specified in Article 6 to take the
necessary measure‟. The words in Section 11
of the Act are „the Chief Justice or the person
or institution designated by him‟. The fact that
instead of the court, the powers are conferred
on the Chief Justice, has to be appreciated in
the context of the statute. „Court‟ is defined in
the Act to be the Principal Civil Court of
Original Jurisdiction of the district and
includes the High Court in exercise of its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The
Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction
is normally the District Court. The High
Courts in India exercising ordinary original
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7342
(2015) 1 SCC 32
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civil jurisdiction are not too many. So in most
of the States the court concerned would be the
District Court. Obviously, Parliament did not
want to confer the power on the District Court,
to entertain a request for appointing an
arbitrator or for constituting an Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 11 of the Act. It has to
be noted that under Section 9 of the Act, the
District Court or the High Court exercising
original jurisdiction, has the power to make
interim orders prior to, during or even post
arbitration. It has also the power to entertain a
challenge to the award that may ultimately be
made. The framers of the statute must
certainly be taken to have been conscious of
the definition of „court‟ in the Act. It is easily
possible to contemplate that they did not want
the power under Section 11 to be conferred on
the District Court or the High Court exercising
original jurisdiction. The intention apparently
was to confer the power on the highest judicial
authority in the State and in the country, on the
Chief Justices of High Courts and on the Chief
Justice of India. Such a provision is
necessarily intended to add the greatest
credibility to the arbitral process. The
argument that the power thus conferred on the
Chief Justice could not even be delegated to
any other Judge of the High Court or of the
Supreme Court, stands negatived only because
of the power given to designate another. The
intention of the legislature appears to be clear
that it wanted to ensure that the power under
Section 11(6) of the Act was exercised by the
highest judicial authority in the State or in the
country concerned. This is to ensure the
utmost authority to the process of constituting
the Arbitral Tribunal.
***
18. It is true that the power under Section
11(6) of the Act is not conferred on the
Supreme Court or on the High Court, but it is
conferred on the Chief Justice of India or the
Chief Justice of the High Court. One possible
reason for specifying the authority as the Chief
Justice, could be that if it were merely the
conferment of the power on the High Court, or
the Supreme Court, the matter would be
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governed by the normal procedure of that
Court, including the right of appeal and
Parliament obviously wanted to avoid that
situation, since one of the objects was to
restrict the interference by courts in the arbitral
process. Therefore, the power was conferred
on the highest judicial authority in the country
and in the State in their capacities as Chief
Justices. They have been conferred the power
or the right to pass an order contemplated by
Section 11 of the Act. We have already seen
that it is not possible to envisage that the
power is conferred on the Chief Justice as
persona designata. Therefore, the fact that the
power is conferred on the Chief Justice, and
not on the court presided over by him is not
sufficient to hold that the power thus conferred
is merely an administrative power and is not a
judicial power.”
It is obvious that Section 11 applications are not to be moved
before the “court” as defined but before the Chief Justice either of
the High Court or of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, or
their delegates. This is despite the fact that the Chief Justice or his
delegate have now to decide judicially and not administratively.
Again, Section 42 would not apply to applications made before the
Chief Justice or his delegate for the simple reason that the Chief
Justice or his delegate is not “court” as defined by Section 2(1)(e).
The said view was reiterated somewhat differently in Pandey &
Co. Builders (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar [(2007) 1 SCC 467], SCC at
pp. 470 & 473, Paras 9 & 23-26.
17. That the Chief Justice does not represent the High
Court or Supreme Court as the case may be is also clear
from Section 11(10):
“11. (10) The Chief Justice may make such
scheme as he may deem appropriate for
dealing with matters entrusted by subsection
(4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to
him.”
The scheme referred to in this sub-section
is a scheme by which the Chief Justice may
provide for the procedure to be followed in
cases dealt with by him under Section 11. This
again shows that it is not the High Court or the
Supreme Court Rules that are to be followed
but a separate set of rules made by the Chief
Justice for the purposes of Section 11. Subsection (12) of Section 11 reads as follows:
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“11. (12)(a) Where the matters referred to
in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10)
arise in an international commercial
arbitration, the reference to „Chief Justice‟ in
those subsections shall be construed as a
reference to the „Chief Justice of India‟.
