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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : 22.04.2026
+
ARB.P. 1358/2025
M/S RUDRA INTERIORS PVT.LTD.
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Bipin Kr. Prabhat, Mr.
Ashok Kr. Verma, Mr. Kislaya
Prabhat and Ms. Rinku Kumari,
Advocates.
versus
HINDUSTAN PREFAB LIMITED & ANR.
Through:
.....Respondents
Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC
with Mr. Shailendra Kumar
Mishra and Ms. Upanita
Soumyadarshni, Advocates.
Mr. Varun Nischal and Ms.
Urvi Johri Advs. for R-1 & 2
along with Mr. Mukesh, Legal
in-charge HPL
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition has been filed by M/S Rudra Interiors
Pvt. Ltd.1 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
19962, seeking the appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon
the disputes inter se the parties.
Petitioner
A&C Act
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2.
At the outset, it is noted that vide Order dated 09.12.2025,
National Disaster Response Force3 was impleaded as Respondent
No. 2 to the present Petition.
3.
Learned CGSC, Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, appearing for
Respondent No. 2 submits that she has no objection to the disputes
being referred to arbitration.
4.
Learned counsel for Hindustan Prefab Limited4 however,
objects to the present Petition on the ground that the Agreement
dated 19.08.20205, as entered into between the parties, prescribes a
specific procedure, particularly articulated under Clause 26 of the
Special Conditions of Contract6 therein, non-compliance with which
would disentitle reference of disputes to arbitration.
5.
Learned counsels appearing on behalf of the Parties are ad idem
that the Petitioner had initially approached the Project-In-charge of
Respondent No.1 and communicated his grievances to him vide letter
dated 21.11.2024, however the same came to be rejected by virtue of
communication dated 19.12.2024.
6.
Subsequent thereto, the Petitioner vide communication dated
21.12.2024 appealed against the abovesaid rejection by the Project-Incharge to the CMD/ Chief Engineer of Respondent No.17, who
replied to the said communication on 01.01.2025 by contending as
follows:
“In this connection, I would like to draw your attention which
respect to agreed clause no. 26 of SCC and Clause no.25 of GCC.
As per clause, you have filed an appeal before CMD/Chief
Engineer against project in charge, HPL letter dated 21.11.2024. In
NDRF/Respondent No.2
Respondent No.1
Agreement
SCC
CMD
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this regard, it is informed you that, appeal is without any cogent
reason/ground dissatisfaction to the decisions of Project in charge
in respect of your claims.
In view of above, your letter dated 21.12.2024, cannot be
considered as appeal. Since no justification/reason has been given
by you (M/s, Rudra Interiors Pvt. Ltd.), hence it may be
appropriate for M/s Rudra Interiors Pvt. Ltd. to file a fresh appeal
with all particulars in respect of each claim before the CMD for
reconsideration”
(emphasis supplied)
7.
As is apparent from the aforesaid Reply, Respondent No.1 took
the stand that the communication dated 21.12.2024, by the Petitioner
to the CMD, cannot be construed as an appeal, inasmuch as it does not
set out any elaborate reasons or grounds for preferring the same.
8.
It is further noted that Respondent No.1 persisted with the
abovesaid stand in subsequent communications and further indicated
to the Petitioner that a fresh appeal was required to be filed.
9.
It is noted that, in pursuance of the foregoing, the Petitioner
addressed a further communication dated 14.02.2025 to the CMD
seeking an opportunity to meet and explain the various issues and
grievances; however, Respondent No.1, vide letter dated 12.03.2026,
maintained its stand that the earlier communication did not constitute
an appeal and that a fresh appeal was required to be filed.
10.
In view of the above-said, the Petitioner, being left with no
alternative, issued a Notice dated 10.04.2025 8 as per Section 21 of
the A&C Act, invoking arbitration.
11.
