Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
CWP No. 20673 of 2025.
Reserved on: 10.07.2026.
Decided on: 29th July, 2026.
Smt. Madhu Bala
State of H.P. & Anr.
Versus
...Petitioner.
....Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Shubham Sood, Advocate.
For the respondents:
Mr. Rahul Thakur, Deputy Advocate
General.
Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge (Oral).
By way of present petition, the petitioner has, inter alia,
prayed for following reliefs:i) That a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order
or direction may kindly be issued for quashing and setting aside
the impugned order dated 17.11.2025 contained in Annexure P8.
ii) That a writ of mandamus of any other appropriate writ,
order of direction may kindly be issued directing the
respondents to seek fresh option from the petitioner and
consequently promote the petitioner to the post of Head Master
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
in terms of her seniority as TGT, from the date her juniors have
been promoted , along with all consequential benefits.”
2.
Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this case are
that the petitioner was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher
(Medical) (hereinafter referred to as (TGT Medical), on regular basis
on 23. 12.2000.
She joined her duties as such with effect from
27.01.2001. According to the petitioner, though the post of Trained
Graduate Teacher is a feeder category for promotion to the post of
Headmaster as well as Lecturer, however, the Education Department
has been making promotions to the post of Headmaster and
Lecturer without seeking options from the feeder category.
Resultant effect thereof was that junior incumbents in the category
of JBT were being promoted to the next higher post of Principal and
as a result thereof, certain TGTs,
were lacking better service
avenues.
3.
Further, as per the petitioner, the respondent-State
issued instructions that whenever there exists two promotional
channels from one post, then it is incumbent upon the Department
to seek option for the promotional post to the person concerned
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
that whether the person wants to be promoted from channel “A” or
channel “B”. As per the petitioner, in terms of Annexure P-2, which is
a judgment, dated 26.07.2010 passed by this Court in CWP(T) No.
14932 of 2008, titled Neelam Kaushal vs. State of HP and Others, this
Court also issued following directions in such like matters, relevant
para-13 whereof, reads as under:“13.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this petition is
disposed of with the following directions:
a. That no promotions made prior to 26th April 2010
shall be affected by the outcome of this petition.
However, since the promotions made after 26th
April,2010 were made expressly subject to the result
of this petition they shall abide by the following
directions.
b. That henceforth and w.e.f 26th April,2010 before
making any promotions to the post of Lecturers or
Head Masters an option shall be sought from the
concerned employee .
c.
Once an employee gives an option he/she will not
be permitted to change the option.
d. Once an employee opts to be promoted as Lecturer/
Head Master he can not claim that he should be
considered for the other post.
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
e.
The
Principal
Secretary
(Education)
to
the
Government of Himachal Pradesh, the Director of
Higher Education and Director of Elementary
Education i.e respondents No. 1 to 3 are made
personally responsible for compliance of these
directions in letter and spirit.
f.
All promotions, if any, made after 26th April,2010
shall be reviewed and after seeking options of the
employees in terms of the aforesaid directions the
promotions shall be made.
The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No order
as to costs.”
4.
It is further the case of the petitioner that she was
promoted against the post of Lecturer (Biology) vide Annexure P-3,
i.e. office order dated 18.09.2010. According to her, she joined her
duties as a Lecturer, but at the relevant time when she was
promoted as such, no prior option was sought from her as to
whether she wanted to be promoted against the post of Lecturer or
Headmaster.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in light
of the fact that paid promotion was unilaterally conferred upon the
petitioner without seeking her option, she is legally entitled to be
considered for the post of Headmaster also and the act of the
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
respondents of not seeking her option for promotion to the post of
Headmaster on the ground that she has already been promoted to
the post of Lecturer is bad in law.
6.
Learned counsel submitted that in terms of the law
declared by this Court, as the promotion of the petitioner against
the post of Lecturer was without seeking her option, she cannot be
denied the right of being promoted against the post of Headmaster.
He submitted that once it was clearly borne out from the record that
the petitioner was not given any option before her promotion to the
post of Lecturer (Biology), she cannot be denied the right of
consideration against the post of Headmaster, and it is incumbent
upon the department to seek the option of the petitioner for
promotion against the post of Headmaster also.
