Manish Kumar vs Union of India and Another

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.4 – s.4 of the impugned amendment, incorporated an additional Explanation in s.11 of the Code – While s.11 is about persons not entitled to make application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process, the additional Explanation provided that nothing in section 11 prevented a corporate debtor from initiating corporate insolvency resolution process against another corporate debtor – Held: The provisions of the impugned Explanation clearly amount to a clarificatory amendment – A clarificatory amendment is retrospective in nature – The Explanation merely makes the intention of the Legislature clear beyond the pale of doubt – The argument of the petitioners that the amendment came into force only on 28.12.2019 and, therefore, in respect to applications filed under ss.7, 9 or 10, it will not have any bearing, cannot be accepted – The Explanation, in the facts of these cases, is clearly clarificatory in nature and it will certainly apply to all pending applications also – The intention of the Legislature was always to target the corporate debtor only insofar as it purported to prohibit application by the corporate debtor against itself, to prevent abuse of the provisions of the Code – It could never had been the intention of the Legislature to create an obstacle in the path of the corporate debtor, in any of the circumstances contained in s.11, from maximizing its assets by trying to recover the liabilities due to it from others – Not only does it go against the basic commonsense view but it would frustrate the very object of the Code, if a corporate debtor is prevented from invoking the provisions of the Code either by itself or through his resolution professional, who at later stage, may, don the mantle of its liquidator – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.11, Explanation II.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.10 – s.10 of the impugned amendment inserts s.32A in the Code – It was contended that but for s.32A, the properties which are acquired could be attached but that is pre-empted by s.32A – The petitioners contend that immunity granted to the corporate debtors and its assets acquired from the proceeds of crimes and any criminal liability arising from the offences of the erstwhile management for the offences committed prior to initiation of CIRP and approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority further jeopardizes the interest of the allottees/creditors – Held: No case whatsoever is made out to seek invalidation of s.32A – The boundaries of this Court’s jurisdiction are clear – The wisdom of the legislation is not open to judicial review – Having regard to the object of the Code, the experience of the working of the code, the interests of all stakeholders including most importantly the imperative need to attract resolution applicants who would not shy away from offering reasonable and fair value as part of the resolution plan if the legislature thought that immunity be granted to the corporate debtor as also its property, it hardly furnishes a ground for this Court to interfere – The provision is carefully thought out – It is not as if the wrongdoers are allowed to get away – They remain liable – The extinguishment of the criminal liability of the corporate debtor is apparently important to the new management to make a clean break with the past and start on a clean slate – The immunity is premised on various conditions being fulfilled – There must be a resolution plan – It must be approved – There must be a change in the control of the corporate debtor – The new management cannot be the disguised avatar of the old management – It cannot even be the related party of the corporate debtor – The new management cannot be the subject matter of an investigation which has resulted in material showing abetment or conspiracy for the commission of the offence and the report or complaint filed thereto – These ingredients are also insisted upon for claiming exemption of the bar from actions against the property – Significantly every person who was associated with the corporate debtor in any manner and who was directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the offence in terms of the report submitted continues to be liable to be prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the corporate debtor – The corporate debtor and its property in the context of the scheme of the code constitute a distinct subject matter justifying the special treatment accorded to them – Creation of a criminal offence as also abolishing criminal liability must ordinarily be left to the judgement of the legislature – Attaining public welfare very often needs delicate balancing of conflicting interests – As to what priority must be accorded to which interest must remain a legislative value judgement and if seemingly the legislature in its pursuit of the greater good appears to jettison the interests of some it cannot unless it strikingly ill squares with some constitutional mandate suffer invalidation – There is no basis at all to impugn the Section on the ground that it violates Articles 19, 21 or 300A – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.32A.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 – s.3 –s.3 of the impugned amendment, amended s.7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Amendment by s.3 of the impugned amendment incorporated three provisos to s.7(1) – The third proviso provided that where an application for initiating the corporate insolvency resolution process against a corporate debtor has been filed by a financial creditor referred to in the first and second provisos and has not been admitted by the Adjudicating Authority before the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, such application shall be modified to comply with the requirements of the first or second proviso within thirty days of the commencement of the said Act, failing which the application shall be deemed to be withdrawn before its admission – Held: The third proviso is a one-time affair – It is intended only to deal with those applications, u/s.7, which were filed prior to 28.12.2019, when, by way of the impugned Ordinance, initially, the threshold requirements came to be introduced by the first and the second impugned provisos – In other words, the legislative intention was to ensure that no application u/s.7 could be filed after 28.12.2019, except upon complying with the requirements in the first and second provisos – The Legislature did not stop there – It has clearly intended that the threshold requirement it imposed, will apply to all those applications, which were filed, prior to 28.12.2019 as well, subject to the exception that the applications, so filed, had not been admitted, u/s.7(5) – In other words, the Legislature intended that in every application, filed under s.7, by the creditors covered by the first proviso and by the allottees governed by the second proviso, should also be embraced by the newly imposed threshold requirement for which, it was intended, should be complied within 30 days from the date of the Ordinance – However, this restriction was not to apply to those applications which stood admitted as on the date of the Ordinance – It is also clear that the consequence of failure to comply with the threshold requirement, in regard to applications, which have been filed earlier, was that they would stand withdrawn – When applications were filed under the unamended provisions of s.7, at any rate it would transform into a vested right – The vested right is to proceed with the action till its logical and legal conclusion – No doubt, there may not be a vested right as regard mere procedure and while limitation, ordinarily, belongs to the domain of procedure, should new law shorten the existing period of limitation, such a law would not operate in regard to the right of action which is vested – Every sovereign Legislature is clothed with competence to make retrospective laws – It is open to the Legislature, while making retrospective law, to take away vested rights – If a vested right can be taken away by a retrospective law, there can be no reason why the Legislature cannot modify the vested rights – The imposition of a threshold requirement being a mandatory and irreducible minimum even, if it is to be achieved as and after the date of the amendment, constitutes an intrusion into the substantive right of action vested in the individual creditor – The action of the creditor was not a completed transaction – As regards his conduct in the past, viz., moving u/s.7, it is incomplete but the action was commenced – But the law (the 3rd proviso) impairs the past action qua the future – Imposing the threshold requirement under the 3rd proviso, is not a mere matter of procedure – It impairs vested rights – Prescribing a time limit in regard to pending applications, cannot be, per se, described as arbitrary, as otherwise, it would be an endless and uncertain procedure – The applications would remain part of the docket and also become a Damocles Sword overhanging the debtor and the other stakeholders with deleterious consequences also qua the objects of the Code – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.7.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Need of – Held: The Code was an imperative need for the nation to try and catch up with the rest of the world, be it in the matter of ease of doing business, elevating the rate of recovery of loans, maximization of the assets of ailing concerns and also, the balancing the interests of all stakeholders.

