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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2808 of 2025
Reserved on: 01.01.2026
Date of Decision: 9.01.2026.
_____________________________________
Mohit
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Vikas Rathore, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Lokender Kutlehira, Additional
Advocate
General,
for
the
respondent/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail, in FIR No. 237 of 2025 dated 28.10.2025,
registered
for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 20,25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) at Police Station Sundernagar
District Mandi, H.P.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:2998
2.
It has been asserted that, as per prosecution, the
petitioner was travelling in a vehicle bearing registration No. HP72A-1340, from which the 329 grams of charas was recovered.
The petitioner is innocent. There is no material to connect him to
the charas. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Una and
there is no likelihood of his absconding. The investigation is
complete and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining
the petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by all the
terms and conditions, which the Court may impose. Hence, the
petition.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were checking the vehicles at Pungh
barrier on 28.10.2025. They intercepted a vehicle bearing
registration No. HP-72A-1340. The occupants of the vehicle got
frightened after seeing the police. The police associated Dalip
Kumar and Constable Kuldeep and inquired the names of the
occupants of the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-72A-1340.
The driver identified himself Rajinder Kumar and the person
sitting beside the driver identified himself as Mohit Kumar
(present petitioner). The police searched the vehicle in presence
of the witnesses and recovered a carry bag containing 329 grams
2026:HHC:2998
of charas.
The police arrested the occupants and seized the
charas. The charas was sent to SFSL Junga and it was found to be
a sample of charas. As per the status report, no F.I.R has been
registered against the petitioner. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely
implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner with
the commission of crime. The quantity of charas stated to have
been recovered is intermediate and rigours of Section 37 of NDPS
Act do not apply to the present case. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State submitted that the quantity of
charas found from the car was huge and it could not have been
meant for self consumption. The charas adversely affects the
young generation and no leniency should be shown to the
2026:HHC:2998
petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
2026:HHC:2998
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of
the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
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course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always
be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant
of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
2026:HHC:2998
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
2026:HHC:2998
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration
must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature
of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail,
except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing
from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating
other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or
intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who
seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2026:HHC:2998
11.
The status report shows that the petitioner was
travelling in a vehicle bearing registration No. HP72A-1340 from
which the police recovered 329 grams of charas. It was submitted
that the petitioner was merely travelling as a passenger in the
vehicle, and he cannot be connected to the contraband stated to
have been recovered by the police. This submission is not
acceptable. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003
SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was
recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of
the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It
was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle,
and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each
other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how
they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must
be conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
2026:HHC:2998
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may
carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja
[(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to
work out a completely logical and precise definition of
“possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the
context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it
was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan
v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2
WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from
possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been
established. It has not been shown by the accused-
2026:HHC:2998
appellants that the possession was not conscious in
the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the
Act.”
12.
Therefore,
prima
facie,
the
petitioner
was
in
possession of the charas when the recovery was made from the
vehicle in which he was travelling, and the burden would shift
upon the petitioner to show that he was not in conscious
possession as per Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act.
13.
Status report shows that the police have recovered 329
grams of charas, which is an intermediate
quantity, hence
rigours of Section 37 of NDPS Act do not apply to the present
case.
14.
The petitioner asserted that he is a permanent
resident of district Una. This was not stated to be incorrect. It
means that the petitioner has roots in the society and there is no
chance of his absconding.
15.
The status report shows that the investigation is
complete; thus no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining
the present petitioner in custody.
It was submitted that the petitioner is a drug peddler
and he should not be released on bail at this stage. This
2026:HHC:2998
submission cannot be accepted. The status report mentions that
no other F.I.R. has been registered against the petitioner, which,
prima facie shows that the petitioner was involved in the
commission of offence for the first time. It is difÏcult to believe
that no F.I.R. would have been registered against a drug peddler.
17.
The petitioner is a first offender and he is entitled to
reform himself. Putting him behind the bars would make the
chance of his reformation bleak because he would come in contact
of hardened criminals.
18.
Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions: (I)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III)
The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the
Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
2026:HHC:2998
19.
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the
Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide
by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
20.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the District Jail Superintendent, Mandi, District
Mandi, H.P. . and the learned Trial Court through FASTER.
21.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case's merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th January, 2026
(ravinder)
Digitally signed
CHANDER
CHANDER by
SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date: 2026.01.09
16:11:56 +0530
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