Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 31.08.2026
Pronounced on : 15.09.2026
Uploaded on: 15.09.2026
#
CNR No. DLHC010404852026
+
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026 & CRL.M.A. 26598/2026, CRL.M.A.
26599/2026, CRL.M.A. 26600/2026
MADHUR KAUSHAL
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Mohit Mathur, Sr. Adv. Mr.
Vikram Singh Panwar, Mr. Suyush
Sinha, Mr. Vignesh, Mr. Neeraj
Maurya, Advs.
versus
CBI
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Premtosh K. Mishra, SPP for CBI
with Mr. Anubhav Upadhyay, Mr.
Ashutosh Tiwari, Mr. Krish Bhatia,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
JUDGMENT
MADHU JAIN, J.
1.
The present criminal revision petition has been filed by the
Revisionist, Madhur Kaushal, under Section 438 read with Section 442 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, the “BNSS”)
(corresponding to Sections 397 read with 401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973), seeking setting aside of the order on charge dated
24.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-02, Rouse
Avenue Court Complex, New Delhi, in CC No. 56/2021, titled CBI v.
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
Madhur Kaushal & Ors., as well as the charges framed pursuant thereto
on 13.02.2026 for the substantive offence punishable under Section 7 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and offences punishable under
Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, the “IPC”)
read with Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter, the “PC Act”).
The brief facts of the case, as emerging from the impugned order, are as
follows:
2.
On the basis of source information, the instant case was registered
on 17.01.2021. The prosecution case, in essence, is that A-1 Madhur
Kaushal, a public servant, allegedly obtained a bribe of Rs.10 lakhs from
A-3 Pawan Baid, Director of A-4 M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd., in
consideration of extending undue favour in relation to the clearance of
bills pertaining to railway contractual works. It is alleged that, out of the
said amount, Rs.10,000/- was deducted towards hawala commission and
the remaining Rs.9.90 lakhs was routed through hawala channels to A-2
Avdhesh Kumar Kaushal, brother of A-1, who allegedly acted as an
intermediary for receiving the bribe amount on behalf of A-1.
3.
At the relevant time, A-1 was posted as Junior Engineer/Inspector
of Works with the Indian Railways at Jogighopa, District Bongaigaon,
Assam. A-4 was executing railway contracts relating to tunnelling works,
which were under the supervision of A-1. Under Contract Agreement
Nos.
CON/NJ/2637
dated
09.11.2020
and
CON/NJ/2641
dated
18.11.2020, A-1 was entrusted with the task of supervising the works and
recording measurements.
4.
The prosecution alleges that, on the basis of measurements recorded
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
by A-1, bills amounting to approximately Rs.6.5 crores were raised in
favour of A-4. It is alleged that A-1 demanded and obtained Rs.10 lakhs
from A-3 in lieu of recording the measurements and facilitating the
processing of the bills, with the amount being routed through A-2 after
deduction of the alleged hawala commission.
5.
A-1 and A-2 were arrested on 17.02.2021. On the same day, at the
instance of A-2, recovery of Rs.4.40 lakhs in cash and a deposit slip
evidencing deposit of Rs.4.90 lakhs in the bank account of his firm was
effected. The prosecution also relies upon intercepted telephonic
conversations between the accused persons and other individuals, which
are stated to corroborate the alleged bribe transaction.
6.
In particular, the prosecution relies upon certain intercepted calls
between LW-1 Ravi Kumar, an employee of A-4, and A-3 Pawan Baid,
wherein reference is allegedly made to the payment of the bribe amount
and deduction of the hawala commission.
7.
The learned Trial Court, vide order on charge dated 24.01.2026,
observed as under. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced below:
“It was next argued that there is no incriminating
evidence against A-1 Madhur Kaushal in reference
to criminal conspiracy. Criminal conspiracy is
never hatched in the open. The requisite elements
of conspiracy are to be inferred from the
circumstances on record, including the statements
of prosecution witness. It is my view that there is
enough material on record to show that accused
persons had conspired with each other to commit
the offences proscribed under sections 7, 8, 9 and
10 of PC Act, 1988.
