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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI P. SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT PETITION No.3356 of 2009
(CNR No: HBHC010570382009)
DATE: 03.11.2026
Reserved on: 03.03.2026
Pronouncement on: 03.11.2026
Uploaded on : 03.11.2026
Between:
M/s. Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana
Ltd.
…Petitioner
AND
The State of Andhra Pradesh and others
…Respondents
ORDER: (As per the Hon’ble Sri Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda)
Heard Mr. S.Suri Babu, learned counsel representing
Mr. S.Krishna Murthy, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner
Government
and
Mr.
Pleader
Swaroop
Oorilla,
for
Tax
State
learned
appearing
respondents. Perused the entire material on record.
Special
for
the
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2.
This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking the following relief:
“to issue a writ order or direction particularly one in the
nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the impugned
Assessment of Value Added Tax in Form VAT 305 dated
03.01.2009 passed by respondent No.2for the tax period from
April, 2005 to July, 2008 under the APVAT Act, 2005, in seeking to
levy tax under Section 4(8) of the APVAT Act on the amounts
collected by the petitioner for the supply of electricity and the
consequential garnishee notice dated 13.02.2009 in Form VAT
206, issued by respondent No.3 to the bankers of the petitioner,
namely respondent No.5 herein and quash the same or to pass”
3.
The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is engaged
in the distribution of Power in the State of Andhra Pradesh and
are
wholly
owned
Government
companies,
constituting
instrumentalities of the State within the meaning of Article 13 of
the Constitution of India. The petitioner has the status of
licensee under the Electricity Act, 2003, and is vested with the
necessary powers and corresponding obligations as laid down in
the
statute and their financial
activities relating to the
distribution and supply of electricity are also regulated by the
State
Electricity
Regulatory Commission, particularly with
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regard to the determination of tariffs and other charges
recoverable for the services rendered and the facilities provided
for the transmission and distribution of electricity generated by
APGENCO and other generating companies.
4.
The
petitioner
has
established
transmission
towers,
transformers, sub-stations and other infrastructure necessary
for the distribution of electricity. Section 42 of the Electricity
Act, 2003, obligates the petitioners to develop and maintain an
efficient, coordinated and economical distribution system in
their respective areas of supply and to supply electricity in
accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 43 requires
the distribution licensees to supply electricity to the owner or
occupier of any premises upon receipt of an application, while
sub-section (2) of Section 43 obligates the petitioner to provide,
where necessary, electric lines or electric plants for extending
such supply. Section 46 empowers the petitioner to recover
expenses incurred in providing electric lines or electrical plants
for
the
purpose
of
supplying
regulations framed by APERC.
electricity,
subject
to
the
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5.
The petitioner contended that their activities are not
confined to the mere trading of electricity but also involve laying
overhead
lines
and
underground
cables
to
facilitate
the
transmission and distribution of electricity up to the point of
supply, ordinarily where the metering equipment is installed.
Such service lines are laid and maintained by the distribution
licensees and continue to remain their property. The consumers
are not entitled to interfere with such lines. The service line
charges and development charges are determined in accordance
with the principles and regulations prescribed by the State
Electricity Regulatory Commission and the petitioner is not
entitled to collect any additional amounts by way of tax or
otherwise, except as authorized by law. The petitioner further
contended that electricity has been treated as goods under the
relevant sales tax legislation, subject to the applicable statutory
exemptions and that the activities relating to the supply of
electricity
cannot,
merely by reason of
the
provision
of
distribution infrastructure, be treated as transactions involving
a transfer of the right to use goods.
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6.
The petitioner is an assessee registered on the rolls of
respondent No.3. On 24.05.2008, respondent No.2 inspected the
petitioner’s premises. Based on the information furnished by the
petitioner, a show-cause notice dated 10.11.2008 was issued,
proposing to levy tax under Section 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh
Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (AP VAT Act), at the rate of 12.5% on
the amounts collected by the petitioner towards the provision of
electricity connections during the tax periods from April 2005 to
July 2008, aggregating to Rs.241,57,35,483/-, on the premise
that there had been a transfer of the right to use goods
employed in providing electrical connections.
7.
The
petitioner
submitted a
reply
dated
18.12.2008,
contending that the provision of electricity to consumers did not
involve any transfer of the right to use goods. However, vide
order
dated
03.01.2009,
respondent
No.2
rejected
the
petitioner’s contentions, relying upon certain judicial decisions,
and proceeded to assess the
amounts collected towards
development charges and service line charges as taxable
turnover under Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act.
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8.
The petitioner contended that the impugned assessment
order is wholly without jurisdiction, illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law. It is further contended that the issue
involves the interpretation and applicability of Section 4(8) of the
AP VAT Act to the supply of electricity by distribution licensees
and is of considerable public importance. The respondents had
not initiated similar proceedings for several years under the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957,
and the impugned assessment, being the first of its kind, would
have
wider
implications
for
other
electricity
distribution
companies and could lead to multiplicity of proceedings and
unnecessary harassment.
9.
The main contention of the petitioner is that the essential
ingredients for invoking Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act are
absent. The petitioner contended that for a transaction to
constitute a transfer of the right to use goods, there must be
identifiable goods forming the subject matter of the transfer, a
transfer of the right to use such goods in favour of the lessee or
licensee and the conferment of an effective right to use the goods
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upon the transferee. None of these requirements is satisfied in
the present case.
10.
It is contended that the consumers are merely recipients of
electricity
and
are
neither
lessees
nor
licensees
of
the
infrastructure employed in supplying electricity. The overhead
lines and underground cables laid by the petitioner are attached
to the earth and acquire the character of immovable property.