7.
Learned counsel has also referred to the judgments
appended with the petition to justify the contention of the
petitioner.
8.
Learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner had
earlier approached this Court by way of CWP No. 10080 of 2025,
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
titled Madhu Bala vs. State of HP and Others, which was disposed of
on 24/6/2025 by permitting her to make a representation to the
Authorities. He submitted that the representation of the petitioner
has been rejected in terms of Annexure P-8, order dated 17/11/2025.
Said order, being against the law settled by this Court, is liable to be
quashed and set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed in
terms of the prayers made therein.
9.
No other point was raised.
10.
On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General
submitted that as far as the legal position enunciated by the learned
counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the same is not in dispute.
However, according to him, these judgments have no applicability in
the facts of this case. Learned Deputy Advocate General drew the
attention of this Court to the promotion letter, Annexure P-3, dated
18/9/2010 and submitted that in terms of this office order, the
petitioner was given the option to accept or not to accept the
promotion against the post of Lecturer and the outcome of
acceptance of the promotion was also mentioned therein.
He
submitted that the judgments, on which the petitioner is relying
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
upon, are
in the facts where unilateral promotions were made
against the post of Lecturer etc., without giving any opportunity to
the TGT concerned to exercise option. He submitted that here, the
right to exercise option was given clearly and expressly in terms of
the promotion order. He submitted that the petitioner accepted
promotion against the post of Lecturer, knowingly well the contents
of office order dated 18/9/2010, and therefore, she cannot now be
allowed to approbate and reprobate by arguing that she was
promoted against the post of Lecturer without affording any option
to her to opt for either of the two channels of promotion.
Accordingly, he submitted that as there is no merit in the writ
petition, the same deserves to be dismissed.
11.
In counter thereto, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the option should have been sought from the
petitioner before the process of promotion was started, and the so
called option contained in the promotion order does not suffice the
purpose. He submitted that the option means an option sought
prior to the issuance of promotion order, and accordingly he again
stated that the petition be allowed as prayed for.
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
12.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
also carefully gone through the pleadings as well as the documents
on record.
13.
As far as the legal proposition that in case of two
promotion avenues being there from one feeder post, option has to
be sought from the incumbent holding the feeder post as to, which
of the two promotional channels the incumbent intends to be
considered for promotion is concerned, the same being a settled
legal position, calls for no discussion.
14.
If an incumbent holding the feeder category post is
unilaterally promoted to one of the promotional posts without
seeking any option from him or her, then the same cannot act as an
estoppel and such an incumbent can always claim promotion to the
other promotional post also.
15.
However, what has to be seen in the present case is
whether in terms of the contents of office order dated 18/9/2010, an
option was given to the petitioner by the Department before
promotion to opt for promotion against the post of Lecturer or not.
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
16.
Office order, Annexure P-3, in terms whereof the
petitioner was promoted against the post of Lecturer School Cadre,
demonstrates that in terms of this office order, TGT teachers
mentioned therein were promoted against the post of Lecturer
School Cadre. In this office order, it was clearly and categorically
mentioned that the concerned Principal/Headmaster will relieve the
promoted TGT immediately by taking either of the two irrevocable
options in writing with entry made in service book, copy whereof will
be pasted in the service book, i.e., (i) that he/she opts for promotion
as Lecturer (School Cadre) and may not be considered for the
promotion as Headmaster; and (ii) that he/she opts the promotion
as Headmaster only and may not be considered for the promotion
as Lecturer (School Cadre). The relevant portion of the order is
quoted herein below:
“In continuation to this Directorate office order Even No.
dated 13.07.2010 on the recommendations of the Departmental
Promotion Committee the following in-service TGTs possessing
the Master Degree in the different subjects are hereby promoted
as Lecturer (School-Cadre) in the respective subjects, on regular
basis in the pay scale of Rs. 10300-34800+ 4200 Grade Pay on
notional basis w.e.f.13.07.2010 and posted in Govt. Sr. Sec.
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
Schools as shown against their names subject to the conditions
that no complaint /inquiry/vigilance case and disciplinary
proceedings are pending against the individual concerned.