Amendment – Clarificatory amendment – Is retrospective in nature.

Legislation – Plenary Legislation – Challenge to – Grounds – Discussed.

Legislation – Plenary Legislation – Challenge to – On ground of malice – Held: While malice may furnish a ground in an appropriate case to veto administrative action, malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law.

Dismissing the writ petitions and transferred case, the Court HELD:1.1. The grounds on which plenary law can be challenged are well established. A law can be successfully challenged if contrary to the division of powers, either the Parliament or the State Legislature usurps power that does not fall within its domain thus, rendering it incompetent to make such law. Secondly, a law made contravening Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India would be visited with unconstitutionality and declared void to the extent of its contravention. Needless to say, a law within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution would remain valid qua a non-citizen. Thirdly, apart from Fundamental Rights, the supremacy of the Constitution vis-a-vis the ordinary legislation, even when the law is plenary legislation, is preserved with a view that legislation must be in conformity with the other provisions of the Constitution. [Para 47][955-C-F]

1.2. A plenary law if it is found to be manifestly arbitrary it becomes vulnerable. [Para 50][958-C]

1.3. A law, be it the offspring of a Legislature, it falls foul of Article 14 if it is found to be vague. [Para 51][958-E]

1.4. It has been urged that the law was created by way of pandering to the real estate lobby and succumbing to their pressure or by way of placating their vested interests. Such an argument is nothing but a thinly disguised attempt at questioning the law of the Legislature based on malice. While malice may furnish a ground in an appropriate case to veto administrative action it is trite that malice does not furnish a ground to attack a plenary law. [Para 52][958-G; 959-A, B-C]

1.5. A supreme legislature cannot be cribbed, cabined or confined by the doctrine of promissory estoppel or estoppel. It acts as a sovereign body. The theory of promissory estoppel, on the one hand, has witnessed an incredible trajectory of growth but it is incontestable that it serves as an effective deterrent to prevent injustice from a Government or its agencies which seek to resile from a representation made by them, without just cause. [Para 54][959-E-G]

1.6. A mere charge of either under inclusiveness or over inclusiveness which is not difficult to make hardly suffices to persuade the court to strike down a law. There is a wide latitude allowed in the legislature in these matters. The examination cannot be extended to find out whether there is mathematical precision or wooden equality established. The working of the statute may produce further issues, all of it may not be fully perceived as which may not be wholly foreseen by the law giver. The freedom to experiment must be conceded to the legislature, particularly, in economic laws. If problems emerge in the working of law and which require legislative intervention, the court cannot be oblivious to the power of the legislative to respond by stepping in with necessary amendment. There is nothing like a perfect law and as with all human institutions there are bound to be imperfections. What is significant is however for the court ruling on constitutionality, the law must present a clear departure from constitutional limits. [Para 121][1005-E-H]

1.7. The mere difficulties in given cases, to comply with a law can hardly furnish a ground to strike it down. As to what would constitute the real estate project, it must depend on the terms & conditions and scope of a particular real estate project in which allottees are a part of. These are factual matters to be considered in the facts of each case. [Para 124][1006-G-H]

2. The rationale behind, confining allottees to the same real estate project, is to promote the object of the Code. Once the threshold requirement can pass muster when tested in the anvil of a challenge based on Articles 14, 19 and 21, then, there is both logic and reason behind the legislative value judgment that the allottees, who must join the application under the impugned provisos, must be related to the same real estate project. The connection with the same real estate project is crucial to the determination of the critical mass, which Legislature has in mind, as a part of its scheme, to streamline the working of the Code. If it is to embrace the total number of allottees of all projects, which a Promoter of a real estate project, may be having, in one sense, it will make the task of the applicant himself, more cumbersome. It becomes a sword, which will cut both ways. This is for the reason that the complaints, relating to different projects, may be different. With regard to one project of a Promoter of real estate project, maybe, in the advanced stage, the allottees in a particular project, may not have much of a complaint. The complaint, in relation to yet another project, may be more serious. If the complaint in respect of the latter, attracts the attention of a critical mass of allottees, and the proposed applicant is part of that project in the said project, then, it may be easier for the allottees to fulfil the statutory mantra in the impugned provisos, with the junction of likeminded souls. If, on the other hand, the requirement was to make a search for allottees of different projects, as would be the case, if the entirety of the allottees, under different projects, were to be reckoned, the task would have been much more cumbersome. The requirement of the allottees, being drawn from the same project, stands to reason and also does not suffer from any constitutional blemish. [Para 140][1013-H; 1014-A-E]

3. There can be no doubt that the requirement of a threshold under the impugned proviso, in Section 7(1), must be fulfilled as on the date of the filing of the application. [Para 141][1014-G-H]