The discharge application of A-3 Pawan Baid and
A-4 M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. under
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
sections 227 and 239 of CrPC (sections 250 and
262 of BNSS) is turned down. Likewise, the
discharge application of A-1 Madhur Kaushal
under section 250 of BNSS, 2023 (section 227 of
CrPC) is also turned down.In view of the above:
➢ A-1 Madhur Kaushal is liable to be charged
for: (i) offence punishable under section 7 of PC
Act, 1988, and (ii) offence(s) punishable under
section 120B of IPC read with sections 7, 8, 9 and
10 of PC Act, 1988.
➢ A-2 Avdhesh Kumar Kaushal is liable to be
charged for offence(s) punishable under section
120B of IPC read with sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of
PC Act, 1988.
➢ A-3 Pawan Baid is liable to be charged for: (i)
offence punishable under section 8 of PC Act,
1988, (ii) offence punishable under section 10 of
PC Act, 1988, and (iii) offence(s) punishable under
section 120B of IPC read with sections 7, 8, 9 and
10 of PC Act, 1988.
➢ A-4 M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd.
(through its Director A-3 Pawan Baid) is liable to
be charged for: (i) offence punishable under
section 9 of PC Act, 1988, and (ii) offence(s)
punishable under section 120B of IPC read with
sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of PC Act, 1988.
➢ It is ordered accordingly.
53. A-1 Madhur Kaushal, A-2 Avdhesh Kumar
Kaushal and A-3 Pawan Baid shall physically
appear before the Court on 13.02.2026 for the
purpose of framing of formal charge(s).”
8.
Vide order dated 13.02.2026, the learned Trial Court framed
charges against the petitioner. The relevant portion of the order, insofar as
it relates to the petitioner, is reproduced hereinbelow:
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
“13.02.2026
CHARGE
1. I, M.P. Singh, Special Judge (PC Act), CBI-02,
Rouse Avenue Court Complex, New Delhi do
hereby charge you accused no.1 Madhur
Kaushal, s/o Late Akhilesh Kumar Kaushal as
follows:
Firstly, sometime between June, 2020 to 16/17
January, 2021, you were posted as JE/Works/Con
in Jogighopa, District Bongaigaon, Assam and/or
Inspector of Works (IOW) at Jogighopa, District
Bongaigaon, Assam in the Indian Railways and as
such being a public servant, you were
authorized/competent to make supervisions and
recording of measurements of the projects
undertaken by M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd.
(A-4) and in the said capacity you raised a
demand for an undue advantage/bribe of Rs. 10
lakhs from A-3 Pawan Baid, Director of M/s ABCI
Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. (A-4). You thus committed
an offence punishable under Section 7 of PC Act
1988 and within the cognizance of this Court.
Secondly, during the aforesaid period, you and the
other three accused in this case, agreed to do an
illegal act, i.e. to demand bribe of Rs. 10 lakhs
from A-3 Pawan Baid, Director of M/s ABCI
Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd. (A-4) and pursuant
thereto on 16/17 January, 2021 in Kanpur, there
was acceptance of the said demanded bribe
amount of Rs. 9.90 lakhs (after deduction of
hawala commission) on your behalf and under
your instructions by your brother namely; Avdhesh
Kumar Kaushal (A-2) in Kanpur and you thereby
committed an offence punishable under section
120B of IPC read with sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of
PC Act, 1988 and within the cognizance of this
Court.
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
AND I hereby direct that you be tried on the said
charge(s) by this Court.
(M. P. Singh)
Special Judge (PC Act) CBI-02
RADC/New Delhi/13.02.2026
The charge is read over and explained to accused
no.1 Madhur Kaushal as follows in vernacular,
and is questioned as under:Q. Have you understood the above charge?
A. Yes.
Q. Whether you plead guilty or claim the trial?
A. I plead not guilty and claim trial.”
9.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the petitioner has approached
this Court by way of the present revision petition.
Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioner
10.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submits that
the impugned order is liable to be interfered with on the very ground
recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as warranting exercise of
jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander,
(2012) 9 SCC 460, wherein this Hon’ble Court has recognised that
interference is warranted where there exists an express legal bar to the
very initiation, institution or continuance of criminal proceedings, such a
bar being intended to afford specific protection to the accused.
11.
