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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 25.03.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 335/2025 & I.A. 20401/2025 (Stay) & I.A.
20402/2025 (For the direction to call for the arbitral record)
M/S ST. THOMAS SCHOOL
.....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Sulekha Agarwal, Mr.
Rohit Amit Sthalekar, Mr.
Ashish Choudhury, Ms. Prachi
Grover, Mr. Abhishek Arora
and Mr. Anand Kamal,
Advocates.
versus
M/S MEGALOGIX
Through:
Mr. Niraj
Advocate.
.....Respondent
Kumar Singh,
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking setting aside of the
Arbitral Award dated 16.04.20252, passed by the learned Sole
Arbitrator. By the said Award, the learned Sole Arbitrator has allowed
the claims of the Respondent herein to the extent of ₹1,30,66,989/-,
along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from 01.07.2021 till
A&C Act
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the date of actual payment. However, the learned Sole Arbitrator has,
at the same time, rejected the claim pertaining to compensation sought
towards loss of business opportunity.
2.
At the outset, learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has exceeded the scope of reference. In
support of this submission, reliance is placed upon the Order dated
30.05.2022, passed by a Co-Ordinate Bench of this Court, in ARB.P.
668/2022, whereby the learned Sole Arbitrator came to be appointed.
Particular reliance is placed on paragraph no. 2 thereof, wherein it was
recorded that disputes arising out of the Curriculum Services
Provider Agreement dated 01.12.20153 would form the subject
matter of arbitration. The relevant portion of the said order reads as
follows:
“2.
By way of the present petition under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“the Act”], the petitioner
seeks appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes
between the parties arising under a “Curriculum Services Provider
Agreement” dated 01.12.2015 read with a communication dated
14.03.2017 entitled “Extension of Agreement for Smart Class”
signed by both the parties.”
3.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner thereafter draws the attention
of this Court to paragraph no. 4 of the Impugned Award wherein
reference is made to two agreements between the parties, namely, the
CSP Agreement and the Agreement for ICT Education dated
25.10.20164.
“4.
The parties entered into two agreements, dated 01.12.2015
called
“THE
CURRICULAM
SERVICE
PROVIDER
AGREEMENT” and 25.10 2016 called the “AGREEMENT FOR
Impugned Award
CSP Agreement
ICT-E Agreement
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ICT EDUCATION” for setting up Smart class programmes at the
Respondent School and for providing ICT education, respectively.
Pursuant to these agreements the Claimant is stated to have agreed
to undertake to set up smart class programmes, which was
subsequently, extended to include smart classes and science lab
equipment as well. There was an extension letter dated 14.03.2017.
The Agreement was for a period of five years to be computed from
the date of its execution and the charges were to be paid
periodically to the Claimant.”
4.
On the basis of the aforesaid, it is contended by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner that the learned Arbitrator travelled beyond
the scope of reference since the arbitration proceedings were confined
to disputes arising out of the CSP Agreement, whereas the Impugned
Award appears to take into consideration aspects relating to the ICT-E
Agreement, which was never referred to arbitration. It is, therefore,
submitted that on this ground alone the Impugned Award deserves to
be set aside.
5.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the
Impugned Award is vitiated by patent illegality as the learned
Arbitrator refused to permit the Petitioner to bring certain documents
on record. In this regard, reliance is placed on paragraph no. 26 of the
Impugned Award wherein the learned Arbitrator declined the request
of the Petitioner herein/ Respondent therein to place additional
documents on record at the stage of final arguments. The relevant
paragraph reads as under:
“26. The Respondent School filed an application for producing
additional documents, being copies of ledger accounts, on the last
date of arguments, i.e. on 22.03.2025, which was opposed by the
counsel for the Claimant for the reason that these documents were
available with the Respondent School at the time of filing the
statement of defence. No cogent reason has been given by the
Respondent School in the application for not producing the
documents at the earliest. In any case the Claimant had no
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opportunity to deal with and respond/counter the documents filed
at the end of the proceedings. Since the time for publishing the
award is available only up to 05.05.2025 after extension granted by
the Hon'ble court, Therefore, the said additional documents cannot
be taken on record and cannot be relied upon.”
6.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner, therefore, submits that the
said conclusion is erroneous and that the documents sought to be
brought on record were material and went to the root of the dispute.
