Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 31.08.2026
Pronounced on: 14.09.2026
Uploaded on: 14.09.2026
#
+
CNR No. DLHC010456852024
CRL.A. 676/2024
MOHAMMAD SAQIB@ SAQIB IFTEKAR
.....Appellant
Through: Mr.Sarim Naved, Adv.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr.Rahul Tyagi, SPP with
Ms.Priya Rai, Mr.Avinash
Kumar Singh, Mr.Priyansh Raj
Singh and Mr.Amit Rohila,
Advs.
DSP Abhinav Kajla, CIO and
Insp. Lalit Sharma, AIO, NIA
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
JUDGMENT
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1.
This appeal has been filed under Section 21(4) of the National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NIA
Act’) seeking grant of bail in FIR No. RC-38/2018/NIA/DLI, PS NIA
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
HQ, New Delhi titled NIA v. Mufti Mohammad Suhail and Ors.,
registered under Sections 120B, 121, 121A and 122 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and Sections 17,
18, 18B, 20, 38 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘UAPA’) and Sections 4 and 5 of
the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
2.
The appeal challenges the rejection of the bail application of the
appellant by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03, Patiala House
Courts, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) vide
order dated 27.05.2024.
3.
The learned counsel for the appellant submits that even as per
the allegations contained in the charge-sheet against the appellant, the
appellant is not alleged to be part of the core module of the terror plot,
but at best, was only a peripheral participant. He submits that the only
allegations against the appellant are that he visited Kashmir along with
Accused No. 6/Muhammad Absar in July 2017 and July 2018 to
request PW-27/Sh.Reyaz Ahmad Najar to facilitate a meeting with the
militants. Admittedly, PW-27 knew the appellant from before as they
studied from the same madrasa in Uttar Pradesh. He submits that a
holistic reading of the statement of PW-27 would show that the
appellant neither requested to facilitate the meeting with the militants,
nor showed any interest for the same.
4.
He submits that the prosecution also relies on the statement of
PW-35/Sh. Zubair Siddique Lone, who again does not truly implicate
the appellant in any of the offence.
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
5.
He submits that the third witness produced by the prosecution
against the appellant is PW-37, Protected Witness D, who again, apart
from being a witness of hearsay, does not implicate the appellant in
any of the offence.
6.
He submits that in any case, as these witnesses stand examined
and the appellant has remained in custody for almost 8 years, and the
trial is not likely to end any time soon, the appellant be released on
bail. In support of his submissions, he places reliance on the
judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. KA Najeeb,
(2021) 3 SCC 713; Ashim v. National Investigation Agency, (2022) 1
SCC 695; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024)
9 SCC 813; Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 8
SCC 293; Mukesh Salam v. State of Chattisgarh & Anr., 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 4021; Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920; Vijay Nair v. Directorate of
Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3597; Javed Ali@ Javed v.
National Investigation Agency, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7874; In re:
Manirul Islam@Doctor, CRM (DB) No. 667/2023, order dated
20.03.2023 (Calcutta High Court); Padam Singhee v. Directorate of
Enforcement, 2024:AHC:178668; Central Bureau of Investigation v.
Dayamoy Mahato & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2775; Jalaluddin
Khan v. Union of India, (2024) 10 SCC 574; Kareem@Sadam v.
State by National Investigation Agency, SLP (Crl) No. 11626/2025,
judgment dated 07.10.2025; Union of India v. Saleem Khan, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1754; Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chattisgarh,
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
2025 INSC 222; Vernon v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2023) 15
SCC 56; Niklesh Prakash Patil v. The State of Maharashtra,
2025:BHC-AS:21761; Chandeep Singh v. National Investigation
Agency, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 6332; Gulfisha Fatima v. State
(Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 10; and, Arvind Dham
v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 30.
7.
On the other hand, Mr.Rahul Tyagi, the learned Special Public
Prosecutor (‘SPP‟), submits that mere delay in conclusion of the trial
cannot be a reason to grant bail to the appellant. He submits that there
are serious allegations against the appellant inasmuch as he is the one
who introduced the prime motivator of terror module in Jammu &
Kashmir, that is, Mufti Mohd. Suhail (A-1) and Anas Younus (A-2),
to Naim@ Mohd. Naeem (A-11). The appellant also went to Kashmir
with Muhammad Absar (A-6) to try and make contact with the
terrorists so that they can obtain training. He also procured arms, and
from his possession, incriminating material in the form of pamphlets
and others was recovered. He submits that given the seriousness of
charges against the appellant, the appellant should not be released on
bail.
8.
He further submits that as this Court is considering an appeal
against the order passed by the learned Trial Court, subsequent
material in the form of statements of witnesses recorded before the
learned Trial Court after the passing of the impugned order rejecting
his bail application, should not be considered by this Court, but the
appellant be given liberty to approach the learned Trial Court again for
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
grant of bail. In support of his plea, he places reliance on the
judgments of the Supreme Court in Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 591; State of AP Through IG,
NIA v. Mohd. Hussain, (2014) 1 SCC 258; CBI v. RS Pai & Anr.,
(2002) 5 SCC 82; and Shahid Nasir v. National Investigation
Agency, Crl.A. 960/2024 order dated 11.03.2025.
