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1 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No.
: 270 of 2024
Decided on
: 02.04.2026
Manoj Kumar & anr.
….Appellants.
Versus
Hoshiar Singh & Ors.
...Respondents
_________________________________
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma. Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 yes
For the appellants
Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, Advocate.
For the respondents
Mr. Surinder Saklani, Advocate
__________________________________
Romesh Verma, Judge(oral)
.
The present Regular Second Appeal arises out of
the judgment and decree as passed by the learned
Additional District Judge-1, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P.
dated 22.8.2024, whereby the appeal preferred by the
present appellants has been ordered to be dismissed and
the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Senior
Civil Judge, (1), Kangra, District Kangra, H.P. dated
14.01.2020 has been affirmed.
2.
The brief facts of the case are that the present
appellants/plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration
and
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
permanent prohibitory injunction in the Court of learned
Senior Civil Judge(1), Kangra, H.P. on 29.01.2014.
3.
It was averred in the plaint that as per the
record contained in the revenue papers, the suit land is
entered in the ownership of the defendants alongwith Smt.
Krishana Devi and others after having inherited the same
from late Sh. Gujjar Mal. It is the case of the plaintiffs that
late Chandu Lal was adopted and taken by late Sh. Gujjar
Mal as his son and therefore, out of love and affection, Sh.
Gujjar Mal gave land measuring measuring 5 marlas to
Chandu Lal vide writing dated 21.11.1966. Pursuant to the
writing dated 21.11.1966, late Chandu Lal
constructed a
house and courtyard over the same and
thereafter the
plaintiffs are residing over the said suit land till date. It has
been averred in the plaint that the aforesaid writing dated
21.11.1966 could not be incorporated in the revenue papers
and taking undue advantage of the same, the defendants
are threatening to raise construction over the suit land and
for
that
purpose
they
have
started
to
collect
the
construction material.
4.
present
The suit of the plaintiffs was contested by the
respondents/defendants
by
taking
various
3 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
preliminary objections with regard to maintainability, cause
of action, locus standi , non-joinder of necessary parties
etc. On merits, all the avermets and contentions as raised in
the plaint were refuted and it was specifically denied that
Chandu Lal was adopted by late Sh. Gujjar Mal and further it
was denied that the land measuring 5 marlas was given to
Chandu Lal by Gujjar Mal vide writing dated 21.11.1966, as
alleged. It was stated by the defendants that the said alleged
writing is false, fabricated and not binding on the rights of
the defendants. Further it was claimed by the defendants
that the suit land is abadi land and the same is in exclusive
ownership of the defendants which they have inherited
from their father late Sh. Gujjar Mal. That as per revenue
record i.e jamabndi for the years 1963-64 and 1968-69,
late Sh. Gujjar Mal
was shown to be in ownership and
possession of the land measuring 5 marlas which was gair
mumkin abadi, therefore, he had no other land which could
have been gifted to the plaintiffs.
5.
The plaintiffs did not file any replication to the
written statement filed by the defendants. The learned trial
Court framed the issues on 22. 08.2014 in the following
manner:
4 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
1. Whether paintiff is entitled for the relief of
declaration as prayed for?OPP.
2. Whether plaintiff is entitled for the relief of
permanent prohibitory injunction, as prayed
for?OPP.
3. Whether suit is not maintainable in the
present form, as alleged?OPD.
4. Whether plaintiff has got no cause of action
and locus standi to file the present suit, as
prayed for?OPD.
5. Whether plaintiff is estopped by his act,
conduct and acquiescence from filing the
present, as alleged?OPD.
6. Whether suit is bad for non-joinder and
mis-joinder of necessary parties, as prayed
for? OPD.
7. Whether suit is not properly valued for the
purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, as
alleged?OPD.
8. Whether plaintiff has not come to the court
with clean hands, if so, its effect?OPD.
9. Whether the present suit is hopelessly time
bared, as alleged? OPD
10.Relief?
