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2026:HHC:5276
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Criminal Revision No.729 of 2024
Date of Decision: 2.3.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Manohar Lal and Ors.
State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr.
Versus
……...Petitioners
…....Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Petitioners:
Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional
Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr.
Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for the
State.
Mr. N.K. Tomar, Advocate, for respondent No.3.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition, lays challenge to order dated
12.9.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, District
Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh in Session Trial No. 12/24, whereby court
below proceeded to frame charge against the petitioners in case FIR No.
97/23 dated 1.7.2023 under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act), 1989 (in short
<SCST Act=)
2.
Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted
in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned
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counsel for the petitioners is that bare perusal of FIR clearly reveals that no
case much less case under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act, is
made out against the petitioners.
If it is so, there was otherwise no
occasion for the learned court below to frame charges against the
petitioners under the afore provisions of law. Mr. Sharma, while making
this court peruse pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record
vehemently argued that complainant, at whose instance FIR as detailed
herein above, came to be lodged, was not able to prove till Hon’ble Apex
Court his ownership qua the land in question. While referring to Sections 3
(1) (f) and 3 (1) (g), Mr. Sharma, contended that person belonging to
scheduled caste community can invoke afore provision of law only in the
event of his being owner or in possession of the land from which he is
seeking removal of a person of higher caste. He further submitted that
since complainant was unable to prove before the civil court that he is
owner or in possession of the land coupled with the fact that judgments
passed by the competent court of law in that regard were made available to
the court below at the time of framing of charges, impugned order thereby
framing charge against the petitioners needs to be interfered with.
2.
To the contrary, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional
Advocate General, representing the respondent-State and Mr. N.K. Tomar,
learned counsel representing the complainant, supported the impugned
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order framing charge. Above named counsel vehemently argued that police
after having perused the sale deed qua the suit land, wherein factum of
complainant’s ownership qua the land in question stands duly recorded,
rightly presented challan in the competent court of law under Sections 3 (1)
(f) and 3 (1) (g) of the Act. They further submitted that during investigation,
police also collected revenue record i.e. jamabandi, suggestive of the fact
that name of the complainant stands entered as owner qua the land in
question. Mr. N.K. Tomar, learned counsel representing the complainant,
further argued that otherwise also, present petition is not maintainable in
terms of Section 14 (A) of the Act, which clearly provides that an appeal
shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory
order, of a Special Court. He submitted that since order framing charge is
not interlocutory order, rather intermediate order, petitioners herein ought
to have filed criminal appeal under Section 14 (A) of the Act instead of
Criminal Revision Petition. Mr. Tomar further submitted that petitioner
Nos. 1 and 3 were never party to the civil suit filed by the respondent Amar
Singh, for permanent injunction and as such, they otherwise cannot take
benefit of the same in the instant proceedings.
3.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the record of the case.
4.
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Since specific question of maintainability of the present petition
has been raised at the behest of the respondents, this Court, at the first
instance deems, it fit to take note of Section 14 (A) of the Act, which reads
as under:
<14A. Appeals.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of CriminalProcedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any
judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a
Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both
on facts and on law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section
378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal
shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or
the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred
within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment,
sentence or order appealed from:
Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the
expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within
the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be
entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty
days.
(4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as
possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the
date of admission of the appeal=
5.
Careful
perusal
of
afore
order
clearly
reveals
that
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, an
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appeal would lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order of a Special Court. Admittedly, order laid challenge in
the instant proceedings has been passed by the Special Court under special
act, but next question, which needs determination is <whether order
framing charge can be said to be interlocutory or intermediate order.=
6.
In Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.
passed in Criminal Appeal No. 472 of 2021 (arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Crl.) No. 10157 of 2019), Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held
that criminal revision would lie against the order framing charge. Para No.
15 of the afore judgment reads as under:
<15. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye
(supra), thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge
are neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not
affected by the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. That apart, this Court
in the above-cited cases has unequivocally acknowledged that the
High Court is imbued with inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of
process or to secure ends of justice having regard to the facts and
circumstance of individual cases. As a caveat it may be stated that
the High Court, while exercising its afore-stated jurisdiction ought to
be circumspect. The discretion vested in the High Court is to be
invoked
carefully
and
judiciously
for
effective
and
timely
administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless,
does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there
should be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which
there is likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For
2026:HHC:5276
example, when the contents of a complaint or the other purported
material on record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent
person, it becomes imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of
process of law.=
7.
Recently, coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 129
of 2026, titled as Lagnesh Verma v. State of Himachal Pradesh and
Ors., has categorically held that order framing charge under SCST Act is
not appealable order on account of its being intermediate order and as
such, same can be laid challenge, if required by way criminal revision
petition, but definitely not under Section 14 (A) of SCST Act.