However, Respondent No. 1, in its reply dated 03.05.2025 to
the said Notice, stated that the claims of the Petitioner were unmerited
and unwarranted, reiterating the Petitioner’s non-compliance with the
procedure stipulated under Clause 26 of the SCC, and further asserting
Notice
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that the letter dated 21.12.2024 could not be treated as an appeal
having no grounds articulated therein.
12.
Thereafter, the Petitioner addressed a further communication
dated 18.06.2025 seeking constitution of a Dispute Redressal
Committee9, being the appellate forum to consider the issues arising
from the decision rendered by the CMD, in pursuance of Respondent
No.1’s communication dated 03.05.2025, whereby the allegations of
the Petitioner were denied and it was asserted that, in terms of the
Agreement as between the parties, a DRC was required to be
constituted and approached for redressal of grievances prior to
preferring an appeal before the CMD.
13.
Respondent No. 1, vide reply dated 08.07.2025, responded to
the Petitioner’s communication dated 18.05.2025, reiterating its earlier
stand.
14.
During the course of arguments before this Court, learned
counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 asserted a similar line of
submissions. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 1 further asserts
that appeal to the DRC is mandated by the Arbitration Clause and the
Petitioner does not dispute the same, but has raised an objection to the
constitution of the DRC and, therefore, the present Petition is not
entertainable.
15.
In the aforesaid factual background and in light of the assertions
advanced by the parties, the present petition came to be filed before
this Court.
ANALYSIS AND DECISION:
16.
This Court has heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf
DRC
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of the Parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
placed on record.
17.
At the outset, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the
Dispute Resolution Clause being Clause 26, which reads as under:
“26. Settlement of Disputes and Arbitration :
Except where otherwise provided in the contract, all questions and
disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, design,
drawings, and instructions here-in before mentioned and as to the
quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any
other question, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way
arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawings,
specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions or
otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure to
execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work
or after the cancellation, termination, completion or abandonment
thereof shall he dealt with as mentioned hereinafter.
i) If the contractor considers any work demanded of him to he
outside the requirements of the contract, or disputes any drawings,
record or decision given in writing by the Engineer-in-Charge on
any matter in connection with or arising out of the contract or
carrying out of the work, to be acceptable, he shall promptly within
15 days request the Project-In-Charge., HPL give his written
instructions or decisions within a period of one month from the
receipt of the contractor's letter.
If the Project In-Charge., HPL fails to give his instructions or
decision in writing within the aforesaid period or if the contractors
is dissatisfied with the instructions or decision of the Project InCharge, HPL, the contractor may, within 15 days of the receipt of
Project In-Charge HPL decision, appeal to the CMD, HPL who
shall afford an opportunity to the contractor to be heard, if the latter
so desires, and to offer evidence in support of his appeal. The
CMD, HPL shall give his decision within 30 days of receipt of
contractor's appeal. If the contractor is dissatisfied with this
decision of the CMD, HPL, the contractor may within 30 days
from the receipt of the CMD,HPL decision, appeal before the
Dispute Resressal Committee(DRC) along with a list of disputes
with amounts claimed in respect of each such dispute and giving
reference to the rejection of his disputes by the CMD, HPL. The
Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC) shall give his decision within
a period of 90 days from the receipt of Contractor's appeal. The
constitution of Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC) shall
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be as indicated in Schedule 'F' and as may be extended from time
to time by HPL. If the Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC) fails to
give his decision within the aforesaid period or any party is
dissatisfied with the decision of Dispute receipt of the decision of
Dispute Redressal Committee (DRC), then either party may within
a period of 30 days from the receipt of the decision of Dispute
Redressal Committee (DRC) give notice to the CMD,HPL, in the
prescribed format attached with SCC as Annexure-X HPL for
appointment of arbitrator failing which the said decision shall be
final binding and conclusive and not referable to adjudication by
the arbitrator.
ii) Except where the decision has become final, binding and
conclusive in terms of Sub Para(i) above disputes or difference
shall be referred for adjudication through arbitration by a sole
arbitrator appointed by the CMD,HPL on behalf of NDRF and with
the consent of NDRF. If the arbitrator so appointed is unable or
unwilling to act or resigns his appointment or vacates his office due
to any reason whatsoever, another sole arbitrator shall be appointed
in the manner aforesaid. Such person shall be entitled to proceed
with the reference from the stage at which it was left by his
predecessor.
