The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
12. In view of the facts as discussed, the order of the learned Lower Court relegating the parties to arbitration seems to not have taken into consideration the fact that the application filed under Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, by the Bank squarely relied only on the agreement dated 16.06.2013, which no longer existed.
13. In this view of the matter, since the pre-requisite conditions to refer the matter to arbitration have not been met, as there was no subsisting arbitration agreement between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1, and further the second agreement being between two parties only, that is the petitioner and the respondent No. 2, the impugned order dated 20.07.2018 is hereby set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the learned Lower Court below for recommencement of the Title Suit.
14. With the above noted observations and directions, this revision application stands allowed and is accordingly disposed of. Meghalaya
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Serial No. 23
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No. 36 of 2018
Date of Decision: 21.11.2022
Vs.
Smti Mala Bhattacharjee
Indusind Bank Limited & Anr.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
None
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1.
The petitioner by way of the instant revision application
under Article 227 of the Constitution is aggrieved with the order dated
20.07.2018, whereby on the application of the defendant No. 1 under
Section 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, the matter
has been referred to Arbitration.
2.
The case of the petitioner in brief is that an agreement had
been entered with the respondent No. 2 for sale of a vehicle bearing
Registration No. ML-05K 7239, and to this effect an Agreement for
Sale was executed on 12.03.2015. The arrangement arrived at was that
the respondent No. 2 would pay the balance amount due, after obtaining
a loan from the respondent No. 1 Bank. The petitioner it appears
thereafter transferred the ownership of the vehicle in favour of the
respondent No. 2 but however, the unpaid amount of Rs. 3,40,000/(Rupees Three Lakhs Forty Thousand only) was never received by the
petitioner. A Suit was then instituted being Title Suit No. 43 (H) 2016
before the Court of the Assistant District Judge, Shillong, praying for a
decree for recovery of the vehicle and further for compensation and
damages. The learned Lower Court as observed earlier, on the
application under Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, returned the plaint to the petitioner by way of the impugned
order.
3.
The respondent No. 1, though had entered appearance
before this Court and after initially contesting the matter has failed to
appear after 16.11.2021, as such the matter proceeded ex parte against
the said respondent. As far as the respondent No. 2 is concerned in spite
of service of notice, the said respondent chose not to appear.
4.
Mr. S.D. Upadhaya, learned counsel for the petitioner in his
submissions has referred to the earlier Agreement dated 16.06.2013
entered into by the petitioner and the respondent No. 1, which is
appended to the application under Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act 1996. He submits that it was the basis on which
the impugned order was passed, and that the Agreement dated
16.06.2013, as per his submissions no longer exists, as the loan which
was granted vide this Agreement has since been satisfied. He further
submits that though both agreements referred to the same vehicle, the
learned Lower Court below had committed grave error in dismissing
the Suit by holding that the earlier Agreement dated 16.06.2013, still
holds good, even though he submits the Suit related to a fresh
transaction. He therefore submits that the conditions under Sections 5
and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 not having met, the
impugned order is patently illegal and is liable to be set aside and the
Suit be allowed to proceed.
5.
In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has
placed reliance on the case of Booz Allen and Hamilton INC vs. SBI
Home Finance Limited & Ors. reported in (2011) 5 SCC 532, wherein
he submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down certain
condition pre-requisites that must be satisfied, as to whether a matter is
to be referred to Arbitration. The learned counsel also refers to the
conditions as laid down in the case of Yogi Agarwal vs Inspiration
Clothes & U & Ors. reported in (2009) 1 SCC 372, on the same point.
6.
I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
examined the materials on record. An examination of the same reveals
that the petitioner had obtained 2 loans from the respondent Bank, (i)
for purchasing Maruti Swift Dzire and (ii) for purchasing Mahindra
Bolero. It seems that the first loan of the petitioner, became a bad debt,
and as the petitioner was not interested in getting the vehicle repaired,
the matter went for arbitration wherein an award was passed against
her, and as per the statement of accounts, there was an outstanding
amount of Rs. 1,60,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Sixty Thousand only). On
the second loan which has been obtained for purchasing the Mahindra
Bolero, it is also seen that the said loan also became ineffective due to
the non-payment of EMI by the petitioner on time. It appears that it was
at this juncture that the petitioner transacted the sale of this vehicle to
the respondent No. 2, wherein the respondent No. 1 agreed to the said
proposal to re-finance the purchase of the Mahindra Bolero by the
respondent No. 2, from the petitioner. To this end, an Agreement was
entered into between the respondent No. 1 and the respondent No. 2,
for the said loan to which the petitioner is not a party. The loan
sanctioned to the respondent No. 2 also became a bad loan for which
the vehicle was then auctioned by the respondent No. 1.