4. In the matter of presentation of an application under Section 7, if the threshold requirement, under the impugned provisos, stands fulfilled, the requirement of the law must be treated as fulfilled. The contention, relating to the ambiguity and consequent unworkability and the resultant arbitrariness, is clearly untenable. If an allottee is able to, in other words, satisfy the requirements, as on the date of the presentation, the requirement of the impugned law is fulfilled. [Para 143][1016-AB]

5. It does not matter whether a person has one or more allotments in his name or in the name of his family members. As long as there are independent allotments made to him or his family members, all of them would qualify as separate allottees and they would count both in the calculation of the total allotments, as also in reckoning the figure of hundred allottees or one-tenth of the allottees, whichever is less. [Para 146][1017-F-G]

6. The object of the Statute, admittedly, is to ensure that there is a critical mass of persons (allottees), who agree that the time is ripe to invoke the Code and to submit to the inexorable processes under the Code, with all its attendant perils. The object of maintaining speed in the CIRP and also the balancing of interest of all the stakeholders, would be promoted by the view that as in the case of the Companies Acts, 1956 and 2013, that for the purpose of complying with the impugned provisos in Section 7(1), while the allottee can be of any of the categories, fulfilling the description of an allottee in Section 2(d) of RERA, joint allottees of a single apartment, will be treated as only one allottee. Any other view can lead to clear abuse and defeating of the object of the Code. If, for instance, a single apartment is taken in the name of hundred persons, a single allottee, who in turn comprise of relatives or family members or friends, can move an application, even though the position ante would be restored, which means that only the allottee qua one apartment, plot or building, is before the Authority and it would not really represent a critical mass of the allottees in the real estate project concerned. [Para 147][1018B-E]

7. The Central Government, having regard to the scheme of Companies Act, is intricately interconnected with the management of the companies. It had powers of investigation into the affairs of the companies under Section 235 and Section

237. The purport of Sections 397 and 398 include the conduct of the affairs of the company in any manner prejudicial to the public interest or also, no doubt, prejudicial to member or members. In such circumstances, clothing the Central Government with the power to waive the requirement and permitting the application to be presented by even a single member, is in sync with the scheme of the Companies Act. The role of the Central Government is different under the Code. In fact, the Central Government does not have any role, as such under the Code. It acts only through the designated Authorities under the Code. The Code is about insolvency resolution and on failure liquidation. The scheme of the Code is unique and its objects are vividly different from that of the Companies Act. Consequently, if the Legislature felt that threshold requirement representing a critical mass of allottees, alone would satisfy the requirement of a valid institution of an application under Section 7, it cannot be dubbed as either discriminatory or arbitrary. [Para 151][1019-D-G]

8. Invalidating a law made by a competent Legislature, on the basis of what the Court may be induced to conclude, as a better arrangement or a morewise and even fairer system, is constitutionally impermissible. If, the impugned provisions are otherwise not infirm, they must pass muster. [Para 157][1023-E]

9. The law giver has created a mechanism, namely, the association of allottees through which the allottees are expected to gather information about the status of the allotments including the names and addresses of the allottees. One cannot proceed on the basis in a case which involves a challenge to a statute that the information to be gathered under the statute will not be available on the basis that the statute will not be worked as contemplated by the law giver. [Para 163][1030-C-D]

10. The law does not interdict the creation of a class within a class absolutely. Should there be a rational basis for creating a sub-class within a class, then, it is not impermissible. A class within a sub-class, is indeed not antithetical to the guarantee of equality under Article 14. [Para 188][1046-G-H; 1047-B]

11. Allottees are, indeed, financial creditors. They do possess certain characteristics, however, which appear to have appealed to the Legislature as setting them apart from the generality of financial creditors. These features, which set them apart, have been clearly indicated in the stand of the Union. They are: (i) Numerosity; (ii) Heterogeneity; and (iii) The individuality in decision making. [Para 189][1047-B-D]

12. In the case of the allottees of a real estate project, it is the approach of the Legislature that in a real estate project there would be large number of allottees. There can be hundreds or even thousands of allottees in a project. If a single allottee, as a financial creditor, is allowed to move an application under Section 7, the interests of all the other allottees may be put in peril. This is for the reason that as stakeholders in the real estate project, having invested money and time and looking forward to obtaining possession of the flat or apartment and faced with the same state of affairs as the allottee, who moves the application under Section 7 of the Code, the other allottees may have a different take of the whole scenario. Some of them may approach the Authority under the RERA. Others may, instead, resort to the For a under the Consumer Protection Act, though, the remedy of a civil suit is, no doubt, not ruled out. Ordinarily, the allottee would have the remedies available under RERA or the Consumer Protection Act, as the more effective option. In such circumstances, if the Legislature, taking into consideration, the sheer numbers of a group of creditors, viz., the allottees of real estate projects, finds this to be an intelligible differentia, which distinguishes the allottees from the other financial creditors, who are not found to possess the characteristics of numerosity, then, it is not for this Court to sit in judgment over the wisdom of such a measure. [Para 192][1049-B-E]

13. The enquiry must not end with finding that there is an intelligible differentia, to be found in the numerosity, heterogeneity and individuality in decision-making of the allottees. The law further requires that the differentia must have bear a rational nexus with the object of the law. [Para 193][1049-F]

14. The object of the law is clear. A radical departure was contemplated from the erstwhile regime, which was essentially contained in The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and which manifested a deep malaise, which impacted the economy itself. To put it shortly, the procedures involved under the Act, simply meant procrastination in matters, where speed and dynamic decisions were the crying need of the hour. The value of the assets of the Company in distress, was wasted away both by the inexorable and swift passage of time and tardy rate at which the forums responded to the problem of financial distress. The Code was an imperative need for the nation to try and catch up with the rest of the world, be it in the matter of ease of doing business, elevating the rate of recovery of loans, maximization of the assets of ailing concerns and also, the balancing the interests of all stakeholders. The Code purports to achieve the object of maximization of the assets of corporate bodies, inter alia, which have slipped into insolvency. Present a default, which, no doubt, is not barred by time (subject to the power of the Authority under Section 5 of the Limitation Act), the Insolvency Resolution Process can be triggered. [Para 194][1049-G-H; 1050-A-C]