6.
The learned trial Court directed the respective
parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions
and finally vide its judgment and decree dated 14.01.2020,
the suit filed by the plaintiffs/appellants for declaration and
permanent prohibitory injunction was ordered to be
dismissed.
7.
Feeling dissatisfied, the plaintiffs/appellants
preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional
5 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
District Judge, Kangra, at Dharamshala on 31.03.2021. The
learned First Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree
dated 22.08.2024 dismissed the appeal preferred by the
present appellants.
8.
Still feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs-appellants
approached this Court by filing the present regular second
appeal.
9.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the
appellants that the judgments and decrees as passed by the
Courts below are not sustainable and liable to be quashed
and set-aside in view of oral as well as documentary
evidence placed on record. He further submits that the
application which was filed by the plaintiffs/appellants
before the First Appellate Court for the withdrawal of the
suit was wrongly rejected by the First Appellate Court and
the said application ought to have been allowed. He further
submits that the judgments and decrees as passed by the
Courts below are erroneous as the plaintiffs have been able
to establish their case. Consequently, the suit ought to have
been decreed.
10.
On the other hand, Mr. Surinder Saklani,
Advocate
has defended the judgments and decrees as
6 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
passed by the Courts below and he has submitted that there
are concurrent findings of fact by the Courts below and no
interference of any kind is required in the present
proceedings. He further submits that the findings as
returned by the Courts below are purely on the basis of the
material placed on record by the respective parties and the
Courts below have rightly appreciated the point in
controversy and have rightly dismissed the suit filed by the
plaintiffs and the said findings have been rightly affirmed
by the First Appellate Court.
11.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties
and have gone through the record of the case file carefully.
12.
With the consent of the parties, the
present
appeal is finally heard at the admission stage.
13.
The plaintiffs had filed the suit for declaration
and permanent prohibitory injunction on the basis that
their predecessor late Sh. Chandu Lal was the adopted son of
late Sh. Gujjar Mal. Further it is a case of the plaintiffs that
late Sh. Gujjar Mal out of love and affection gave 5 marlas of
suit land to the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs late
Sh. Chandu Lal vide writing dated 21.11.1966. It has also been
averred that mother of Chandu Lal had married to Sh.Gujjar
7 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
Mal. It is contended by the learned counsel for the
appellants that on the basis of the writing dated 21.11.1966,
the plaintiffs are the owner in possession of the suit
property and their predecessor had raised construction of
the house, however, the said writing cannot be incorporated
in the revenue record and taking undue advantage of the
same, the defendants are threatening and interfering in the
ownership and possession of the plaintiffs over the suit
land. The said case of the plaintiffs has been duly refuted by
the respondents. It is case of the defendants that neither
late Sh. Chandu Lal was adopted by Sh. Gujjar Mal nor any
land was given to the predecessor in interest of the
plaintiffs and further it has been denied that any writing
was executed between the parties on 21.11.1966.
14.
In order to substantiate its case, the plaintiffs
examined PW-1 Ram Saran. In its deposition, he has stated
that Sh. Gujjar Mal was his relative and he got married to
the mother of Chandu Lal. He further stated that Chandu Lal
was child of second wife of Gujjar Mal. He stated that he was
merely asked to put signatures on Ext.P1. However, the
contents of the document were denied by PW-1.
8 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
15.
The plaintiff Manoj Kumar entered in the
witness box as PW-2 and tendered his evidence by filing
affidavit Ext.PW2/A. Interestingly, when the matter was
fixed for his cross examination, he failed to appear in the
witness box and finally the learned trial Court vide its order
dated 10.03.2017, closed the evidence of the plaintiffs.
16.