The
ownership
petitioner,
of
which
such
also
infrastructure
undertakes
its
remains
with
the
maintenance
and
operation. The consumers are not granted possession or
exclusive control over the infrastructure, nor are they entitled to
use it independently of the petitioner’s distribution activities.
The petitioner therefore contended that no transfer of the right
to use goods takes place and that the transaction cannot be
characterized as a lease or any other transaction falling within
the scope of Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act.
11.
The petitioner further contended that the reasoning
adopted by respondent No.2 is self-contradictory, as the
impugned order does not identify the goods in respect of which
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the right to use is alleged to have been transferred or record a
specific finding establishing the existence of a lease or a transfer
of the right to use goods. There is no agreement between the
petitioner and the consumers transferring such a right, either
expressly or by necessary implication. The mere payment of the
cost of infrastructure by a consumer does not confer upon the
consumer any right to use the infrastructure independently,
particularly when the petitioner retains ownership, control and
responsibility for its maintenance and operation.
12.
The petitioner also contended that respondent No.2 erred
in
treating
concrete
poles,
distribution
transformers,
conductors, insulators, underground cables and other materials
used in extending service
lines as goods transferred to
consumers. Though such materials may constitute goods before
their incorporation into the distribution infrastructure, their use
in establishing or extending the distribution system does not
establish a transfer of the right to use those goods. In this
regard, the petitioner relies upon a communication dated
28.05.2008 issued to one of its consumers, wherein the
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materials required for laying the service line were enumerated to
explain the charges payable by the consumer. According to the
petitioner, those materials form part of the distribution system
developed and maintained by it and no right to use them is
transferred to the consumer.
13.
The petitioner further relies upon Sections 42, 43 and 46
of the Electricity Act, 2003, to contend that the development and
maintenance of the distribution system, the provision of
electricity connections and the recovery of the corresponding
expenses are statutory functions of a distribution licensee. The
development charges and service line charges are collected in
exercise of the authority conferred by Section 46 and in
accordance with the applicable regulatory framework. Such
collections cannot be treated as consideration for the transfer of
the right to use goods, particularly in the absence of any
contractual arrangement conferring such a right upon the
consumer.
14.
It is also contended that respondent No.2 failed to
appreciate the nature of the petitioner’s activities and the
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definition
of
business
applicable
under
the
relevant
tax
legislation. The petitioner submitted that it discharges statutory
public duties in distributing electricity and that its activities
cannot be equated with the ordinary business of buying and
selling goods merely because it collects charges for extending
service lines and developing distribution infrastructure. The
petitioner accordingly disputes the characterization of the
impugned collections as taxable consideration for a transfer of
the right to use goods.
15.
In response to the notice issued by respondent No.2, the
petitioner vide letter dated 31.10.2008, furnished details of the
schemes sanctioned for extending service lines for domestic,
commercial and water-supply purposes during the financial
years 2005–06 to 2008–09. The petitioner stated that the
amounts collected from consumers during the relevant period
were set out in the material placed before the assessing
authority. However, respondent No.2 treated the development
charges and service line charges as consideration for the
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transfer of the right to use goods, bifurcated the turnover on a
proportionate basis and determined the tax payable accordingly.
16.
The petitioner contended that respondent No.2 failed to
appreciate the precise nature and purpose of the development
charges and service line charges. The expression “transfer of the
right
to
use
goods”
under
Section
4(8)
contemplates
a
transaction founded upon an agreement between the parties and
involving the transfer of an identifiable right to use goods. The
charges
in
question
are
collected
towards
the
overall
development of the distribution system and the extension of
service lines to provide electricity connections. Since such
collections are authorized by Section 46 of the Electricity Act,
2003, and do not represent consideration for the transfer of any
right to use goods, the petitioner contended that they cannot be
subjected to tax under Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act.
17.
By the impugned assessment order, respondent No.2
determined the tax liability at Rs.21.88 Crores and granted
thirty days time for payment. Thereafter, respondent No.3 issued
a demand to the petitioner’s banker, respondent No.5 herein,
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vide proceedings dated 13.02.2009 in Form VAT 206, initiating
attachment proceedings for recovery of the said amount. The
petitioner
contended
that
the
consequential
recovery
proceedings are unsustainable in view of the illegality and lack
of jurisdiction alleged in the assessment order.
18.
Respondent No.2 filed counter affidavit denying the
averments made by the petitioner and contended that the
petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy of appeal against
the impugned assessment order under the provisions of the
Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (AP VAT Act).
Without availing such remedy, the petitioner has approached
this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking
to circumvent the statutory appellate mechanism.
19.
It is submitted that the writ petitioner was a licensee
under the Electricity Act, 2003, engaged in the distribution of
electricity in the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh, subject to
the statutory obligations and regulatory control of the State
Electricity Regulatory Commission. Under Section 43 of the
Electricity Act, the petitioner was obligated to develop and
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maintain an efficient, coordinated and economical distribution
system for the supply of electricity to consumers. Section 46
empowers the petitioner, subject to the regulations framed by
the State Commission, to recover reasonable expenses incurred
in providing electric lines or electrical plants for supplying
electricity.
20.
In accordance with the aforesaid provisions and the
General Terms and Conditions of Supply approved by the
Electricity Regulatory Commission, the petitioner collected
security deposits, service line charges and development charges
from
consumers
seeking
new
electricity
connections
or
additional load to existing connections.
21.
It is further contended by respondent No.2 that the service
line charges and development charges collected from consumers
include the cost of goods used for developing the necessary
infrastructure, such as electric poles, transformers, conductors,
underground cables and other electrical equipment. Though the
consumer bears the cost of the service line, the infrastructure
remains the property of the petitioner and forms part of the
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overall distribution system. However, the petitioner contended
that the goods become embedded in the earth and constitute
immovable property, and that no effective delivery of such goods
or transfer of the right to use them takes place in favour of the
consumer.