15. A Resolution Plan is intended to resuscitate an ailing corporate debtor and keep it going as a going concern. The importance of rescuing ailing businesses in the form of infusing new life in such concerns, cannot be understated. Its significance lies in various directions. There would be various categories of creditors, of which, the legislative choice appears to show some degree of preference for the financial creditors, particularly in the form of banks and financial institutions. One of the chief goals of the Code is to prevent the loss of the value of capital. If the recovery of the loan is effected at the earliest, it translates into the availability of the recovered capital for being lent to other entrepreneurs, and this is an aspect, which goes to the root of the matter. With every passing hour, not unnaturally, depreciation will claim its victim in the form of diminution of value of the assets. Should insolvency pass into the stage of liquidation, the loss is not only of the concerned businesses, but it also would represent a loss for the Nation. This is, undoubtedly, apart from the impairment of the interests of all stakeholders. The stakeholders would include the financial creditors and the operational creditors, as well. Employees of the failed business, would take a direct hit. Therefore, the Code accords the highest importance to speed in the matter of undergoing the process of insolvency. [Para 194][1050-F-H; 1051-A-B]

16. The speed, with which the processes can be conducted and completed, is based on the volume of the litigation. The Adjudicating Authorities and the Appellate Bodies, viz., N.C.L.A.T., are authorities under other enactments, as well. They are hard-pressed for time. The matters, which are covered by the Code, may present convoluted facts. The issues may bristle with complications, both in points of law and also facts. If, out of a large body of financial creditors belonging to a sub-group, as for instance allottees of a real estate project, were to be given the freedom to activise the Code, then, the possibility of multiple individual actions, is a spectre, which the Legislature, must be presumed to be aware of. In other words, the Legislature became alive to the peril of entire object of the Code, being derailed by permitting the individual players crowding the docket of the Authorities under the Code, and resultantly, reviving the very state of affairs, which compelled the Legislature to script a new dawn in this area of law. Instead, having regard to the numerosity, the Legislature has thought it fit to adopt a balanced approach by not taking the allottee out of the fold of the financial creditors altogether. The allottee continues to be a financial creditor. All that is envisaged is the legislative value judgment that a critical mass is indispensable for allottees to be present before the Code, can be activised. The purport of the critical mass of applicants would ensure that a reasonable number of persons similarly circumstanced, form the view that despite the remedies available under the RERA or the Consumer Protection Act or a civil suit, the invoking of the Code is the only way out, in a particular case. [Para 196][1051-D-H; 1052-A-B]

17. One of the objects is the balancing of the interests of all stakeholders. By imposing a threshold limit of either hundred allottees or if the number of allottees going by the criteria of one-tenth of the allottees is, even less than hundred, then, the said number of allottees must agree to invoke the Code. This is again, based on the intelligible differentia of heterogeneity. By heterogeneity, is meant, differences between a seemingly homogenous group. All allottees of a real estate project form a class. All of them have stakes in the prompt and effective completion of the real estate project. There is a plurality of remedies, which the law provides. More importantly, the outcome of activising the Code, is almost like an uncertain wager. The outcome of invoking the Code by individual allottees would be apart from clogging the dockets of the Adjudicating Authorities with even more voluminous files leading to greater delay, that at the instance of such individual allottees, what would be perceived as an avoidable calamity, is perpetuated. In other words, while a vast majority of allottees may see reason in either giving time and reposing faith in existing management of real estate project or successfully invoking the other remedies available to them, an individual allottee, out of the heterogenous group, would throw the spanner in the works and bring the entire real estate project itself to a possible doom. [Para 196][1052-D-H; 1053-A-B]

18. The individual allottee, with a high-level of subjectivity in decision-making, may take a plunge at invoking the Code, without having a more global view of the consequences, which will follow. Any such attempt would only be dubbed as frivolous. This attempt by individual allottees would have the following consequences:

i. It would crowd an already heavy docket;

ii. It would consequently slow down the processes under the Code, even with respect to matters, which may be more genuine and require greater and more timely attention; iii. It will defeat the object of the balancing the interests of all stakeholders. [Para 197][1053-E-G]

19. The law under scrutiny is an economic measure. In dealing with the challenge on the anvil of Article 14, the Court will not adopt a doctrinaire approach. A law cannot operate in a vacuum. In the concrete world, when the law is put into motion in practical experiences, bottlenecks that would flow from its application, are best envisaged by the Law Givers. Solutions to vexed problems made manifest through experience, would indeed require a good deal of experimentation, as long as it passes muster in law. It is no part of a court’s function to probe into what it considers to be more wise or a better way to deal with a problem. In economic matters, the wider latitude given to the Law Giver is based on sound principle and tested logic over time. [Para 199][1054-G-H; 1055-A-B]

20. There cannot be any doubt that intrinsically a financial creditor and an operational creditor are distinct. An operational creditor is one to whom money is due on account of goods or services supplied to the debtor. The financial creditor on the other hand, is so described, on account of there being the element of borrowing. This distinction is indisputable. What is unique to the real estate developer vis-a-vis operational debts is that the developer is the debtor as an allottee funds his own apartment by paying amounts in advance. On the other hand, in case of operational debt, the person who has supplied the goods and services, becomes the creditor and the corporate debtor is one who has availed such services. Another distinction is that an operational creditor has no interest or stake in the corporate debtor. The allottee is, on the other hand, vitally concerned with the financial health of the corporate debtor. Should financial ruin occur, the real estate project will come to a nought. Should such an event take place also, the allottee would not be in a position to either claim or get compensation or even refund with interest. Thirdly, there is no consideration for the time value of money in the operational debt. This is not so in the case of an allottee. [Para 212][1065-F-H; 1066-A-C]