It is submitted that Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 is precisely such a statutory bar. Learned Senior Counsel relies
upon Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in paragraph 117, categorically held that, in the absence
of the requisite previous approval, there could be neither an inquiry or
enquiry nor an investigation. In paragraph 118, the Hon’ble Court further
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
held that Section 17A constitutes a bar to any inquiry, enquiry or
investigation.
12.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order, as well as the charges framed pursuant thereto, are unsustainable in
law and are liable to be set aside. It is submitted that the learned Trial
Court has failed to appreciate that the entire proceedings against the
petitioner are vitiated for want of the mandatory prior approval
contemplated under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (“PC Act”). The present RC was registered on 17.01.2021, i.e. after
the introduction of Section 17A, and therefore, no enquiry, inquiry or
investigation concerning the petitioner, a public servant, could have been
undertaken without obtaining the requisite prior approval from the
competent authority.
13.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
was neither named as an accused in RC No. AC1 2021 A0001 dated
17.01.2021 nor was he alleged to be in conspiracy with any of the public
servants named therein. It is submitted that during the course of
investigation, the petitioner was subsequently implicated and a separate
charge-sheet came to be filed against him, without registering any fresh
RC. According to learned counsel, once an entirely distinct offence
concerning a different public servant came to light during investigation,
the CBI was required to register a fresh RC and, before commencing any
enquiry, inquiry or investigation against the petitioner, obtain the approval
mandated under Section 17A of the PC Act. It is contended that the failure
to do so cannot be permitted to defeat the statutory safeguard contained in
Section 17A.
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
14.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the
preliminary enquiry in respect of unknown persons may not, by itself, be
barred under Section 17A of the PC Act; however, the same cannot be
used as a means to circumvent the mandatory requirement of prior
approval once the identity of the public servant and the alleged acts
forming the subject matter of the prosecution are known. It is submitted
that the CBI deliberately continued with the investigation under the
original RC, instead of registering a fresh RC and seeking the requisite
approval, thereby rendering the investigation against the petitioner
contrary to the statutory mandate.
15.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
learned Trial Court has erred in holding that Section 17A has no
application where the allegation is of obtaining undue advantage by a
public servant in connection with the performance of his public duties. It
is submitted that the said finding is contrary to the Standard Operating
Procedure No. 428/07/2021-AVD.IV(B) dated 03.09.2021 issued by the
Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India, which
specifically contemplates examination of information relating to the
alleged deriving of undue advantage by a public servant and, where such
information is disclosed, placing the matter before the appropriate
authority for seeking previous approval under Section 17A of the PC Act.
16.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner contends that, even on the
prosecution’s own case, the alleged gratification is connected with the
petitioner’s official functions. It is alleged that, in relation to two
construction projects being executed by A-4 company, the petitioner, in
discharge of his official duties as Junior Engineer, recorded measurements
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
of the work executed and recommended the same for preparation of bills
and payment. The allegation is that the petitioner received Rs.9.90 lakhs
in consideration thereof. It is, therefore, submitted that the alleged act is
directly connected with the discharge of the petitioner’s official functions
and falls squarely within the scope of Section 17A of the PC Act. The
investigation undertaken without the requisite prior approval is
consequently illegal.
17.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the
prosecution has also failed to place any material establishing the essential
ingredient of demand of illegal gratification by the petitioner. It is
submitted that, despite interception of several mobile numbers, there is
not a single conversation between the petitioner and A-3, the alleged
bribe-giver, or any of his employees, which records or even refers to any
demand made by the petitioner. The learned Trial Court, according to
counsel, has merely presumed a demand on the basis of the statement of
one witness regarding an alleged telephonic conversation in which the
petitioner is said to have referred to his “monetary needs”. It is contended
that the witness himself does not state that the petitioner demanded any
bribe or that the money was sought as consideration for any official act.
18.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that a mere
request for money, even if assumed, cannot by itself constitute a demand
for gratification within the meaning of Section 7 of the PC Act. The
demand must be shown to be for an undue advantage or gratification other
than legal remuneration and must have a nexus with the performance or
non-performance of a public duty. It is submitted that there is no material
to establish any such nexus in the present case. The measurements in
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
question had already been completed in December 2020, whereas the
alleged payment is stated to have been made only on 15.01.2021. There is,
therefore, no material to show that the alleged payment was a reward for
recording favourable measurements or that the petitioner had extended
any undue advantage to A-3 or A-4.