He/ She should report for duty to the concerned Principal
within stipulated period .The concerned Principal/Headmaster
will relieve the promoted TGTs immediately by taking either of
the following irrevocable options in writing with entry made in
the service book and the copy of the same will also be pasted in
the service book.
i)
That he/she opts for promotion as Lecturer
(School Cadre) and may not be 1 considered for the
promotion as Headmaster.
ii)
That
he/she
opts
the
promotion
as
Headmaster only and may not be considered for the
promotion as Lecturer (School cadre).”
17.
Thus, it is evident from the contents of office order dated
18/9/2010 that a clear option was given to the persons in the feeder
category whose names were mentioned in this promotion order that
they could opt for promotion against the post of Lecturer (School
Cadre) and thus forego their right of consideration for promotion as
Headmaster, or they could opt for promotion against the post of
Headmaster only and thus, may state that they may not be
considered for promotion as Lecturer (School Cadre).
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
18.
Incidentally, this office order was dealing with TGTs, who
were to be promoted as Lecturer School Cadre, and thus it was not a
case that the persons referred to or mentioned in the promotion
order were Class-IV employees, who were rustic villagers or people
possessing minimal educational qualification. Obviously, as it was
mentioned
in
the
office
order
that
the
concerned
Principal/Headmaster will relieve the promoted TGT by taking either
of the irrevocable options in writing mentioned therein, the
petitioner was relieved by the concerned Principal or Headmaster
only after she opted for promotion as Lecturer School Cadre and
gave up her right of being considered for promotion as Headmaster.
In this backdrop, now a complete somersault on the part of the
petitioner after more than a decade to the effect that she be
considered and promoted against the post of Headmaster is nothing
but an abuse of the process of law.
19.
At this stage, this Court would like to refer to the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. vs.
N. Murugesan and others, (2022)2 SCC 25, in which, the Hon’ble
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as under on acquiescence,
approbate and reprobate:
“24.
We have already discussed the relationship between
acquiescence on the one hand and delay and laches on the other.
25.
Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It
is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an
action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence
takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act.
From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead
of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the
original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and
instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and
thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a
consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between
the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party
that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original
terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We
only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence.
When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches.
Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of
acquiescence is to be seen on a case-to-case basis.
“Approbate and reprobate
26.
These phrases are borrowed from the Scott’s law. They
would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject
the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The
principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of
approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who
knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the
benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the
fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the
rest.
A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an
instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to
affirm or disaffirm the transaction.
This principle has to be
applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a
party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of
the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An
element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of
estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already
dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the
conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while
confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.
27.
We would like to quote the following judgments for better
appreciation and understanding of the said principle:
27.1
Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593
“23. But it is argued by Sri Krishnaswami Ayyangar that as
the proceedings in OS. No. 92 of 1938-39 are relied on as
barring the plea that the decree and sale in OS. No. 100 of
1919-20 are not collusive, not on the ground of res judicata
or estoppel but on the principle that a person cannot both
approbate and reprobate, it is immaterial that the present
appellants were not parties thereto, and the decision in
Verschures
Creameries
Ltd.
v.
Hull
and
Netherlands
Steamship Company Ltd. [(1921) 2 KB 608], and in particular,
the observations of Scrutton, LJ, at page 611 were quoted in
support of this position. There, the facts were that an agent
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
delivered goods to the customer contrary to the instructions
of the principal, who thereafter filed a suit against the
purchaser for price of goods and obtained a decree.
Not having obtained satisfaction, the principal next filed
a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of
negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an
action was barred. The ground of the decision is that when
on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two
reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and
obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his
election and claim the alternative relief. The principle was
thus stated by Bankes, L.J.: (Verschures Creameries Ltd. Case,
(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)
‘…….Having elected to treat the delivery to him as an
authorised delivery they cannot treat the same act as a
misdelivery. To do so would be to approbate and reprobate
the same act.’
The observations of Scrutton, LJ on which the appellants rely
are as follows:
‘…...A plaintiff is not permitted to ‘approbate and reprobate’.
