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Serial No.01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC (WA) No.13/2022 in
WA No.33/2022
Date of order: 05.09.2022
Vs. Pawan Casting (Meghalaya)
Pvt. Ltd. & ors
Meghalaya Power Distribution
Corporation Ltd. & ors
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Applicant/Appellant:
For the Respondents:
Mr. S. Sahay, GA (via VC) with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, GA
Ms. S. Laloo, GA
Mr. K. Paul, Sr.Adv with
Mr. S. Chanda, Adv.
i) Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
In view of the good grounds shown, the marginal delay of about
28 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. The appeal is received on
board and taken up for immediate hearing.
2.
The appeal is directed against a judgment and order of July 1, 2022
passed on the first respondent’s petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
3.
There is no dispute that the first respondent is part of a collective
body that goes by the name of Byrnihat Industries Association (BIA) and
is registered under the Meghalaya Societies Registration Act, 1983. The
members of BIA require electricity for industrial purpose and, as such,
the society approached the appellant herein for obtaining electricity
supply to the industrial units of its members at a concessional rate. It may
be indicated at the outset that the tariff for supply of electricity is fixed
by the Meghalaya State Electricity Regulatory Commission in
accordance with the statutory requirements.
4.
A memorandum of understanding was entered between the
appellant and BIA for sale of power to its member industrial concerns at
a special rate on or about October 7, 2020. Since the MoU provided for
electricity to be supplied by the appellant to the members of BIA at a
fixed but concessional rate, the approval of the State Electricity
Regulatory Commission was necessary. An application was filed in such
regard, which was disposed of by the State Electricity Regulatory
Commission by an order of October 19, 2020. The relevant order of the
Regulatory Commission incorporated the entirety of the MoU as a part
thereof, including the key clause therein pertaining to the concessional
rate of Rs.4.90 per kvah, inclusive of demand charges, for an initial
period of three years from the date of implementation of the MoU. The
supply at a concessional rate, in terms of the MoU, was to be made upon
the member industries of BIA maintaining a minimum load factor of 68
per cent. The load factor was to be determined on an average basis and
the relevant clause pertaining thereto provided that the load factor would
be adjustable over a six- month consumption period between April and
September and October and March. The MoU clearly stipulated, in its
17th clause, that the arrangement “can be terminated by either of the two
parties after giving 3 months advance notice.” The State Electricity
Regulatory Commission endorsed the entirety of the agreement by setting
it out and making it a part of its order dated October 19, 2020. To boot,
two sub-paragraphs in the operative part of the order contained at
paragraph 21 thereof specifically referred to the reduced rate of tariff and
the requirement to meet the minimum load factor of 68 per cent. The
Regulatory Commission also indicated that any amendment or
modification of any clause in the MoU “will only be done with the mutual
consent of the parties involved and with the approval of MSERC.”
5.
The order dated October 19, 2020 by which the MSERC approved
the concessional rate at which the appellant would supply power to
member industries of BIA signed off with the following observation:
“In the result the Commission approves the petition for special
tariff for an initial period of 3 years to the industrial consumers of
the Respondent, BIA as per the terms and conditions provided in
details of the MOU executed between MePDCL and BIA, as
reproduced at para 20 above.”
6.
It appears that pursuant to the MoU with the body of the industrial
manufacturers at Byrnihat, individual agreements were entered into
between the appellant and the individual industrial units for drawing
electricity at the concessional tariff. The individual agreements were,
indeed, incidental to the MoU and incorporated the terms of the MoU or
were completely based on the terms of the MoU. Thus, the individual
agreements which were executed under the umbrella of the MoU,
essentially provided for three key matters: that the relevant unit would be
entitled to a concessional rate of tariff of Rs.4.90 per kvah; that the
relevant industrial unit would have to attain a load factor of 68 per cent
calculated on an average basis during the two six-month periods indicated
above; and, that either party could terminate the agreement with three
months’ notice, but till such time that termination became effective,
uninterrupted supply would be enjoyed by the industrial unit.
7.