7.
It is in this backdrop that this Court is to decide as to
whether an arbitration clause contained in the Agreement dated
16.06.2013, will also cover the subsequent dispute that the petitioner
has with the respondent Bank. As noted earlier, the case of the petitioner
is that (i) there is no subsisting agreement between the petitioner and
the respondent Bank (ii) that the agreement entered between the
petitioner and respondent No. 2, is independent of respondent No. 1 and
(iii) that the parties in issue are not the same.
8.
From the sequence of events that have unfolded, and from
a perusal of the of the order of the learned Lower Court, it is seen that
reliance has been placed on the Agreement dated 16.06.2013, and the
parties were referred to arbitration, on the finding that clause 23.1, that
contained the arbitration clause was couched in the widest terms to
cover any dispute, and that clause 20.1 also allowed the lender
(respondent No.1) to have lien over all the assets of the borrower/coborrower, and the right to set off any money due to the lender for
recovery of the lender’s dues.
9.
To determine as to whether this agreement still subsists, it
is seen that the respondent No. 1 Bank, by a certificate dated
13.10.2014, addressed to the Regional Transport Officer, had however,
issued their no objection for Lien Endorsement Removal, on this
Agreement that was entered into on 16.06.2013 i.e. much before the
second Agreement was entered into on 12.03.2015, which shows that
this Agreement dated 16.06.2013, stood terminated.
10.
Coming to the case of Booz Allen and Hamilton INC vs.
SBI Home Finance Limited & Ors. (supra) cited by the learned counsel
for the petitioner giving conditions which are to be met, Para-19 of the
said judgment which is relevant, for easy convenience, is reproduced
hereinbelow:“19. Where a suit is filed by one of the parties to an arbitration
agreement against the other parties to the arbitration
agreement, and if the defendants file an application under
Section 8 stating that the parties should be referred to
arbitration, the Court (judicial authority) will have to decide:
i)
Whether there is an arbitration agreement among the
parties;
ii)
Whether all the parties to the suit are parties to the
arbitration agreement;
iii) Whether the dispute which are the subject-matter of
the suit fall within the scope of arbitration agreement;
iv)
Whether the defendant had applied under Section 8
of the Act before submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute; and
v)
Whether the reliefs sought in the suit are those that
can be adjudicated and granted in an arbitration.”
The first pre-requisite is that there should be an arbitration
agreement among the parties, which would mean thereby a subsisting
agreement. The second requirement is that all the parties in the Suit
should also be parties to the arbitration agreement. The other clauses
will not be discussed, as they are not relevant to the present case.
11.
In the instant case, the only relation that the petitioner had
with the respondent Bank was vide an Agreement dated 16.06.2013,
which provided for arbitration but however, as the said Agreement had
since been terminated/determined, it cannot be held as on the date the
application under Section 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 1996 was filed, that there was a subsisting arbitration agreement
between the petitioner and the respondent Bank. Secondly, the
Agreement entered into between the petitioner and the respondent No.
2, apart being independent from the respondent No. 1 Bank, does not
contain any arbitration clause and is a plain agreement, though the
respondent No. 1 is mentioned therein, it is not a signatory, to the
agreement.
12.
In view of the facts as discussed, the order of the learned
Lower Court relegating the parties to arbitration seems to not have taken
into consideration the fact that the application filed under Sections 5
and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, by the Bank
squarely relied only on the agreement dated 16.06.2013, which no
longer existed.
13.
In this view of the matter, since the pre-requisite conditions
to refer the matter to arbitration have not been met, as there was no
subsisting arbitration agreement between the petitioner and the
respondent No. 1, and further the second agreement being between two
parties only, that is the petitioner and the respondent No. 2, the
impugned order dated 20.07.2018 is hereby set aside, and the matter is
remanded back to the learned Lower Court below for recommencement of the Title Suit.
14.
With the above noted observations and directions, this
revision application stands allowed and is accordingly disposed of.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
21.11.2022
“V. Lyndem-PS”
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review