Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr. President Shri L. Chinzah vs Union of India & Ors.

Held: Undeniably, there has been an inordinate delay of nearly six decades, given that the impugned notification was issued in the year 1955 and the present petition was instituted only in the year 2014 – What is important is to gauge if the petitioner has a cogent explanation for the delay – In the decades immediately following Independence, the administrative and constitutional status of the area was in a state of continuous evolution – Another mitigating circumstance is the Mizo Chiefs’ continuous agitation of their claims before various forums – The chiefs persisted with administrative representations for a prolonged duration, a crucial factor warrants specific attention – Further fortifying this expectation is the fact that the Chief Minister of Mizoram, on at least two distinct occasions, addressed formal communications to the Prime Minister of India, espousing the chiefs’ claims for compensation – Weighing the totality of these circumstances, this Court is conscious of the fact that the delay herein is undeniably inordinate, and the explanation offered by the petitioner is, strictly speaking, not unequivocally convincing – In the present case, the central dispute concerns the alleged violation of the Mizo Chiefs’ right to property, as guaranteed under Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution, respectively – In an effort to discharge the burden of establishing title to the land, the petitioners have primarily relied on accounts and writings of scholars and officials of the British government – Upon a meticulous perusal of the said material, it is, at the very outset, highly ambiguous whether these texts unequivocally recognise the Mizo Chiefs as the absolute owners of the land – The petitioners have advanced no compelling justification as to why such writings and accounts should be elevated to the status of conclusive evidentiary proof – The material adduced by the respondent, at least on a prima facie examination, indicates that during the British administration of the Lushai Hills district, the title over the land never vested in the Chiefs – Consequently, this Court is constrained to hold that the petitioners have woefully failed to discharge their burden of proving title over the subject lands – Both sides have failed to present a continuous, documented chain of events that would clearly map out the status of the land at different periods – Therefore, having considered the matter from all vantage points, the inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner has not been able to establish any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs in the present matter. [Paras 55, 57-61, 65, 68, 69, 74] Constitution of India – Art.32 – Doctrine of Delay and Laches in Art.32 Petitions:

Held: It is settled law that in the context of petitions under Article 32, the doctrine of laches operates as a flexible rule of practice rather than a rigid rule of law to be mechanically applied – Its application is anchored in sound judicial discretion, moulded by the specific facts and circumstances of each case – In application of the said doctrine the inquiry shall be guided by three primary considerations: first, whether there has been an inordinate delay in approaching the Court; secondly, whether the petitioner has provided a cogent and satisfactory explanation for such delay; and thirdly, whether entertaining the belated claim would unsettle settled matters and prejudice third party rights by reopening matters long concluded – Consideration should be given to the totality of the circumstances affecting both parties, rather than the mere fact of delay – When evaluating the totality of circumstances for applying the doctrine of delay and laches to an Art.32 petition, the pivotal considerations are two-fold: (i) whether entertaining the claim would unsettle concluded matters and prejudice third-party rights, and

(ii) whether the petitioner has offered a cogent explanation for the delay – The adequacy of the explanation for the delay constitutes the paramount consideration when determining whether an Art.32 petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of laches – Stated differently, the operative test is not one of ‘unreasonable delay’ but of ‘unexplained delay’. [Paras 39-41, 44, 45] Constitution of India – Arts. 19(1)(f), 31 – Constitution (FortyFourth Amendment) Act, 1978: Held: Right to property was earlier enshrined in Arts.19(1)(f) and

31 of the Constitution – It may be noted that both these provisions were repealed by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 – However, the 44th Amendment is prospective in its operation, and all laws passed and executive action taken prior to 20th June 1979 will continue to be judged by and be subject to the provisions of Part III, including Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 – Art.19(1)

(f) guaranteed to the Indian citizens a right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property – Art.19(5), however, permitted the State to impose by law reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe – Art.31(1) laid down that no person could be deprived of his property without the authority of law – Art.31(2), on the other hand, underwent significant change and was the focal point of multiple constitutional amendments. [Paras 63, 64] Burden of Proof – Fundamental Right violation – Burden of proof in cases where fundamental rights violations: Held: It is established that who bears the burden of proof in cases where fundamental rights violations are alleged depends on the fundamental right alleged to have been violated – The same burden of proof rule will not apply to all fundamental rights violation challenges – However, in cases such as the present one, the initial burden is on the petitioner to satisfy the Court and make out a case for an invasion of their fundamental right(s) – To discharge this initial burden and successfully establish a violation of their fundamental right to property, the petitioner must necessarily succeed on two distinct fronts – First and foremost, it must prove a clear title of the Mizo Chiefs over the subject lands – To establish such a title, the petitioner must conclusively demonstrate that, under the chieftainship system, as it operated during the British regime, the Mizo Chiefs held complete ownership of the land, rather than merely functioning as local administrative heads – Secondly, and only upon proving the ownership as aforesaid, the petitioner must satisfy the other parameters under Art.31 – This includes, amongst other things, proving that the respondents deprived the chiefs of their property without lawful authority, or that the property was acquired without providing due compensation – In the present case, petitioners have woefully failed to discharge their burden of proving title over the subject lands – The petitioner has not been able to establish any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs in the present matter – Hence, not entitled to any relief. [Paras 66, 67, 69, 74]