7.
It is further contended that the principal claim of the
Respondent has been erroneously allowed by the learned Arbitrator
solely on the basis of ledger accounts filed by the Respondent, without
any supporting invoices or primary documentation to substantiate the
claims.
8.
Additionally, learned counsel raises a plea of impossibility of
performance, contending that the contract in question fell within the
period of the COVID-19 pandemic and, therefore, the contractual
obligations could not have been performed. Consequently, it is urged
that the claims pertaining to that period ought not to have been
entertained.
ANALYSIS:
9.
This court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties at length and, with their able assistance, has carefully perused
the Impugned Award and the other material placed on record.
10.
At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court remains
conscious of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an
objection petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. There is a
consistent and evolving line of precedents whereby the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court has authoritatively delineated and settled the contours
of judicial intervention in such proceedings. In this regard, a threeJudge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after an exhaustive
consideration of a catena of earlier judgments, in OPG Power
Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions (India) (P)
Ltd.5, while dealing with the grounds of conflict with the public policy
of India and patent illegality, grounds which have also been urged in
the present case, made certain pertinent observations, which are
reproduced hereunder:
“Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application for
setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2), (2-A)
and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 34
has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five sub-clauses which
are not relevant to the issues raised before us. Insofar as clause (b)
is concerned, it has two sub-clauses, namely, (i) and (ii). Subclause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to the controversy in hand.
Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides that if the Court finds that the
arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India, it may
set aside the award.
Public policy
31. “Public policy” is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and is
also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872
uses the expression by stating that the consideration or object of an
agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to public policy.
That is, a contract which is opposed to public policy is void.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
(2025) 2 SCC 417
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*****
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior to
the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment the
expression “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law” was not used by the legislature in either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or
Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and its
Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are dealing
with a case where the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the newly
substituted/added Explanations would apply [Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b), in
place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it does
away with the use of words : (a) “without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)” in the opening part of the preamended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) “without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section” in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section 48(2)(b);
secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India to the three
specified categories by using the words “only if”.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute shall
not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an application
under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996
Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in Section
34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an arbitral
award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the Court
may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. This power of the Court is,
however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an arbitral
award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if:
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(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law;
or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of the
award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall confine
our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral award is in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law, and/or
whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or
justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of sub-section
(2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there is any patent
illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be apposite
to consider as to how the expressions:
(a) “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law”;
(b) “in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice”;
and
(c) “patent illegality” have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
“in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law” was
not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase “contrary to the public policy”, this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention of
law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid discussion
is that after “the 2015 Amendments” in Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and
Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase “in conflict with the
public policy of India” must be accorded a restricted meaning in
terms of Explanation 1. The expression “in contravention with the
fundamental policy of Indian law” by use of the word
“fundamental” before the phrase “policy of Indian law” makes the
expression narrower in its application than the phrase “in
contravention with the policy of Indian law”, which means mere
contravention of law is not enough to make an award vulnerable.
To bring the contravention within the fold of fundamental policy of
Indian law, the award must contravene all or any of such
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fundamental principles that provide a basis for administration of
justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of such
contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public interest,
are considered contravention of the fundamental policy of
Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a contravention
of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the extent of judicial
scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out in Explanation 2 to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral award
not arising out of international commercial arbitrations, may also
be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is visited
by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
to sub-section (2-A) states that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase “public policy of India” as used in Section
34, this Court took the view that the concept of public policy
connotes some matter which concerns public good and public
interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates statutory
provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest. Thus, an award
could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It was, however,
clarified that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held that award is against
public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
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68. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that “patent illegality appearing on the face of
the award” refers to such illegality as goes to the root of matter, but
which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It was
also clarified that what is not subsumed within “the fundamental
policy of Indian law”, namely, the contravention of a statute not
linked to “public policy” or “public interest”, cannot be brought in
by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the
ground of patent illegality [ See Ssangyong Engg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it was observed,
reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under this category of
challenge to an arbitral award [See Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised in ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral decision
must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable person
would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an award is
perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain tests
were laid down to determine whether a decision of an Arbitral
Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context, it was
observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such decision
would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though, a possible
view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the
arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of
evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an award
based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up
in quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score.
