Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
Judgment Reserved on: 13th August, 2026
Judgment pronounced on: 16th September, 2026
+
RFA 858/2017 & CM APPL. 36615/2017, CM APPL. 15483/2018,
CM APPL. 38475/2023, CM APPL. 34438/2026
MANJIT SINGH & ANR
.....Appellants
Through:
Mr. Shiv Prakash Pandey, Mr. Raghav
Pandey, Advocates with appellant inperson.
versus
NIRMAL & ORS
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr.
Darpan
Wadhwa, Senior
Advocate and Mr. D.K. Rustagi,
Senior Advocate with Mr. Mayank
Rustagi, Ms. Prakriti Kapoor &
Ms. Divita Vyas, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT BANSAL
JUDGMENT
AMIT BANSAL, J.
1.
The present Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (‘CPC’) has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment and
decree dated 11th July, 2017 passed by the Additional District Judge-04,
South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in Civil Suit No. 7580/2016,
titled as Manjit Singh & Anr. v. Nirmal & Ors.
2.
The
appellants
shall
hereinafter
be
referred
to
as
the
appellants/plaintiffs, as the case may be, and the respondents shall hereinafter
be referred to as the respondents/defendants as the case may be.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
BRIEF FACTS
3.
The brief facts as stated in the plaint are as follows:
3.1.
The plaintiffs, namely S. Manjit Singh and S. Harjinder Singh, are the
sons of Late S. Swaran Singh from his first wife, Smt. Swinder Kaur. The
marriage between Late S. Swaran Singh and Smt. Swinder Kaur was
dissolved in the year 1961, whereafter Late S. Swaran Singh married
defendant no.1, Smt. Nirmal.
3.2.
Defendant no.2, S. Ravinder Singh, is the son of Late S. Swaran Singh
and defendant no.1 Late S. Swaran Singh died on 20th June, 2003.
3.3.
The plaintiffs instituted a suit seeking partition of the estate of Late S.
Swaran Singh, claiming that he had died intestate and that the plaintiffs and
defendants no.1 and 2 were his legal heirs.
3.4.
The suit concerned Plot No.27, Surya Niketan, Delhi (‘Surya Niketan
Property’) and Flat No.407, 4th Floor, Shakuntala Apartments, Nehru Place,
New Delhi (‘Nehru Place Property’). The aforesaid two properties are
hereinafter referred to collectively as suit properties. The plaintiffs claimed
that Late S. Swaran Singh had acquired Nehru Place Property and Surya
Niketan Property from his own funds and that the suit properties formed part
of his estate.
4.
In the written statement dated 10th September, 2003, the case set up by
defendants no.1 and 2 was as follows:
4.1.
Through a Will dated 8th May, 2002, Late S. Swaran Singh had
bequeathed all his movable and immoveable properties, including the suit
properties, in favour of the defendant no.1.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
4.2.
Nehru Place Property had already been agreed to be sold by Late S.
Swaran Singh in favour of S. Kapil Kumar Chopra and S. Narinder Pal Singh,
for a consideration of Rs. 5 lakhs, under an Agreement to Sell dated 9 th
October, 2001 and that possession thereof had been handed over to them.
4.3.
Late S. Swaran Singh had executed a General Power of Attorney
(‘GPA’) dated 1st February, 2003 in favour of defendant no.1 in respect of
Surya Niketan Property, pursuant to which defendant no.1 had entered into an
Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003 in favour of Ms. Shobha Sharma for
a consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs and had handed over possession of the said
property to her.
5.
The plaintiffs thereafter amended the suit and impleaded Ms. Shobha
Sharma as defendant no.3, S. Kapil Kumar Chopra as defendant no.4 and S.
Narinder Pal Singh as defendant no.5. The plaintiffs also sought cancellation
of following documents:
i.
Will dated 8th May, 2002,
ii.
Agreement to Sell dated 9th October, 2001 in favour of defendants
no. 4 and 5,
6.
iii.
GPA dated 1st February, 2003 in favour of defendant no.1 and
iv.
Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003 in favour of defendant no.3.
