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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay
C.O. 4115 of 2025
With
C.O. 4117 of 2025
Md. Hasinuddin & Anr.
Versus
Beauty Dutta
For the Petitioners
: Mr. Debasis Roy
: Mr. Anjan Banerjee
: Mr. Sourav Pal
For the opposite parties
: Mr. Tanmoy Mukherjee
: Mr. Mrityunjoy Saha
… in CO 4115 of 2025
: Mr. Anupam Bhattacharya
: Mr. Sudhakar Thakur
… in CO 4117 of 2025
Heard on
: 27.08.2026
Judgment on
: 10.09.2026
Uploaded on
: 10.09.2026
Rai Chattopadhyay, J. :1.
The two civil revisions as above are concerning with similar subject
matter, hence, are heard analogously and are being disposed of by
dint of this common judgment. An order of the Chief Judge, City
Civil Court dated September 18, 2025 in Ejectment Suit No. 34 of
2025 is under challenge in the instant revisions. By dint of the
same, the Chief Judge, City Civil Court has rejected the
petitioner‟s application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, striking out the defence of the
petitioners/defendants in the suit. The Court has cited the ground
that rent for the month of July, 2024 has been tendered by the
revisionist defendants in the month of September, 2024 which was
beyond the period as prescribed in the statute. The Court held that
in such a situation, the deposits made by the defendant can be
declared as bad deposits. The Court in the said impugned order
has expressed doubt about the bona fide intent and means of the
defendants in obtaining the order from Court dated April 01, 2025.
2.
Mr. Roy has represented the petitioners and challenges the legality
and propriety of the said impugned order. Mr. Roy says by relying
on the rent control challan Form (No. 3), that rents for the months
July, 2024 and August, 2024 have been deposited by the
petitioners/defendants on September 17, 2024 and September 21,
2024 respectively. He also relies on rent receipt dated June 08,
2024 showing deposit of rent paid by the present petitioner for the
month of June, 2024, to the landlady/opposite party.
3.
It is submitted that the landlady/opposite party refused to accept
the amount of rent for the month of July, 2024, which was sent
through post. Upon refusal by the landlady to accept the rent for
the month of July, 2024, the petitioners tendered rent by money
order on August 13, 2024 to the landlady. The same was refused
by the landlady on August 17, 2024 and returned to the
petitioners with postal remark „refused‟. The defendants deposited
the said rent in the office of the Rent Controller, Kolkata. Likewise
for all the subsequent months, the defendants/revisionists
deposited the rent in the office of the Rent Controller, Kolkata till
the month of March, 2025. Accordingly, the defendants/petitioners
filed application under Section 21 of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997, before the Rent Controller. It is submitted that
Rent Controller passed order only on August 30, 2024, permitting
the petitioners to deposit the rent for the month of July, 2024. It is
submitted that it is only after such permission being granted by
the Rent Controller the petitioners proceeded to submit rent before
the Court in the month of September, 2024.
4.
It is further submitted that the petitioners have duly deposited
rent of July, 2024 in the Court within the statutory period of
limitation from the date of order of the Rent Controller, that is, the
rent was submitted on September 17, 2024 after permission being
granted by the Rent Controller on August 30, 2024 that is within a
period of one month from the date of permission.
5.
As such, Mr. Roy has contended that there is no violation of any
legal provision or any legal infirmity is there, apparent in the entire
process adopted by the revisionist/defendants, in depositing rent
before the Court in accordance with law. It is submitted further
that the defendants have ever accepted the default period as
alleged. For the reasons as above stated, Mr. Roy for the
defendant/petitioners has sought for setting aside of the impugned
order dated September 18, 2025 of the learned Chief Judge, City
Civil Court and further appropriate order allowing the petitioners
to put forth their defence in the suit.
6.
Mr. Tanmoy Mukherjee representing the opposite party/plaintiff
landlady has raised strong objection as to the contentions and
prayer of the petitioners in the instant revision. He submits that
the revisionists are the habitual defaulters. He submits further
that the money order returned back to the defendant/tenants with
the endorsement „refused‟ on August 19, 2024. Hence, that is the
date of knowledge of the defendant/petitioners, though the
petitioners have not complied with statutory liability of them,
within the statutorily prescribed time limit from such date of
return. It is indicated that the petitioners‟ intentional latches
would be evident from the fact that since after date of return of the
money order on August 19, 2024, the petitioners sat tight over the
matter and filed their prayer under Section 21 of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, before the Rent Controller, only on
August 27, 2024.