In order to corroborate its case, the defendants
led evidence and DW-1
Hoshiar Singh entered in the
witness box and he filed his affidavit Ext.DW1/A. He refuted
the claim as put forth by the plaintiffs and he specifically
denied that Sh.Chandu Lal used to live with Sh. Gujjar Mal
and that he was maintained and brought up by Sh. Gujjar
Mal. He denied the suggestion that suit land was given to
Sh. Chandu Lal in the year 1966. He denied the suggestion
that any structure was raised by the plaintiffs over the suit
land.
17.
The entire case of the plaintiffs hinges around
the writing dated 21.11.1966 but the plaintiffs have
miserably failed to prove the said writing. Though, in order
to prove the said writing, the plaintiffs have examined one
Ram Saran as PW-1, however, he has failed to prove the
said document in accordance with the law. The writing
9 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
dated 21.11.1966 Ext.P1 is in urdu and the hindi translation
of the same has been filed. However, interestingly the
person who translated the said urdu document has not been
examined in order to prove the veracity of the said
document. The description of the suit land has also not been
mentioned in the said document which clinches the entire
controversy and falsifies the case of the plaintiffs. The
initial onus to prove the said writing dated 21.11.1966 is
upon the plaintiff. However, they have failed to plead and
prove the said document Ext.P1 in accordance with law.
Therefore, the Courts below
have rightly come to the
conclusion that the plaintiffs have not been able to stand on
their own legs and have rightly dismissed the suit filed by
the plaintiffs and said findings have been affirmed by the
First Appellate Court.
18.
The submission of learned counsel for the
appellants that the First Appellate Court has wrongly
dismissed the application filed by the present appellants for
the withdrawal of the suit under the provisions of Order 23
Rule 1 C.P.C is not sustainable.
19.
The provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C reads as follows:
“Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of
claim.—
10 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
(1) At any time after, the institution of a suit, the
plaintiff may as against all or any of the
defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of
his claim:
Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or
other person to whom the provisions contained in
Rules 1 to 14 of Order 32 extend neither the suit
nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned
without the leave of the Court”.
20.
In the present case, the appellants/plaintiffs
have failed to establish any formal defect in the suit which
could have come to the aid of the plaintiffs for the
withdrawal of the suit. In the present case after passing the
decree by the learned trial Court, the appellants/plaintiffs
filed the appeal and at the stage of the appeal, the
application for the withdrawal of the suit has been filed.
After the passing of the judgment and decree, the rights of
the parties were crystallized by the learned trial Court,
therefore,
the
application
which
was
filed
for
the
withdrawal of the suit has rightly been rejected by the First
Appellate Court that too in the absence of any formal defect
to have occurred in the said proceedings.
21.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Executive
Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple Vs. R. Sathyamoorthy and
Others (1999)3 SCC 115, held as under:“14. It is true that in a large number of cases
decided by the High Courts, it was held while
11 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
dealing with applications under Order 23, Rule
1, CPC, that if an appeal was preferred by an
unsuccessful plaintiff against the judgment of
the trial Court dismissing the suit and if the
appellant-plaintiff wanted to withdraw not
only
the
appeal
but
also
the
suit
unconditionally, then such a permission so far
as the withdrawal of the suit was concerned,
can be granted if there was no question of any
adjudication on merits in favour of the
defendants by the trial being nullified by such
withdrawal. On the other hand, if any such
findings by the trial court in favour of the
defendant would set nullified, such permission
for withdrawal of the suit should not be
granted, (See Thakur Singh v. A. Achuta Rao,
Kedar Nath v. Chandra Kiran Vidydhar Dube v.
HarcharaN Charles Sanuel Vs. Board
of
Trustees; Lala Chetram v. Krishnamoni,
Jubedan Begum v. Sekhawat Ali Khan; Ram
Dhan v. Jagat Prasad Sethi). In the present case,
the learned Judge felt that no such finding in
favour of the Commissioner was being nullified
by the withdrawal of the OP at the stage of
revision and therefore the withdrawal of OP
was permissible”.
22.
To the similar extent the The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in R. Rathinavel Chettiar and another Vs. V.
