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2026:HHC:10811
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2600 of 2025
Reserved on: 02.04.2026
Date of Decision: 08.04.2026.
Mangal Bahadur
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State:
Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 153 of 2023, dated 08.11.2023, registered at
Police
Station
Chowari,
District
Chamba,
H.P.,
for
the
commission of offences punishable under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2.
It has been asserted that the petitioner’s mother,
Maya Devi (since deceased), was found dead on 08.11.2023 in a
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:10811
house where she and the petitioner were residing together. Maya
Devi had sustained injuries on her right arm by means of a sharp
object. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner.
The petitioner was sleeping in his room when the incident
occurred. The petitioner had cordial relations with his mother,
and he had no reason to murder his mother. The police have filed
a charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by
detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner is a permanent
resident of District Chamba, and there is no likelihood of his
absconding. The petitioner would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Taragad, Sikandar
Singh, informed the police about the death of Maya Devi. The
police went to the spot and recorded the statement of the
informant Kul Bahadur, who stated that Maya Devi is his wife
and the petitioner Mangal Bahadur is his son. All of them resided
together. The petitioner, Mangal Bahadur’s wife was residing
separately because he used to quarrel with her. Mangal Bahadur
2026:HHC:10811
was not doing any work and used to demand money from Maya
Devi, which led to frequent quarrels. The informant used to sleep
in a goat pen with his goats to protect them from wild animals.
Mangal Bahadur and Maya Devi used to sleep in the house.
Mangal Bahadur had consumed liquor and was quarrelling with
his mother, Maya Devi, on the previous night of the incident.
Maya Devi did not bring the tea as usual to the informant on the
date of the incident. The informant went to the house and found
that Maya Devi was lying near the door, and Mangal Bahadur was
washing the floor. The right arm of Maya Devi was bleeding
because of the injury caused by sharp edged weapon. The
informant asked Mangal Bahadur as to what had happened, and
Mangal Bahadur evaded the question. The police registered the
FIR and arrested the petitioner. The police seized the petitioner’s
clothes and Khukhri lying on the spot. The post-mortem
examination of the deceased was conducted, and as per the final
report, the death occurred because of the injuries caused by
Khukhari. The blood samples and other objects were sent to the
FSL, and as per the report of analysis, the shirt, T- shirt,
Khukhari and the shirt of the deceased contained the DNA of the
deceased. The charge sheet was filed before the Court. The
2026:HHC:10811
statements of 14 witnesses have been recorded, and the matter
was listed on 25.11.2025. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Udit Shaurya Kaushik, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The prosecution has failed to complete the
evidence, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being
violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was last seen
in the house with the deceased. He was quarrelling with her in a
state of intoxication. The deceased was found dead, and the
burden is upon the petitioner to explain the circumstances
leading to her death. The petitioner has not provided any
explanation. The statements of 14 witnesses have been recorded,
and there is no delay in the progress of the trial. The offence is
2026:HHC:10811
grave, and the penalty is severe. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
2026:HHC:10811
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
2026:HHC:10811
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
2026:HHC:10811
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
2026:HHC:10811
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
2026:HHC:10811
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report specifically mentions that the
petitioner and his mother, Maya Devi, were present in the room
on 07.11.2023. The petitioner was quarrelling with his mother.
The petitioner’s mother, Maya Devi, was found dead, and the
petitioner was washing the floor with water. Maya Devi had
sustained injury on her right arm with sharp edged weapon, and
she was bleeding profusely. The petitioner was questioned about
the circumstances leading to the death of Maya Devi, but he could
not give any satisfactory explanation. The DNA taken from the
petitioner’s clothes and the khukhari recovered from the spot
contained the DNA of the deceased. All these circumstances show
that the petitioner and the deceased were last seen together
inside the house, and the burden would shift upon the petitioner
to explain the circumstances leading to the death of the
deceased2. No explanation has been provided by the petitioner
regarding the death, and an inference can be, prima facie, drawn
Jayantilal Verma v. State of M.P., (2021) 12 SCC 71
2026:HHC:10811
that the petitioner is responsible for causing the death of the
deceased.
12.
It was submitted that an injury caused to the right
arm with a sharp-edged weapon will not constitute an offence of
murder. This submission cannot be prima facie accepted as
correct. The learned Trial Court has framed the charges against
the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC, and the petitioner has not assailed the
order framing charges. It is highly doubtful that the bail court
can ignore the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court
framing charges. Further, the profuse bleeding from the arm,
prima facie, shows an intention of causing such bodily injury as is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This is
also corroborated by the fact that no medical treatment was
provided to the deceased. Thus, prima-facie the petitioner is
involved in the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 302 of the IPC.
13.
It was submitted that some unknown person had
injured Maya Devi while the petitioner was sleeping. The
petitioner tried to save Maya Devi, and his clothes were stained
2026:HHC:10811
with the blood of the deceased. This explanation is not supported
by the petitioner’s conduct. The petitioner had not raised any hue
and cry when he saw the deceased lying dead. He did not inform
his father about the injury. He was seen washing the blood from
the floor, which does not show the conduct of a person who had
found another dead due to the serious injuries. He did not provide
any immediate explanation for the injuries, even though he was
asked to do so. Therefore, the submission that the injury was
caused by some other person and the petitioner was merely
trying to save the deceased is not acceptable.
14.
The offence under Section 302 is punishable with the
extreme penalty of death or life imprisonment. Thus, the
punishment is severe. The deceased was the mother of the
petitioner, and the nature of the offence is heinous. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v.
Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC
(Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is
severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page
244:
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
2026:HHC:10811
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and
the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to
secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible
in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime
charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of
the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned
by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably
presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of
bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage
of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50
ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this
approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order
of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
sufficient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and
because the detention is necessary to ensure his
appearance at trial .... It is a very important element
in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail,
would appear to take his trial; and I think that in
coming to a determination on that point three
elements will generally be found the most
important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by
which it is supported, and the punishment to which
the party would be liable if convicted. In the present
case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the
evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of
the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the
offence is, by law, death.”
2026:HHC:10811
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
15.
Thus, the nature of the offence and the severity of the
punishment would disentitle the petitioner from the concession
of bail.
16.
It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress
of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission cannot be accepted. The status
report shows that the statements of 14 witnesses had been
recorded till 25.11.2025. The petitioner had prayed for time to
produce the copies of the order sheets to demonstrate the delay;
however, no copies of the order sheets were filed, and the plea
that the delay is attributable to the prosecution or the Court is
not established. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129:
(2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of
incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a
crime like murder. It was observed at page 141:
“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the
grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the
Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than
2026:HHC:10811
one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the
accused was in custody for more than one year may not be
a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v.
State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743], it
was observed that the period of incarceration by itself
would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The
same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688”
17.
Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to
bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial.
18.
No other point was urged.
19.
In view of the above, the petitioner is not entitled to
bail. Hence, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.
20.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
8th April, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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