The plaintiffs challenged the aforesaid documents on the ground that
the signatures and/or thumb impressions of Late S. Swaran Singh appearing
thereon were forged and fabricated. In respect of Surya Niketan Property, the
plaintiffs specifically disputed the execution and validity of the GPA dated 1st
February, 2003 and the Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003 and disputed
the claim of defendant no.3 that possession of the property had been handed
over to her.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
7.
By order dated 10th October, 2006, the Trial Court framed the following
issues:
(1) Whether the plaintiff was in actual, physical possession of any portion
of the suit property at the time of institution of the suit? OPP
(2) Whether the suit has been valued properly for the purposes of court fee
and whether the court fee in accordance with law is affixed on the plaint?
OPP
(3) Whether the document dated 8th May, 2002 is the last Will and
Testament of late S. Swaran Singh? If so, to what effect? OPD
(4) Whether the agreement to sell dated 9th October 2001 was executed by
late S. Swaran Singh in favour of defendants 4 & 5? OPD 4&5
(5) Whether the General Power of attorney dated 1st February 2003 in
favour of defendant no.1 is valid & binding? OPD3
(6) Whether the defendant no.3 is a bonafide purchaser of property no.27,
Surya Niketan, Delhi-92 by virtue of the agreement to sell dated 26th May,
2003? OPD3
(7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for declaration and
partition in respect of the suit properties?
(8) Relief.
8.
The parties thereafter led evidence in support of their respective cases.
The plaintiffs examined, inter alia, witnesses in support of their challenge to
the documents relied upon by the defendants and also relied upon the medical
records of Late S. Swaran Singh and a handwriting expert’s report.
Defendants no.1 and 2 led evidence in support of the Will, GPA and
Agreements to Sell, while defendant no.3 led evidence concerning the
transaction and possession of Surya Niketan Property.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT
9.
The Trial Court in the impugned judgment has returned the following
findings:
9.1.
In relation to the Will dated 8th May, 2002, the Trial Court considered
the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the surrounding circumstances and
held that the Will had not been duly proved.
9.2.
In relation to the Agreement to Sell dated 9th October, 2001 concerning
Nehru Place Property, the Trial Court held that Late S. Swaran Singh had
executed the Agreement to Sell in favour of defendants no.4 and 5.
9.3.
In respect of Surya Niketan Property, the Trial Court considered the
GPA dated 1st February, 2003 and the Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003
and held that Late S. Swaran Singh had duly executed the GPA in favour of
defendant no.1 and that defendant no.1, acting as his duly constituted attorney,
had executed the Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003 in favour of
defendant no.3 for consideration. The Trial Court further held that the entire
consideration had been received by Late S. Swaran Singh and possession of
the property had been handed over to defendant no.3.
9.4.
While deciding the issue of possession, the Trial Court held that
defendants no.4 and 5 were in possession of Nehru Place Property and
defendant no.3 was in possession of Surya Niketan Property pursuant to the
Agreements to Sell. The Trial Court further held that the plaintiffs were
neither in actual physical possession nor in constructive possession of the suit
properties, as Late S. Swaran Singh did not have any right, title or interest in
the suit properties at the time of his death.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
9.5.
The Trial Court consequently held that, since the plaintiffs were
neither in actual nor constructive possession of the suit properties and had not
sought the relief of possession, the suit for partition was not maintainable in
the manner in which it had been framed.
10.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the plaintiffs preferred the
present appeal.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
11.
This matter first came up for hearing on 13th October, 2017, wherein
the counsel for the appellants made it clear that the appeal is restricted to
Surya Niketan Property and the appellants do not claim any right, title and
interest in the Nehru Place Property. The relevant observations from the said
order are set out below:
“2. In the subject suits two immovable properties were in issue of which
partition was claimed. First was Flat No.407, 4th Floor, Shakuntala
Apartments, Nehru Place, New Delhi and the second was Plot No.27,
Surya Niketan, Delhi-92 admeasuring 330 sq. yards.
3.
Today, counsel for the appellants states that the appeal is restricted
to the property at Surya Niketan and the appellants do not claim any
right, title and interest in the Flat No. 407.”
[emphasis supplied]
12.