21. An action under the Code by way of an application under Section 7 is an action in rem. The recovery of the amounts paid is not what is primarily contemplated under the Code. The vires of the impugned provisions must be judged without turning a blind eye to the distinction between the wisdom and the legislative value judgment behind the Statute being immune from judicial scrutiny on the one hand and a hostile discrimination falling foul of the mandate of equality under Article 14, being fatal to the Statute. In this case, while it may be true that the allottees are unsecured creditors and in that regard, they are similar to the operational creditors and it also may be true that many contracts under real estate projects, may not involve large sums as the subject matter of advances by banks and other financial institutions, the similarity between the two ends there. What is of greater importance is the distinctions and the most vital point which sets them apart, in the matter of pronouncing on the vires of the provisos under Section 7 is the numerosity of the allottees, and what is more not being homogeneous in what they want in a particular situation, since the law has indeed endowed the allottees with different remedies, having different implications, be it under the Consumer Protection Act or under RERA. If the Legislature felt that having regard to the consequences of an application under the Code, when such a large group of persons, pull at each other, an additional threshold be erected for exercising the right under Section 7, certainly, it cannot suffer a constitutional veto at the hands of Court exercising judicial review of legislation. [Para 213][1066-F; 1067-B-F]

22. This is not a case where the right of the allottee is completely taken away. All that has happened is a half-way house is built between extreme positions, viz., denying the right altogether to the allottee to move the application under Section 7 of the Code and giving an unbridled license to a single person to hold the real estate project and all the stakeholders thereunder hostage to a proceeding under the Code which must certainly pass inexorably within a stipulated period of time should circumstances exists under Section 33 into corporate death with the unavoidable consequence of all allottees and not merely the applicant under Section 7 being visited with payment out of the liquidation value, the amounts which are only due to the unsecured creditor. The point of distinction, between a financial creditor in this case, the allottees of a real estate project and the operational creditors, as contained in Section 7 on the one hand and Sections

8 and 9 are preserved. In other words, the operational creditor still has to cross the threshold of not being shut off from the application not being processed in the teeth of the defense allowed to the corporate debtor in regard to an operational creditor. All that has happened is the Legislature in its wisdom has found that the greater good lies in conditioning an absolute right which existed in favour of an allottee by requirements which would ensure some certain element of consensus among the allottees. The requirement is a mere one-tenth of the allottees. This is a number which goes to policy and lies exclusively within the wisdom of the Legislature. [Para 214][1067-G-H; 1068-A-D]

23. The first proviso is invulnerable. The impact of the insertion of sub-section 3A in Section 25A is to be noticed. Section 25A, inter alia, deals with the exercise of rights and the liabilities of authorised representative of creditors like debenture holders and allottees. After the insertion of sub-section 3A in section 25A, the majority of the creditors of a class is permitted to call the shots. It’s view, in other words, will hold sway. This is subject to the Code otherwise. The legislative understanding is clear that in regard to such creditors bearing the hallmark of large numbers they are required to be treated differently. If they are not treated differently it would spell chaos and the objects of the Code would not be fulfilled. It is an extension of this basic principle which has led to the insertion of the impugned proviso. Insisting on a threshold in regard to these categories of creditors would lead to the halt to indiscriminate litigation which would result in an uncontrollable docket explosion as far as the authorities which work the Code are concerned. The debtor who is apparently stressed is relieved of the last straw on the camel’s back, as it were, by halting individual creditors whose views are not shared even by a reasonable number of its peers rushing in with applications. Again, as in the case of the allottees, this is not a situation where while treating them as financial creditors they are totally deprived of the right to apply under Section 7 as part of the legislative scheme. The legislative policy reflects an attempt at shielding the corporate debtor from what it considers would be either for frivolous or avoidable applications. What we mean by avoidable applications is a decision which would not be taken by similarly placed creditors keeping in mind the consequences that would ensue not only in regard to persons falling in the same category but also the generality of creditors and other stakeholders. All that the amendment is likely to ensure is that the filing of the application is preceded by a consensus at least by a minuscule percentage of similarly placed creditors that the time has come for undertaking a legal odyssey which is beset with perils for the applicants themselves apart from others. As far as the percentage of applicants contemplated under the proviso it is clear that it cannot be dubbed as an arbitrary or capricious figure. The legislature is not wanting in similar requirements under other laws. The provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and its predecessors contained similar provisions. Allowing what is described as ‘lone Ranger’ applications beset with extremely serious ramifications which are at cross purposes with the objects of the code. This is apart from it in particular spelling avoidable doom for the interest of the creditors falling in the same categories. The object of speed in deciding CIRP proceedings would also be achieved by applying the threshold to debenture holders and security holders. The dividing line between wisdom or policy of the legislature and limitation placed by the Constitution must not be overlooked. [Para 220][1071-D-H; 1072-A-E]

24. The intention of the Legislature was always to target the corporate debtor only insofar as it purported to prohibit application by the corporate debtor against itself, to prevent abuse of the provisions of the Code. It could never had been the intention of the Legislature to create an obstacle in the path of the corporate debtor, in any of the circumstances contained in Section 11, from maximizing its assets by trying to recover the liabilities due to it from others. Not only does it go against the basic commonsense view but it would frustrate the very object of the Code, if a corporate debtor is prevented from invoking the provisionsof the Code either by itself or through his resolution professional, who at later stage, may, don the mantle of its liquidator. The provisions of the impugned Explanation, thus, clearly amount to a clarificatory amendment. A clarificatory amendment, it is not even in dispute, is retrospective in nature. The Explanation merely makes the intention of the Legislature clear beyond the pale of doubt. The argument of the petitioners that the amendment came into force only on 28.12.2019 and, therefore, in respect to applications filed under Sections 7, 9 or 10, it will not have any bearing, cannot be accepted. The Explanation, in the facts of these cases, is clearly clarificatory in nature and it will certainly apply to all pending applications also. [Para 243][1084-E-H; 1085-A]

