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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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: 09.02.2026
: 18.05.2026
: 20.05.2026
FAO 165/2015 & CM APPL. 9219/2015, CM APPL. 52912/2018
M/S UDK PAPERS PVT LTD
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. K. Venkatraman and Mr. D. K.
Chawla, Advocates.
versus
M/S MAGNUM VENTURES LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Neeraj Gupta and Mr. Rajat
Asija, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI
JUDGMENT
1.
The present appeal has been preferred under Section 37 of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”)
against the judgment dated 28.02.2015 passed by the learned ADJ in
Original Objection No. 5/2013 (New No. 195/2015).
Vide the impugned order, the objections filed by the appellant herein
under Section 34 of the Act against the arbitral award dated 10.10.2012
(hereinafter the “Award”) were dismissed.
2.
The Award came to be passed in the context of a business transaction
for the supply of paper. In its claim petition, the claimant (respondent before
this Court) averred that it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
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selling different types and qualities of paper. On being approached by the
appellant, it had supplied different types of paper as per the appellant‟s
requirements. Against the supply of the said goods, the claimant raised bills
from time to time, which were duly paid, save for the appellant‟s default in
making payments against the bills raised between 05.07.2009 and
16.11.2009. The total amount payable was claimed to be Rs.7,64,526/-. The
details of the bills were exhibited as Ex. CW-1/2 to Ex. CW-1/7. The
claimant further claimed interest @ 24% per annum up to 31.01.2011. The
claimant also relied upon the C-Forms issued by the appellant company.
The appellant company appeared before the learned arbitrator,
contested the claim, and filed its written statement as well as evidence by
way of affidavit. It contested the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to
entertain the claim petition. It also filed an application under Order VII Rule
11 CPC, which was dismissed. It further objected to the learned arbitrator
assuming jurisdiction on the ground that no consent was ever given for his
appointment by the appellant. On merits, it was claimed that the claimant
had not supplied the proper material in terms of the orders placed. It was
claimed that against the samples of „High Bright‟ paper quality, the claimant
had supplied material of ordinary quality from 01.04.2008 to 16.11.2009.
The bills, however, were raised for „High Bright‟ paper quality. When this
was objected to, the claimant agreed to give a discount @ Rs.250/- per MT
at the end of the financial year; however, it failed to keep the said promise. It
was claimed that the claimant had supplied a total of 293 MT of material in
the aforesaid period, with the discount amounting to Rs.7,32,500/-. The
adjustment as promised was not given by the claimant. It was claimed that
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the material against Bill No. 1308 dated 17.05.2009 of 8779.2 kg and
against Bill No. 127 dated 17.05.2009 of 6550.02 kg was received in wet
and damaged condition, for which the claimant had promised an adjustment
@ Rs.5/- per kg, totalling Rs.76,647/-. It was also claimed that an authorized
representative of the appellant had visited the Ghaziabad office of the
claimant, where he was assured that credit notes of Rs.7,32,500/- and
Rs.76,647/- would be raised, which was not done. The appellant company
claimed that it was entitled to an adjustment of Rs.7,32,500/- and
Rs.76,647/- and, in fact, it is the claimant who was liable to pay an amount
of Rs.44,621/-. The proceedings also reveal that the appellant had filed
written submissions and, by way of a separate application dated 05.09.2012,
prayed for an opportunity to cross-examine the claimant. The said
application was rejected by the learned arbitrator on 14.09.2012, observing
that he had examined the two bills as well as the concerned C-Forms.
Further, the account of the appellant showed a balance of Rs.7,64,526/-. The
application was rejected by stating that it was not necessary to grant the
opportunity to cross-examine.
The objections filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act were
also rejected by observing that the same were vague and general in nature
and no material/document was pointed out that could be said to have been
overlooked by the learned arbitrator. Insofar as the objection regarding not
being granted the opportunity to cross-examine the claimant is concerned,
the same was brushed aside by stating that the rejection of the opportunity
would not vitiate the Award.
3.
Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant has restricted the
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challenge in the appeal only to the denial of the opportunity to crossexamine the claimant. The other objections to the Award are not pressed.
4.
As far as the scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37 of
the Act is concerned, the law is well settled. In Larsen Air Conditioning and
Refrigeration Company Vs. Union of India1, it has been held in paragraph 15
as under: “15. The limited and extremely circumscribed jurisdiction of the
court under Section 34 of the Act, permits the court to interfere with an
award, sans the grounds of patent illegality, i.e., that “illegality must go to
the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature”; and that the
tribunal “must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if
an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it
will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground”
[ref: Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49:
(2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204], SCC p. 81, para 42]. The other ground would be
denial of natural justice. In appeal, Section 37 of the Act grants narrower
scope to the appellate court to review the findings in an award, if it has
been upheld, or substantially upheld under Section 34.
16. It is important to notice that the old Act contained a provision
which enabled the court to modify an award. However, that power has
been consciously omitted by Parliament, while enacting the 1996 Act. This
means that the Parliamentary intent was to exclude power to modify an
award, in any manner, to the court. This position has been iterated
decisively by this court in NHAI v. M. Hakeem [NHAI v. M. Haeem,
(2021) 9 SCC 1 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 437]: (SCC p. 28, para 42)
„42. It can therefore be said that this question has now been
settled finally by at least 3 decisions [McDermott International
Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181] [Kinnari
Mullick v. Ghanshyam Das Damani, (2018) 11 SCC 328 : (2018) 5
SCC (Civ) 106] [Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v.