9.
We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
10.
In the present case, the appellant had been taken in custody on
26.12.2018 and has, therefore, remained in jail for almost 8 years.
Presently, out of 120 witnesses cited by the prosecution, statements of
only 40 witnesses have been recorded. The learned SPP has submitted
that the respondent shall be dropping 39 witnesses. Even if that be so,
the trial is not likely to end any time soon.
11.
In Khuram Parvez v. National Investigation Agency,
2026:DHC:5092-DB, we had considered the law relating to the effect
of delay in the trial on the Fundamental Rights of the accused under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and balance to be achieved
between this right and the restrictions on bail contained in Section
43D(5) of the UAPA. We would quote from the said judgment as
under:
“52. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Supreme
Court considering the balance to be achieved
between the Fundamental Right of an accused
for a speedy trial vis-à-vis the restrictions
imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA on
release of the accused on bail, held that these
restrictions do not oust the ability of the
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution. It
held that whereas at the commencement of
proceedings, the courts are expected to
appreciate the legislative policy against grant
of bail, however, these restrictions will melt
down where there is no likelihood of the trial
being completed within a reasonable time and
the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. It was further held that
Section 43D(5) of UAPA is comparatively less
stringent than Section 37 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
where the court needs to be satisfied that
prima facie the accused is not guilty and that
he is unlikely to commit another offence while
on bail. Instead, Section 43D(5) of the UAPA
merely provides another possible ground for
the court to refuse bail, in addition to the wellsettled considerations like gravity of offence,
etc.. We quote from the judgment as under:
“17. It is thus clear to us that the
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does
not oust the ability of the constitutional
courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Indeed, both the restrictions under a
statute as well as the powers exercisable
under constitutional jurisdiction can be
well
harmonised.
Whereas
at
commencement of proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood
of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA being used as the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial.
18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are
conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the respondent are
grave and a serious threat to societal
harmony. Had it been a case at the
threshold, we would have outrightly
turned down the respondent's prayer.
However, keeping in mind the length of
the period spent by him in custody and
the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed anytime soon, the High Court
appears to have been left with no other
option except to grant bail. An attempt
has been made to strike a balance
between the appellant's right to lead
evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and
simultaneously the respondent's rights
guaranteed under Part III of our
Constitution have been well protected.
19. Yet another reason which persuades
us to enlarge the respondent on bail is
that Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA is
comparatively less stringent than Section
37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS
Act where the competent court needs to
be satisfied that prima facie the accused
is not guilty and that he is unlikely to
commit another offence while on bail;
there is no such precondition under
UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA merely provides another possible
ground for the competent court to refuse
bail, in addition to the well-settled
considerations like gravity of the
offence, possibility of tampering with
evidence, influencing the witnesses or
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
chance of the accused evading the trial
by absconsion, etc.”
53. The above judgment and various others of
the Supreme Court were considered by the
Supreme Court in Gulfisha (supra), and the
Supreme Court framed the question to be
considered as “in prosecution under the
UAPA,
when
delay
and
prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail,
what is the principled approach by which a
constitutional court is to examine such a
plea.”
54. In answer to the above question, the
Supreme Court held as under:
“30. Article 21 occupies a central place
in the constitutional scheme. The right to
life and personal liberty, and the
insistence that any deprivation must
conform to procedure established by
law, are foundational guarantees. The
right to a speedy trial has been
recognised as an important facet of this
guarantee. It follows that pre-trial
incarceration cannot, by the mere
passage of time, be permitted to assume
the character of punishment.
31. At the same time, Article 21 has
never been understood as operating in
isolation from law. The constitutional
promise is not that liberty will be
unregulated, but that deprivations of
liberty
will
not
be
arbitrary,
unconscionable,
or
unfair.
The
expression “procedure established by
law” reflects that balance. The UAPA,
as a special statute enacted to address
offences alleged to affect the security of
the State and the stability of civic life,
represents a legislative judgment as to
the conditions under which bail may be
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
granted at the pre-trial stage. Section
43D(5) of UAPA embodies the exercise
of that judgment.
32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,
this Court recognised a constitutional
safeguard that cannot be ignored:
statutory restrictions cannot be applied
so as to render the guarantee of personal
liberty illusory. It was held that where
the trial is not likely to commence or
conclude within a reasonable period,
constitutional
courts
retain
the
jurisdiction
to
grant
bail
notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection
against unconscionable detention and
there can be no second opinion on the
said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does
not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere
passage of time becomes determinative
in every case arising under a special
statute. The jurisprudence of this Court
does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory
regime enacted by Parliament to address
offences of a special category.