22.
It is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner is a registered
VAT dealer on the rolls of the Commercial Tax Officer,
Khairatabad, engaged in supplying electricity generated by
APGENCO and other agencies to consumers and collecting
charges at the rates determined by the Electricity Regulatory
Commission. For this purpose, the petitioner develops and
maintains the necessary distribution infrastructure, comprising
electric
poles,
transformers,
substations,
conductors
and
underground cables.
23.
Respondent
No.2
further
contended
that
although
electricity is exempt from tax under the AP VAT Act, the
petitioner was carrying on business within the meaning of the
said Act. Where the main activity constitutes business under the
Act,
any
ancillary
or
subsidiary
activity
undertaken
in
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connection therewith is also liable
to tax, provided the
transaction satisfies the relevant charging provisions.
24.
It is stated that pursuant to the authorization issued by
the
Deputy
Commissioner,
Commercial
Taxes,
Punjagutta
Division, respondent No.2 conducted an audit of the petitioner’s
business transactions on 24.05.2008. During the audit, it was
noticed that the petitioner was recovering the full value of the
goods used for developing electricity distribution infrastructure
in certain cases. While the petitioner did not recover the
infrastructure costs from individual domestic and commercial
consumers in the ordinary course, such costs were recovered in
respect of infrastructure projects undertaken for real estate
developments and other specified applicants.
25.
In such cases, the petitioner sanctioned schemes for
developing the required infrastructure on land belonging to the
concerned infrastructure companies or applicants. The cost was
collected under two heads i.e., service line charges and
development charges, in addition to the usual security deposit.
The annexures to the proceedings sanctioning such schemes
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specified the nature and value of the goods required for
establishing the service lines and developing the infrastructure
and the infrastructure was developed for the exclusive use of the
respective applicants.
26.
Respondent
infrastructure
No.2
and
further
extending
contended
service
that
lines
to
developing
specified
applicants, upon recovering the entire cost of the goods used
therein, constitutes an ancillary or subsidiary activity connected
with the petitioner’s main business of supplying electricity. If
such transactions satisfy the charging provisions of the AP VAT
Act, they are liable to tax notwithstanding their ancillary nature.
27.
It is further contended that the petitioner was assessed
under Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act by treating the value of the
goods recovered from the specified applicants as turnover arising
from the transfer of the right to use goods. The petitioner’s
contention that the levy amounts to taxation of immovable
property is denied. The goods were identified as such at the time
the infrastructure schemes were sanctioned and their temporary
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attachment to the earth would not alter their character as goods
for the purpose of the transaction in question.
28.
Respondent No.2 also disputes the petitioner’s contention
that delivery of goods is indispensable for attracting tax under
Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act. Reliance is placed on the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat
Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Union of India (BSNL), in support of
the proposition that the relevant inquiry concerns the transfer of
the right to use goods. It is further contended that the recovery
of the entire cost of the infrastructure from a specified applicant,
coupled with the exclusive use of such infrastructure for
supplying electricity to that applicant, amounts to a transfer of
the right to use the goods employed in developing the
infrastructure.
29.
Respondent No.2 contended that a transfer of ownership in
the goods is not necessary to attract Section 4(8) of the AP VAT
Act. It is sufficient if the right to use the goods is transferred.
The assessment order accordingly explains that ownership
comprises a bundle of rights and that the transfer of one such
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right, namely, the right to use the goods, is sufficient to attract
the levy.
30.
It is pertinent to mention here that on the basis of the
material available on record, respondent No.2 found that the
applicants had paid the entire value of the goods and that the
infrastructure developed therewith was exclusively used for
supplying electricity to the respective applicants. Accordingly,
tax was levied on the value of the goods recovered by the
petitioner at the applicable rates of 4% or 12.5%, depending on
the nature of the goods, under Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act.
31.
Respondent
No.2
further
contended
that
where
an
incidental or ancillary activity undertaken by the petitioner falls
within the scope of a charging provision of the AP VAT Act, the
petitioner cannot claim immunity from taxation merely because
such activity is connected with the supply of electricity. The
assessment covered the tax period from April 2005 to July 2008,
involving a turnover of Rs.241,57,35,483/-, which represented
transactions involving the transfer of the right to use goods to
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specified applicants and was therefore taxable under Section
4(8) of the Act.
32.
It is also contended that neither the Electricity Act nor the
General Terms and Conditions of Supply prohibit the levy of tax
on such transactions. The amounts collected under the heads of
service line charges and development charges represent the
value of the goods used in establishing the infrastructure for the
specified consumers. Respondent No.2 contended that the
assessment was made only in respect of the value of the goods
identified in the proceedings issued to the respective applicants
and not on the entire electricity distribution system, as alleged
by the petitioner.
33.
According to respondent No.2, payment of the full cost of
the
infrastructure by the
consumer and the consumer's
entitlement to receive electricity through the service lines
developed using those goods establish the transfer of the right to
use the goods. The absence of an express agreement transferring
such a right does not, by itself, exclude the transaction from the
purview of Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act. It is therefore
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submitted that the levy was lawfully imposed on the value of the
goods for which the cost was recovered from the respective
consumers.
34.
Respondent No.2 further contended that the existence or
absence of a profit motive is irrelevant for determining the
taxability of a transaction under the AP VAT Act. Upon
considering the facts, the objections raised by the petitioner and
the applicable statutory provisions, the assessing authority
concluded that the disputed turnover represented the value of
goods in respect of which the right to use had been transferred
to the consumers and was consequently exigible to tax under
Section 4(8) of the Act.
35.
