Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:22887
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.142 of 2026
Date of Decision: 18.06.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Mohammad Irshad
……...Petitioner
Versus
Punjab National Bank
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Munish Datwalia, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438, read
with Section 442 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays
challenge to judgment dated 18.08.2025, passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in
Registration No.69 of 2024, Filing No.1072 of 2024, titled Mohammad
Irshad Vs. P.N.B., affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 29.10.2024/30.10.2024, passed by the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Sundernagar, District Mandi, Himachal
Pradesh, in case Registration No.66 of 2019, whereby the learned trial
Court while holding the petitioner-accused (hereinafter, “accused”) guilty
of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"), convicted and sentenced
2026:HHC:22887
-2-
him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 14 months and pay
compensation to the tune of ₹4,20,000/- to the respondent-complainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that on the request of accused, complainant-Bank
advanced car loan of ₹6,55,000/- on 06.09.2014 @ 9.05%. Accused with a
view to discharge his liability, issued Cheque in favour of complainantBank, however, fact remains that aforesaid Cheque on its presentation to
the Bank concerned was dishonoured with the remarks “Funds Insufficient
and Account is Dormant” on 24.12.2018. Immediately, after receipt of
aforesaid return memo, complainant-Bank served accused with a legal
notice calling upon him to make the payment good well within stipulated
time. However, since accused failed to make the payment good within the
time stipulated in the legal notice, complainant was compelled to initiate
proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Sundernagar, District Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh.
3.
by
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
the
respective
parties,
vide
judgment/order
dated
29.10.2024/30.10.2024, held the accused guilty of having committed
2026:HHC:22887
-3-
offence under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and
sentenced him, as per the description given hereinabove.
4.
At the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in the Court
of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundernagar, District Mandi,
Himachal Pradesh, however, same was dismissed vide judgment dated
18.08.2025. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this
Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his acquittal after
setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 26.02.2026, this Court stayed the substantive
sentence
imposed
by
the
learned
Court
below,
subject
to
petitioner/accused depositing 50% of the compensation amount and
furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/-. Though aforesaid
order stands complied with, but thereafter on 07.05.2026, learned counsel
representing the petitioner, on instructions, made statement that petitioner
is ready and willing to pay the balance amount within reasonable time.
Accordingly, matter was adjourned for today’s date, however, fact remains
that neither petitioner has come present, nor he has deposited the
remaining amount. In the aforesaid background, this Court has no option
but to decide the petition on its own merits.
6.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with Mr. Munish Datwalia,
2026:HHC:22887
-4-
learned counsel representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen
in grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that
both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect
of the matter and there is no scope left for interference.
7.
Factum with regard to advancement of loan as well as issuance
of Cheque and signatures thereupon never came to be disputed at the
behest of accused, rather, accused in his statement recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. categorically admitted factum with regard to availing loan from
the complainant-Bank, however, he denied that Cheque was issued in
favour of complainant-Bank. To probabilise the aforesaid defence, he also
examined Rajneesh Kumar as DW-1.
8.
Complainant-Bank with a view to prove its case, examined
Rajneesh Kumar as CW-1, who besides tendering evidence by way of
affidavit Ex.CW1/A, reiterating therein averments contained in the
complaint, also placed on record documents; GPA Ex.CW1/B, Cheque
Ex.CW1/C, memo Ex.CW1/D, legal notice Ex.CW1/E, postal receipt
Ex.CW1/F,
acknowledgment
Ex.CW1/G
and
statement
of
account
Ex.CW1/H. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness nowhere
suggests that accused was able to extract anything contrary, to what this
witness stated in his examination-in-chief. Afore witness in his crossexamination, while testifying that loan in question was not sanctioned by
him, admitted that loan documents and documents of hypothecated vehicle
2026:HHC:22887
-5-
have not been appended with the complaint. While stating that complaint
was filed by Devender Kumar, he further denied that accused had not
applied for the loan in question. He also denied that he has not been
authorised to depose on behalf of the complainant.
9.