In the order dated 13th October, 2017, this Court noted the objection
with regard to non-payment of proper court fees on the appeal and held that,
since the Trial Court has held that the possession of Surya Niketan Property
is with respondent no.3, the appellants would have to value the appeal for the
relief of possession on the market value of the property, without prejudice to
the respective rights and contentions of the parties. The relevant observations
from the said order are set out below:
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
4.
It is seen from the record of the Trial Court that the Plot No. 27,
Surya Niketan, Delhi was said to be purchased by the defendant no. 3 in
the suit in terms of documentation executed by Sh. Swaran Singh/father
in his life time. Defendant no.3 relies upon the documents including a
document dated 26.5.2003, and which document is a registered
agreement to sell.
5.
The doctrine of non-payment of any ad valorem court fee in a suit
for partition on the ground that the suit for partition is covered by
Schedule-II Article 17 Sub-Clause(vi) of the Court Fees Act is premised
that every co-owner is deemed to be in possession for and on behalf of
all the co-owners, and therefore, the plaintiffs also are in constructive
possession of the joint/owned property although they may not be in
physical possession. This presumption of joint possession/constructive
possession however extinguishes and comes to an end when the physical
possession of the suit property is no longer with one or more family
members. In such a scenario there cannot be filed a suit for partition or
declaration etc without the plaintiff in the suit seeking possession of the
suit property and paying court fees as per the market value of the suit
property.
6.
I may note that by the impugned judgment the trial court has upheld
the documentation transferring the property at Surya Niketan in favour of
the defendant no.3 in the suit, and who is the respondent no.3 herein. It
has also been held by the trial court in its impugned judgment that the
respondent no.3/defendant no.3 is in physical possession of the Surya
Niketan property pursuant to the registered Agreement to Sell dated
26.5.2003.
7.
Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs states that the
appellant/plaintiff will pay the court fees on the market value of the suit
property for seeking the relief of possession, and appellants/plaintiff will
accordingly value the appeal for the relief of possession on the market
value of the property at Surya Niketan on the date of filing of the suit. It
is stated that needful will be done within a period of six weeks.”
[emphasis supplied]
13.
Consequently, the appellants paid the requisite court fees.
14.
Thereafter, the appellants filed C.M. No.26030/2018 seeking
amendment of the plaint so as to incorporate a prayer for possession in respect
of Surya Niketan Property.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
15.
C.M. No.26030/2018 was subsequently withdrawn by the appellants
vide order dated 28th March, 2026.
16.
The parties were heard on 31st July, 2026 and 13th August, 2026, when
the judgment was reserved.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
17.
The counsel for appellants have made the following submissions:
17.1. The GPA dated 1st February, 2003, allegedly executed by Late S.
Swaran Singh in favour of defendant no.1, is surrounded by suspicious
circumstances and, consequently, the Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003
executed by defendant no.1 in favour of respondent no.3 on the basis of the
said GPA cannot confer any right upon respondent no.3. In this regard,
reliance is placed upon the medical records of Late S. Swaran Singh.
17.2. The appellants did not seek the relief of possession as Late S. Swaran
Singh, during his lifetime, continued to remain in possession of Surya Niketan
Property, and, after his demise on 20th June, 2003, the appellants along with
defendants no.1 and 2 continued to remain in possession thereof.
17.3. The claim of defendant no.3 that possession of the property was
handed over to her on 26th May, 2003 is false and cannot be accepted,
particularly when the deceased was admitted in hospital during the said
period. The respondent no.3 herself stated in her cross-examination that she
had never met or spoken to Late S. Swaran Singh.
17.4. Accordingly, Late S. Swaran Singh continued to remain in possession
of Surya Niketan Property and the appellants are entitled to the relief of
declaration and partition in respect thereof.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.2
18.
Per contra, counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.2 has made
the following submissions:
18.1. Late S. Swaran Singh had executed a GPA dated 1st February, 2003 in
favour of defendant no.1 in respect of Surya Niketan Property pursuant to
which defendant no.1 executed the Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003
in favour of defendant no.3, Ms. Shobha Sharma, for a consideration of Rs.
10 lakhs and handed over possession of the said property to her.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.3
19.
Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 has made the following
submissions:
19.1. The respondent no.3 is the purchaser of Surya Niketan Property under
the Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003, executed by defendant no.1
pursuant to the GPA dated 1st February, 2003 executed by Late S. Swaran
Singh in her favour. The respondent no.3 as bona fide purchaser has been in
physical and constructive possession of the Surya Niketan Property since 26th
May, 2003.
19.2. The respondent no.3 had been put in possession of Surya Niketan
Property on 26th May, 2003 pursuant to the aforesaid Agreement to Sell and,
therefore, the plaintiffs were not in actual or constructive possession of the
said property.
19.3. Late S. Swaran Singh was in a sound and disposing mind when the
Agreement to Sell was executed in favour of respondent no.3. In this regard,
reliance is placed on the letters placed on record by the appellants, namely,
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
letter dated 6th May, 2003 [Ex. DW-9/P-5], letter dated 12th May, 2003 [Ex.
DW-9/P-6] and letter dated 23rd May, 2003 [Ex. DW-9/P-8], all obtained by
plaintiff no.2 under RTI from DDA. These letters were confronted in crossexamination of DW-9 (defendant no.1) and duly exhibited. Hence, the
hospitalization and health of Late S. Swaran Singh between 6th May, 2003 till
23rd May, 2003 does not establish that he was of unsound mind.
19.4. There is nothing on record, including in the evidence led by the
appellants, to establish or corroborate that the appellants were in actual
physical possession of Surya Niketan Property at the time of institution of the
present suit.
ANALYSIS and FINDINGS
20.
I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record.
21.
To begin with, I would deal with the findings of the Trial Court on
issues no.5 and 6, which are set out below for ease of reference:
“(5) Whether the General Power of attorney dated 1st February 2003 in
favour of defendant no.1 is valid & binding? OPD3
(6) Whether the defendant no.3 is a Bonafide purchaser of property no.27,
Surya Niketan, Delhi-92 by virtue of the agreement to sell dated 26th May,
2003? OPD3”
22.
It has come in evidence that Late S. Swaran Singh, during his lifetime,
executed a registered GPA dated 1st February, 2003 [Ex.DW4/2] in favour of
defendant no.1 in respect of the Surya Niketan Property.
23.
The GPA duly records that Late S. Swaran Singh is aged about 82
years, suffering from ill health, and is undergoing treatment for diabetes and
blood pressure. On account of expenses required for his treatment, he wishes
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
to sell the Surya Niketan Property and, therefore, has executed the GPA in
favour of his wife to enter into a sale agreement for the Surya Niketan
Property.
24.
This GPA is a registered document, registered before the concerned
Sub-Registrar. The GPA bears thumb impressions of Late S. Swaran Singh.
25.
DW-4, S. Harbans Singh, has deposed on behalf of the defendants that
Late S. Swaran Singh had affixed his thumb impressions on the GPA. DW-4
has also deposed that he, along with Ms. Asha Kumari, had signed as an
attesting witness on the GPA. He has also deposed that he, along with Ms.
Asha Kumari and Mrs. Nirmal Kaur, signed and put their thumb impressions
before the Sub-Registrar, and Late S. Swaran Singh put his thumb
impressions before the Sub-Registrar. He has duly identified the signatures of
Mrs. Nirmal Kaur and Ms. Asha Kumari, as well as his own signatures. He
has also identified the thumb impressions of Mr. Swaran Singh on the GPA.
The said witness was duly cross-examined, however, the appellants have not
been able to discredit his testimony.
26.
The defendants duly summoned the LDC from the office of the Sub-
Registrar, Seelampur, Delhi and examined him as DW-1. DW-1 brought the
original GPA [Ex. DW4/2] dated 1st February, 2003 executed by Late S.
Swaran Singh. He confirmed the registration of the said GPA.
27.
Once a document is registered and the process of registration is proved
by examining the concerned official, a presumption arises that the document
was validly executed. It is for the party disputing the document to lead
evidence to disprove the credibility of the registered document. In this
context, reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
Prem Singh v. Birbal1, wherein it has been held that a registered document
carries a presumption of validity and the onus lies on the person challenging
the same to rebut such presumption. The relevant observations of the said
judgment are set out below:
“27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed.