19.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that none
of the witnesses from the North Frontier Railway has alleged that the
petitioner recorded incorrect measurements or otherwise acted improperly
in the discharge of his official duties. It is submitted that, even according
to the prosecution, the petitioner, being a Junior Engineer, was not
competent to release payment to the contractor. The process involved
recording of measurements by the Junior Engineer, preparation and
verification of the bill measurement book by the Assistant Engineer, test
checks by the Deputy Chief Engineer, scrutiny by the technical and bill
sections, and thereafter approval and payment. Thus, the petitioner had
neither the authority nor the power to extend the alleged undue advantage
to A-3 or A-4.
20.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is also no
recovery of any bribe amount from the petitioner or at his instance. The
prosecution case rests, inter alia, upon the alleged recovery of Rs.4.40
lakhs from one Jitender Soni, a jeweller, on the basis of the disclosure of
A-2. However, no statement of Jitender Soni has been recorded to
establish when or from whom he received the money or to connect the
alleged amount with the petitioner. It is submitted that the disclosure
statement of a co-accused cannot, by itself, establish that the money was
received by A-2 on the instructions of the petitioner.
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
21.
It is submitted that there is, in fact, no material to establish that A-2
received the alleged amount on behalf of or at the instance of the
petitioner. Even the statement of A-2 does not state that he received the
money on the petitioner’s instructions. Further, the alleged amount
remained with A-2 and was utilised by him until its seizure, and there was
no attempt on his part to hand over or transfer the same to the petitioner.
The learned Trial Court, therefore, erred in presuming that A-2 acted as a
conduit for the petitioner.
22.
He further submits that the prosecution’s own witness, LW-10, a
Supervisor with M/s ABCI Infrastructures Pvt. Ltd., has stated that his
role was to calculate commissions on the directions of A-3 Pawan Baid
and has furnished a list of Railway officials who were allegedly paid
commissions. Significantly, the petitioner’s name does not find mention in
the said list. It is submitted that, in the absence of any material showing
that the petitioner received any money or recorded any incorrect
measurement, the prosecution case against him is wholly speculative.
23.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
reliance placed by the learned Trial Court upon the intercepted telephone
conversations is misplaced. The call transcripts neither mention the
petitioner by name nor contain any conversation between the petitioner
and the alleged bribe-giver. The reference to an “RW” in the transcripts,
according to counsel, cannot be linked to the petitioner in the absence of
any supporting material. There is also no conversation demonstrating any
demand for gratification on behalf of the petitioner.
24.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the
interception itself was not conducted in accordance with the mandatory
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
requirements of Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules. It is contended
that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the judgments relied upon
by the petitioner, including Vinit Kumar v. CBI 2019 SCC OnLine Bom
3155, Jatinder Pal Singh v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 135
Sukhwinder Singh v. CBI , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3617, KLD
Nagashree v. Union of India AIR 2007 (1) APLJ 1HC /
MANU/AP/0819/2006 and P. Kishore v. Union of India 2025 SCC
OnLine Mad 3053, which, according to the petitioner, lay down that
intercepted communications not placed before the Review Committee in
accordance with Rule 419A cannot be relied upon against an accused. The
reliance placed by the learned Trial Court upon Akashdeep Chouhan v.
State (NCT of Delhi) Crl. MC No. 204 of 2020 is stated to be misplaced,
as the said decision proceeded on a finding that the interception therein
was legal, whereas the present case involves admitted non-compliance
with the applicable requirements.
25.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner lastly submits that, at the
stage of framing of charge, although the Court is not required to conduct a
detailed appreciation of evidence, the material on record must disclose a
strong or prima facie case giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the
accused has committed the offence. In the present case, according to
learned counsel, the material relied upon by the prosecution does not
establish demand, acceptance or receipt of any undue advantage by the
petitioner, nor does it establish any nexus between the alleged payment
and the discharge of his official duties. The charges framed against the
petitioner are therefore liable to be set aside.
26.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner places reliance
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
on the following judgments:
Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., (2013) 6 SCC 384
CBI v. Dilip Kumar Lahiri, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 3373
Neeraj Dutta v. State NCT of Delhi, (2023) 4 SCC 731
Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay, (1954) 2 SCC
Submissions On Behalf Of The Respondent
27.