34. The constitutional inquiry into delay
is not an inquiry into guilt. It is an
inquiry into whether continued detention
remains constitutionally permissible in
the circumstances of the case. That
inquiry is necessarily contextual.
Context includes the nature of the
allegation, the statutory field, the stage
of the proceedings, the realistic
trajectory of the trial, the causes
contributing to delay, and the risks
attendant upon release. Delay cannot be
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
detached from these considerations and
treated as a solitary determinant.
35. The proper constitutional question,
therefore, is not whether Article 21 is
superior to Section 43D (5). The proper
question is how Article 21 is to be
applied where Parliament has expressly
conditioned the grant of bail in relation
to offences alleged to implicate national
security. The law does not contemplate
an either-or approach. Nor does it
contemplate an unstructured blending of
statutory
and
constitutional
considerations. What is required is
disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives
due regard to both.
xxx
101. It is well recognised that Article 21
rights, though not absolute, require the
State and the Court to justify continued
custody with reference to the specific
individual before it. Treating all accused
identically irrespective of their roles
would risk transforming pre-trial
detention into a punitive mechanism
divorced from individual circumstances.
The constitutional mandate demands a
differentiated inquiry: where prolonged
custody disproportionately burdens
those whose roles are limited, the
balance between individual liberty and
collective security may call for
conditional release, while the same
balance may tilt differently for those
alleged to have orchestrated the
offence.”
55. The Supreme Court also examined the
principles governing the scope of judicial
inquiry under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA at
the bail stage, and held as under:
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
“80. From the foregoing discussion,
certain propositions governing the
application of Section 43D(5) emerge
with clarity. First, the provision
embodies a deliberate legislative
departure
from
ordinary
bail
jurisprudence, premised upon the
distinctive nature of offences under
Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second,
the expression “prima facie true”
mandates a threshold judicial inquiry
which is neither perfunctory nor
adjudicatory, requiring the Court to
examine whether the prosecution
material, taken at face value, discloses
the essential statutory ingredients of the
alleged offence. Third, the inquiry is
necessarily accused-specific, directed to
the role and attribution qua the
individual, and does not admit of
collective or undifferentiated treatment
merely because allegations arise from a
common
transaction
or
conspiracy. Fourth, the bail stage under
Section 43D(5) is not a forum for
evaluating defences, weighing evidence,
or conducting a mini-trial; judicial
restraint at this stage is not an
abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the
statutory mandate. These propositions,
read together, define the contours of
judicial power and responsibility under
the provision.
81. The correct application of Section
43D(5), therefore, requires the Court to
undertake a structured inquiry confined
to the following:
i. whether the prosecution material,
accepted as it stands, discloses a
prima facie case satisfying the
statutory ingredients of the offence
alleged;
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
ii. whether the role attributed to the
accused reflects a real and
meaningful nexus to the unlawful
activity
or
terrorist
activity
proscribed under the Act, as
distinguished from mere association
or peripheral presence; and
iii. whether the statutory threshold is
crossed qua the individual accused,
without
embarking
upon
an
assessment reserved after full-fledged
trial.
82. Where these requirements are met,
the statutory restraint on the grant of
bail must operate with full force; where
they are not, the embargo stands lifted.
This approach preserves the legislative
purpose of the Act, and ensures that the
exceptional nature of the bail regime
under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted
by overreach nor distorted by
mechanical application.”
56. The correctness of the above judgment,
insofar as interplay between Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA is concerned, has been doubted by
the Supreme Court in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v.
National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026
INSC 503. It explained K.A. Najeeb (supra),
as under:
“31. In K.A. Najeeb, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court was clear and
unequivocal in holding that once it is
obvious that a timely trial would not be
possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of
time, the courts would ordinarily be
obligated to enlarge the accused on bail.
We have already extracted supra
paragraph 17 of the said judgment
where it has been clearly stated that the
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act per se
does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution.
Whereas
at
the
commencement of the proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigors of such provisions will
„melt down‟ where there is no likelihood
of the trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. In the facts of that
case, this Court observed that it was
conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the accused were grave
and a serious threat to societal harmony
and had it been the case at the threshold,
perhaps the Court would have outrightly
rejected such a prayer. However,
keeping in mind the duration of
incarceration and the unlikelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future,
the accused had to be enlarged on bail.
xxx
35. The often invoked phrase „bail is the
rule and jail is the exception‟ is not
merely an empty statutory slogan
flowing from the CrPC as Gurwinder
has stated. It is a constitutional principle
flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution and the presumption of
innocence which is the cornerstone of
any civilised society governed by the
rule of law. Statutes may undoubtedly
calibrate the manner in which that
principle is applied, particularly in cases
involving national security or terrorist
offences for which the UAP Act is meant,
but those cannot altogether invert the
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
constitutional relationship between
liberty and detention. The statutory
embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain
a circumscribed restriction that operates
subject to the guarantee of Articles 21
and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, we
have no manner of doubt in stating that
even under the UAP Act, „bail is the rule
and jail is the exception‟; of course, in
an appropriate case, bail can be denied
having regard to the facts of that
particular case.”
