The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
13. Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy between the parties.
14. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms and directions.
Full Judgment Text
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*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
ARB.P. 104/2026
M/S SREE VENKATESWARA ENTERPRISES .....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Tushar Sharma & Mr.
Tarun Verma, Advs.
versus
INDIAN RAILWAY CATERING AND TOURISM
CORPORATION LTD.
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Lalit Chauhan, Ms. Laxmi
Chauhan, Mr Manish Yadav &
Mr Rustam Singh Chauhan,
Advs.
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
ORDER
15.01.2026
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“the Act”], seeking
appointment of the Arbitrator in respect of various contractual
disputes concerning the license agreements dated 28.07.2016 and
26.08.2016 executed for operation of Water Vending Machines
[“WVM”] at railway stations.
2.
Material on record indicates that the arbitration clause is
envisaged under Clause No. 10 of the General Terms and Conditions
of the License Agreement.
3.
The material on record indicates that the Petitioner herein
invoked arbitration vide Notice dated 18.10.2025, which was duly
served upon the Respondent. However, the Respondent failed to
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appoint an arbitrator within the stipulated period.
4.
Under these circumstances and since disputes have arisen
between the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to allow the
present Petition.
5.
This Court is cognizant of the scope of interference at the stage
of a Section 11 Petition. The law with respect to the scope and
standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act has been
fairly well settled. A Coordinate bench of this Court, in Pradhaan Air
Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt Ltd [2025 SCC
OnLine Del 3022], has extensively dealt with the scope of interference
at the stage of Section 11. The Court held as under:““9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning,1 while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 &
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re2 has held that scope of inquiry
at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent
of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no. 114 in the
case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. that observations made
in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn.,3 and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd.,4 that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facienon-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re :
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no. 114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd. reads as under:—
“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re : Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it
difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya
Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that
the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
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issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re : Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd.,5 however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated such
as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim through
arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the limited
scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the interest
of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne
by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other
parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent
and malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts
of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:—
“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024 INSC
532], frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section 11
as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent to
adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11
must not be misused by parties in order to force other
parties to the arbitration agreement to participate in a
time consuming and costly arbitration process. This is
possible in instances, including but not limited to, where
the claimant canvasses the adjudication of non-existent
and mala fide claims through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial
interference of the referral courts with the interests of the
parties who might be constrained to participate in the
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arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct
that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party
which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the
other party to the arbitration. Having said that, it is
clarified that the aforesaid is not to be construed as a
determination of the merits of the matter before us, which
the Arbitral Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to
determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to the
extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of
the referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act
and further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural
safeguards but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the
arbitral process. Any transgression beyond this limited judicial
threshold would not only contravene the legislative intent
enshrined in Section 8 and Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk
undermining the sanctity and efficiency of arbitration as a
preferred mode of dispute resolution. The referral Court must,
therefore, exercise restraint and refrain from venturing into the
merits of the dispute or adjudicating issues that fall squarely within
the jurisdictional domain of the arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen
that the scope of enquiry at the referral stage is conservative in
nature. A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S.
Patel6.”
6.
As stated in the Petition, the disputed amount comes to more
than Rs. 40,00,000/-.
7.
Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent enters an
appearance on advance notice and submits that he has no objection if
the disputes are referred to Arbitration under the aegis of DIAC.
8.
In view thereof, Ms. Mrinalini Sen, Advocate (Mob. No.
9873367274), who is empanelled with the Delhi International
Arbitration Centre [“DIAC”], is hereby appointed as the Sole
Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties.
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9.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the DIAC
and would abide by its rules and regulations. The learned Arbitrator
shall be entitled to fees as per the Schedule of Fees maintained by the
DIAC.
10.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12 (2) of the Act within a week of entering
reference.
11.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned Arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
12.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
13.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties.
14.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms and
directions.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 15, 2026/ v/her/sg
This is a digitally signed order.
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The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 22/01/2026 at 12:21:17
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