Learned SPP for the respondent submits that the impugned order
dated 24.01.2026 is a well-reasoned order dealing with all the contentions
raised by the petitioner, and charges were accordingly framed on
13.02.2026. It is submitted that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court is
limited and interference is warranted only in cases of patent illegality,
jurisdictional error or manifest error of law. At the stage of framing of
charge, the Court is only required to see whether a prima facie case or
grave suspicion is made out and cannot conduct a mini-trial. Reliance is
placed upon Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, Union
of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC
4 and State of
Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap (2021) 11 SCC 191.
28.
Learned SPP for the respondent submits that the charge-sheet,
statements of the prosecution witnesses and the intercepted call
conversations disclose sufficient material against the petitioner. It is
submitted that the petitioner, while posted as Inspector of Works/Junior
Engineer at Jogighopa, was supervising the work of A-4 company and, on
the basis of his measurements, bills of approximately Rs.3.13 crores and
Rs.3.44 crores were prepared.
29.
Learned SPP for the respondent submits that LW-1 Ravi Kumar
stated that the petitioner had called him regarding his monetary needs,
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
which was conveyed to A-3 Pawan Baid. It is submitted that, in the
intercepted conversation dated 15.01.2021, A-3 directed that Rs.10 lakhs,
after deduction of hawala commission, be delivered at Kanpur for delivery
to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter contacted LW-1 regarding the
communication from Pawan concerning Kanpur, which further connects
him with the transaction.
30.
Learned SPP submits that A-2 Avdhesh Kumar Kaushal also
disclosed that the petitioner had instructed him to provide the number of a
ten-rupee note, pursuant to which Rs.9.90 lakhs was released to A-2 at
Kanpur. It is submitted that the chain of the transaction stands
corroborated by the statements of the witnesses, recovery of Rs.4.40 lakhs
at the instance of A-2 and seizure of the deposit slip relating to Rs.4.90
lakhs. Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was also subsequently
obtained.
31.
Learned SPP submits that Section 17A of the PC Act applies only
where the alleged offence is relatable to a recommendation made or
decision taken by a public servant in discharge of his official functions. A
demand or obtaining of illegal gratification is itself the alleged criminal
act and cannot be equated with such recommendation or decision.
32.
He further submits that the issue is covered by Anil Daima v. State
of Rajasthan, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 807, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that Section 17A cannot be applied to cases involving demand
of illegal gratification. It is submitted that the present case concerns
demand and obtaining of undue advantage through A-2 and not any
recommendation or decision of the petitioner.
33.
Learned SPP submits that the SOP dated 03.09.2021 also supports
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
the respondent’s case, as it requires the alleged offence to be relatable to a
specific recommendation or decision of the public servant. Where no such
recommendation or decision exists, the requirement of prior approval
under Section 17A does not arise. It is further submitted that the SOP,
being an executive instruction, cannot enlarge the statutory scope of
Section 17A.
34.
It is submitted that, in any event, Section 17A governs the
investigating agency and does not oust the jurisdiction of the Special
Court. An irregularity in investigation does not vitiate the proceedings
unless failure of justice is demonstrated. Reliance is placed upon H.N.
Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 and Union of India v.
Prakash P. Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC 195.
35.
He submits that the RC dated 17.01.2021 disclosed different sets of
accused public servants and their respective transactions, and four
separate cases arose from the investigation. The evidence against the
petitioner surfaced during the course of investigation and, therefore, there
was no requirement to register a fresh RC.
36.
Learned SPP submits that a second FIR in respect of the same
occurrence would itself be impermissible in law in view of T.T. Antony v.
State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181. The filing of separate charge-sheets
concerning distinct sets of accused and transactions, therefore, cannot
render the proceedings against the petitioner illegal.
37.
Learned SPP submits that there is no inconsistency in the
designation of the petitioner as Inspector of Works and Junior Engineer,
as both descriptions relate to his posting at Jogighopa, and LW-1 has
consistently identified him by name and designation. It is further
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
submitted that the designation is not an ingredient of the offence under
Section 7 of the PC Act.
38.