Navigant Technologies (P) Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 657] of this Court.
Even otherwise, to state that the judicial trend appears to favour
an interpretation that would read into Section 34 a power to
modify, revise or vary the award would be to ignore the previous
law contained in the 1940 Act; as also to ignore the fact that the
1996 Act was enacted based on the Uncitral Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 which, as has been
(2023) 15 SCC 472
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pointed out in Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration,
makes it clear that, given the limited judicial interference on
extremely limited grounds not dealing with the merits of an award,
the “limited remedy” under Section 34 is coterminous with the
“limited right”, namely, either to set aside an award or remand
the matter under the circumstances mentioned in Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996.‟”
5.
The Supreme Court, in its earlier decision in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd Vs. General Electric Co.2, held that “public policy” includes: a. fundamental policy of Indian law;
b. the interests of India; and
c. justice and morality.
6.
In Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd.3, the
concept of “public policy” and the scope of interference on this ground were
expanded. It was held that “patent illegality” is one of the grounds included
therein. Later, in ONGC Vs. Western Geco International Ltd.4, three more
grounds were added to the “public policy of India”, namely: (i) a judicial
approach is not adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal; (ii) principles of natural
justice, including the opportunity of hearing, are not followed by the
Tribunal; and (iii) perversity and irrationality.
7.
A gainful reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Sohan Lal Gupta Vs. Asha Devi Gupta5, wherein, while discussing
what constitutes a reasonable opportunity of “putting case” in an arbitration,
the Supreme Court laid down the following conditions: “23. For constituting a reasonable opportunity, the following
1994 Supp (1) SCC 644
(2003) 5 SCC 705
(2014) 9 SCC 263
(2003) 7 SCC 492
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conditions are required to be observed:
1. Each party must have notice that the hearing is to take place.
2. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to be present at
the hearing, together with his advisers and witnesses.
3. Each party must have the opportunity to be present throughout
the hearing.
4. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence and argument in support of his own case.
5. Each party must have a reasonable opportunity to test his
opponent‟s case by cross-examining his witnesses, presenting
rebutting evidence and addressing oral argument.
6. This hearing must, unless the contrary is expressly agreed, be
the occasion on which the parties present the whole of their
evidence and argument.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
The facts noted above show that while the claimant had premised the
claim on the basis of the bills raised as well as the C-Forms against them,
the appellant had claimed that there was an oral understanding between the
parties whereby the claimant had promised to grant adjustments on two
occasions, which eventually were not granted. The learned arbitrator denied
the opportunity to cross-examine despite the application filed in this regard.
The application was dismissed by merely stating that both the bills were
examined. A perusal of the order dated 14.09.2012 would show that the
same failed to even take note of the submission that the appellant had set up
the defence of an oral promise of adjustment made by the claimant.
9.
Section 34(2) of the Act provides for setting aside of an arbitral award
if the Court finds that the same is in conflict with the public policy of India.
Indeed, the arbitrator is the master of the evidence placed before them and
examines the quality and quantity of evidence placed before them when they
deliver the arbitral award. However, the proviso to Section 24 of the Act
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stipulates that if a party before the arbitrator seeks to lead oral evidence, it
must be granted, as the expression used is “…shall hold oral hearings, at an
appropriate stage of the proceedings, on a request by a party…”. Bearing in
mind that the defence set up by the appellant is of an oral understanding, as
per which it is claimed that the claimant had not provided the adjustment,
the denial of opportunity to cross-examine the claimant vitiates the Award as
being contrary to the public policy of India.
10.
The ground on which the Award stands vitiated could perhaps have
been cured by following the procedure entailed in sub-section 34(4) of the
Act. The said provision contemplates adjournment of the objection
proceedings, affording an opportunity to the arbitral tribunal to eliminate the
grounds for setting aside the arbitral award, and resume the proceedings
thereafter. However, there is no indication that such a request was made by
the appellant before the Court dealing with the objections.
11.
In Gayatri Balasamy Vs. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd.6, the
Supreme Court held that the power to remand under Section 34(4) of the Act
may be exercised by the Court on an oral request, and it is not necessary for
a party to make a written application in this regard; however, a request must
be made, as there is no suo moto power of remand.
12.
The appellant has now preferred such a request before this Court,
having specifically prayed in the present appeal for remanding back of the
matter to the learned arbitrator, and having further reiterated the same
request in its written submissions.
13.
Considering all the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the
2025 INSC 605
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impugned order is set aside. Without expressing any final opinion on the
merits of the remand request made by the appellant, the matter is remitted to
the Court below to consider the submission on Section 34(4) of the Act on
its own merits in accordance with the law.
14.
The matter shall be listed before the concerned Court at the first
instance on 28.05.2026, for further directions.
15.
The present appeal, along with the pending applications, is disposed
of in the above terms.
(MANOJ KUMAR OHRI)
JUDGE
MAY 18, 2026
ga
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