57. Further, while highlighting the low
conviction rate in UAPA, the Supreme Court
opined that:“42.3. Thus, from the aforesaid figures,
it is evident that the country-wide
percentage of conviction under the UAP
Act for the five years comprising the
period 2019-23 hovers between 2% to
6%. In other words, there is 94% to 98%
possibility of acquittal in such cases in
the country. When it comes to the Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the
percentage of conviction is abysmal, to
say the least. For the aforesaid period,
the annual rate of conviction is always
less than 1%. It means that at the end of
the trial, there is 99% possibility of
acquittal in such cases. With these kind
of statistics staring at our face, the
question is, should we continue the
detention of the appellant or defer the
consideration to a later stage, simply
because the charges are serious?”
58. We must also note that this issue
concerning the interplay between Article 21 of
the Constitution and Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA Act, has now been referred to a larger
Bench in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of
NCT of Delhi (order dated 22.05.2026 passed
by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.)
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
2867/2026). In the said order, the Supreme
Court has observed that delay cannot be the
sole ground for releasing the accused on bail
and that the inquiry into delay is contextual
and must take into account the nature of the
allegations, the statutory field, the stage of the
proceedings, the realistic trajectory of the
trial, the causes contributing to the delay, the
role attributed to the accused, the prima facie
material, the availability of intermediate
safeguards, and the risks attendant upon
release. It has further observed as under: “20. We are also conscious that an
unqualified reading of the proposition
that lapse of time by itself must compel
bail in every case under the UAPA may
have serious consequences. Such an
approach may leave little room for
courts to examine the nature of
allegations, centrality of role, protected
witnesses,
risk
of
intimidation,
possibility of reactivation of networks,
nature of delay and whether such delay
is attributable to the accused
himself/herself, public order concerns
and national security implications. On
the other hand, an equally unqualified
insistence on Section 43D(5) without
regard to prolonged incarceration would
imperil Article 21. The Constitution does
not command either extreme. It is this
precise issue that may warrant attention
of the appropriate bench dealing with
the issues.
21. The question, therefore, is not
whether Article 21 survives Section
43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true
question is how Article 21 is to be
applied in a statutory field where
Parliament has consciously imposed
restrictions on bail in respect of offences
alleged to affect the security of the State
and the stability of civic life.
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
22. We clarify that nothing in this order
is intended to whittle down, dilute, read
narrowly, or detract from the authority
of K.A. Najeeb. ...”
59. In the said order, after having referred the
issue to the larger Bench, the Supreme Court
still went on to consider the case of the
appellant therein for bail and, taking into
account the substantial period of incarceration
already undergone by the appellant therein,
released the appellant on interim bail for a
period of 6 months.
60. In Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v.
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, the Supreme
Court has also held that merely because a
question of law is referred to a larger Bench,
the High Court must not refrain from
considering the matter before it in accordance
with the law binding on it. It has opined as
under:
“35. We are seeing before us judgments and
orders by High Courts not deciding cases on
the ground that the leading judgment of this
Court on this subject is either referred to a
larger Bench or a review petition relating
thereto is pending. We have also come across
examples of High Courts refusing deference to
judgments of this Court on the score that a
later coordinate Bench has doubted its
correctness. In this regard, we lay down the
position in law. We make it absolutely clear
that the High Courts will proceed to decide
matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It
is not open, unless specifically directed by this
Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a
review petition, as the case may be. It is also
not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a
judgment by stating that it has been doubted
by a later coordinate Bench. In any case, when
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of
equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier
one which is to be followed by the High
Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench
in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay
Sethi. The High Courts, of course, will do so
with careful regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.”
12.
We shall now test the plea of the appellant for bail on the above
parameters.
13.
As noted hereinabove, the trial is not likely to end any time
soon. The allegations in the charge-sheet against the appellant are as
under:iii) Role in Crime (in A-5 is a member of the
brief)
Pro-IS group Harkat-ulHarb-E-Islam.
He
propagated the ideology
of ISIS and supported
the ideology of Jaish-EMuhammad for which
be al-so established
contacts in the Tral
region of Jammu &
Kashmir for arranging
certain local terrorists
for committing terrorist
acts within India and to
wage
war
against
Government of India.
A-5 was instrumental in
the formation of the
group led by Mufti
Mohammad Suhail (A-1)
wherein A-5 contributed
by
arranging
for
weapons through his
contacts in the western
UP.
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
He
knowingly
facilitated waging of war
against Government of
India by concealing of
the design of his group
members.
He
also
supported
proscribed
terrorist organizations
like
IS1S,
Jaish-EMuhammad and AlQaida.
xxx
XVII. Following is the summary of
incriminating seizures made from the house
Saqib, S/o Iftekhar (A-5) dated 26/12/2018,
working as Imam in Jama Masjid, Baksar
Flyover, Baksar, Uttar PradeshMobile
Total-03 Mobiles (Samsung, Gionee & Nokia),
One Tablet Model no. GT-N8000Build No.