Relevant
paras of the afore judgment read as under:
<15. The other judgments, which have been relied upon by the
learned counsel for the appellant have only interpreted that the
<framing of charge=, if not to be construed as an <interlocutory
order=, it can be said to be an <intermediate order=. None of the
judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant had
the occasion to deal with the issue to the effect that against the
framing of charge, an appeal is maintainable.
16. Once the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that framing of charge
cannot be construed as final order, the appeal is not maintainable.
The aggrieved party can avail the remedy of revisional jurisdiction or
inherent jurisdiction of this Court under the BNSS or other laws if
permissible. However, the appeal filed by the appellant is not
maintainable against the order of framing the charge.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye’s case (supra) as
well as in Sanjay Kumar Rai ‘s case (supra) had held that the High
Court can entertain the petition either filed under Sections 397 or
2026:HHC:5276
482 of the Cr.P.C., but it has not held that the order of framing of
charge can be questioned by way of an appeal. The other judgments
cited are also not applicable and none of the judgments had dealt
with the preposition that the appeal is maintainable against an order
of framing the charge.=
8.
Though, at this stage, Mr. Tomar, while inviting attention of
this Court to judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu
Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, argued that
judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for
another. The meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has,
therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose
for which it is required.
Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court, in
Sanjay Kumar Rai and Lagnesh Verma (supra) have dealt with judgment
passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye’s case.
While
interpreting its earlier judgment in Madhu Limaye’s case, Hon’ble Apex
Court has clarified that order framing charge or refusing to discharge is
neither interlocutory nor final in nature and are, therefore, not affected by
the bar of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. Hence for the discussion made herein
above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court is convinced that
present petition is maintainable.
9.
Next
question,
which
needs
consideration
is
“whether
provisions contained under Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could be
2026:HHC:5276
attracted in the given facts and circumstances or not?= Before ascertaining
answer to the aforesaid question, this court deems it necessary to take note
of aforesaid provision of law.
10.
Sections 3 (1)(f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act, reads as under:
<(f) Wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land, owned by, or in the
possession of or allotted to, or notified by any competent authority to
be allotted to, a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
or gets such land transferred;
(g) Wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or interferes with the
enjoyment of his rights, including forest rights, over any land or
premises or water or irrigation facilities or destroys the crops or takes
away the produce therefrom.=
11.
Conjoint reading of both the aforesaid provisions of law clearly
reveals that a person, who is not a member of SC/ST community if
wrongfully occupies or cultivates any land owned by or in the possession of
any member of the SCST shall be liable to be prosecuted under Section 3
and shall be punished for imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less
than six months, but which may extend to five years with fine.
12.
In nutshell, case of the complainant as came to be reported to
the police is that petitioners herein, who are admittedly member of the
higher
caste,
wrongfully
interfered/dispossessed
them
from
land
comprising Khata No.97, Khatauni III, Khasra No. 16763, measuring 01
2026:HHC:5276
kanal, 15 marla (in short <suit land=) situate at village Jahu Khurd, Tappa
Mewa, Tehsil Bhoranj, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh.
13.
Though
police
after
having
completed
the
investigation
presented challan in the court of learned Special Judge, Hamirpur, stating
therein that petitioners herein being members of upper caste have
interfered
with the possession of the complainant Amar Singh, who is
member of the scheduled caste community and as such, are required to be
charged under Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the Act, but in
nutshell, case of the petitioners herein is that suit land, which is being
claimed to be interfered was never in the possession of the complainant,
rather it has been categorically held by civil Court that predecessor-ininterest of the petitioners Mauji Ram was in possession of the same and
thereafter, petitioners are in possession of the same.
14.
Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate, while making this court peruse
judgment dated 23.5.1997, passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge
Hamirpur (Annexure P-1), titled as Amar Singh v. Geeta Devi, vehemently
argued that complainant Amar Singh had filed civil suit for permanent
prohibitory injunction, restraining the defendant from interfering in the suit
land.
He states that since predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners Mr.
Mauji Ram, was one of the defendants, it is quite apparent that at the time
of filing of the suit, complainant was never in possession of the suit land.
2026:HHC:5276
He states that though afore suit was decreed for getting vacant possession
of the suit land from defendant No.2 i.e. predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners, but it was specifically ordered that defendant No.2 Mauji Ram
will not be ejected from the suit land except in due course of law.
15.
It also emerges from the pleadings that afore order passed by
the learned trial court was laid challenge in the appeal before Additional
District Judge, Hamirpur, by way of Civil Appeal No. 26/1997 RBT No. 45
of 2002, which came to be upheld vide judgment dated 31.8.2017
(Annexure P-2). In the afore judgment, learned first appellate court set
aside the judgment and decree dated 23.5.1997 with respect to relief of
possession, as a result of which, suit of respondent No.2 was dismissed.
Respondent laid challenge to afore judgment before this Court in RSA No.