Sivaraman and others (1999) 4 SCC 89 has held that if a
suit has already been decreed or, for that matter, dismissed
and a decree has been passed determining the rights of the
parties to the suit, which is under challenge in an appeal,
can the decree be destroyed by making an application for
dismissing the suit
as not
pressed or unconditionally
12 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
withdrawing the suit at the appellate stage. In that background, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that what is
essential is that the matter must have been finally decided
so that it becomes conclusive between the parties. It is at
this stage, that the rights of the parties are crystallized
and unless the decree is reversed, recalled, modified or set
aside, the parties cannot be divested of their rights under
the decree. The right of the plaintiff to withdraw the suit at
the appellate stage is not an absolute right but it is subject
to the rights acquired by the defendant under the decree.
The withdrawal can be permitted only if no vested or
substantive right of any party to the litigation is adversely
affected.
23.
In the present case, the learned trial court after
appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence
placed on record,
determined the
rights of respective
parties, therefore, in appeal the said rights cannot be taken
away by filing the application for the withdrawal of the suit.
Therefore, the dismissal of the application under the
provisions of Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C by the First Appellate
Court cannot be interfered with.
13 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
24.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of
judgments has held that the first appellate is the final court
of the fact. No doubt, second appellate court exercising the
power under Section 100 CPC can interference with the
findings of fact on limited grounds such as - (a) where the
finding is based on inadmissible evidence; (b) where it is in
ignorance of the relevant admissible evidence; (c) where it
is based on misreading of evidence; (d) where it is perverse,
but that is not case in hand.
25.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with
scope of interference under Section 100 in Civil Appeal Nos.
2843/2844/2010, titled Nazir Mohamed Vs. J. Kamala & ors
decided on 27.08.2020, held that a second appeal only lies
on a substantial question of law. It is not open to re-agitate
facts or to call upon the High Court to re-analyze or reappreciate evidence in a second appeal. Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure restricts the right of second appeal
only to those cases, where a substantial question of law is
involved. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment read as
under:“25. A second appeal, or for that matter,
any appeal is not a matter of right. The right
of appeal is conferred by statute. A second
appeal only lies on a substantial question of
14 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
law. If statute confers a limited right of
appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of
the appeal. It was not open to the
Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or
to call upon the High Court to reanalyze or
re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal.
26. Section 100 of the CPC, as amended,
restricts the right of second appeal, to only
those cases, where a substantial question of
law is involved. The existence of a
“substantial question of law” is the sine qua
non for the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 100 of the CPC.”
26.
A question of law must arise from the
pleadings. It becomes substantial question of law, if it is
debatable, not previously settled by law of land or any
binding precedent, must have a material bearing on the
decision of the case. A pure finding of fact is not open to
challenge in second appeal even if appreciation of evidence
is palpably erroneous & finding of fact incorrect.
“29. The principles for deciding when a
question of law becomes a substantial
question of law, have been enunciated by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir
Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg.
& Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1 , where this Court held:“The proper test for determining whether a
question of law raised in the case is
substantial would, in our opinion,be
whether it is of general public importance or
whether it directly and substantially affects
the rights of the parties and if so whether it
is either an 12 open question in the sense
that it is not finally settled by this Court or
15 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court
or is not free from difficulty or calls for
discussion of alternative views. If the
question is settled by the highest court or the
general principles to be applied in
determining the question are well settled
and there is a mere question of applying
those principles or that the plea raised is
palpably absurd the question would not be a
substantial question of law.”
30. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal 2, this
Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal v.
Mehta and Sons (supra) and other
judgments and summarised the tests to find
out whether a given set of questions of law
were mere questions of law or substantial
questions of law.
31. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment
of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set
out hereinbelow:“21. The phrase ”substantial
question of law”, as occurring in the
amended Section 100 CPC is not
defined in the Code. The word
substantial, as qualifying ”question
of law”, means of having substance,
essential, real, of sound worth,
important or considerable. It is to be
understood
as
something
in
contradistinction with- technical, of
no substance or consequence, or
academic merely. However, it is
clear that the legislature has chosen
not to qualify the scope of
“substantial question of law” by
suffixing the words ”of general
importance” as has been done in
many other provisions such as
Section 109 of the Code or Article 133
(1) (a) of the Constitution. The
substantial question of law on
which a second appeal shall be
16 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
heard need not necessarily be a
substantial question of law of
general importance. In Guran Ditta
v. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 :
AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase
substantial question of law as it was
employed in the last clause of the
then existing Section 100 CPC (since
omitted by the Amendment Act,
1973) came up for consideration and
their Lordships held that it did not
mean a substantial question of
general
importance
but
a
substantial question of law which
was involved in the case. In Sir
Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR
549 : AIR1962 SC 1314] the
Constitution
Bench
expressed
agreement with the following view
taken by a Full Bench of the Madras
High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba
Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad
969 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir
Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR
549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] , SCR p. 557)
“When a question of law is fairly
arguable, where there is room for
difference of opinion on it or where
the Court thought it necessary to
deal with that question at some
length and discuss alternative views,
then the question would be a
substantial question of law. On the
other hand if the question was
practically covered by the decision of
the highest court or if the general
principles
to
be
applied
in
determining the question are well
settled and the only question was of
applying those principles to the
particular fact of the case it would
not be a substantial question of
law.”
17 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
32. To be “substantial”, a question of law
must be debatable,not previously settled by
the law of the land or any binding
precedent, and must have a material
bearing on the decision of the case and/or
the rights of the parties before it, if
answered either way.
33. To be a question of law “involved in the
case”, there must be first, a foundation for it
laid in the pleadings, and the question
should emerge from the sustainable
findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts,
and it must be necessary to decide that
question of law for a just and proper
decision of the case.
34. Where no such question of law, nor even
a mixed question of law and fact was urged
before the Trial Court or the First Appellate
Court, as in this case, a second appeal
cannot be entertained, as held by this Court
in Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra
Goswami.
35. Whether a question of law is a
substantial one and whether such question
is involved in the case or not, would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The paramount overall consideration is the
need for striking a judicious balance
between the indispensable obligation to do
justice at all stages and the impelling
necessity of avoiding prolongation in the
life of any lis. This proposition finds support
from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari .
36. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of
the High Court being confined to substantial
question of law, a finding of fact is not open
to challenge in second appeal, even if the
appreciation of evidence is palpably
erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect
as held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam .An
entirely new point, raised for the first time,
before the High Court, is not a question
18 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
involved in the case, unless it goes to the
root of the matter.
37. The principles relating to Section 100
CPC relevant for this case may be
summarised thus :
(I) An inference of fact from the recitals or
contents of a document is a question of fact,
but the legal effect of the terms of a
document is a question of law. Construction
of a document, involving the application of
any principle of law, is also a question of
law.
Therefore,
when
there
is
misconstruction of a document or wrong
application of a principle of law in
construing a document, it gives rise to a
question of law.
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that
the case involves a substantial question of
law, and not a mere question of law. A
question of law having a material bearing
on the decision of the case (that is, a
question, answer to which affects the rights
of parties to the suit) will be a substantial
question of law, if it is not covered by any
specific provisions of law or settled legal
principle
emerging
from
binding
precedents, and, involves a debatable legal
issue.
(iii) A substantial question of law will also
arise in a contrary situation, where the legal
position is clear, either on account of
express provisions of law or binding
precedents, but the Court below has decided
the matter, either ignoring or acting
contrary to 14 such legal principle. In the
second type of cases, the substantial
question of law arises not because the law is
still debatable, but because the decision
rendered on a material question, violates
the settled position of law.