The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law,
where it is used to express the principle embodied in our
doctrine of election — namely, that no party can accept and
reject the same instrument: Ker v. Wauchope [(1819) 1 Bligh
PC 1, p. 21] : Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby [(1908) AC 224,
p.232] . The doctrine of election is not however confined to
instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a
transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid,
and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of
securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and
reprobate the transaction.’
It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a
person cannot ‘approbate and reprobate’ is only one
application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation
must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same
transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The
law is thus stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. XIII, p.
464, para 512:
“On the principle that a person may not approbate and
reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to
be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in
pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party
cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment
of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it
aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have
relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was
founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made
in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties
who have acted on it”.
27.2
State of Punjab vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15 SCC
144:
“22. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a
species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties.
As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. MR. Firm Muar, AIR 1965
SC 1216 ]).
23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has
been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party
and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on
any ground. (Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service, AIR 1969 SC 329] .) In R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir (R.
N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683] this Court has
observed as under: (SCC pp. 687-88, para 10)
“10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and
reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election
which postulates that no party can accept and reject the
same instrument and that ‘a person cannot say at one time
that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some
advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing
that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the
purpose of securing some other advantage’.”
25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial
Development and Investment Corpn. v. Diamond and Gem
Development Corpn. (2013) 5 SCC 470 made an observation
that a party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast
and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one
knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance
or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect
on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is
applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a
manner as to violate the principles of right and good
conscience.
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the
rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and
reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by
election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or
equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a
person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct,
or silence when he has to speak, from asserting a right which
he would have otherwise had.”
27.3
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment
Corpn. vs. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5
SCC 470:
“I. Approbate and reprobate
15. A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot-blow cold”,
“fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one
knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance,
or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or
the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order
upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however,
it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the
principles of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide
Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC 593] , CIT v. V.
MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216] , Ramesh Chandra
Sankla v. Vikram Cement [(2008) 14 SCC 58 : (2009) 1 SCC
(L&S) 706 : AIR 2009 SC 713] , Pradeep Oil Corpn. v.
MCD [(2011) 5 SCC 270 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712 : AIR 2011 SC
1869] , Cauvery Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources
(International) Co. Ltd. [(2011) 10 SCC 420 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ)
685] and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [(2012)
12 SCC 133 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136 : JT (2012) 9 SC 260] .]
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based
on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot
approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of
estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in
pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this
law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or
conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from
asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.”
20.
This Court again reiterates that herein it is not a case
that unilaterally without intimating the petitioner that she was
having an option either to accept promotion against the post of
Lecturer or forego the same, she was promoted against the post of
Lecturer. The office order clearly and categorically mentioned that if
the promoted incumbent was opting for promotion to the post of
Lecturer, then the incumbent has to state in writing that she may
not be considered for promotion against the post of Headmaster
and vice versa also.
21.
The petitioner acquiesced to the conditions of the
promotion order and now she cannot be allowed to approbate and
reprobate by firstly having accepted the terms and conditions of the
promotion order, and now by making an attempt to wriggle out
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
from the same.
The promotion order specifically mentioned that
upon acceptance of the said promotion, the incumbent shall be
giving up the right of promotion to the other promotion channel. All
these facts were in the notice of the petitioner, yet she decided to
accept the promotion, meaning thereby that she accepted all the
terms and conditions which were contained in the promotion order.
22.
Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the
promotion against the post of Lecturer does not bar her from
seeking promotion against the post of Headmaster, or that the act
of the respondents of promoting the petitioner in terms of Annexure
P-3 against the post of Lecturer is in violation of the law declared on
the issue by this Court in terms of the judgments appended with the
writ petition, is totally unsustainable and is rejected.
This Court
again reiterates that filing of this petition is nothing but abuse of the
process of law.
23.
Accordingly, in light of the above observations, this writ
petition is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 25,000/-, which shall
be deposited by the petitioner with the “Chief Justice Disaster Relief
( 2026:HHC:31442 )
Fund, 2025”, within 4 weeks from today. For compliance of this part
of the order, list on 9th September, 2026.
24.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
29th July, 2026.
(jai)
(Ajay Mohan Goel)
Judge
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review