Though accused attempted to set-up a case that he had not
availed the loan in question, but while replying to question No.2 of his
statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he categorically admitted
that loan in question was availed by him. Moreover, factum of raising of
loan from the complainant-Bank stands duly substantiated with the
statement of DW-1 Rajneesh Kumar, who stated that accused deposited
sum of ₹1,00,000/- with the complainant-Bank. Cross-examination of DW1 Rajneesh Kumar clearly reveals that he categorically admitted that sum of
₹4,94,859/- remains due from the accused towards the complainant-Bank.
If nothing was to be paid by the accused, there was no occasion, if any, for
him to deposit sum of ₹1,00,000/-, as has been stated by DW-1 Rajneesh
Kumar.
10.
In the case at hand, accused also attempted to prove that he
was not served with legal notice, however, complainant-Bank with a view to
prove service of legal notice upon accused, successfully proved on record
postal receipt Ex.CW1/F. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as C.C. Allavi
Haji Vs. Pala Pelly Mohd., 2007 (6) SCC 555, has categorically held that
person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the
2026:HHC:22887
-6-
amount within the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of summons
from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take advantage of
the fact that notice was not received by him and as such, no illegality can
be said to have been committed by learned Courts below while recording
that “even if the accused did not receive the legal notice issued by the
complainant Bank, but since he has failed to make payment of the Cheque
amount within 15 days from the date of receipt of summons from the
Court, he cannot take advantage of the fact that notice was not served
upon him”.
11.
In the case at hand, complainant-Bank had successfully
proved on record that on the request of accused, loan to the tune of
₹6,55,000/- was advanced and accused with a view to discharge his lawful
liability issued Cheque Ex.CW1/C, but the same was dishonoured on
account of “Funds Insufficient and Account is Dormant”. Complainant also
proved on record that before instituting proceedings under Section 138 of
the Act, complainant-Bank served accused with legal notice, but he failed
to comply with the mandate contained in the same and as such,
complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section 138
of the Act in the competent Court of law. Since factum with regard to
issuance of Cheque as well as signatures thereupon could not be rebutted
by the accused, no illegality, otherwise, can be said to have been committed
by the Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which
2026:HHC:22887
-7-
speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque
was issued towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid
presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either
can refer to the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant
or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any.
However, in the case at hand, accused was unable to point out from the
documents as well as evidence adduced on record by the complainant that
Cheque issued by him was not issued towards discharge of lawful liability.
12.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under
Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the
offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras
No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has
been included in furtherance of the legislative objective
of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.
While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
2026:HHC:22887
-8-
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The
Court however, further observed that it must be
remembered that the offence made punishable by
Section 138can be better described as a regulatory
offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the
nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined
to the private parties involved in commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant
accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high
standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is
a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the
presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof
for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities.
24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the
prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the
materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise
such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases
the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of
his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a
cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor
able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section
139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence
comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard
to the materials submitted by the complainant.
25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques
in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of
the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer
is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the
cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the
receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to
make the payment within the time stipulated under the
statute does not pay the amount, that the said default
2026:HHC:22887
-9-
would be considered a dishonour constituting an
offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the
question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable
debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was
issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to
examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it
keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless
rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued
for a valid consideration. In view of this the
responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons
to conduct the trial in matters where there has been
instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds
and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to
proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
13.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of funds
insufficient as well as on the ground that account is dormant and he
despite having received legal notice failed to make the payment good within
the stipulated time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings
under Section 138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be
decided by both the Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as
evidence adduced on record by the respective parties.
14.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
2026:HHC:22887
-10-
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the
jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the
High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said
revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an
appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second
appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be
appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion on the same when the
evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as
well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature
is brought to the notice of the High Court which would
otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.”
15.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
16.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
2026:HHC:22887
-11-
representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity
committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as
such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned
judgments passed by the Courts below.
17.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
18.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court within a period of thirty days to serve the
sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail
bonds of the petitioner, if any, are cancelled. Interim order dated
26.02.2026 stands vacated. Amount, if any, deposited by the petitioneraccused with the learned trial Court as well as Registry of this Court is
ordered to be released in favour of complainant by remitting the same in its
bank account, detail whereof, shall be furnished by its counsel within a
period of one week.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
June 18, 2026
Rajeev Raturi
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review