484 of 2017, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 27.9.2019
(Annexure P-3). Most importantly, in the afore judgment, this Court came
to the conclusion that sale deed, on the basis of which, respondent Amar
Singh was claiming possession, was never proved in accordance with law.
Interestingly, respondent/complainant laid challenge against the judgment
dated 27.9.2019, in the Hon’ble Apex Court by way of SLP (c) No. 1152 of
2020, but same was withdrawn with liberty to file review before the High
Court.
Though respondent/complainant filed review petition praying
therein to review judgment dated 27.9.2019 passed in RSA No. 484 of
2026:HHC:5276
2017, but same was also dismissed. Though Mr. Tomar, learned counsel
appearing for the complainant fairly admitted factum with regard to finality
attached to the judgment dated 27.9.2019 passed by this Court in RSA No.
484 of 2017, wherein admittedly, it came to be ruled that complainant
never proved sale deed in accordance with law, thereby showing him to
have purchased the suit land from Sh. Hem Raj, but he states that during
investigation of FIR, which is subject matter of the present case,
complainant produced sale deed as well as jamabandi, showing him to be
owner of the suit land and as such, no illegality can be said to have been
committed by the court below while charging the petitioners under Sections
3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the SCST Act. He states that since at the time of
registration of case, complainant was found to be owner of the land in
question and he was also able to establish factum with regard to
interference by the accused named in the FIR i.e. petitioners therein, court
below rightly passed the impugned order.
16.
Having scanned the material adduced on record, especially
charge sheet under Section 173 of CrPC, presented by investigating agency,
this court finds that though factum with regard to filing of the civil suit by
the respondent/complainant as well as judgments passed thereupon uptill
Hon’ble Apex Court was brought to the notice of learned Special Court at
the time of framing of charge, but yet court below ignored the same and
2026:HHC:5276
proceeded to frame the charge under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the
SCST Act.
17.
Though Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate
General representing the respondent-State attempted to argue that since
investigating agency was able to find out during investigation that suit land
was in the possession of the complainant and same was being interfered by
the petitioners who are members of upper caste, there is no scope of
interference
in the impugned order, but this court is not persuaded to
agree with aforesaid submission of learned Additional Advocate General as
well as learned counsel appearing for the complainant for the reason that to
invoke Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g), it is incumbent to prove ownership or
possession of the person belonging to Scheduled Caste. Though in the case
at hand, complainant belongs to Scheduled Caste, but as has been taken
note herein above, complainant has been neither held to be owner nor in
possession of the land in question by the competent court of law. Though
learned trial Court had decreed the suit of the complainant, but learned
first appellate court set aside the judgment of learned trial Court especially
with regard to relief of possession.
Subsequently, this Court in Regular
Second Appeal having been filed by the complainant returned a categorical
finding that respondent/ complainant was not able to prove sale deed, on
the basis of which, he was claiming himself to be owner of the suit
2026:HHC:5276
land. Since aforesaid finding returned by the learned first appellate court
as well as this Court in proceedings as detailed herein above, has attained
finality, on account of withdrawal of SLP filed by the petitioners, this Court
is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that Sections
3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could not have been attracted in the case at hand.
Since respondent/complainant was unable to prove his ownership or
possession qua the suit land in the competent court of law, mere
production of sale deed or jamabandi during investigation by the police
cannot be sufficient to conclude guilt, if any, of the petitioners under
Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g). Though Investigating Agency was aware of
factum of passing of the judgments by the competent court of law as
detailed herein above, but yet proceeded to present the challan under the
afore provisions of law for petitioners’ having committed offence under
Section Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) on the basis of sale deed and
jamabandi, thereby showing the petitioners to be owner in possession of
the suit land, however for the discussion made herein above, no case much
less case under Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) could have been registered
against the petitioners.
18.
This
Court
having
taken
note
of
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances of the case is compelled to draw a conclusion that
respondent, who admittedly belongs to Scheduled Caste community after
2026:HHC:5276
his having failed to get relief in civil proceedings, has attempted to get
similar relief by lodging criminal proceedings under SCST Act, which for the
reasons stated herein above are not maintainable. Civil dispute, which
otherwise stands concluded on account of dismissal of SLP filed at the by
the respondent/complainant has been attempted to be re-opened by the
complainant by filing criminal proceedings under the Act, which are not
otherwise maintainable.
19.
In view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as
law taken into consideration, this Court, while holding present petition to
be maintainable, is persuaded to conclude that court below has fallen in
grave error while proceeding to frame charge against the petitioners under
Sections 3 (1) (f) and 3 (1) (g) of the Act and as such, same needs to be
interfered with.
20.
Consequently, in view of the above, present petition is allowed
and Order dated 12.9.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge,
Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh in Session Trial No. 12/24
is quashed and set-aside.
Present petition is disposed of along with
pending applications, if any.
March 2, 2026
(manjit)
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
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