25. No case whatsoever is made out to seek invalidation of Section 32A. The boundaries of this Court’s jurisdiction are clear. The wisdom of the legislation is not open to judicial review. Having regard to the object of the Code, the experience of the working of the code, the interests of all stakeholders including most importantly the imperative need to attract resolution applicants who would not shy away from offering reasonable and fair value as part of the resolution plan if the legislature thought that immunity be granted to the corporate debtor as also its property, it hardly furnishes a ground for this this Court to interfere. The provision is carefully thought out. It is not as if the wrongdoers are allowed to get away. They remain liable. The extinguishment of the criminal liability of the corporate debtor is apparently important to the new management to make a clean break with the past and start on a clean slate. One must also not overlook the principle that the impugned provision is part of an economic measure. As far as protection afforded to the property is concerned there is clearly a rationale behind it. Having regard to the object of the statute one hardly sees any manifest arbitrariness in the provision. [Para 257][1098-B-D, F]

27. The immunity is premised on various conditions being fulfilled. There must be a resolution plan. It must be approved. There must be a change in the control of the corporate debtor. The new management cannot be the disguised avatar of the old management. It cannot even be the related party of the corporate debtor. The new management cannot be the subject matter of an investigation which has resulted in material showing abetment or conspiracy for the commission of the offence and the report or complaint filed thereto. These ingredients are also insisted upon for claiming exemption of the bar from actions against the property. Significantly every person who was associated with the corporate debtor in any manner and who was directly or indirectly involved in the commission of the offence in terms of the report submitted continues to be liable to be prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the corporate debtor. The corporate debtor and its property in the context of the scheme of the code constitute a distinct subject matter justifying the special treatment accorded to them. Creation of a criminal offence as also abolishing criminal liability must ordinarily be left to the judgement of the legislature. Erecting a bar against action against the property of the corporate debtor when viewed in the larger context of the objectives sought to be achieved at the forefront of which is maximisation of the value of the assets which again is to be achieved at the earliest point of time cannot become the subject of judicial veto on the ground of violation of Article 14. Attaining public welfare very often needs delicate balancing of conflicting interests. As to what priority must be accorded to which interest must remain a legislative value judgement and if seemingly the legislature in its pursuit of the greater good appears to jettison the interests of some it cannot unless it strikingly ill squares with some constitutional mandate suffer invalidation. There is no basis at all to impugn the Section on the ground that it violates Articles 19, 21 or 300A. [Paras 258, 259][1098-F-H; 1099-A-E]

28. The third proviso is a one-time affair. It is intended only to deal with those applications, under Section 7, which were filed prior to 28.12.2019, when, by way of the impugned Ordinance, initially, the threshold requirements came to be introduced by the first and the second impugned provisos. In other words, the legislative intention was to ensure that no application under Section 7 could be filed after 28.12.2019, except upon complying with the requirements in the first and second provisos. The Legislature did not stop there. It has clearly intended that the threshold requirement it imposed, will apply to all those applications, which were filed, prior to 28.12.2019 as well, subject to the exception that the applications, so filed, had not been admitted, under Section 7(5). In other words, the Legislature intended that in every application, filed under Section 7, by the creditors covered by the first proviso and by the allottees governed by the second proviso, should also be embraced by the newly imposed threshold requirement for which, it was intended, should be complied within 30 days from the date of the Ordinance. However, this restriction was not to apply to those applications which stood admitted as on the date of the Ordinance. It is also clear that the consequence of failure to comply with the threshold requirement, in regard to applications, which have been filed earlier, was that they would stand withdrawn.[Para 261][1100-BE]

29. Every sovereign Legislature is clothed with competence to make retrospective laws. It is open to the Legislature, while making retrospective law, to take away vested rights. If a vested right can be taken away by a retrospective law, there can be no reason why the Legislature cannot modify the vested rights. [Para 333][1145-G-H; 1146-A]

30. The financial creditors covered by the 3rd proviso were clothed with a statutory right under Section 7. This right was available to be exercised by an individual creditor, by himself or jointly with others. The imposition of a threshold requirement being a mandatory and irreducible minimum even, if it is to be achieved as and after the date of the amendment, constitutes an intrusion into the substantive right of action vested in the individual creditor. The action of the creditor was not a completed transaction. As regards his conduct in the past, viz., moving under Section 7, it is incomplete but the action was commenced. But the law (the 3rd proviso) impairs the past action qua the future. Imposing the threshold requirement under the 3rd proviso, is not a mere matter of procedure. It impairs vested rights. It has conditioned the right instead, in the manner provided in the first and the second proviso. This Court has already upheld the first and second proviso, which, in fact, operates only in the future. In that sense, the Legislature has purported to equate persons who had not filed applications with persons like the petitioners who had filed the applications under the unamended law. [Para 346][1149-F-H; 1150-A-B]

31. The requirement of compliance with the threshold numerical requirements under the first and second proviso is an integral and inseparable part of the third proviso. [Para 347][Para 348][1150-E]

32. From the standpoint of public interest, every application maintained by a single applicant, is perceived as a veritable threat to the fulfilment of the objectives of the Code. The continuance of the applications could not, therefore, be in public interest. It is, as if, the Legislature intended to apply its brakes in the form of asking the applicants to obtain the consensus of a minimum number of similar stakeholders, before the applications could be further processed. [Para 359][1154-D-E]

33. The law in question is an economic measure. This is a case where the Law Giver has not left anything to speculation or doubt. [Para 360][1155-B]