A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The
onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut
the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to
rebut the said presumption.”
[emphasis supplied]
28.
The appellants contend that GPA was forged and fabricated, however,
they have failed to discharge the onus of proving the same. Their challenge to
the GPA was founded primarily on the report of their handwriting expert,
PW2. The Trial Court, however, disbelieved the said expert evidence on the
ground that the report was based on comparison of thumb impressions from a
dim and light photocopy, and did not indicate any specific markers of forgery
in respect of the thumb impressions appearing on the GPA and hence, lacked
credibility.
29.
The appellants have also contended that Late S. Swaran Singh was
seriously unwell from June 2002 to June 2003, and hence he could not have
executed a GPA on 1st February, 2003. Reliance in this regard is placed on
the discharge summary dated 26th January, 2003 issued by Sitaram Bhartiya
Hospital [Ex. P-3].
30.
A perusal of the said discharge summary shows that Late S. Swaran
Singh was unwell and undergoing treatment and was discharged from Sitaram
Bhartiya Hospital on 26th January, 2003, and at the time of his discharge, he
(2006) 5 SCC 353
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
was in a satisfactory condition. This discharge summary does not suggest that
Late S. Swaran Singh was not in a position to visit the Sub-Registrar’s office
on 1st February, 2003 for the execution of the GPA.
31.
Hence, the appellants have failed to place any cogent material on record
to demonstrate that the GPA [Ex.DW4/2] was forged or fabricated. Based on
the evidence on record, the defendants have proved that the GPA has been
validly executed.
32.
In terms of the aforesaid GPA, defendant no.1 was empowered to sell
the Surya Niketan Property and also receive the sale consideration in respect
thereof. Acting on the aforesaid registered General Power of Attorney, a
registered Agreement to Sell [Ex. DW5/3] was executed by defendant no.1,
as his attorney, transferring the Surya Niketan Property in favour of defendant
no.3.
33.
The defendants duly summoned the LDC from the office of the Sub-
Registrar, Geeta Colony, Delhi and examined him as DW-2. DW-2 brought
the original Agreement to Sell dated 26th May, 2003. He confirmed the
registration of the Agreement to Sell on 27th May, 2003. Since the Agreement
to Sell was executed through a registered Power of Attorney, there was no
requirement for Late S. Swaran Singh to visit the office of the Sub-Registrar.
34.
The appellants have challenged execution of the Agreement to Sell on
the ground that since Late S. Swaran Singh was in the hospital from 2nd May
to 30th May, 2003, he could not have entered into an Agreement to Sell.
However, the hospitalization of Late S. Swaran Singh would have no bearing
on the Agreement to Sell being executed, as the same was executed by Late
S. Swaran Singh through a duly appointed attorney.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
35.
The letters relied upon by the appellants [Ex. DW-9/P-5], [Ex. DW-
9/P-6] and [Ex. DW-9/P-8], which were put in cross-examination to
defendant no.3 by the appellants themselves, show that Swaran Singh was in
sound mental condition when the Agreement to Sell was executed on 26 th
May, 2003.
36.
The appellants dispute the validity and execution of the Agreement to
Sell [Ex. DW5/3]. However, in his cross-examination, the plaintiff no.2
himself stated that he was not aware as to whether the complete sale
consideration had been paid by defendant no.3 to Late S. Swaran Singh. The
plaintiff no.2 has also admitted that his father, Late S. Swaran Singh, being
the owner of the property, had an absolute right to sell the same to anyone.
37.
The Agreement to Sell duly records that the entire sale consideration of
Rs. 10,00,000/- has been received by the seller from the buyer through a pay
order. In this regard, the defendant no.1 has stated in her affidavit that the
amount of sale consideration, i.e. Rs. 10,00,000/- was received by way of a
Banker's cheque [Mark – B] in the name of Late S. Swaran Singh and was
duly deposited in his bank account no.1120 with Syndicate Bank. The
certified copy of passbook of bank account no.1120 with Syndicate Bank in
the name of Late S. Swaran Singh for the period from 8th May, 1999 to 14th
March, 2005, which shows the deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/-, has been exhibited
as Ex. DW 1/G. Therefore, the evidence on record shows that defendant no.3
was a bona fide purchaser of the Surya Niketan Property.