19 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will
not interfere with the concurrent findings of
the Courts below. But it is not an absolute
rule. Some of the well-recognised
exceptions are where (i) the courts below
have ignored material evidence or acted on
no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn
wrong inferences from proved facts by
applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the
courts have wrongly cast the burden of
proof. A decision based on no evidence, does
not refer only to cases where there is a total
dearth of evidence, but also refers to case,
where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not
reasonably capable of supporting the
finding.”
27.
In Hero Vinoth (minor) vs. Seshammal, (2006) 5
SCC 545, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“18. It has been noted time and again that
without insisting for the statement of such a
substantial question of law in the
memorandum of appeal and formulating
the same at the time of admission, the High
Courts have been issuing notices and
generally deciding the second appeals
without adhering to the procedure
prescribed under Section 100 of the CPC. It
has further been found in a number of cases
that no efforts are made to distinguish
between a question of law and a substantial
question of law. In exercise of the powers
under this section in several cases, the
findings of fact of the first appellate court
are found to have been disturbed. It has to
be kept in mind that the right of appeal is
neither a natural nor an inherent right
attached to the litigation. Being a
substantive statutory right, it has to be
regulated in accordance with law in force at
the relevant time. The conditions mentioned
20 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
in the section must be strictly fulfilled before
a second appeal can be maintained and no
court has the power to add or to enlarge
those grounds. The second appeal cannot be
decided on merely equitable grounds. The
concurrent findings of facts will not be
disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the
powers under this section. Further, a
substantial question of law has to be
distinguished from a substantial question of
fact. This Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and
Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. (AIR
1962 SC 1314) held that : "The proper test for
determining whether a question of law
raised in the case is substantial would, in our
opinion, be whether it is of general public
importance or whether it directly and
substantially affects the rights of the parties
and if so whether it is either an open
question in the sense that it is not finally
settled by this Court or by the Privy Council
or by the Federal Court or is not free from
difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative
views. If the question is settled by the
highest court or the general principles to be
applied in 23 determining the question are
well settled and there is a mere question of
applying those principles or that the plea
raised is palpably absurd the question would
not be a substantial question of law."
19. It is not within the domain of the High
Court to investigate the grounds on which
the findings were arrived at, by the last court
of fact, being the first appellate court. It is
true that the lower appellate court should
not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by
the trial court in respect of credibility but
even where it has rejected the witnesses
accepted by the trial court, the same is no
ground for interference in second appeal
when it is found that the appellate court has
given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a
case where from a given set of circumstances
21 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
two inferences of fact are possible, one
drawn by the lower appellate court will not
be interfered by the High Court in second
appeal. Adopting any other approach is not
permissible. The High Court will, however,
interfere where it is found that the
conclusions drawn by the lower appellate
court were erroneous being contrary to the
mandatory provisions of law applicable or
its settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or
was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at by ignoring material evidence.
20. to 22 xx xx xx xx
23. To be "substantial" a question of law
must be debatable, not previously settled by
law of the land or a binding precedent, and
must have a material bearing on the
decision of the case, if answered either way,
insofar as the rights of the parties before it
are concerned. To be a question of law
"involving in the 24 case" there must be first
a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and
the question should emerge from the
sustainable findings of fact arrived at by
court of facts and it must be necessary to
decide that question of law for a just and
proper decision of the case. An entirely new
point raised for the first time before the High
Court is not a question involved in the case
unless it goes to the root of the matter. It
will, therefore, depend on the facts and
circumstance of each case whether a
question of law is a substantial one and
involved in the case, or not; the paramount
overall consideration being the need for
striking a judicious balance between the
indispensable obligation to do justice at all
stages and impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis.”
22 ( 2026:HHC:11105 )
28.
Since there are concurrent findings of fact returned
by the Courts below, therefore, no question of law much
less the substantial question of law is involved in the
present case.
29.
Consequently, present appeal being devoid of
any merit deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly
dismissed.
30.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
02.04.2026 (veena)
(Romesh Verma),
Judge
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