34. The Legislature has power to impair and take away vested rights. The limitation that flows, however, is from both Article 14 and 19 read with Article 21. It flows from the Doctrine that the action of the State must be fair and reasonable. The question, as to validity of the retrospective law, is a matter to be judged on a consideration of the facts, the period of time, over which the retrospective law operates, the impact of the law on the vested rights, the public interest, the nature of the right, which is the subject matter of the law and the terms of the law. [Para 361][1155-D-F]

35. The nature of the right involved in this case, is the right of the financial creditors to move an application under Section 7. Though, Section 7 confers a right upon the financial creditor to file the application, the proceedings are one in rem. The Legislature was faced with the situation, where it felt that the requirement, as to maintainability of the application under Section 7, must, in regard to pending applications, be modified in the manner done. There is a determining principle, namely, the perception from experience about how the entire object of the Code would stand jeopardised if applications already filed could go on even when a fair and reasonable number of kindred souls are not available to support it. Once there is a principle, it cannot be capricious, excessive or disproportionate unless the time given under the proviso is manifestly arbitrary. A vested right under a statute can be taken away by a retrospective law. A right given under a statute can be taken away by another statute. There was considerable public interest behind such a law. The sheer numbers, in which applications proliferated, combined with the results it could produce, cannot be brushed aside as an irrational or capricious aspect to have been guided by in making the law. Being an economic measure, the wider latitude available to the Law Giver, cannot be lost sight of. [Para 362][1155-F-H; 1156-AC]

36. As regards the compelled withdrawal under the third proviso of the pending applications is concerned, once the Legislature intended that the pending applications must be made compliant with the threshold requirement, consequences for not doing so had to be provided. Otherwise, it would have created complete uncertainty and the applicant would have been dealt with in a manifestly arbitrary manner. Providing for the consequence of withdrawal before admission does not have the consequence of preventing the fresh filing, even in regard to the same default, after complying, no doubt, with the requirement of the first or the second proviso, cannot be dubbed as arbitrary. No doubt, there is lack of clarity in this regard in the provision but on an understanding of the law, as expounded, the provision was capable of being understood in the manner done. [Para 365][1156G-H; 1157-A-B]

37. In regard to the first and the second provisos, they have only prospective operation. The creditors covered by these provisos, are not subjected to any time limit (except, no doubt, the bar under Article 137 of the Limitation Act), in the matter of garnering the requisite support. However, prescribing a time limit in regard to pending applications, cannot be, per se, described as arbitrary, as otherwise, it would be an endless and uncertain procedure. The applications would remain part of the docket and also become a Damocles Sword overhanging the debtor and the other stakeholders with deleterious consequences also qua the objects of the Code. The period could have been more fair to the petitioners by being longer but that is where one must bear in mind, the limits of jurisdiction. Where would the Court draw the line? It is difficult to hold that within the time limit of 30 days it is impossible to comply with the requirements. [Para 366 and 369][1157-B-D; 1158-C]

38. The impugned amendments are upheld, subject to directions issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. [Para 372][1159-D]

The State of Gujarat and Others v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad and Others (1974) 4 SCC 656 : [1974]

3 SCR 760; State of West-Bengal v. Anwar Ali AIR 1952 SC 75 : [1952] SCR 284; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (1974) 4 SCC 3 : [1974] 2 SCR 348; Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797; Navtej Singh Johar and Others v. Union of India and Others (2018) 10 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 379; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC

39 : [2018] 11 SCR 765; Justice K.S. Puttuswamy and Others v. Union of India and Others (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; Hindustan Construction

Company Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others AIR 2020 SC 122; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963; K. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (1985)

1 SCC 523 : [1985] 2 SCR 579; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 : [2009] [10] SCR 821 – relied on.

Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and another v. Union of India and Others (2019) 8 SCC

416 : [2019] 10 SCR 381; Chitra Sharma and Others v. Union of India and Others (2018) 18 SCC 575 : [2018] 12 SCR 1044; Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1979) 2 SCC 409 : [1979] 2 SCR 641; Nagpur Investment Trust and Others v. Vithal Rao and Others (1973) 1 SCC 500 : [1973] 3 SCR 39; B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Swiss Ribbon Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry AIR 1957 SC 540 : [1957] SCR 488; Thirumalai Chemicals Limited v. Union of India and Others (2011) 6 SCC 739 : [2011] 4 SCR 838; Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh and Others (2018) 14 SCC 161 : [2017] 14 SCR 202; State of Karnataka and Others v. The

Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association and Others

(2018) 6 SCC 363 : [2018] 10 SCR 409; Vasant Ganpat Padvave (D) by LRs & Ors. v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (D) Through LRs. & Ors. 2019 (12) SCALE 572;

Ameerunnissa Begum and Others v. Mahboob Begum and others [1953] SCR 404; State of Jammu and

Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and Others (1974) 1 SCC

19 : [1974] 1 SCR 771; Murthy Match Works and

others v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Another (1974) 4 SCC 428 : [1974] 3 SCR 121; Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Others v. Union of India and Others (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252; Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan and Others (2002) 4 SCC

34 : [2002] 2 SCR 649; Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India and Others (1992) 3 Suppl. SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Limited and Another v. Union of India and Another [1960] 1 SCR 39; State of Kerala and Another v. N.M. Thomas and Others (1976) 2 SCC 310 : [1976] 1

SCR 906; State of West Bengal and Another v. Rash Behari Sarkar and Another (1993) 1 SCC 479 : [1992]

3 Suppl. SCR 351; State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakant Modawdakar and Others (1999) 7 SCC 400; Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab and Another (2002) 4 SCC 154 : [2002] 2 SCR 881; Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (1985) 4 SCC 369 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123; K. Nagaraj and Others v. State of A.P. and Another (1985) 1 SCC 523 : [1985]

2 SCR 579; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh (2009) 13 SCC 165 : [2009] 10 SCR 821; Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others (1999) 4 SCC 468 : [1999]