Finally, it is submitted that the impugned assessment
order is appealable before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner
under Section 31 of the AP VAT Act. Since the petitioner has an
efficacious statutory alternative remedy, the invocation of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is unwarranted. On this ground also,
respondent No.2seeks dismissal of the writ petition.
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36.
The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the
LCD projectors and audio-video multimedia equipment are
provided only on a hire/rental basis for specific events, without
transferring ownership or the right to use the equipment
independently. The transactions are temporary in nature, and
the
petitioner
retains
ownership,
effective
control
and
supervision over the equipment, which must be returned
immediately after completion of the event.
37.
The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended
that mere hiring of equipment for consideration does not
constitute a deemed sale under Section 2(28) read with Section
4 of the Act. There must be a legally enforceable transfer of the
right to use the goods, including the transfer of effective control
and the right to use them. Since the customers have only
temporary custody of the equipment and no independent or
unrestricted right to use it, the assessment order treating the
transactions as deemed sales is legally unsustainable and liable
to be set aside.
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38.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon
the following judgments of the various High Courts which are
mentioned below:
i.
Banda Tent House Association vs. State of A.P. and Others1,
ii.
State of Tripura and Another vs. Tripura Bus Syndicate2,
iii.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Another vs. Union of India and
Another3,
iv.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and Another vs. Union of India and
Others4,
v.
Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board vs. State of A.P. 5,
vi.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Another vs. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam
Limited6,
vii.
G.S. Lamba and Sons and Others vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 7and
viii.
State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Sri Ganesh Bhavan Hotel 8.
39.
The learned counsel for the respondents contended that
the transfer of the right to use goods must be determined by
considering who actually uses and enjoys the goods during the
contracted period. The person responsible for maintaining,
repairing, or supervising the equipment need not necessarily be
2006 146 STC 355
(2001) 122 STC 175
(2003) 130 STC 1
(2006) 145 STC 91
(2011) 52 APSTJ 175
(2002) 126 STC 114
(2011) 52 APSTJ 191
(1983) 53 STC 169
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its user. Where the equipment is made available for the specific
purpose of a customer’s function or event, the customer is the
beneficial user, notwithstanding the supplier’s retention of
limited supervisory or maintenance control.
40.
The learned counsel for the respondents further contended
that the relevant consideration is whether the goods are made
available for the customer’s use during the agreed period, and
continuous physical control by the customer is not essential.
Maintenance or repair obligations retained by the supplier do
not negate the transfer of the right to use the equipment.
Therefore, the transactions constitute a transfer of the right to
use goods and are liable to be treated as deemed sales.
41.
In
support
of
his
contentions,
the
learned
Special
Government Pleader for State Tax appearing for the respondents
has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of
the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Viceroy Hotels
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Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer9, the relevant paragraphs are
extracted below:
33. On a notice being issued, calling upon them to show cause why the
transaction relating to hire of audio-visual equipment should not be
treated as a "deemed sale" under section 4(8) of the Act as it involved
the transfer of the right to use the said equipment, the burden lay on
the petitioner to adduce proof, by way of documentary evidence, that
the hiring of audio- visual equipment did not involve the transfer of
the right to use such goods. A perusal of the bill, enclosed as part of
the documents annexed to the writ petition, shows that M/s. Abbot
Industries were charged Rs. 12,500 towards audio-visual equipment
rental charges, in addition to the charges for food, liquor, etc. The
contents of the "bill" does not justify the petitioner's plea show that
the audio-visual equipment rentals charged on the consumer did not
involve the transfer of the right to use the audio-visual equipment. In
their objections to the show-cause notice the petitioner, vide letter
dated March 31, 2010, stated that they had outsourced certain items
during conferences/meetings, and were collecting consideration from
the parties who were renting such LCD projectors, audio and video
equipments, etc., ; they had transferred part of the consideration to
the provider of such equipment, and had retained the balance amount
; providing equipment, and operating them through their own
operators, for the conferences, meetings and functions amounted to
"service", and did not fall within the ambit of section 4(8) of the Act ;
and effective control and possession of the equipment vested in the
hands of the outsourcing agency. They relied on the decision of the
Karnataka High Court in Lakshmi Audio Visual [2001] 124 STC 426
(Karn), and the Division Bench judgment of this court in
RashtriyaIspat Nigam Ltd. [1990] 77 STC 182 (AP), to contend that
they did not fall within the ambit of section 4(8) of the Act.
36. In the impugned order of assessment dated April 8, 2010, the
assessing authority notes that the sample bill, produced as part of the
objections, revealed that the petitioner-hotel was providing equipment
2011 SCC OnLine AP 1089
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to its customers on rental basis ; this amounted to a "deemed sale"
under Explanation (iv) to section 2(28) of the Act ; the bill produced
for verification did not reveal that technicians were provided along
with the LCD projectors or audio/video equipment ; consideration
was charged exclusively for the equipment ; effective control over the
said goods had been transferred to the ultimate customer for use in
their functions ; the petitioner had given the LCD projectors and
audio/video multimedia equipment on hire to their customers without
rendering any other service, i.e., they merely delivered the equipment
to their customers on hire ; the customer could use the equipment in
any manner he wanted, and had to return the equipment at the end of
the event ; possession and effective control was transferred to the
customer during the event, and the customer had the right to use the
same ; in view of Explanation (iv) to section 2(28), the activity of
renting of LCD projectors and audio and video equipments was "sale"
attracting tax under section 4(8) of the Act; and, in the judgments
relied on by the petitioner possession vested with the service provider,
whereas, in the present case, the petitioner had transferred possession
and control of the equipment rented to their customers.
42.