KOT49H.N8000xxUDNE6 (navy blue colour
without SIM Card
xxx
ID. Procurement of Pistols from Meerut: (1st
Visit):
a) The initial investigation revealed that A-1,
A-2, A-3, A-4 & A-5 went to Meerut in the first
week of July, 2018 to procure pistols from
Radhana Inayatpur, Meerut, UP. Naim (A-11)
was instrumental in their procuring the
weapons.
b) The investigation revealed that during the
first week of July, 20 18, Suhail (A-1) went to
Simbhaoli in western UP alongwith Anus
Younus (A-2), Zafar (A-4) and Zubair (A-3) by
a Maruti Swift Car white colour (belonging to
Zubair (A-3) and took Saqib (A-5) from Jama
Masjid Baksar, Hapur and reached at the tea
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
stall near bus stand of Radhna Inyatpur, Nairn
(A-I I) and Kasim (s/o Sh. Zafaryab) a resident
of this village was already there when Kasim
called Matloob (PW-11).
c) Matloob (PW-11) handed one Pistol and
one Katta and one packet (Cartridge) rounds
(20) to Mufti Suhail (A-1). In this transaction
A-5 introduced A-11 to the group who
promised them that weapons can be arranged
for a price.
d) Evidence gathered by Investigation to
substantiate the transactions in Meerut (First
Visit):
i. Witness Matloob (PW-11) in his
statement testified that during the
transaction of weapons dealings by
Naim (A-1l) and Suhail (A-1) he witness
the transaction of arranging 01 country·
made pistol, 01 country made Katta and
20 Nos. ammunition on the direction of
Naim (A-11) and that these were handed
over to A-I.
ii. Matloob (PW-11) also identified the
arms which were given to A-1 after
seeing the photographs of pistols at the
time of seizure.
iii. Voluntary Disclosure and Pointing
out by Naim (A-11): The investigation
has also corroborated the fact of this
meeting from the disclosure/pointing out
on 12/01/2019 wherein A-11 pointed out
the places where A-11 met with A-l and
the place where Pistols were purchased.
During the visit A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4,
and A-5 came at Village Radhna
Inyatpur and collected one country made
pistol, one country made pistol and a
packet of bullets from Matloob (PW-11).
iv. After taking the said arms and
ammunition Mufti Suhail (A-1) and his
team returned to Delhi and dropped
Saqib (A-5) and Kasim at Simbhaoli
(UP).
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
e) Corroboration of above from CDR
Analysis: CDR Analysis of Suhail (A-l), Zubair
(A-3) and Anas (A-2) was conducted to
corroborate the facts corning up from the
disclosures of accused and from statement of
witnesses. CDR Analysis confirms that Suhail
(A-1), Zubair (A-3) and Anas (A-2) (their
mobile numbers are 9910660673, 9811626865
& 8750150219) went to Meerut in the first
week of July 2018. The locations and
movements of phone numbers used by accused
persons as mentioned above are consistent
with the facts as come up in the evidence
discussed above. Details are attached in the
CDR Report (D-192.).
17.7.9 .Jammu &Kashmir Visits by AS, & A6
to
link
Harkat-ul-Harb-EIslam
with
Kashmiri Militants:
I. Investigation has evidence that Mufti Saqib
(A-5) and Maulvi Absar (A-6) visited Jammu,
Srinagar and Tral (Pulwama) in Jammu &
Kashmir twice during the month of July, 2017
and July, 2018 to link their group with
Kashmiri militants (specifically for attending
training and collection of weapons to carry
out violent acts.
This has been substantiated by following
facts:a) Absar (A-6) in his disclosure dated
17/01/2019 led by pointing out memo dated
17/01/2019 voluntarily disclosed that in July,
2018 he and Saqib (A-5) had gone to Tral,
Pulwama, J&K and stayed in the house of a
common friend Riyaz Ahmed Najar(PW-15),
(r/o
Village-Amirabad,
PSTral,
Distt.Pulwama) with an intention to meet
'Mujahideens‟
(militants)
of
Jaish-eMuhammed, and for getting training and
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
collect weapons to carry out jihad. Further,
upon their return to Delhi, A-5 & A-6
described about their Tral visit to Suhail (A-1),
Anas (A-2), Zubair (A-3) and Zafar (A-4) at
Pacific Mall, near Koushambi Metro Station.