2 SCR 895; Howrah Municipal Corporation and

Others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Others (2004) 1 SCC 663 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212; Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others (2019) 2 SCC 1 : [2018] 12 SCR 362; Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and another v. Union of India and Others (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; Karnail Kaur and Others v. State of Punjab and Others (2015)

3 SCC 206; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited Through Authorised Signatory v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others (2019) SCCONLINE SC 1478; M.S. Shivananda v. Karnataka State Road Transport

Corporation and Others (1980) 1 SCC 149 : [1980]

1 SCR 684 ; Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram (1971) 1 SCC 721 : [1971] 3 SCR 815; Kanaya Ram and Others v. Rajender Kumar and Others (1985) 1 SCC 436 ; J.P. Srivastava & Sons (P) Ltd. and Others v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. and Others (2005) 1 SCC

172 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 648; Anjum Hussain and Others v. Intellicity Business Park Private Limited and Others (2019) 6 SCC 519 : [2019] 7 SCR 1036; Union of India and Others v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. (1985)

4 SCC 369 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 123; B.K.

Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta & Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. A. Nageshwara Rao and Others AIR 1956 SC 213 : [1955] SCR 1066; Chairman, Tamil Nadu Housing

Board v. T. N. Ganapathy (1990) 1 SCC 608 : [1990] 1 SCR 272; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Another v. Union of India and Others (2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR 381; Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (2019) 9 SCC 304; State of Gujarat and Another v. Shree Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 656 : [1974] 3 SCR 760; In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (1979) 1 SCC 380 : [1979] 2 SCR 476; Ajoy Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252; Subramanian Swami v. Director, CBI and Ors. (2014) 8 SCC 682 : [2014] 6 SCR 873; Indira Sawney v. Union of India (1992) 3 Suppl. SCC

217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Rash Bihari Sarkar and Ors. (1993) 1 SCC

479 : [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 351; State of Kerala v. Aravind Ramakant Modawdakar and Ors. (1999) 7

SCC 400; Sansar Chand Atri v. State of Punjab and Another (2002) 4 SCC 154 : [2002] 2 SCR 881; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and Another (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973]

0 Suppl. SCR 1; Innoventive Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank and Another (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8

SCR 33; Vasant Ganpat Padave (D) by LRs. and Ors. v. Anant Mahadev Sawant (D) through LRs. and Ors. (2019) 12 SCALE 579; Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797;

S. Sundaram Pillai and others v. R. Pattabiraman and Others (1985) 1 SCC 591 : [1985] 2 SCR 643; Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. and Others (1981) 2 SCC 585 : [1981] 3 SCR 239; Virtual Soft Systems Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-I (2007) 9 SCC 665 : [2007] 2 SCR 289; Hiralal Rattanlal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and another (1973) 1 SCC 216 : [1973] 2 SCR 502; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others (1994) 4 SCC 602 : [1994]

1 Suppl. SCR 360; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal & Co. and Another (2001) 8 SCC 397 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 195; B.K. Educational Services Private Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; Lalji Raja and Sons v. Hansraj Nathuram (1971) 1 SCC 721 : [1971] 3 SCR 815; Isha Valimohamed v. Haji Gulam Mohamad & Haji Dada Trust (1974) 2 SCC 484 : [1975] 1 SCR 720; Bombay Stock Exchange v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar (2015)

2 SCC 1 : [2014] 14 SCR 409; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra (1975) 2 SCC 840 : [1976]

2 SCR 266; Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National

Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 333 : [1991]

3 SCR 912; Union of India v. Harnam Singh (1993) 2 SCC 162 : [1993] 1 SCR 862; V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (1979) 4 SCC 214 : [1980] 1 SCR 334; D. C. Bhatia v. Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 104 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 539; Mst. Bibi Sayeeda & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Others (1996) 9 SCC 516 : AIR 1996 SC 1936 : [1996] 1 Suppl. SCR 799; M.S.

Shivananda v. Karnataka SRTC (1980) 1 SCC 149 : [1980] 1 SCR 684; Rameshwar and Others v. Jot Ram and Another (1976) 1 SCC 194 : [1976] 1 SCR 847; Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan (1989) 2 SCC 557 : [1989] 2 SCR 152; Mohinder Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (1985) 4 SCC 221 : [1985]

2 Suppl. SCR 859; D. C. Bhatia and Others v. Union of India and Another (1995) 1 SCC 104 : [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 539; Howrah Municipal Corporation and Others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Others (2004) 1 SCC 663 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1212; Arcelormittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Others (2019) 2 SCC 1 : [2018] 12 SCR 362; B.K. Educational Services Private Limited v. Parag Gupta and Associates (2019) 11 SCC 633 : [2018] 12 SCR 794; M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2015)

7 SCC 58; Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others (2004) 4 SCC 311 : [2004]

3 SCR 982; P.D. Aggrawal & Others v. State of U.P and Others (1987) 3 SCC 622 : [1987] 3 SCR 427; Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh and Ors. (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 191 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 212; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) 5 SCC 593 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405; State Bank’s Staff Union (Madras Circle) v. Union of India and Others AIR 2005 SC 3446 : (2005) 7 SCC 584 : [2005] 3 Suppl.

SCR 200; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991) 1 Suppl. SCC 600 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142 and Vijay v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 6 SCC 289 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 81 – referred to. Gopeshur Pal v. Jiban Chandra Chandra and Others AIR 1914 Calcutta 806 – referred to.

West v. Gwynne (1910) WLR 976; In Re: Pulborough Parish School Board Election, Bourke v. Nutt (1894) 1 QB 725; Abbott and Minister of Lands (1895) AC 425; Hamilton Gell v. White (1922) 2 K.B. 422; Odgen Industries Pty. Ltd. v. Haider Doreen Lucas 3 WLR 75/(1969) (1) All England Reports 121; Director of Public Works and Another v. Ho Po Sang and Others [1961] 3 WLR 39 and L’Office Cherifien Des Phosphates and another And Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (1994) 1 All ER 20 – referred to.