According to the appellant, the writ petitioner herein could not
meet the load factor of 68 per cent that was required to be maintained. As
a consequence, a notice was issued in October, 2021 informing the writ
petitioner that the agreement between the appellant and the writ petitioner
would stand determined at the end of three months from the date of
receipt of the notice. The writ petitioner now disputes that it did not
adhere to the minimum guaranteed load factor, though the appellant
claims that no objection in such regard was raised earlier. The writ
petitioner responded to the notice and sought to raise several issues.
Ultimately, by a letter dated January 17, 2022, the appellant herein
reiterated that the notice to determine the agreement stood and that the
agreement for supply of power under the special rate of tariff would end
on January 25, 2022. It is necessary to notice the short letter of January
17, 2022 since the writ petitioner, in course of this appeal, has sought to
give a twist to the letter which is impermissible on the plain English terms
thereof:
“With reference to the subject and letter cited above, this is to
inform you that in pursuance to the Termination Notice dated
26.10.2021, the Agreement for supply of Power under Special
Tariff would end on 25th January 2022. As such, if your Company
desire to continue to avail power from the Meghalaya Distribution
Corporation Limited (MePDCL), the same shall be considered as
per the regular/normal tariff applicable to IHT/IEHT consumers as
determined by the Hon’ble Meghalaya State Electricity Regulatory
Commission (MSERC) vide order dated 01.04.2021 and after
execution of fresh agreement and payment of security deposits as
per the contract load.
In this regard, in order to avoid discontinuation of power supply to
your premises w.e.f. 26.01.2022 and to enable the Corporation to
bill accurately, you are requested to take up the matter with the
concerned Executive Engineer of MePDCL for completing the
above procedures for availing power supply as per the
normal/regular tariff applicable for IHT/IEHT consumers latest by
25th January 2022.
This is for favour of your kind information and necessary action.”
8.
It may do well, at this stage, to notice the prayer in the writ petition
carried to this Court:
“In the premises of the aforesaid, it is most humbly prayed that
your Lordships may be pleased to admit this Petition, call for
records, issue Rule calling upon the Respondent to show cause as
to why a writ in the nature of Mandamus not issue directing the
Respondent to withdraw, recall and or otherwise forbear from
giving effect to or acting under the impugned notice dated
17.01.2022 issued by the Respondent No.4 and further as to why a
writ in the nature of Certiorari not issue quashing and setting aside
the impugned notice dated 17.01.2022 issued by the Respondent
No.4 and on cause or causes being shown and after hearing the
parties be further pleased to make the Rule absolute and/or pass
such further and or other order/orders as Your Lordships may deem
fit and proper.”
9.
Thus, the frontal attack made in the writ petition was to the
decision of the appellant herein to terminate the agreement for supply of
power to the writ petitioner’s industrial unit at a concessional rate on the
ground that the relevant unit failed to maintain the minimum guaranteed
load factor as envisaged in the agreement. Significantly, the appellant did
not insist that it would not supply any electricity to the writ petitioner;
and gave the writ petitioner the opportunity to obtain electricity at the
regular tariff.
10.
One of the conditions in the agreement between the appellant and
the writ petitioner or in view of the order passed by the State Electricity
Regulatory Commission was that if there were any disputes pertaining to
the implementation of the MoU, the parties would approach the
Regulatory Commission in such regard. Though it is trite law that the
mere existence of an alternative forum does not prohibit a party from
approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution in case
of any arbitrary action on the part of the State or other authority
answering to the description of Article 12 of the Constitution, it is the
self-imposed restraint exercised by the writ court to not entertain any
disputed question of fact if there is a designated body agreed upon by the
parties or statutorily mandated to address the disputes between them.
11.
The MoU and, consequently, the agreement between the appellant
and the writ petitioner in this case gave an unfettered right to either party
to terminate the agreement upon giving three months’ notice. It is true
that the appellant as a State or other authority could not act arbitrarily and
could not have whimsically terminated the agreement without there being
some good reason therefor. Indeed, the appellant cited the failure on the
part of the writ petitioner to meet the minimum guaranteed load factor as
the reason to terminate the agreement. Due notice for three months was
issued. It further appears that the appellant considered the writ
petitioner’s response to the notice and reiterated its position that the
agreement with the writ petitioner would stand determined on January
25, 2022.