The learned Special Government Pleader has also placed
reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka 10,
the relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
21. A reading of the definition of sale makes it crystal clear that every
transfer of property in goods by one person to another in the course of
trade or business, includes the transfer of right to use any goods for
any purpose. Section 5-C of the Act also provides levy of tax on the
transfer of the right to use any goods. Article 366(29-A)(d) inserted by
the Constitution (46th Amendment) Act, 1982 on 2-2-1983 reads:
“366. (29) “tax on income” includes a tax in the nature of an excess
profits tax;
(2020) 3 SCC 354
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(29-A) “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” includes—
(a) a tax on the transfer, otherwise than in pursuance
of a contract, of property in any goods for cash,
deferred payment or other valuable consideration;
(b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether
as goods or in some other form) involved in the
execution of a works contract;
(c) a tax on the delivery of goods on hire-purchase or
any system of payment by instalments;
(d) a tax on the transfer of the right to use any goods
for any purpose (whether or not for a specified period)
for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration;
(e) a tax on the supply of goods by any unincorporated
association or body of persons to a member thereof for
cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration;
(f) a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any
service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods,
being food or any other article for human consumption
or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such
supply or service, is for cash, deferred payment or
other valuable consideration,and such transfer,
delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a
sale of those goods by the person making the transfer,
delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the
person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is
made;”
33. When we peruse the various terms and conditions of the charter
party agreement (Annexure I), Clause 1 provides that the contractors
“let” and the charterer “hire” the goods vessel for six months. The
expression “let” has been used, and the vessel most significantly
27 of 45
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during the charter period has been placed at the “disposal” of the
charterers and under their control in every respect. The charterers
have been given the right to use all outfits, equipment, and appliances
on board the vessel at the time of the delivery, including the whole
reach, burthen, and deck capacity. Thus, in our considered opinion,
merely by providing the staff, insurance, indemnity, and other
responsibilities of bearing officials costs. Effective control for the
entire period of six months has been given to the charterers. It is a
case of transfer of right to use the vessel for which certain expenses
and staff are to be provided by the contractor, which is not sufficient
to make out that the control and possession of the vehicle are with the
contractor. The possession and control are clearly with the charterer.
As in essence, it has to be seen from a conjoint reading of various
conditions whether there is a transfer of right to use the vessel. In our
considered opinion there is not even an iota of doubt that under the
charter agreement coupled with the instructions to tenderers, general
conditions and special conditions for the contract as specified in the
tender documents and charter party clauses, there is a transfer of
right to use the vessel for the purposes specified in the agreement.
34. To constitute a transaction for the transfer of right to use of
goods, essential is, goods must be available for delivery. In the instant
case, the vessel was available for delivery and in fact, had been
delivered. There is no dispute as to the vessel and the charterer has a
legal right to use the goods, and the permission/licence has been
made available to the charterer to the exclusion of the contractor.
Thus, there is complete transfer of the right to use. It cannot be said
that the agreement and the conditions subject to which it has been
made, is not a transfer of right to use the goods, during the period of
six months, the contractor has no right to give the vessel for use to
anyone else. Thus in view of the provisions inserted in Article 366(29A)(d), Section 5-C, and definition of “sale” in Section 2 of the KST
Act, there is no room for doubt that there is a transfer of right to use
the vessel.
35. What constitutes the transfer of right to use tangible property has
been dealt with in various decisions. In BSNL v. Union of India
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[BSNL v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1] , this Court has observed
thus: (SCC pp. 29-32 & 37-38, paras 42, 44-45, 50 & 73-75)
“42. All the sub-clauses of Article 366(29-A) serve to bring
transactions where one or more of the essential ingredients of a sale,
as defined in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 are absent within the ambit
of purchase and sales for levy of sales tax. To this extent, only is the
principle enunciated in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley& Co.
(Madras) Ltd. [State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley& Co. (Madras)
Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 560] (sic modified). The amendment especially
allows specific composite contracts viz. works contracts [sub-clause
(b)]; hire-purchase contracts [sub-clause (c)], catering contracts
[sub-clause (e)] by legal fiction to be divisible contracts where the
sale element could be isolated and be subjected to sales tax.
44. Of all the different kinds of composite transactions, the drafters of
the Forty-sixth Amendment chose three specific situations, a works
contract, a hire-purchase contract, and a catering contract to bring
them within the fiction of a deemed sale. Of these three, the first and
third involve a kind of service and sale at the same time. Apart from
these two cases where splitting of the service and supply has been
constitutionally permitted in sub-clauses (b) and (f) of clause (29-A)
of Article 366, there is no other service which has been permitted to
be so split. For example, the sub-clauses of Article 366(29-A) do not
cover hospital services. Therefore, if during the treatment of a patient
in a hospital, he or she is given a pill, can the Sales Tax Authorities
tax the transaction as a sale? Doctors, lawyers, and other
professionals render service in the course of which can it be said that
there is a sale of goods when a doctor writes out and hands over a
prescription or a lawyer drafts a document and delivers it to his/her
client? Strictly speaking, with the payment of fees, consideration does
pass from the patient or client to the doctor or lawyer for the
documents in both cases.
45. The reason why these services do not involve a sale for the
purposes of Entry 54 of List II is, as we see it, for reasons ultimately
attributable to the principles enunciated in Gannon Dunkerley case
[State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley& Co. (Madras) Ltd., AIR 1958
29 of 45
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SC 560] , namely, if there is an instrument of contract which may be
composite in form in any case other than the exceptions in Article
366(29-A), unless the transaction in truth represents two distinct and
separate contracts and is discernible as such, then the State would not
have the power to separate the agreement to sell from the agreement
to render service, and impose tax on the sale. The test, therefore, for
composite contracts other than those mentioned in Article 366(29-A)
continues to be: Did the parties have in mind or intend separate rights
arising out of the sale of goods? If there was no such intention, there
is no sale even if the contract could be disintegrated. The test for
deciding whether a contract falls into one category or the other is as
to what is “the substance of the contract”. [ SeeAtiyah, The Sale of
Goods, (1995 reprint) p. 27.] We will, for want of a better phrase, call
this the dominant nature test.”