71. In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the 2015
Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed that a
decision which is perverse, while no longer being a ground for
challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount to
a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. It was pointed
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out that an award based on no evidence, or which ignores vital
evidence, would be perverse and thus patently illegal. It was also
observed that a finding based on documents taken behind the back
of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision
based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on
evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be
characterised as perverse [See Ssangyong Engg. & Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed in Ssangyong
Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 and
later approved by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel Engg.
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC
167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in DMRC
Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6 SCC 357,
the ground of patent illegality/perversity was delineated in the
following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
“39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of “patent illegality”.
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.”
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court does
not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with an
arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is to be
respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only when an arbitral
award could be categorised as perverse, that on an error of fact an
arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a mere erroneous
application of the law or wrong appreciation of evidence by itself is
not a ground to set aside an award as is clear from the provisions of
sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
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(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
are not to be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless
the court concludes that the perversity of the award goes to the root
of the matter and there is no possibility of an alternative
interpretation that may sustain the arbitral award. It was observed
that jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot be equated with the
normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the approach ought to be to
respect the finality of the arbitral award as well as party's autonomy
to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided
under the law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11.
This Court now proceeds to examine the contentions raised by
the Petitioner on the anvil of the limited and circumscribed
jurisdiction available under Section 34 of the A&C Act, and in the
light of the principles authoritatively laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in OPG Power Generation (supra).
12.
Upon a careful consideration of the findings recorded in the
Impugned Award, as well as the rival submissions advanced by
learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view
that no infirmity can be discerned in the approach adopted by the
learned Arbitrator. Having due regard to the narrow scope of judicial
interference permissible under Section 34, this Court finds no reason
to depart from, or interfere with, the conclusions arrived at by the
learned Arbitrator and accordingly concurs with the same.
13.
The principal contention advanced by learned counsel for the
Petitioner is premised upon certain entries in the ledger accounts,
which, according to the Petitioner, demonstrate that a portion of the
claims adjudicated and ultimately allowed by the learned Arbitrator
pertain not to the CSP Agreement, but to a distinct and independent
agreement, namely, the ICT-E Agreement. It is urged that the arbitral
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proceedings were invoked exclusively in respect of disputes arising
under the CSP Agreement, and that no reference to arbitration was
ever made insofar as disputes arising under the ICT-E Agreement are
concerned.
14.
On this basis, it is contended that any claim traceable to the
ICT-E Agreement falls outside the scope of the arbitral reference and,
therefore, ought to have been treated as wholly irrelevant and nonadjudicable by the learned Arbitrator. It is further submitted that the
very invocation of arbitration, as facilitated through the Order passed
by this Court under Section 11 of the A&C Act, was confined strictly
to the CSP Agreement, and consequently, the learned Arbitrator
exceeded jurisdiction in entertaining or allowing claims which
allegedly arise from a separate contractual framework.
15.
In order to substantiate the aforesaid contention, the Petitioner
sought to rely upon certain ledger entries, which were sought to be
placed on record before the learned Arbitrator at a highly belated
stage, namely, at the verge of conclusion of final arguments.
16.
It is an admitted position that although the ledger entries were
placed on record at the belated stage, the manner in which the
Petitioner now seeks to highlight alleged discrepancies therein was
neither pleaded nor articulated at any stage before the learned
Arbitrator. The present attempt, which essentially involves introducing
an additional row in the ledger so as to provide a revised break-up, is
clearly an afterthought. Such a case was never set up in the pleadings,
nor was it urged during the arbitral proceedings.
17.
A plain reading of the manner in which this argument has been
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advanced before this Court, in proceedings under Section 34 of the
A&C Act, reveals that the Petitioner could well have raised such a
contention on the basis of the material already on record, without
seeking to rely upon documents that were not permitted to be taken on
record. Significantly, the documents now sought to be relied upon did
not form part of the original pleadings, nor were they introduced
during the evidentiary stage, when the parties were afforded a full and
fair opportunity to lead their evidence.
18.