A6 pointed out the location also.
b) In his disclosure dated he has testified that
he contributed Rs.1000/- (One Thousand
rupees) for purchase of weapons.
c) Riyaz Ahmed Najar (PW-15) in his
statement has also testified following facts:
i. That in the month of July, 2018 Saqib (A5) and Absar (A-6) had come in his house
(at Amirahad, PS-Tral, Pulwama, J&K)
and stayed there for 04 to 05 days.
ii. That Absar (A6) told Riyaz (PW-15) to
arrange meeting with 'Mujahidins' of (JEM)
and A-6 told to Riyaz(PW-15) that he will
not return back without meeting them.
iii. That after promise by Zubair (PW-16)
(S/oMohd Sadiq Lone, r/o Amirabad, Tral,
Dist-Pulwama, J&K, a friend of Riyaz) that
he will arrange their meeting with
Mujahideens as and when it will finalize,
both A-5 & A-6 returned from Tral,
Srinagar. A-5 & A-6 exchange the mobile
numbers also with Zubair (PW-16).
iv. Zubair Siddique Lone(PW-16), S/o
Mohd Sadiq Lone, r/o Amirabad, Tral,
Dist-Pulwama, J&K in his statement
testified following facts:
o That in the month of July, 2018 Saqib
(A-5) and Absar (A-6) visited villageAmrabad, PS-Traland stayed in the
house of Riyaj Ahmad Najar.
o That Absar (A6) told to arrange
meeting with Mujahidins of (JEM).
o That after promising by Zubair (PW16) ( a friend of Riyaj) that he will
arrange meetings with Mujahideens as
and when it will final both A-5 & A-6
returned from Tral, Srinagar. A-5 & A6 exchange the mobile numbers also.
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
o That Zubair knows two of his childhood
friends namely Mukhtar and Jahagir
who joined terrorist organization.
b. Saqib (A-5) in his disclosure led by pointing
out dated 08/01/2019, has disclosed that
during his onward journey to Tral, Pulwama
he stayed in the house of master Showket
Ahmad Khan, S/o Talib Hussain, House No95, Ward No- 09, Opposite Water Tank,
Rajouri for a night in the year 2017. In an
another disclosure dated 10/01/2019, he
pointed out the house of Riyaj Ahmad Najar
(PW-15),R/o Amirabad, PS-Tral, Pulwama,
J&K in which A-5 & A-6 stayed twice i.e. in
the year 2017 & July, 2018.
xxx
“17.7.15.
Evidence Against: Saqib (A-5):
Substantiation through evidence against
accused Saqib (A-5) has been done under
following headings:
I. (A-5) is a member of the Pro-IS Group
Harkat-ul-Harb-E-Islam: this is substantiated
from the fact that A-5 took active part in
proceedings of the group including procuring
of arms & ammunition through his contacts
from Radhana Inayatpur, Meerut, UP. The
facts have already discussed in the relevant
para (Para No-17.7.6 (III)).
II. Investigation has substantiated that A-5
established contacts in Tral region of Jammu
& Kashmir for arranging certain local
terrorists for committing terrorist acts in
India. Investigation has also established that
A-5 with A-6 visited Jammu, Srinagar and Tral
(Pulwama) in Jammu & Kashmir twice
(during the month of July, 2017 and July,
2018) to tie up with their friends to request
them to arrange for training with Jaish-EMuhammad. Their contacts Riyaj Ahmed
Najar (PW-15) and Zubair (PW-16) were
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
identified by the investigation and their
depositions have been recorded. The
circumstances and players leading to the
preparation of the facts have already been
discussed in the relevant paras (Para No17.7.9).
b.
Cyber
Examination
Report-VI:
Investigation has substantiated by analysis of
data recovered from the mobile devices
GIONEE X1 of A-5 that he was in touch with
the peoples who were supporting and
propagating materials related to terror
organisation like Jaish e Mohammed (JEM),
Taliban and was preparing to wage war
against the Government of India.
c. Chats (recovered in seized phone of accused
and social media recovery done u/s 27 IEA),
Disclosure followed by pointing outs and
statements of Prosecution witnesses will prove
his visit of Tral (Pulwama) to meet terrorists
of Jaish-e-Mohammed for getting training to
carry out jihad.
d. Cyber Examination Report-VI: Chats
recovered from Facebook and WhatsApp from
the device of Saqib (A-5). Some incriminating
contents are as under: CERT-IN's report, Page No 4138, date
10/17/2018 4:38:03 PM: Shahzad has
sent a voice message "PTT-20181017WA0029.opus", in which he says "Indian
are "Buzdil",
CERT-IN's report, Page No 414:
10/18/2018 6:15:50 PM: Translation of
Shahzad's message says "Fifty thousand
nine hundred rupees", also he has
mentioned "57900"
CERT-IN's report, Page No date
10/19/2018 2:03:18 AM: Translation of
Saqib's message says "Hazrat Balance
has arrived", "57900".
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
CERT-IN's report, Page No: 10/19/2018
3:22:36 AM: Translation of Shahzad's
message says "50000 to Baba, 4000 to
Ammi jaan, 1000 to you, 900 to Maulana
Absar, 2000 Jihad per Subullah"
CERT-IN's report, Page No 16840 date
10/23/2018 4:52:23 AM: Translation of
Shahzad's message says "Kaushah Kalam
is occupied by occupied Kashmir, Mr.
