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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 09.04.2026
+
ARB.P. 2057/2025
M/S WINSOME BREWERIES LIMITED
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Manish Srivastava and Mr.
Hardik Vashisht, Advocates.
versus
M/S BHORUKA POWER CORPORATION LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Satyajit Sarna and Mr.
Aman Goyal, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1.
The present Petition has been filed under Sections 11(5) & (6)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking the
appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes inter se the
parties arising out of three Inter-Corporate Deposit Agreements
dated 25.10.2016, 22.02.2017 and 10.08.20172 executed between the
parties.
2.
Clause 7 of the ICDs contains the dispute resolution clause,
which stipulates for resolution of disputes between the parties thereto
by way of Arbitration. The said clause reads as under:
“7. Disputes, if any, shall be decided by an Arbitrator to be
appointed by you. Jurisdiction of Courts/ Venue of Arbitration
Act
ICDs
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shall be New Delhi only.”
3.
The material on record indicates that the statutory requirement
under Section 21 of the Act for invocation the aforestated Arbitration
clause stands duly complied with vide Legal Notice dated 04.04.2025
issued by the Petitioner.
4.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submits
that the disputes between the parties stand fully settled and that
nothing survives for adjudication. He draws the attention of this Court
to the Order dated 06.02.2025 passed by the learned Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court, wherein it is recorded that the amounts in respect
of which an earlier Order dated 01.07.2022 had been passed by the
learned District Court, pursuant to which a Demand Draft for a sum of
Rs. 1,55,32,602/- was issued, stood duly paid. He also refers to
Paragraph 5 of the Order which reads as follows:
“5.
However, after some arguments in the Court, the parties
have arrived at a settlement. The respondents have agreed to pay
another sum of Rs. 6 lakhs to the petitioner within two weeks from
today, which is acceptable to the petitioner. The statement of the
counsel for the respondents is taken on record and the respondents
are bound by the same.”
5.
He would, therefore, submit that the payment of the sum of Rs.
6,00,000/- is indicative of the parties having settled all the issues inter
se.
6.
This Court notices that the said Order dated 06.02.2025 arose
out of an appeal concerning the closure of proceedings relating to
dishonour of the cheques without the consent of the complainant. It is
further noticed that the Court therein also recorded that the parties had
agreed to settle that matter upon the further payment of a sum of Rs.
6,00,000/-.
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7.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent further
contends that the present Petition is ex facie barred by limitation,
having been filed almost six years after the alleged cause of action
first arose.
8.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner contends that the ICDs themselves provided for payment of
interest and that the total outstanding amount was substantially higher
than the amount which formed the subject matter of the complaint,
culminating in the Order dated 06.02.2025. It is contended that
disputes between the parties, therefore, continue to subsist and require
adjudication through arbitration.
9.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner further
contends that the payment of the aforesaid amount cannot be
construed as an acknowledgement of the entire claim raised by the
Petitioner.
10.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the present
Petition is not barred by limitation and places reliance on Section 19
of the Limitation Act, 1908. It is contended that the Order dated
01.07.2022 read with Order dated 06.02.2025 constitutes a clear
acknowledgement
of
liability
by
the
Respondent.
Such
acknowledgement, having been made before the expiry of the
prescribed period, gives rise to a fresh period of limitation, which
commenced from 06.02.2025. Consequently, the present Petition,
having been instituted within the renewed period of limitation, is ex
facie maintainable.
11.
This Court is of the view that a determination of whether or not
matters as between the parties stood finally resolved would require
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this Court to examine the contours of the earlier litigation as well as
enter into an inquiry on the factual matrix.
12.
At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the legal position
governing the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section
11(6) of the Act is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish
Spinning3,
after
taking
into
consideration
the
authoritative
pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between
Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp
Act, 1899, In re4, comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial
intervention at the stage of Section 11 of the Act. The excerpt of Krish
Spg (supra) reads as under:“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
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112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
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when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
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any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
13.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the Act, is required to confine itself to a prima facie
examination of the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement and
nothing
beyond.
The
Court’s
role
is
facilitative
and
procedural, namely, to give effect to the parties’ agreed mechanism of
dispute resolution when it has failed, without embarking upon an
adjudication of contentious factual or legal issues, which are reserved
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for the Arbitral Tribunal.
14.
In view of the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Krish Spinning (supra), the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the Act is extremely circumscribed. All the contentions
sought to be raised herein are matters that can appropriately be urged
before the learned Arbitrator, who is legally empowered and
competent to adjudicate upon the same.
15.
In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the matter may be
referred to arbitration by an Arbitrator for the purpose of the
resolution of disputes between the parties.
16.
Material on record indicates that the valuation of the subject
matter of the disputes is stated to be approximately Rs. 1.94 crores.
17.
Accordingly, this Court hereby requests Mr. Jayant Tripathi,
Advocate (Mobile No.9891871186), to enter upon the reference and
adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
18.
The learned Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
19.
The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to a fee in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise be agreed to
between the parties and the learned Arbitrator.
20.
The parties shall share the learned Arbitrator’s fee and arbitral
costs equally.
21.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
22.
Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
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expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
23.
Let the copy of the said order be sent to the learned Arbitrator
through all permissible modes, including electronic mode as well.
24.
Accordingly, the present Petition stands disposed of in the
above-stated terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
APRIL 09, 2026/tk/DJ
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