38.
As noted above, since the Agreement to Sell is a registered document,
there is a presumption in its favour that the said document was validly
executed. The onus was on plaintiff to lead evidence to disprove the
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
credibility of the registered document. However, plaintiffs have failed to
show that the Agreement to Sell was not validly executed.
39.
In light of the above, there is no infirmity in the findings of the Trial
Court that i) GPA was validly executed by Late S. Swaran Singh in favour of
defendant no.1; ii) defendant no.1, acting as the duly constituted attorney of
Late S. Swaran Singh, executed the Agreement to Sell in favour of defendant
no.3 for sale of Surya Niketan Property; and iii) defendant no.3 has paid the
entire sale consideration for the Surya Niketan Property.
40.
Next, I proceed to consider findings of the Trial Court on issues no.1
and 2. The same are set out below for ease of reference:
“(1) Whether the plaintiff was in actual, physical possession of any portion
of the suit property at the time of institution of the suit? OPP
(2) Whether the suit has been valued properly for the purposes of court fee
and whether the court fee in accordance with law is affixed on the plaint?
OPP”
41.
The Agreement to Sell [Ex. DW5/3] records that the seller has handed
over actual physical possession of the Surya Niketan Property to the buyer.
42.
The appellants have sought to contend that since Late S. Swaran Singh
was in the hospital and undergoing treatment, he could not have handed over
possession of the Surya Niketan Property to defendant no.3 on 26th May,
2003. The appellants also placed reliance on the cross-examination of
defendant no.3 on 27th July, 2013, wherein she stated that she had never met
Late S. Swaran Singh.
43.
Since the possession of the Surya Niketan Property was handed over
by the Power of Attorney holder of Late S. Swaran Singh to the buyer, which
she was authorized to do in terms of the GPA, there was no requirement for
the buyer, i.e., defendant no.3, to meet Late S. Swaran Singh.
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
44.
The defendant no.3 in her cross-examination has also stated that the
Surya Niketan Property is in her possession under her lock. She has also
produced the letter issued by the President of the housing society to the
defendant no.3 regarding the deposit of security and other charges in respect
of Surya Niketan Property [Ex. DW-3/6].
45.
Therefore, there is no infirmity in the finding of the Trial Court that
defendant no.3 was in physical possession of the Surya Niketan Property since
26th May, 2003. Consequently, it cannot be said that the appellants were either
in physical possession or constructive possession of the Surya Niketan
Property. The relevant findings of the Trial Court in this regard are set out
below:
“The defendants no: 4 and 5 and the defendant no. 3 have been proved to
be in possession of the respective properties sold to them under the
Agreements to Sell dated 09.10.2001 and 26.05.2003 Certainly the
plaintiffs were not in actual physical possession of the properties as the
plaintiffs long before the death of S. Swaran Singh were not residing
with S. Swaran Singh or over any portion of the suit properties and it is
not even the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs were in actual
physical possession of the suit properties. The plaintiffs as class-I legal
heirs of late S. Swaran Singh were not even in constructive possession of
the suit properties along with defendants no. 1 and 2 as S. Swaran Singh
at the time of his death was not vested of any right, title or interest in the
suit properties. Issue no: 1 is, therefore, decided against plaintiffs and in
favour of the defendants.”
[emphasis supplied]
46.
Based on the aforesaid findings, the Trial Court held that since the
plaintiffs had not sought relief of possession, when admittedly they were not
in possession, the suit for partition was not maintainable. Relevant findings
of the Trial Court are set out below:
“The suit for partition was not maintainable in the facts and circumstances
without the plaintiffs also seeking the relief of possession. As the plaintiffs
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
have not sought the relief of possession and on the relief of partition, the
plaintiff are not required to have a fixed ad-valorem court fees, however,
in the facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs were required to have also
sought the relief of possession as the plaintiffs at the time of the institution
of the suit for partition were neither in actual nor in constructive
possession of the suit properties which rested with subsequent / bona-fide
purchasers.”
47.