7.
Mr. Mukherjee has argued that belated submission of rent, even
for one month, is not condonable as per the strict provisions under
the statute. He refers to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Seventh Day Adventist Senior Secondary School versus Ismat
Ahmed and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1696.
Learned advocate has argued that the requirement under Section
7(1)(a), (b) and (c), as also the first part of Section 7(2) of the WBPT
Act, to deposit/pay rent and, where necessary, to file an
application for determination of rent within the prescribed period,
is mandatory. The time so prescribed cannot be enlarged by resort
to Section 5 of the Limitation Act or by invoking the proviso to
Section 7(2).
8.
The Supreme Court in the judgment as above has held that the
proviso to Section 7(2) of the Act of 1997 does not confer a general
power upon the Civil Judge to extend the initial thirty-day period.
Its operation is confined to the subsequent stage, after the Civil
Judge has determined the amount of rent payable. Hence, learned
advocate for the opposite party has elaborated that there are
provisions to address pre suit default by the tenant as well as the
post suit default committed by him, and the Court is empowered
to take into consideration both the factors. He has submitted that
the order of the Trial Court is just, legal and proper and needs no
interference. He submits that the instant revision is liable to be
dismissed.
9.
The principal question requiring determination is whether the
statutory consequence contemplated by Section 7(3) of the Act of
1997, can be attracted to the present case when the tenant had,
prior to making the deposit before the Civil Court, taken steps to
tender the rent, had suffered refusal at the hands of the landlady,
had thereafter tendered the rent by money order, and had
approached the Rent Controller under Section 21 of the Act for
permission to deposit the rent, which permission was ultimately
granted on August 30, 2024.
10.
The statutory scheme contained in Section 7 of the
Act
undoubtedly imposes a discipline upon the tenant seeking
protection against eviction. The obligation to pay or deposit rent
within the time prescribed by the statute cannot ordinarily be
treated as a matter of mere procedural convenience. The protection
available to a tenant under the rent control legislation is a
statutory protection and its enjoyment is conditioned upon
compliance with the requirements enacted by the Legislature.
Equally well settled is the principle that where a special statute
prescribes a particular consequence for failure to comply with a
statutory condition, the Court cannot, under the guise of equitable
jurisdiction, rewrite the statutory scheme or extend a period which
the statute itself does not permit to be extended.
11.
The materials placed before this Court disclose that the rent for
July 2024 was not withheld by the petitioners. The rent was
initially tendered to the landlady through post. Upon refusal, the
petitioners again tendered the rent by money order on August 13,
2024. The money order was refused and returned to the
petitioners with the postal endorsement “refused”. Thereafter,
instead of retaining the amount or remaining supine, the
petitioners approached the Rent Controller under Section 21 of the
Act on August 27, 2024. The Rent Controller ultimately permitted
the petitioners to deposit the July rent by order dated August 30,
2024. The petitioners thereafter deposited the amount before the
Civil Court on September 17, 2024, i.e. within one month from the
date upon which the statutory authority permitted such deposit.
These facts have been specifically placed on record by the
petitioners
and
have
not
been
displaced
by
any
material
demonstrating that the rent was deliberately withheld. The
significance of these facts cannot be lost sight of while applying
Section 7(3) of the Act. The expression “default” in a rent control
statute cannot be considered in a vacuum, divorced from the
tenant‟s conduct in relation to tender of rent and the statutory
mechanism which the Legislature itself has provided for situations
where the landlord refuses to accept rent. The statutory scheme
must be construed as a whole. Section 7 cannot be read in
isolation from the other provisions of the Act which recognise and
regulate the tenant‟s right to deposit rent upon refusal by the
landlord. A construction which treats a tenant, who has bona fide
tendered rent and whose tender has been refused by the landlord,
on the same footing as a tenant who has simply chosen not to pay
rent, would attribute to the Legislature such an intention, which
does not readily appear from the statutory scheme.
12.