In fact, the documents which came to be disallowed by the
learned Arbitrator were never produced at any stage during the
pleadings or evidence. It was only at the stage of final arguments that
the Petitioner attempted to introduce the same. The learned Arbitrator,
having regard to the belated stage at which such documents were
sought to be brought on record, and the surrounding circumstances of
their production, rightly declined to admit them. The Petitioner now
seeks to challenge this refusal by contending that such rejection
amounts to a violation of the Principles of Natural Justice, on the
ground that it allegedly deprived the Petitioner of an effective
opportunity to present its case. However, this contention is clearly
untenable in light of the record, which demonstrates that the Petitioner
had adequate opportunity throughout the proceedings to place all
relevant material on record but failed to do so within the permissible
stages of the arbitral process.
19.
This Court, upon a careful and holistic consideration of the
record, finds no merit in either limb of the Petitioner’s contention. The
learned Arbitrator has, in paragraph no. 26 of the Impugned Award,
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categorically recorded that the documents sought to be introduced by
the Petitioner were at all material times within its possession and
control. Despite such availability, the Petitioner failed to place the
same on record at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. It was only
at the stage of final arguments, on the last date of hearing, that an
attempt was made to introduce these documents.
20.
The learned Arbitrator has further noted that no cogent,
plausible, or satisfactory explanation was furnished by the Petitioner
to justify such belated filing. In addition, it was rightly observed that
permitting the introduction of such documents at that stage would
have caused manifest prejudice to the Respondent, who would have
been deprived of a fair and reasonable opportunity to examine, rebut,
or respond to the same.
21.
The Impugned Award further reflects that both parties were
granted adequate and sufficient opportunity, at the appropriate stages
of the proceedings, to lead evidence and place all relevant material on
record. Indeed, the record demonstrates that at a particular stage, both
parties consciously elected not to lead any further evidence and agreed
to proceed on the basis of the documents already on record. In such
circumstances, it is not open to the Petitioner, having voluntarily
foregone the opportunity to introduce evidence at the proper stage, to
subsequently attempt to reopen the evidentiary record at the stage of
final hearing, and that too without any justifiable cause or explanation.
Such conduct is clearly contrary to settled principles of procedural
discipline and cannot be countenanced.
22.
It is well-settled that the scheme of the A&C Act mandates
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adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice, and any violation
thereof may render an arbitral award susceptible to challenge under
Section 34, including under Section 34(2)(a)(iii), which contemplates
situations where a party was unable to present its case. Section 18 of
the A&C Act expressly enshrines the requirement that parties shall be
treated with equality and that each party shall be afforded a full and
fair opportunity to present its case. However, the concept of “full
opportunity” cannot be stretched to include a right to act in a dilatory
or negligent manner, or to introduce material at a stage that would
compromise the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.
23.
In the present case, there is no material whatsoever to indicate
that the Petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to present its case. On
the contrary, the record clearly establishes that the arbitral proceedings
were conducted in a fair, transparent, and equitable manner, with due
adherence to procedural propriety. It is equally significant to note that
Section 19 of the A&C Act confers autonomy upon the Arbitral
Tribunal to determine its own procedure, and expressly provides that
the Tribunal shall not be bound by the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
24.
This legislative framework is intended to ensure that arbitration
remains a flexible, efficient, and expeditious mode of dispute
resolution, free from the rigidities and technicalities that characterize
conventional civil litigation. At the same time, such procedural
flexibility is balanced by the overarching requirement that the
proceedings must conform to the principles of fairness and natural
justice.
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25.
Up to the stage of final hearing, the Petitioner did not raise any
grievance whatsoever regarding any alleged deviation from the agreed
procedure, nor was any complaint made with respect to denial of
opportunity or procedural unfairness. The absence of any such
contemporaneous objection is a significant factor that militates against
the Petitioner’s present attempt to assail the proceedings on grounds of
alleged violation of natural justice. The learned Arbitrator, in exercise
of powers vested under the A&C Act, is fully competent to regulate
the conduct of proceedings and to decline attempts to introduce
material at a belated stage, particularly where such attempts would
disrupt the procedural balance and fairness of the adjudicatory
process.
26.
In the absence of any demonstrable prejudice or denial of
opportunity, the contention that rejection of the belated documents
constitutes a violation of natural justice is wholly untenable. It is a
settled principle that a party cannot, as a matter of right, seek to
introduce new evidence at the stage of final arguments. Procedural
fairness operates bilaterally, and any indulgence shown to one party at
a belated stage must not come at the cost of prejudice to the other. The
refusal to entertain such belated material, especially in the absence of
due diligence, cannot be construed as a procedural infirmity, much
less one that vitiates the arbitral proceedings.