50. What are the “goods” in a sales transaction, therefore, remains
primarily a matter of contract and intention. The seller and such
purchaser would have to be ad idem as to the subject-matter of sale or
purchase. The court would have to arrive at a conclusion as to what
the parties had intended when they entered into a particular
transaction of sale, as being the subject-matter of sale or purchase. In
arriving at a conclusion, the court would have to approach the matter
from the point of view of a reasonable person of average intelligence.
73. With respect, the decision in 20th Century Finance Corpn. Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra [20th Century Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 6 SCC 12] , cannot be cited as authority for the
proposition that delivery of possession of the goods is not a necessary
concomitant for completing a transaction of sale for the purposes of
Article 366(29-A)(d) of the Constitution. In that decision, the Court
had to determine where the taxable event for the purposes of sales tax
took place in the context of sub-clause (d) of Article 366(29-A). Some
States had levied a tax on the transfer of the right to use goods on the
location of goods at the time of their use irrespective of the place
where the agreement for such transfer of right to use such goods was
made. The other States levied a tax upon delivery of the goods in the
State pursuant to agreements of transfer while some other States
levied a tax on deemed sales on the premise that the agreement for the
30 of 45
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transfer of the right to use had been executed within that State (vide
para 2 of the judgment as reported). This Court upheld the third view,
namely, merely that the transfer of the right to use took place where
the agreements were executed. In these circumstances, the Court said
that: (SCC p. 42, para 28)
‘28. No authority of this Court has been shown on behalf of the
respondents that there would be no completed transfer of right to use
goods unless the goods are delivered. Thus, the delivery of goods
cannot constitute a basis for the levy of tax on the transfer of right to
use any goods. We are, therefore, of the view that where the goods are
in existence, the taxable event on the transfer of the right to use goods
occurs when a contract is executed between the lessor and the lessee
and situs of sale of such a deemed sale would be the place where the
contract in respect thereof is executed. Thus, where goods to be
transferred are available, and a written contract is executed between
the parties, it is at that point situs of taxable event on the transfer of
right to use goods would occur, and situs of sale of such a transaction
would be the place where the contract is executed.’
74. In determining the situs of the transfer of the right to use the
goods, the Court did not say that the delivery of the goods was
inessential for the purposes of completing the transfer of the right to
use. The emphasised portions in the quoted passage evidences that the
goods must be available when the transfer of the right to use the
goods takes place. The Court also recognised that for oral contracts,
the situs of the transfer might be where the goods are delivered (see
para 26 of the judgment).
75. In our opinion, the essence of the right under Article 366(29-A)(d)
is that it relates to user of goods. It may be that the actual delivery of
the goods is not necessary for effecting the transfer of the right to use
the goods, but the goods must be available at the time of transfer,
must be deliverable and delivered at some stage. It is assumed, at the
time of execution of any agreement to transfer the right to use, that the
goods are available and deliverable. If the goods, or what is claimed
to be goods by the respondents, are not deliverable at all by the
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service providers to the subscribers, the question of the right to use
those goods, would not arise.”
43.
The aforesaid judgment dealt with a situation, wherein the
petitioners had transferred possession and control of the
equipment taken on hire to their customers. In that case, the
petitioners
had
hired
audio-visual
equipment
from
an
outsourcing agency for consideration and, in turn, provided the
facility of such equipment to their customers for consideration.
As there was no privity of contract between the outsourcing
agency and the petitioner’s customers, and the petitioners did
not render any service to their customers in relation to the
audio-visual equipment, the contract between the petitioners
and their customers was held not to be a contract for rendering
services. In those circumstances, the Court held that the
assessing authority was justified in treating the transaction as a
transfer of the right to use goods and levying tax thereon under
Section 4(8) of the Act.
44.
In view of the above judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
considered a case concerning the charter of a vessel/tug,
wherein the vessel was made available to the charterer and was
32 of 45
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delivered. There was no dispute that the charterer had a legal
right to use the vessel. The relevant permissions and licences
were also made available to the charterer, thereby enabling the
charterer to use the vessel to the exclusion of the contractor.
Having regard to the complete transfer of the right to use the
vessel, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the charter party
agreement amounted to a deemed sale within the meaning of
Article 366(29-A)(d) of the Constitution of India and that the
transaction was, therefore, liable to tax.
45.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court also considered the definition
of sale under Section 5-C of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. On a
reading of the said definition, the Court observed that the
expression sale encompasses every transfer of property in goods
by one person to another in the course of trade or business and
includes the transfer of the right to use any goods for any
purpose. The Court further observed that Section 5-C of the Act
provides for the levy of tax on the transfer of the right to use
goods, consistent with Article 366(29-A)(d) of the Constitution of
India, which was inserted by the Constitution (Forty-sixth
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Amendment) Act, 1982. Further, while examining the charter
party agreement between the parties, in the context of the
instructions to tenderers, the general conditions, the special
conditions of the contract and the charter party clauses
contained in the tender documents.
46.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that, upon a
conjoint reading of the charter agreement and the relevant
contractual documents, there could be no doubt that the right to
use the vessel had been transferred to the charterer for the
purposes specified in the agreement. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the transaction constituted a transfer of the right
to use goods within the meaning of Article 366(29-A)(d) of the
Constitution of India.
47.
Having heard the rival contentions made by the learned
counsel appearing for both parties and upon perusal of the
entire material placed on record, including the decisions relied
upon by them, the following facts emerge for consideration.
