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2026:HHC:11131
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1094 of 2025
Reserved on: 5.3.2026
Date of Decision: 09.4.2026.
Manjeet Kaur
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP & ors.
…. Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Rajiv Rai, Advocate.
For Respondents No.1 to 3
:
Mr Prahant Sen,
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.4
:
None.
Deputy
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
quashing of FIR No. 23 of 2023, dated 07.06.2023, registered at
the Women Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant, Isha Chauhan, filed a complaint
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:11131
with the police, asserting that she was married to the accused
Akhil Chauhan in 2018, according to Hindu rites and ceremonies.
Her husband began demanding money six months after their
marriage. She started a job in Chandigarh on 10.01.2020, and
shifted to Chandigarh with her husband. She became pregnant in
June 2020 but suffered a miscarriage due to harassment and
abuse. Her stridhan, including jewellery, a fixed deposit of ₹2.00
lacs, and dowry articles, were retained by the accused. She was
forced to pay ₹10 lakh and the registration charges for a car. She
purchased a TVS Jupiter for herself with her own money, but was
compelled to give it to her sister-in-law. The accused
increasingly demanded money and land and subjected her to
physical and mental torture. The informant filed a complaint
under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act at
Una. She also submitted an application to the Women's Cell, Una,
but the accused refused to appear before the Women’s Cell.
Accordingly, it was prayed that action be taken against the
accused.
3.
The police registered the FIR and investigated the
matter. The police made enquiries in the neighbourhood, but no
house except the house of the uncle was located in the
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neighbourhood. The police seized the documents from the Gram
Panchayat, recorded the statements of the witnesses as per their
version and filed the charge sheet before the Court after the
completion of the investigation.
4.
Being aggrieved by the filing of the charge-sheet, the
petitioner Manjeet Kaur has filed the present petition for
quashing of the FIR and the proceedings pending before the
learned Trial Court. It has been asserted that the marriage of the
informant
and
the
petitioner’s
son
was
solemnised
on
22.09.2018. The relationship between the petitioner’s son and
the informant remained cordial till 2020. The petitioner’s
husband is an employee of National Fertilisers Limited, Naya
Nangal, District Ropar, Punjab. He was posted at National
Fertilisers Limited, Panipat. The informant joined the company
of the entire family at Panipat after her marriage and resided at
Panipat till March, 2019. The informant got the employment and
joined as a Data Entry Operator at Net Smartz Infotech,
Chandigarh. She shifted to Chandigarh to live with her mother
and younger brother with the consent of the entire family of the
petitioner. The informant never had any association with the
petitioner for more than 3 to 4 days at a time because the
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informant used to reside at Chandigarh, and the petitioner used
to reside with her husband. The petitioner had gone on a family
trip to Amritsar with the informant on 12.06.2022 and had shared
a very good and affectionate bonding with her. This fact is
evident from the photographs taken during the trip. The
petitioner’s son got employed with M&M Swaraj Tractors at
Mohali in January 2020 and started residing with the informant
at Chandigarh. He and the informant shifted to Nangal
thereafter. One daughter was born to the informant and her
husband on 17.08.2021. The petitioner used to visit the
informant’s house to meet her grand daughter. The petitioner
found out in June 2022 that the relationship between her son and
the informant had deteriorated, and the informant had left her
matrimonial home without any reason. The informant filed a
complaint, but no allegation was made against the petitioner in
the complaint. The police also called the informant on many
occasion, but she failed to participate. No specific allegations
were made against the petitioner. She had averred in the
complaint filed under the Domestic Violence Act that the
petitioner was harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry and
that she had demanded a gold bracelet and a car, which
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allegations are false. Such allegations were not made in the
complaint made to the police, and these are clear improvements.
The informant has filed a false complaint due to the strained
relationship with her husband. Hence, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.
5.
I have heard Mr Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent-State.
6.
Mr Rajeev Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the allegations made by the informant against the
petitioner are false, which is evident from the fact that no
specific allegation was made against the petitioner in the initial
complaint made to the police. The petitioner never resided with
the informant for a long time and had not demanded any dowry
from the informant. The continuation of the proceedings against
the petitioner amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be
quashed.
7.
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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent-State, submitted that the police found
sufficient material to file the charge-sheet against the petitioner
after the investigation. The informant specifically asserted that
the petitioner had demanded the gold jewellery and had retained
her stridhan. This Court should not exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some
of
the
principles
under
which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
2026:HHC:11131
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
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sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
10.
2026:HHC:11131
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
11.
A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear
that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of
any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the
ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only
2026:HHC:11131
empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its
inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new
power on the High Court but rather saves the power which
the High Court already possesses, from before the
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very
existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the
High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it
may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the
proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”
12.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13.
The FIR specifically says that the informant’s
stridhan, including her jewellery and fixed deposit of ₹2.00 lacs
and dowry articles, are lying with the accused. The application
filed by the informant under the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act specifically mentions that the informant’s
husband and his parents used to taunt the informant for not
bringing sufficient dowry. Therefore, it is not correct to say that
no allegations have been made against the petitioner.
14.
It was submitted that the allegations made in the FIR
are false. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025
SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under
Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint
as correct. It was observed: -
2026:HHC:11131
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely
according to its whims or caprice.”
15.
It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent
jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of
quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if
taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the
cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do
not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a
case against the accused. We are of the considered view
that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the
categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
2026:HHC:11131
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A.
[Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:
(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when
the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the
pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC
p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even prima
facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the
charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single
Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007
SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
made out from the complainant's FIR, chargesheet, documents, etc. or not.”
16.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a minitrial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It
was observed on page 397:
2026:HHC:11131
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v.
Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379].
The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC,
the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed
further against the accused for which the accused is
required to be tried or not’.”
17.
This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan
(Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of
quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial.
Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.
with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court
has to only consider whether any sufficient material is
available to proceed against the accused or not. If
sufficient material is available, the power under Section
482 should not be exercised.”
18.
It was submitted that no allegations were made
against the petitioner in the complaint made to the police, and
the comparison of the complaint made to the police and the FIR
would show various improvements. This submission will not help
2026:HHC:11131
the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Muskan (supra) that the High Court cannot quash the F.I.R. based
on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: “17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether
the High Court was right in quashing the criminal
proceedings against the private respondents primarily on
the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the
two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022,
which were later on added in the FIR and whether the
same would not amount to conducting a ‘mini trial’ which
is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 482 of
the Cr. P.C.
xxxx
19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned
paragraphs it can be seen that one of the important factors
that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of
the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints
filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events
of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and
27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR dated
28.01.2024.
Xxxx
27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law
by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the
credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the
complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it
must be shown that there exists no prima facie case
against the accused persons. In the present case, from the
conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be
seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and
demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High
Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents
primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints
that were filed by the appellant did not mention the
2026:HHC:11131
specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and
27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the
FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the
legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the
appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial
home. This approach adopted by the High Court, in our
considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial.
19.
Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR simply
because some incidents were not mentioned in the earlier
complaint made by the informant.
20.
It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge
sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of
the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that
when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court
should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the
absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials
which the investigating officer might have collected
forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge
2026:HHC:11131
application is filed, the trial court shall look into the
materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
21.
No other point was urged.
22.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and
the same is dismissed.
23.
The present petition stands disposed of, and so are
the miscellaneous applications, if any.
24.
The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
9th April, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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