Maulana Mohammad Masood Azhar
Sahib's latest message of Kashmir *Offer
Mujahidin Jeep Mohammad".
CERT-IN's report, Page No date 16847
date 10/26/2018 1:59:08 PM: Shahzad's
message says "Bayan Mout ki tayyari
Mufti Abdur Raouf Asgar 35:50". One of
his contacts in Kashmir. He was also
communicated through WhatsApp with
another accused of the same case RC38/2018/NIA/DLI, namely Mohd. Gufran,
who has sent him a message in support of
Taliban.
CERT-IN's report, Page No 16850 date
10/29/2018 5:52:05 PM: Message sent by
shahzad, whch has mention of *Tehreeke-Azadi
Jammu
Kashmir*
https://t.me/TehreekEAzaadi
CERT-IN's report, Page No 16865 date
11/7/2018 6:06:49 AM: Shahzad has sent
a document namely "Aye- MusalmanBehan.pdf"
CERT-IN's report, Page No 16896 date
12/19/2018 3:02:28 AM: Saqib has sent
an audio message "PTT-20181219WA0003.opus". It has mention of lashkar
and mujahid.
CERT-IN's report, Page No 16897 date
12/19/2018 3:05:11 AM : Shahzad bas
sent an audio message "PTT-20181219-
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
WA0004.opus". The audio says "Allah Es
Beche Ko Mujahid Banaye... Zalimoka
Katil Karne Wala Banaye"
CERT-IN's report, Chat-654.txt, Page
no: 3822, Sr no. 268: Chat participant
namely "Mufti Riyaz ks" (919797203362).
Application used for sharing messages is
WhatsApp. WhatsApp number used by
Saqib (918700316459)
CERT-IN's report, Page No 3823 date
date 10/9/2018 9:56:27 AM: Translation
of Saqib's message "Please give Zubair
Bhutto's number I got out of my mobile".
CERT-IN's report, Page No 3824 date
10/20/2018 1:15:02 AM: Riyaz has
messaged "Ma haar giya, Ma majboor
hoo, Ma apna vada poora Na kar saka,
agar aap meri juga hoti aap be aisa karti
humari halat hi aise hai. Maloom Nahi
hai ajant kon hai aur apna kon hai, is
liye aap hazrat maaf kariye.
CERT-IN's report, Page No 26425:
Gufran has sent message to Saqib, in
support of Taliban.
III. Conclusion on the involvement of Saqib
(A-5): The investigation has established that
A-5 was a member of Harkat-Ul-Harb-E-Islam
and that he had entered into a conspiracy to
link up this group with the Jaish-EMuhammad (JEM) group through his contacts
in Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that he had
received and transferred amounts received
from Shahzad Kamal (A-18) („Shahzad bhai
Arb‟ as per chats recovered from A-5‟s social
media recovery) and that part of this amount
was to be used for Jihad substantiates that A-5
was part of the conspiracy designed and
furthered by A-1”
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
5 Mufti Mohd. Saqib (A-5)
Testimonial Evidence: A-5 is a member of
Oral evidence of Protected
the Pro-IS group
Witness 'D' which was
Harkat-ul-Harb-Erecorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C.
Islam.
Oral evidence of Reyaz
A-5 propagated the
Ahmad Najar S/o Late Ali
ideology of ISIS and
Mohammad Najar, r/o- villsupported
the
Amirabad, PS Tral, Distideology of Jaish-EPulwama, J&K, recorded
Muhammad
for
under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
which
he
also
Oral evidence of Zubair
established contacts
Siddique Lone Mohd Sadiq
in the Tral region of
Lone, Amirabad, Tral, DistJammu & Kashmir
Pulwama, J&K, recorded
for
arranging
under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
certain
local
Oral evidence of Mohd
terrorists
for
Uvaish Pasha S/o Shri
committing terrorist
Bahadur Ali, r/o Villacts within India
Thunapur, PS-Bhot, Distand to wage was
Rampur, UP, recorded under
against Government
Section 161 Cr.P.C.
of India.
Forensic
Examination
A-5
was
Report of Dr. V S Baswani,
instrumental in the
Scientific
Consultant,
formation of the
(Explosive Expert) related to
group led by A-1
the recoveries made during
wherein
A-5
searches on 26th Dec, 2018
contributed
by
says that the seized materials
arranging
for
were collected for fabrication
weapons
through
of IEDs.
his contacts in the
Documentary Evidence:western UP.
Search/Seizure Memo dated
A-5
knowingly
26.12.2019 related to seizure
facilitated waging of
of articles from the room
war
against
(Masjid premises) and house
Government
of
of Saqib.
India by reconciling
Disclosure cum Recovery
of the design of his
Memo
dated
03.01.2019
group members.
pertaining to disclosure and
recovery of email and social
media accounts such as
Gmail, Telegram, Facebook,
and IMO.
Pointing out Memorandums
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
of different dates and the
different places of J&K where
he visited and met with some
persons to join militancy.