The
conduct
of
the
present
petitioners
assumes
further
significance because, after the money order was returned, they did
not simply wait until the litigation progressed. They approached
the Rent Controller under Section 21, West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997, on August 27, 2024, shortly after the refusal of
the money order, and the competent statutory authority granted
permission on August 30, 2024. The submission of rent before the
Civil Court on September 17, 2024, was consequently not an
independent or unexplained act of belated payment. It followed the
order of the Rent Controller. The impugned order, however,
appears to have treated September 17, 2024, as the only relevant
date and thereby omitted from consideration the preceding
statutory steps taken by the petitioners.
13.
The argument advanced on behalf of the opposite party that the
money order returned with the endorsement “refused” on August
19, 2024 and that the petitioners ought to have completed the
statutory requirement within the prescribed period thereafter,
cannot, by itself, justify the striking out of the defence. The
petitioners‟ approach to the Rent Controller on August 27, 2024
and
the
subsequent
order
dated
August
30,
are
circumstances which require consideration in determining whether
the subsequent deposit was a wilful statutory default. The
statutory provisions cannot be applied in a manner which renders
the remedy expressly contemplated by Section 21, West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, practically meaningless, in a case
where the landlord has refused to accept the rent.
14.
It is also necessary to distinguish between condonation of a
statutory delay and determination of whether there was, in the
first place, a default attracting the statutory consequence. The
judgment of Seventh Day Adventist (supra) is concerned with the
former proposition: a Court cannot invoke Section 5 of the
Limitation Act or the proviso to Section 7(2) to enlarge the initial
statutory period prescribed for the acts contemplated by Section 7.
The present case does not require this Court to condone a delay
contrary to the ratio of that decision. The question here is whether,
upon the landlord‟s refusal to accept rent and the tenant‟s
consequent invocation of the statutory machinery under Section
21, West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, the subsequent
deposit made pursuant to the permission granted by the
competent authority can mechanically be characterised as a “bad
deposit” and made the foundation for striking out the defence. The
distinction is not merely factual but rests upon the different
statutory situations involved. Seventh Day Adventist (supra)
cannot be understood as laying down that a tenant who has
tendered rent to the landlord, whose tender has been refused, and
who thereafter acts under the statutory mechanism available to
him for depositing the rent, is necessarily to be treated as a tenant
who has simply allowed the statutory period to lapse without
payment. Such an interpretation would convert a judgment
concerning the non-extendability of the initial period under
Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 into an
authority for disregarding the statutory consequences of refusal of
rent by the landlord. The latter question did not constitute the
ratio of the said judgment.
15.
In the present case, therefore, the chronology is decisive. Rent for
June 2024 had been paid to the landlady; the rent for July 2024
was tendered and refused; the petitioners thereafter sent the rent
by money order, which was again refused; they approached the
Rent Controller under Section 21 of the Act; permission to deposit
was granted on August 30, 2024; and the rent was thereafter
deposited before the Court on September 17, 2024. The petitioners
had thus demonstrated a continuing attempt to discharge their
liability rather than an intention to withhold rent. The deposit
made after obtaining permission from the competent statutory
authority cannot, in the peculiar facts of the present case, be
equated with an unexplained or wilful failure to comply with
Section 7 of the 1997 Act.
16.
The learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, therefore, fell into error
in treating the date of deposit before the Court as determinative,
without appropriately considering the earlier tenders, the refusal
by the landlady, the recourse to Section 21 of the Act and the
order of the Rent Controller permitting the deposit. The impugned
order also proceeds on an erroneous application of Seventh Day
Adventist (supra). That decision certainly binds this Court on the
proposition that the initial statutory period under Section 7 cannot
be enlarged by resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act or the
proviso to Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act; but it does not mandate
the striking out of the defence in a case where the tenant‟s
inability to deposit before the Court within the period arose in the
course of bona fide tender and statutory recourse following refusal
by the landlord. Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court is of
the view that the petitioners cannot, in the circumstances
disclosed herein, be visited with the extreme consequence of
striking out their defence. The impugned order dated September
18, 2025, passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court in
Ejectment Suit No. 34 of 2025, therefore, suffers from an error of
law and material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The
order is accordingly set aside.
17.
The petitioners shall be permitted to contest the suit subject to
their
continued
compliance
with
the
statutory
obligations
regarding payment/deposit of current rent.
18.
Both the revisions are, accordingly, allowed.
19.
Urgent certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to
the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.
(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)
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