27.
This Court is also of the considered view that the reasoning
adopted by the learned Arbitrator does not suffer from perversity,
patent illegality, or any jurisdictional error. The learned Arbitrator has
exercised discretion judiciously and in accordance with settled
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principles governing arbitral procedure. It is incumbent upon parties to
act with due diligence and to ensure that all documents and material
sought to be relied upon are placed on record at the appropriate stage.
A failure to do so cannot be remedied by invoking the limited
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 34 of the A&C Act, which is
not intended to function as an appellate forum.
28.
It is further noteworthy that the Petitioner has sought to rely
upon the very same documents, which were rejected by the learned
Arbitrator, before this Court, in an attempt to challenge the merits of
the adjudication, particularly in relation to the alleged distinction
between the ICT-E Agreement and the CSP Agreement. In the
considered opinion of this Court, such an approach is impermissible.
The scope of examination under Section 34 of the A&C Act is
confined to the record that was before the Arbitral Tribunal, and it is
not open to a party to introduce new material at this stage in order to
assail the award. While there may exist exceptional circumstances
where additional material may be looked into, no such circumstance
has been demonstrated in the present case, not even remotely.
29.
The challenge mounted by the Petitioner is, in substance,
predicated almost entirely upon the rejection of the additional
documents. For the reasons already recorded hereinabove, this Court
finds no merit whatsoever in such grievance. The rejection of the
documents was justified, reasonable, and in consonance with the
principles of procedural fairness.
30.
Furthermore, the attempt of the Petitioner to rely upon these
documents to draw a distinction between the ICT-E Agreement and
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the CSP Agreement is equally misconceived. A perusal of the record
reveals that the case set up by the Claimant/Respondent before the
learned Tribunal was not confined in a narrow or restrictive sense, and
encompassed the entirety of the transactional relationship between the
parties. If the Petitioner intended to raise any jurisdictional objection
or to draw a clear distinction between the two agreements, it was
incumbent upon the Petitioner to do so at the appropriate stage, either
in its pleadings or during the course of evidence.
31.
Significantly, no such distinction was raised by the Petitioner at
the relevant stage. There is no indication in the pleadings, nor in the
conduct of the proceedings, that the Petitioner ever sought to segregate
the claims on the basis now sought to be urged. Even in the
application filed for bringing additional documents on record at the
stage of final hearing, no such case was clearly or specifically
articulated. This omission assumes critical importance, as it
demonstrates that the present contention is not rooted in the original
defence, but is being raised as an afterthought.
32.
The belated attempt to introduce such a distinction appears to be
a clear afterthought, aimed at setting up an altogether new case which
was never urged before the learned Arbitrator. It is trite law that a
party cannot be permitted to raise, for the first time in proceedings
under Section 34, a contention which was neither pleaded nor argued
before the Arbitral Tribunal.
33.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the learned
Arbitrator has adjudicated the dispute on the basis of the material duly
placed on record by the parties, and in accordance with a procedure
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that is consistent with the mandate of the A&C Act. The conduct of
the proceedings reflects due adherence to the Principles of Natural
Justice, procedural fairness, and party equality.
34.
The Petitioner has further contended that the principal claim of
the Respondent has been erroneously allowed by the learned
Arbitrator solely on the basis of ledger accounts produced by the
Respondent. According to the Petitioner, such reliance on ledger
entries, without corroborative material, renders the findings of the
learned Arbitrator unsustainable.
35.
At the outset, this Court finds that such a contention is ex facie
not tenable within the limited scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of
the A&C Act. It is well-settled that this Court, while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 34, does not sit in appeal over the findings
of the Arbitral Tribunal and is not empowered to reappreciate
evidence or reassess its sufficiency. The Court cannot undertake a reevaluation of the evidentiary material on record or substitute its own
view merely because another interpretation may be possible. In the
present case, it is not even the Petitioner’s assertion that the findings
of the learned Arbitrator are based on no evidence whatsoever, or that
irrelevant material has been relied upon, or that vital evidence has
been ignored. In the absence of such grounds, the findings cannot be
said to suffer from perversity or patent illegality so as to warrant
interference.