He submits that Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338, does
not hold that Section 17A approval is mandatory in every case except a
spot arrest. The said judgment, according to learned counsel, does not deal
with a case of demand and receipt of bribe unconnected with any
recommendation or decision and stands explained by subsequent
decisions including CBI v. Santosh Karnani 2023 SCC OnLine SC 427
and Anil Daima (supra).
39.
It is submitted that the relevant period of the offence is June 2020 to
17.01.2021 and, therefore, Section 7 of the PC Act as amended in 2018
applies. It is submitted that an attempt to obtain undue advantage itself
constitutes an offence and the advantage may be obtained directly or
through a third party. Demand can also be established through
circumstantial evidence. Reliance is placed upon Neeraj Dutta v. State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731.
Findings and Analysis
40.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and
perused the material on record, including the impugned order dated
24.01.2026, the charge-sheet, the statements of witnesses relied upon, and
the case law cited from the Bar.
41.
At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate the settled parameters
within which revisional jurisdiction under Section 438 read with Section
442 of the BNSS (corresponding to Sections 397/401 of the CrPC)
operates qua an order on charge. It is well settled that at the stage of
framing of charge, the Court is required to sift the material only to the
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
extent of determining whether a prima facie case exists, giving rise to
grave suspicion against the accused; it is neither required, nor entitled, to
weigh the evidence as if conducting a mini-trial or to enter into a
meticulous evaluation of its credibility, sufficiency or probative value.
Reference in this regard may usefully be made to Union of India v.
Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, and Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
42.
Revisional interference is warranted only where the charge is
founded on no material at all, or where the order suffers from patent
illegality, jurisdictional error, or manifest arbitrariness. Several of the
contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner — the absence of a direct
conversation between the petitioner and A-3, the omission of the
petitioner's name from the list furnished by LW-10, the interval between
the recording of measurements and the alleged payment — go to the
weight and sufficiency of the evidence and are, in the considered view of
this Court, matters appropriately left for trial. This Court declines to enter
upon that exercise at the present stage.
43.
The principal legal contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner
is that the entire investigation is vitiated for want of prior approval under
Section 17A of the PC Act. This contention, being a pure question of law
going to the very foundation of the prosecution, merits closer
examination.
44.
Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter,
the “PC Act”) reads as under:
“(1)No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or
inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
have been committed by a public servant under this
Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any
recommendation made or decision taken by such
public servant in discharge of his official functions or
duties, without the previous approval(a)in the case of a person who is or was employed, at
the time when the offence was alleged to have been
committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union,
of that Government;
(b)in the case of a person who is or was employed, at
the time when the offence was alleged to have been
committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of
that Government;
(c)in the case of any other person, of the authority
competent to remove him from his office, at the time
when the offence was alleged to have been committed:
Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for
cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the
charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue
advantage for himself or for any other person:
Provided further that the concerned authority shall
convey its decision under this section within a period
of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded
in writing by such authority, be extended by a further
period of one month.]”
45.
Section 17A, in terms, protects a public servant from enquiry,
inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed
by him, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation
made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official
functions or duties. The provision is thus attracted only where the act
complained of is itself a recommendation or decision, that is, where the
very exercise of official discretion is sought to be criminalised. It is not a
provision of general application to every act that merely occurs in the
course of, or in proximity to, the discharge of official duty.
46.
In the present case, the prosecution case, as reflected in the charge-
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
sheet and the material relied upon by it, is not that the petitioner has
committed an offence merely because he recorded measurements or took
a decision regarding a bill. The allegation is that he demanded an undue
advantage of Rs.10 lakhs in connection with the discharge of his official
functions and that the amount was allegedly received on his behalf
through A-2.Thus, the alleged criminality is founded upon the demand
and obtaining of illegal gratification and not upon the correctness,
propriety or bona fides of any particular recommendation or decision
made by the petitioner. The recording of measurements and the
processing/facilitation of bills constitute the alleged official context or
occasion in which the gratification was demanded. They do not, on the
prosecution case, constitute the criminal act for which the petitioner has
been charged.
47.
This view finds support in Anil Daima v. State of Rajasthan, 2026
SCC OnLine SC 807, cited by learned counsel for the respondent, which
holds that Section 17A cannot be invoked in cases involving demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification. The reliance placed by the petitioner on
Yashwant Sinha v. CBI, (2020) 2 SCC 338, does not assist him, that
decision not being concerned with a case of demand and receipt of bribe
dissociated from any recommendation or decision, and having been
explained in subsequent decisions, including Anil Daima(supra).