(b) Where the matters referred to in subsections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in
any other arbitration, the reference to „Chief
Justice‟ in those sub-sections shall be
construed as a reference to the Chief Justice of
the High Court within whose local limits the
Principal Civil Court referred to in clause (e)
of sub-section (1) of Section 2 is situate and,
where the High Court itself is the court
referred to in that clause, to the Chief Justice
of that High Court.”
It is obvious that Section 11(12)(b) was necessitated in order
that it be clear that the Chief Justice of “the High Court” will only
be such Chief Justice within whose local limits the Principal Civil
Court referred to in Section 2(1)(e) is situate and the Chief Justice
of that High Court which is referred to in the inclusive part of the
definition contained in Section 2(1)(e). This sub-section also does
not in any manner make the Chief Justice or his designate “court”
for the purpose of Section 42. Again, the decision of the Chief
Justice or his designate, not being the decision of the Supreme
Court or the High Court, as the case may be, has no precedential
value being a decision of a judicial authority which is not a Court
of Record.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
25. Our conclusions therefore on Section 2(1)(e) and
Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 are as follows:
(a) Section 2(1)(e) contains an exhaustive definition
marking out only the Principal Civil Court of
Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court
having original civil jurisdiction in the State, and no
other court as “court” for the purpose of Part I of
the Arbitration Act, 1996.
(b) The expression “with respect to an arbitration
agreement” makes it clear that Section 42 will
apply to all applications made whether before or
during arbitral proceedings or after an award is
pronounced under Part I of the 1996 Act.
(c) However, Section 42 only applies to applications
made under Part I if they are made to a court as
defined. Since applications made under Section 8
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are made to judicial authorities and since
applications under Section 11 are made to the Chief
Justice or his designate, the judicial authority and
the Chief Justice or his designate not being court as
defined, such applications would be outside Section
42.
(d) Section 9 applications being applications made to a
court and Section 34 applications to set aside
arbitral awards are applications which are within
Section 42.
(e) In no circumstances can the Supreme Court be
“court” for the purposes of Section 2(1)(e), and
whether the Supreme Court does or does not retain
seisin after appointing an arbitrator, applications
will follow the first application made before either a
High Court having original jurisdiction in the State
or a Principal Civil Court having original
jurisdiction in the district, as the case may be.
(f) Section 42 will apply to applications made after the
arbitral proceedings have come to an end provided
they are made under Part I.
(g) If a first application is made to a court which is
neither a Principal Court of Original Jurisdiction in
a district or a High Court exercising original
jurisdiction in a State, such application not being to
a court as defined would be outside Section 42.
Also, an application made to a court without
subject-matter jurisdiction would be outside Section
42.
The reference is answered accordingly.”
14. It is thus manifest that the District Judge has clearly taken an
erroneous view in holding that a petition under Section 11 is one
made to a court and which would consequently attract Section 42
of the Act. As has been unequivocally held by the Supreme Court,
a petition under Section 11 for the constitution of an arbitral
tribunal cannot be recognised as an application made to a court.
The provisions of Section 42 would consequently be inapplicable.
Viewed in that light, it is manifest that the District Judge clearly
erred in returning the petition for presentation before the High
Court and that too on a wholly unsustainable construction of
Section 42. That error, if not corrected, would clearly result in
manifest injustice and clearly merits the legal position which
would flow from Section 42 being clearly enunciated.”
(emphasis supplied)
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26. A perusal of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court would clearly indicate that the present Petition under Section 11
would not be hit by the bar under Section 42 of the Act.
27. Now, adverting to the second ground on which this Court rejects
the objections as raised by the learned counsel for the Respondent.
28. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to extract
Section 42 of the Act, which reads as under:
“42.
Jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding
anything
contained
elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in
force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any
application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court
alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all
subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the
arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other
Court.”