36.
It is trite law that the learned Arbitrator is the final authority on
questions of fact, including the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence. Unless the conclusions drawn are shown to be wholly
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unreasonable, arbitrary, or unsupported by the record, the same are not
open to judicial interference. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that the findings returned by the learned Arbitrator fall within any of
these exceptional categories.
37.
Notwithstanding, even on merits, the contention regarding the
insufficiency of reliance on ledger accounts is devoid of substance. In
terms of Section 19 of the A&C Act, the Arbitral Tribunal is vested
with wide procedural discretion to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence placed before it.
The Tribunal is not bound by the strict rules of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and is entitled to
adopt a flexible approach in evaluating the material on record. This
includes the power to rely upon documentary evidence such as ledger
accounts, especially where such material forms part of the regular
course of business and is not effectively rebutted.
38.
The learned Tribunal is also entitled to act upon admissions,
whether express or implied, and to draw reasonable inferences from
the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. The
determination of the probative value of the evidence, including
whether ledger entries are sufficient to substantiate a claim, lies
squarely within the exclusive domain of the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
The Courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act
cannot revisit or second-guess such determinations.
39.
The only limitation on the procedural flexibility afforded to the
Arbitral Tribunal is that the proceedings must conform to the
fundamental principles of fairness, equality of treatment, and natural
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justice. Both parties must be afforded a full and reasonable
opportunity to present their respective cases. So long as these
foundational safeguards are adhered to, the manner in which the
Tribunal evaluates evidence or conducts the proceedings cannot be
faulted merely because it departs from the technical rigours of
conventional civil trials.
40.
Furthermore, the record clearly demonstrates that the learned
Arbitrator did not base the findings solely on ledger accounts, but
undertook an evaluation of all material on record. This included
consideration of the bills and invoices raised, payments made by the
Petitioner at relevant stages, and the overall pattern of such
transactions. The learned Arbitrator also took into account the
admitted part liability of the Petitioner, as reflected from its conduct
and payments. Further, the defence raised by the Petitioner was duly
examined in light of the documentary evidence. The conclusions thus
reflect a cumulative and reasoned appreciation of evidence, and
cannot be faulted.
41.
This court, therefore is of the considered opinion that no
infirmity, much less any patent illegality or conflict with the public
policy of India, can be said to arise in the Impugned Award on the
ground of alleged insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, this
contention of the Petitioner is liable to be rejected.
42.
Insofar as the plea of impossibility of performance on account
of the COVID-19 pandemic is concerned, the learned Arbitrator has
dealt with the said contention in considerable detail in paragraph nos.
39, 40 and 43-45 of the Impugned Award. The relevant paragraphs of
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the Impugned Award read as under:
“39. Reliance is placed by the Respondent School on the Direction
issued on 23.04.2020 by the State of Haryana to counter the claim
of the Claimant which provides as under:
“In continuation of the office order dated 12.04.2020 on
the above subject. As you are aware that the instructions
related to fees and other charges have been detailed in
rule 158 by the Haryana government, according to which
it is mandatory to give the details of fees charged by the
schools in form six every year. In this context, it is
expressed that lockdown has been implemented across
India to prevent the infection of COVID-19. As a result
there is a complete stop on all types of business activities
which has had an adverse impact on the livelihood and
sources of livelihood of the common people. In view of this
instructions regarding fees and charges have been issued
to private schools under the letter dated 12.4.2020 issued
by Department of education, Haryana but it has come to
the notice of the government that some private schools are
charging students/parents other charges along with tuition
fees. In view of the above situation, in continuation of the
above letter, the education Department of Haryana
instructs you to strictly follow the following instructions:
1. Private schools should charge only tuition fees on monthly
basis other types of funds like building fund, maintenance
fund, admission fee, computer fee etc. should be deferred
in view of the unusual situation like COVID-19.
2. Private schools should not increase the tuition fees
charged on monthly basis.
3. It should also be ensured that private schools do not add
any kind of hidden charge in the monthly fees.
4. It should also be ensured that no private school will
charge any kind of transport fee from students/parents
during the lockdown period.
5. No private school should make any changes in the school
uniform this year.