12.
The prayer in the writ petition, read in the context of the subsequent
letter of January 17, 2022, implied, in effect, that the writ petitioner
approached this Court for specific performance of the agreement with the
appellant. Since the agreement contained a termination clause and there
were no strings attached thereto, the writ petitioner could never have
obtained an order in the nature of specific performance of the contract
that, by its very nature, was determinable. Even if the appellant’s status
as a State is taken into consideration and it is held that despite the freedom
in the termination clause, the appellant as a State had to act rationally and
not whimsically, there was some modicum of reason which was furnished
by the appellant as to what impelled the appellant to issue notice to
determine the agreement.
13.
The matter then boiled down to whether the justification proffered
by the appellant to determine the agreement was in order. The appellant
asserted that the writ petitioner in this case failed to maintain the
minimum guaranteed load factor. The writ petitioner disputed the same
in its reply and asserts even at this stage that the writ petitioner seriously
disputes the appellant’s submission that the writ petitioner failed to meet
the guaranteed load factor. As a consequence of the appellant’s assertion
as to the load factor and the writ petitioner’s denial thereof, a dispute on
facts arose that was not amenable to be adjudicated upon conclusively on
affidavit evidence in course of proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
14.
In any event, the agreement between the parties or the MoU or the
order passed by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission provided
for the disputes between the parties to be referred to the Regulatory
Commission for adjudication. Once the writ court noticed that the
appellant in this case was, in terms of the agreement with the writ
petitioner, free to terminate the agreement and the appellant had exercised
its right under the relevant clause and even indicated reasons therefor,
when the basis for the termination was sought to be disputed on the
ground that the assertion as to the failure to meet the minimum load factor
was incorrect, the writ court ought to have exercised restraint and not
gone into the matter to, in effect, disbelieve the appellant’s contention
that the minimum load factor had not been met.
15.
As is the wont of deviant business entities seeking to take undue
advantage, an argument put forth in the appeal on behalf of the writ
petitioner is that the MoU or the individual agreement provided for
realisation of the additional amount or the quantum of loss occasioned to
the appellant as a result of the load factor not being met. The argument is
in the nature of a wild goose chase as the right of the distribution company
to realise the loss that it has suffered as a consequence of the failure of
the consumer to meet certain conditions, is quite distinct from the right
of the distribution company to exercise its choice to determine the
agreement as a result of its perception that certain conditions intrinsic to
the agreement had not been met by the consumer.
16.
Just as the appellant in this case will not have been vindicated
merely by enforcing the termination but the appellant would still have to
pursue the writ petitioner to realise the loss that the appellant has suffered
on account of the writ petitioner’s perceived failure to meet the minimum
load factor, the two aspects cannot be confused for the consumer to
suggest that merely because there is a mechanism to realise the loss, the
consumer is absolved of its obligation to meet the guaranteed load factor.
17.
There is no basis to the writ petition and the writ petitioner appears
to have failed to meet a condition precedent as indicated in its governing
agreement to be entitled to the beneficial tariff. Since the writ petitioner
raised disputes pertaining to the failure to meet the load factor, the writ
petitioner had to carry the grievance to the State Electricity Regulatory
Commission and not invite the writ court to go into the disputed facts.
18.
For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and order dated July 1,
2022 are set aside and the writ petition is dismissed with liberty to the
parties to approach the State Electricity Regulatory Commission in
accordance with law.
19.
It is made clear that the observations herein are for the purpose of
adjudication of the appeal and will not prejudice either party in course of
any future proceedings before any other authority, including the State
Electricity Regulatory Commission.
20.
WA No.33 of 2022 is allowed as above.
21.
MC (WA) No.13 of 2022 stands disposed of.
22.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
05.09.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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