29. In the scheme of the Act, Section 42 is not intended to confer
exclusive jurisdiction upon a court merely by reason of the fortuitous
filing of an application under Part I of the Act. The legislative intent
underlying the provision is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings in
various jurisdictions once a competent court has validly assumed
jurisdiction over the arbitral process. The assumption of jurisdiction
contemplated under Section 42 is, therefore, not illusory or symbolic,
but real, effective, and subsisting.
30. For Section 42 to operate, the first application must not only be
one referable to Part I of the Act, but must also be entertained by a
court of competent jurisdiction, culminating in the court exercising
judicial authority over the arbitral proceedings. The Apex Court in
Associated Contractors (supra) has made it abundantly clear that the
exclusive jurisdiction envisaged under Section 42 arises only when the
initial application is made to a court which answers the description
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:09:02
ARB.P. 1115/2025
under Section 2(1)(e) and is legally competent to grant the relief
sought.
31. In the present case, the Section 9 Petition was admittedly not
pressed and consequently came to be disposed of, prior to any
adjudication on the merits. Upon such withdrawal, the application
ceased to exist in the eyes of the law. The court before which the
Section 9 Petition was filed did not render any decision, nor did it
exercise its judicial power in a manner that would amount to a
determination affecting the arbitral proceedings. The withdrawal thus
resulted in the Petition becoming non-subsisting, incapable of
anchoring jurisdiction for future proceedings.
32. A withdrawn petition cannot be equated with a decided or
pending application. To hold otherwise would be to confer upon an
abandoned proceeding a jurisdiction-creating effect, which Section 42
neither contemplates nor permits. Jurisdiction under Section 42
crystallises only when a court validly assumes seisin; it does not
survive the abandonment of proceedings by the party who invoked the
court‟s jurisdiction in the first place.
33. Moreover, where the arbitration agreement is silent as to the seat
or venue of arbitration, jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e) is
determined on the basis of territorial jurisdiction under the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908. In such a situation, when multiple courts are
otherwise competent, exclusivity under Section 42 can arise only upon
the lawful and continued exercise of jurisdiction by one such court.
The non-pursuance of the Section 9 Petition, therefore, prevented the
crystallisation of exclusive jurisdiction in favour of the court in Uttar
Pradesh.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:09:02
ARB.P. 1115/2025
34. Accepting the Respondent‟s contention would lead to an
anomalous situation where a party, by merely filing and abandoning
an application, could permanently oust the jurisdiction of all other
competent courts. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the
object of Section 42, which is facilitative. The provision cannot be
used as a tool to foreclose legitimate remedies before otherwise
competent courts in the absence of a valid and subsisting prior
proceeding.
35. Consequently, in the absence of any valid, subsisting, pending, or
adjudicated first application under Part I of the Act, Section 42 cannot
be invoked to non-suit the present proceedings. Accordingly, this
Court finds no merit in the objections raised by the learned counsel for
the Respondents.
36. Consequently and in view of the fact that disputes have arisen
between the parties and the Partnership Agreement contains an
arbitration clause, more particularly, clause 15 thereof, this Court is
inclined to allow the present Petition and appoint an Arbitrator to
adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties.
37. As stated in the Petition, the disputed amount comes up to Rs.
11,57,92,656/-.
38. Accordingly, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Shakdher (Retired)
(Mob. No. +919717495004), is appointed as the Arbitrator to
adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
39. The learned sole Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:09:02
ARB.P. 1115/2025
40. The learned sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise be agreed to
between the parties and the learned sole Arbitrator.
41. The parties shall share the learned sole Arbitrator's fee and
arbitral costs equally.
42. All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counterclaims are kept open, to be decided by the learned sole
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
43. Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved.
44. Let a copy of the said order be sent to the learned sole Arbitrator
through the electronic mode as well.
45. Accordingly,
the
present
Petition,
along
with
pending
application(s), is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
46. No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 15, 2026/va/dj/jk
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:09:02
ARB.P. 1115/2025
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