6. No private schools should make changes in textbooks
workbooks private books practical files etc.”
40. The argument based on the Direction issued on 23.04.2020 by
the State of Haryana, is completely misplaced and mis founded on
the face of it, in as much as the said direction specifically provides
for Private schools should charge only tuition fees on monthly
basis other types of funds like building fund, maintenance fund,
admission fee, computer fee etc. should be deferred in view of the
unusual situation like COVID-19 and does not direct the schools to
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not charge the computer fees. Therefore, this argument of the
Respondent School is rejected.
****
43. The legal position as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
judgments, cited on behalf of the Respondent School are well
settled. It is to be seen if the same apply to the present facts and
circumstance and if the Respondent School can be said to be
covered in the same i.e. whether the agreement stood frustrated due
to Covid-19 lock down. The judgments relied upon on behalf of the
respondent are not applicable for the same are different than the
facts and circumstances of the present case.
44. No communication has been placed on record to show that the
said stand was taken by the Respondent School before the
Claimant filed the statement of claims. At no point in time did the
Respondent School inform the Claimant that due to lock down the
service could not be rendered; therefore, the Claimant shall not be
paid for the period starting March 2020. There is no plea or
evidence to show that the school did not charge the said fees from
the students which was only directed to be deferred. To the
contrary, the amounts have been paid to the Claimant even during
the Covid period which have been adjusted by the Claimant
towards the invoices raised by it, as discussed herein below.
45. The claim is certainly not for the period from March 2020
onwards. The Respondent School has failed to pay to the Claimant
the amounts due to the Claimant for three invoices from 2016, 10
invoices from 2017, 12 invoices from 2018, 11 invoices from 2019,
13 invoices from 2020 and 12 invoices from 2021. Therefore, the
argument of frustration of the agreement is not available to the
Respondent School in present facts and circumstances.”
43.
A careful, holistic, and contextual reading of the reasoning
adopted by the learned Arbitrator while addressing the Petitioner’s
plea of impossibility of performance on account of the COVID-19
pandemic reveals the following key facets of the arbitral findings:
(a) The Petitioner herein relied on the Haryana Government’s
direction dated 23.04.2020 to justify non-payment of certain
charges.
(b) The said direction only mandated that non-tuition fees (such as
building, maintenance, computer fees, etc.) be deferred, not
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waived or permanently prohibited.
(c) The direction did not prohibit charging of computer fees
altogether, but merely postponed their collection due to the
COVID-19 situation.
(d) Therefore, the Petitioner’s interpretation of the direction as a
complete bar on such charges was misplaced and legally
untenable.
(e) The argument that the agreement stood frustrated due to
COVID-19 lockdown was also examined in light of settled law
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
(f) The judgments cited by the Petitioner on frustration of contract
were found inapplicable, as the facts of the present case did not
support such a defence.
(g) There was no contemporaneous communication from the
Petitioner informing the Respondent herein that services could
not be rendered or that payments would be withheld due to the
lockdown.
(h) The Petitioner failed to establish that it had stopped collecting
fees from students; rather, the direction only required
deferment, not waiver.
(i) On the contrary, payments were in fact made by the Petitioner
herein to the Respondent herein during the COVID period,
which were adjusted against invoices, indicating that the
contractual relationship continued.
(j) The claim was not limited to the COVID period; it included
unpaid invoices spanning multiple years from 2016 to 2021,
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thereby weakening the frustration argument.
(k) The Petitioner herein had defaulted on several invoices even
prior to the pandemic, showing that non-payment was not solely
attributable to COVID-19.
(l) In light of these facts, the defence of frustration of contract was
held to be unsustainable and inapplicable. Consequently, the
reliance on the government direction and the plea of frustration
were both rejected as lacking merit.
44.
Upon an independent consideration of the reasoning adopted by
the learned Arbitrator, this Court finds no perversity, illegality, or
patent error in the conclusions drawn with respect to the plea of
impossibility of performance under Section 56 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872. The findings are based on a proper appreciation of both law
and evidence and do not warrant interference.
CONCLUSION:
45.
In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered
opinion that no ground is made out within the limited scope of
interference under Section 34 of the A&C Act, so as to justify the
setting aside of the Impugned Award.
46.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MARCH 25, 2026/v/kr/sg
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