48.
The reliance placed by the petitioner upon the SOP dated
03.09.2021 issued by the Department of Personnel and Training does not
alter this conclusion. An administrative SOP, being in the nature of an
executive instruction issued for internal guidance, cannot enlarge the
scope of a statutory provision or override its plain terms. To the extent the
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
SOP is sought to be read as extending Section 17A to every case of
alleged undue advantage connected with official duty, such a reading
would run counter to the statutory language itself and cannot be accepted.
49.
It may further be noted that, even assuming there were any
infirmity in the investigation on this score, it is well settled that a defect or
irregularity in investigation, howsoever serious, does not by itself vitiate
the trial or the charge, unless a failure of justice has occasioned thereby , a
matter which the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate at this stage.
Reference may be made to H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC
196, and State v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195. For the
foregoing reasons, the contention founded on Section 17A of the PC Act
is rejected.
50.
The submission that a fresh RC ought to have been registered upon
the petitioner's implication does not survive independent scrutiny once the
Section 17A contention fails. The original RC dated 17.01.2021 disclosed
a wider conspiracy involving multiple public servants and contractors, of
which the petitioner's alleged role forms one strand, uncovered in the
course of investigation. Registration of a second FIR/RC in respect of the
same occurrence would, in fact, be impermissible in law, as held in T.T.
Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181. The filing of a separate
charge-sheet against the petitioner, arising from the same investigation,
discloses no illegality.
51.
Insofar as the petitioner contends that no material exists to establish
demand, acceptance or nexus, it is well settled, following the Constitution
Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023)
4 SCC 731, that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification may be
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct or primary
evidence, provided the facts and circumstances proved give rise to the
necessary inference. On a prima facie reading of the material, the
statement of LW-1 regarding the petitioner's reference to his monetary
needs and the consequent conversation between LW-1 and A-3; the
intercepted conversation of 15.01.2021 regarding delivery of the amount
at Kanpur; the disclosure of A-2 regarding communication of the
currency-note identifier and subsequent release of Rs.9.90 lakhs to him;
and the recovery of Rs.4.40 lakhs together with the deposit slip for
Rs.4.90 lakhs , this Court is satisfied that a coherent chain of
circumstances has been placed on record sufficient to raise grave
suspicion warranting trial. Whether this material, on a full appreciation of
evidence, in fact establishes the charge beyond reasonable doubt is a
matter for trial and is expressly left open.
52.
The objection regarding non-compliance with Rule 419A of the
Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, goes to the admissibility of the intercepted
material and not to the existence of a prima facie case, particularly where
the prosecution case does not rest solely upon the intercepts but is also
founded upon witness statements, disclosure statements and recoveries.
This question is more appropriately addressed by the learned Trial Court
at the stage the said evidence is formally tendered and objected to, and is
accordingly left open for determination at trial. No final view is expressed
thereon.
53.
The submission regarding inconsistent description of the petitioner
as "Inspector of Works" and "Junior Engineer" does not advance the
petitioner's case. Designation is not an ingredient of the offence under
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
Section 7 of the PC Act, and LW-1 has consistently identified the
petitioner by name in connection with the transaction; the variation in
nomenclature, both descriptions relating to the same posting at Jogighopa,
occasions no prejudice.
54.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no patent
illegality, jurisdictional error or manifest infirmity in the impugned order
dated 24.01.2026 or in the charges framed pursuant thereto on 13.02.2026,
warranting interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The
material on record discloses a prima facie case giving rise to grave
suspicion sufficient to put the petitioner to trial, and the questions of
admissibility of the intercepted conversations and the ultimate sufficiency
of the evidence are left open for adjudication before the learned Trial
Court.
Conclusion
55.
The present revision petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending
application(s), if any, also stand disposed of in the above terms.
56.
All observations made herein are confined to the disposal of the
present petition and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on
the merits of the case, which shall be decided by the learned Trial Court
uninfluenced thereby.
57.
A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
information.
MADHU JAIN
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 15, 2026/RM
Signed By:RENUKA
NEGI
19:14:11
CRL.REV.P. 511/2026
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review