Admittedly, the writ petitioner is the Central Power Distribution
Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited (APCPDCL), Hyderabad,
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which, following the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra
Pradesh into the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, was
renamed as the Southern Power Distribution Company of
Telangana Limited.
48.
The petitioner company is a registered VAT dealer bearing
TIN No.28580127730 and is on the rolls of the Commercial Tax
Officer, Khairatabad. The company is engaged in the business of
distribution of electricity and has been filing monthly returns
under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax
Act, 2005 (AP VAT Act).
49.
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner filed VAT-200 monthly
returns for the tax periods from April 2005 to July 2008,
disclosing a total output turnover of Rs.25,62,96,515/- and
output tax of Rs.1,13,05,264/-.The dispute arose pursuant to
an audit conducted in respect of the petitioner’s business
transactions under the instructions and authorization of the
Deputy
Division.
Commissioner
of
Commercial
Taxes,
Panjagutta
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50.
During the course of the audit, it was noticed that apart
from its other business activities, the petitioner company was
also undertaking the extension of service lines for domestic,
commercial, and water supply purposes to its consumers for
consideration. The said extension schemes involved the supply
and erection of electrical lines of suitable kV capacity, PFCC
cables, distribution transformers, and the laying of underground
cables. The expenditure incurred under the said schemes was
recovered from the consumers under two heads i.e., service line
charges and development charges.
51.
Whenever a service line was extended or such facilities
were provided to a consumer, the petitioner company issued
proceedings to the concerned consumer. One such proceeding,
which was examined by the audit officer, revealed that the
petitioner had recovered an amount of Rs.99,20,500/- from
M/s. Fortune Infra Developers Private Limited towards service
line charges and development charges.
52.
The
said
proceedings
specifically
recorded
that
the
petitioner company had supplied electric poles, transformers,
36 of 45
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and cables while extending the power distribution network to
the said consumer and had recovered the cost of the materials
under the aforesaid two heads. During the audit, the petitioner
company also informed the audit officer that the schemes
undertaken for other consumers were similar to the scheme
sanctioned in favour of M/s. Fortune Infra Developers Private
Limited and that the corresponding costs were recovered from
the respective consumers.
53.
Upon
examining
the
documents,
the
audit
officer
concluded that the transactions attracted Section 4(8) of the AP
VAT Act, which deals with the transfer of the right to use goods
for valuable consideration. According to the audit officer, under
the scheme for the extension of service lines, the petitioner
company
transferred
the
right
to
use
electrical
poles,
transformers, and cables to individual consumers for monetary
consideration. As the turnover relating to these transactions had
not been disclosed in the monthly VAT-200 returns, a notice was
accordingly issued to the petitioner.
37 of 45
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54.
The petitioner company also furnished details pursuant to
a letter issued by its General Manager (Finance). A total amount
of Rs.241,57,35,483/- had been collected from consumers under
the aforesaid schemes during the tax period from April 2005 to
July 2008.
55.
Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the
material placed on record, it is evident that though the petitioner
company supplied electrical poles, transformers, and cables
while extending its power distribution network to the respective
consumers and recovered the cost of such materials under the
heads of service line charges and development charges, the mere
recovery of the cost of the materials does not establish that the
right to use the goods was transferred to the consumers.
56.
It
is
pertinent
to
note
that
the
electrical
poles,
transformers, cables, and other equipment forming part of the
distribution network continued to remain under the control and
maintenance of the petitioner company. The petitioner company
remained responsible for maintaining the entire electricity
distribution infrastructure, including the transformers, cables,
38 of 45
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and poles. The consumers were not entitled to interfere with or
independently operate or maintain the said equipment and the
responsibility for its maintenance rested with the petitioner
company.
57.
In these circumstances, the continued ownership and
control
of
the
equipment,
together
with
the
petitioner’s
responsibility for its maintenance and operation, are relevant
factors in determining whether the transactions amounted to a
transfer of the right to use goods in favour of the consumers.
58.
It is further evident that the electrical poles, transformers,
and cables were supplied and installed by the petitioner
company for the specific purpose of distributing electricity to the
consumers. The question that therefore arises is whether the
installation and use of such equipment for supplying electricity,
notwithstanding the recovery of its cost from the consumers,
constitutes a transfer of the right to use goods within the
meaning of Section 4(8) of the AP VAT Act.
39 of 45
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59.
For a proper understanding and appreciation of the issue,
the relevant provisions of Sections 42, 43, and 46 of the
Electricity Act, 2003, are extracted hereunder:
Section 42(1): It shall be the duty of a distribution licensee to develop
and maintain an efficient, co-ordinated and economical distribution
system in his area of supply and to supply electricity in accordance
with the provisions contained in this Act.
Section 43(1): [Save as otherwise provided in this Act, every
distribution] licensee, shall, on an application by the owner or
occupier of any premises, give supply of electricity to such premises,
within one month after receipt of the application requiring such
supply:
Provided that where such supply requires extension of distribution
mains, or commissioning of new sub-stations, the distribution licensee
shall supply the electricity to such premises immediately after such
extension or commissioning or within such period as may be specified
by the Appropriate Commission.
Section 43(2): It shall be the duty of every distribution licensee to
provide, if required, electric plant or electric line for giving electric
supply to the premises specified in sub-section (1).
Section 43(3): If a distribution licensee fails to supply the electricity
within the period specified in sub-section (1), he shall be liable to a
penalty which may extend to one thousand rupees for each day of
default.
Section 46:The State Commission may, by regulations, authorise a
distribution licensee to charge from a person requiring a supply of
electricity in pursuance of section 43 any expenses reasonably
incurred in providing any electric line or electrical plant used for the
purpose of giving that supply.
60.