CDR Analysis report.
Extracted data of mobile
phones related to A-5 is
already mentioned in the para
No. 17.7.
Material Evidence:
Recovery of 3 mobile phones,
SIM cards and one Tablet
from the house of the accused
Mohd Saqib during the
raid/search conducted on
26.12.2018.
14.
The prime witnesses against the appellant for his visit to
Kashmir along with A6/Muhammad Absar, are PW-27/Sh. Reyaz
Ahmad Najar, PW-35/Sh. Zubair Siddique Lone, and PW37/Protected Witness D, who all already stand examined before the
learned Trial Court. We have also perused the statements tendered by
them before the learned Trial Court, and find no reason to deny bail to
the appellant on their imputations against the appellant.
15.
The learned SPP had submitted that as the testimony of these
witnesses had been recorded post the rejection of bail by the learned
Trial Court by the order impugned before us, therefore, we should not
consider this subsequent material. In the peculiar facts of the present
appeal, we are unable to accept the said submission. We are of the
opinion that, given the long period of incarceration of the appellant
and the long pendency of the present appeal, wherein, its hearing was
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
in fact adjourned for the learned Trial Court to record the testimony of
the witnesses relevant to the appellant (Refer Order dated 08.01.2026
and 07.04.2026), it would not be just and proper for us to not consider
the said material and to remand the appellant back to the learned Trial
Court.
16.
As far as the allegation of the appellant introducing A-1/Mufti
Mohammad Suhail to A11/Naim @ Mohd. Naeem @ Nayeem
Choudhary for procurement of arms is concerned, A-11 is stated to be
a relative of the appellant and the case against the appellant is based
on the alleged voluntary disclosure and pointing out by A-11.
17.
We have intentionally refrained ourselves from giving a
detailed analysis of the statements of the witnesses already recorded,
as it is likely to prejudice the trial. We may only state that prima facie
we do not find them grave enough to prolong the period of detention
of the appellant during trial.
18.
Similarly, the electronic evidence of chats allegedly recovered
from the phone of the appellant, though grave in nature, given the long
period of incarceration of the appellant pending trial, does not warrant
denial of bail to him.
19.
Having considered the statements of the witnesses and the
allegations against the appellant, and being moved particularly by the
long period of incarceration of the appellant, we are of the opinion that
the appellant has been able to make out a case for being released on
bail.
20.
Accordingly, we direct that the appellant be released on bail,
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
subject to the following conditions:a. The appellant shall execute a personal bond in the sum of
Rs.50,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court;
b. The appellant shall surrender his passport, if any, before the
learned Trial Court. If he does not hold a passport, an affidavit
to that effect shall be filed before the learned Trial Court;
c. The appellant shall not leave the country without prior
permission of the learned Trial Court. Any application seeking
permission to travel shall disclose the destination, duration,
purpose of travel and complete contact details during such
travel;
d. The appellant shall not leave his native place i.e., District
Hapur, except to travel to Delhi to attend his Trial or to report at
the NIA Office as part of his bail conditions;
e. The appellant shall only use one mobile phone and/or landline
number during the course of the trial, which shall always be
kept in the switch-on mode;
f. The appellant shall furnish his current residential address, the
mobile/landline number and his e-mail address to the
Investigating Officer and to the learned Trial Court. He shall
not change his residence or contact particulars without giving at
least seven days’ prior intimation to the Investigating Officer
and the learned Trial Court;
g. The appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court on
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
each date of hearing, unless exempted by the learned Trial
Court from such appearance;
h. The appellant shall not exhibit any conduct that has the effect of
delaying the proceedings;
i. The appellant shall not directly or indirectly contact, influence,
threaten or communicate with any prosecution witness,
protected witness, complainant, person acquainted with the
facts of the case or the co-accused or their family members;
j. The appellant shall not tamper with evidence, electronic
material, records, devices or documents relating to the case;
k. The appellant shall not make any public statement, including
through print, electronic media or social media, touching upon
the merits of the case, the evidence, the witnesses or the
pending trial;
l. The appellant shall not participate in any activity which may
prejudice public order or the integrity of the trial;
m. The appellant shall not upload/share/disseminate or circulate
any anti-national material on any social media platform or
otherwise;
n. The appellant shall report to the NIA BRANCH OFFICE,
LUCKNOW, once every fortnight, or at such interval as may be
directed by the learned Trial Court. The Branch Office shall
maintain a separate register of attendance with respect to the
appellant;
21.
In the event of breach of any condition, it shall be open to the
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
prosecution to seek cancellation of bail before the appropriate court.
22.
The impugned order rejecting the appellant's bail application is,
accordingly, set aside. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
23.
It is made clear that the observations made herein shall not be
construed as an observation on the merits of the case, as the same have
been made only for the purpose of consideration of bail.
24.
A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court as
also to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and
necessary compliance.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
SEPTEMBER 14, 2026/rv/as
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 676/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:26:25
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review