In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of this Court
in Manmohan Batra v. Bharat Bhushan Batra2, wherein a suit for partition
was dismissed by the Trial Court. This Court, while upholding the findings of
Trial Court, held that as the plaintiff therein was not in physical possession
and the documents recorded delivery of possession to defendants, the plaintiff
could not claim constructive possession. The plaintiff was therefore required
to seek possession, and in the absence of such relief, the suit for partition as
framed was held to be not maintainable. The relevant observations of the said
judgment are set out below:
“10. I completely agree with the aforesaid findings and conclusions of the
trial court and in addition thereto I would like to reiterate and add the
following reasoning as an appellate court under Order 41 Rule 24 CPC
XXXX
(c) In my opinion, the suit was in fact not maintainable as framed
inasmuch as, the appellant/plaintiff admittedly was not in physical
possession of the property. A suit for partition only lies when the plaintiff
is either in physical possession of the property or in constructive
possession of the property i.e. when the property is held by a co-owner
for all the other co-owners. In the present case, once it was shown that
the appellant/plaintiff was not in physical possession of the property, and
could not be in constructive possession because Respondent 1/Defendant
1 claimed rights in the property under the documentation dated 26-5-1995,
which mentioned that possession was handed over to Defendant 1, ouster
was clearly pleaded and it was incumbent on the appellant/plaintiff to
amend his plaint to seek the relief of possession. Admittedly, no relief of
possession is sought and hence the suit as framed is not maintainable.
2012 SCC OnLine Del 2663
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
Also, in my opinion, the suit for possession if now sought to be amended to
claim the relief would in the peculiar facts of this case be hopelessly barred
by limitation inasmuch as once ouster is clear from the year 1996, the
period of 12 years under Article 65 expires in 2007, and thereafter by
virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the rights of the
appellant/plaintiff assuming they existed in the suit property would stand
extinguished. Thus, neither the suit as framed was maintainable as a suit
for partition and the relief for possession as of today, if the suits were to
be converted into a suit for possession, the relief for possession cannot be
granted because the suit for possession as on today will be barred if the
same is filed today.”
[emphasis supplied]
48.
In this regard, appellants had moved an application bearing CM
No.26030/2018 seeking amendment of the plaint. In paragraphs 7, 19, and 21
of the said application, the appellants admitted that they were not in
possession of the Surya Niketan Property at the time of institution of the suit.
Hence, they sought amendment of the plaint so as to include the relief of
possession. The aforesaid paragraphs are set out below:
“7. That on 13.10.2017, this Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that
since the appellants/plaintiffs were not in physical possession of the
Surya Niketan property, no sufficient Court fees had been paid. This
Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that the appellants/plaintiffs will
accordingly value the appeal for the relief of possession on the market
value of the property at Surya Niketan on the date of filing of the suit.
Copy of the order dated 13.10.2017 is annexed herewith as Annexure-A.
XXXX
19. That in the backdrop of the above facts and circumstances, it is become
necessary for the appellants to seek amendment of the plaint to the extent
that they may be allowed to seek decree of possession of the suit land.
XXXX
21. That the appellants may also be allowed to add sub para (viii) after
sub para (vii) in the prayer clause of the amended plaint as under: "Decree
of possession in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant No.3 in
respect of plot No.27, Surya Niketan, Delhi””
[emphasis supplied]
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
49.
However, the aforesaid application was withdrawn by the counsel for
the appellants on 28th March, 2026.
50.
To a pointed query from the Court as to why the said application was
withdrawn, counsel for the appellants submitted that since the appellants were
in constructive possession of the Surya Niketan Property, the aforesaid
application was withdrawn. However, from the discussion above, it is
manifest that plaintiffs were not in actual or constructive possession of Surya
Niketan Property at the time of institution of the suit. Consequently, in the
absence of possession and without seeking the relief of possession, the suit
for partition was not maintainable as framed.
51.
In view of the discussions above, I do not find any infirmity in the
findings of the Trial Court that requires interference by this Court.
52.
Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed.
53.
Pending applications stand disposed of.
AMIT BANSAL
SEPTEMBER 16, 2026
Rzu
Signed By:VIVEK
MISHRA
16:39:22
RFA 858/2017
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review