Further, to ascertain the nature of the rights over the said
equipment, it is necessary to examine Clauses 5.12.5, 5.12.6,
and 6.1 of the General Terms and Conditions of Supply of the
40 of 45
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WP_3356_2009
Central
Power
Distribution
Company
of
Andhra
Pradesh
Limited, Hyderabad. The relevant provisions are extracted
hereunder:
Clause 5.12.5
All Meters and other equipment belonging to the Company and
installed in the Premises of the consumer, shall be and continue to be
at all times the property of the Company. This is notwithstanding the
fact that such Meters and other equipment or any part thereof, may be
fixed or fastened to or embedded, in any part of the consumer’s
Premises. Such equipment shall not be disturbed or dealt with in any
manner except by the Designated Officers of the Company.
Clause 5.12.6.1
The consumer shall not interfere in any manner with the property of
the Company and shall be fully responsible for the safety of the
Company’s property on the consumer’s premises. In the event of any
loss or damage caused to Company’s property by any act, neglect or
default of the consumer, his servants or persons employed by him or
due to any reason other than force-majeure conditions, the consumer
shall compensate the Company for the cost of necessary repairs or
replacement as may be assessed by the Company and in addition shall
pay penalties prescribed or lawfully due to the Company for
unauthorized interference with the Company property or seals, within
thirty days of the issue of the bill, in this behalf. Non-payment of such
bill by the consumer will entail all the consequences attendant on
failure to pay the Monthly bill for current consumption.
Clause 5.12.6.2
The Company has to provide quality power supply in accordance with
the ‘Standards of Performance’ Regulation and the Distribution &
Retail Supply licence issued by the Commission.
Clause 6.1 — Access to Premises and Apparatus
Any officer or person duly authorized by the company as per
‘Designated Officers Notification’ may, enter any premises to which
electricity is, or has been, supplied by him for the purpose provided by
41 of 45
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and in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or (2) of
Section 163 of the Act and the APERC (Electricity Supply Code)
Regulation, 2004 (No.5 of 2004) issued by the Commission.
61.
It is also pertinent to note that, where the equipment
supplied by the petitioner is fixed or fastened to, or embedded
in, any part of the consumer’s premises, such equipment may be
intended for the exclusive use of the concerned consumer in
connection with the supply of electricity. However, the fact that
the equipment is installed at the consumer’s premises and is
used for supplying electricity to that consumer must be
considered along with the question of who retains control over
the equipment and who is entitled to operate, maintain, and
regulate its use.
62.
Therefore, the issue as to whether the transactions
constitute a transfer of the right to use goods cannot be
determined merely on the basis of the recovery of the cost of the
equipment or its installation at the consumer’s premises. The
relevant statutory provisions and the applicable terms and
conditions of supply must be examined to determine whether
the essential requirements for a transfer of the right to use
goods are satisfied.
42 of 45
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63.
Having considered the said provisions of the Electricity Act
and the General Terms and Conditions of supply of the Central
Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh Limited, it is
pertinent to mention that the entire control over the equipment
and infrastructure vests with the petitioner Department. In the
event of any interference with the equipment by the consumer or
any damage being caused thereto, the consumer would be liable
for penal action under the provisions of the Electricity Act. This
clearly demonstrates that the equipment is installed and utilized
by the Electricity Department for the purpose of transmitting
electricity through the said infrastructure to the end-user,
namely, the consumer.
64.
Though the equipment and infrastructure are procured
and
installed
at
the
instance
of
the
petitioners,
the
corresponding costs are recovered by the Department from the
consumers. Admittedly, the infrastructure extending up to the
substations and primary distribution lines is provided by the
petitioners themselves. However, for the subsequent supply of
electricity
to
individual
domestic
consumers,
commercial
43 of 45
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establishments and other applicants, the cost incurred towards
the development of the electricity distribution infrastructure is
recovered from the respective applicants, particularly in cases
involving real estate developments and other infrastructure
projects.
65.
The said costs are recovered under two heads i.e., service
line charges and development charges, in addition to the usual
security
deposit.
Such
recovery
is
made
in
respect
of
infrastructure developed exclusively for the use of the respective
applicants.
66.
The recovery of the entire cost of the goods utilized in
developing
the
infrastructure
constitutes
an
ancillary
or
subsidiary activity connected with the petitioners principal
business of supplying electricity. There is a clear element of
recovery of the value of the goods employed in developing the
infrastructure on the land belonging to the consumer, for the
purpose of facilitating the supply of electricity. Though the
principal business of the petitioners is the supply of electricity,
the installation of equipment, establishment of service lines and
44 of 45
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development of the requisite infrastructure, coupled with the
recovery of the cost of the goods employed therein, constitute
activities incidental or ancillary to such principal business.
67.
Further, the subsequent control over the said equipment
and infrastructure continues to vest with the petitioners. The
consumer merely utilizes the infrastructure for the purpose of
receiving electricity supplied by the petitioners. Such use by the
consumer does not amount to a transfer of ownership of the
equipment or infrastructure. However, the nature of the
transaction, viewed in its entirety, establishes a transfer of the
right to use the goods employed in developing the infrastructure
and supply of electricity.
68.
In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the absence of
any transfer of ownership of the goods to the consumer, we are
of the considered opinion that the transaction in question
constitutes a transfer of the right to use the goods and
consequently, attracts the levy of tax. Accordingly, the tax levied
on the value of the goods recovered by the petitioners is exigible
at the applicable rates under Section 4(8) of the Andhra Pradesh
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Value Added Tax Act. Consequently, the question framed for
consideration is answered in favour of respondent and the
petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought in the writ
petition.
69.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending,
shall stand closed.
___________________________
P. SAM KOSHY, HACJ
_______________________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 03.11.2026.
vjb
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