It is a term of this contract that the party invoking arbitration shall
give a list of disputes with amounts claimed in respect of each such
dispute along with the notice for appointment of arbitrator and
giving reference to the rejection by the CMD, HPL of the appeal.
It is also a term of this contract that no person other than a person
appointed by such CMD, HPL on behalf NDRF & with the consent
of NDRF, as aforesaid should act as arbitrator and if for any reason
that is not possible, the matter shall not be referred to arbitration at
all.
It is also a term of this contract that if the contractor does not make
any demand for appointment of arbitrator in respect of any claims
in writing a aforesaid within 120 days of receiving the intimation
from the Engineer-in-charge that the final bill is ready for payment,
the claim of the contractor shall be deemed to have been waived
and absolutely barred and the Government shall be discharged and
release of all liabilities under the contract in respect of these
claims.
The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996 (26 of
1966) or any statutory modifications or re-enactment thereof
and the rules made there under and for the time being in force shall
apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. (including the
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fees, if any, of the arbitrator) shall be in the discretion of the
arbitrator who may direct to any by whom and in what manner,
such costs or any part thereof shall be paid and fix or settle the
amount of costs to be so paid.
It is also a term of this contract that the arbitrator shall adjudicate
on only such disputes as are referred to him by the appointing
authority and give separate award against each dispute and claim
referred to him and in all cases where the total amount of the claim
by any party exceeds Rs. 1,00,000/- the arbitrator shall give
reasons for the award.
It is also a term of the contract that if any fees are payable to the
arbitrator, these shall be paid equally by both the parties.
It is also a term of the contract the arbitrator shall be deemed to
have entered on the reference on the date he issues notice to both
the parties calling them to submit their statement of claims and
counter statement of claims. The venue of the arbitration shall be
New Delhi. The fees, if any, of the arbitrator shall, if required to be
paid before the award is made and published, be paid half and half
by each of the parties.”
18.
After the perusal of the afore-mentioned Clause, this Court
expresses and records its dissatisfaction with the interpretation as
sought to be placed by Respondent No. 1 on Clause 26 of the
Agreement, by reading into it a requirement of furnishing detailed
reasons and grounds at the stage of preferring an appeal against the
decision of the Project-In-Charge.
19.
It is unclear as to how Respondent No.1 has sought to read such
a requirement into the Clause, and the entire course of subsequent
correspondence, emanating from this inflexible stand, appears to be
erroneous.
20.
With respect to the contention that resort to an Appeal before
the DRC is a mandatory requirement, this Court notes that a plain
reading of the said Clause does not support the construction sought to
be placed by Respondent No. 1. The Clause provides that an appeal to
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the CMD from the decision of the Project-In-Charge “may” be
preferred. Therefore, the interpretation sought to be advanced by
Respondent No. 1 does not appear to be borne out from the
Agreement. The relevant portion of the said Clause reads as follows:
“………if the contractors is dissatisfied with the instructions or
decision of the Project In-Charge, HPL, the contractor may, within
15 days of the receipt of Project In-Charge HPL decision, appeal to
the CMD…………”
21.
The use of the expression “may”, in the clause, indicates that
recourse to the DRC is not mandatory; however, Respondent No.1 has
maintained an obdurate stand by insisting upon requirements relating
to details, particulars and reasons, as also other conditions not borne
out from the Agreement, thereby constraining the Petitioner, who,
being left with no alternative, has approached this Court under Section
11 of the A&C Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. In view of the
same, the contention with respect to the Petitioner’s alleged admission
that an appeal was to be made to the DRC and the same not having
been done, vitiates the present proceedings, is rendered academic.
22.
This Court is of the considered view that the conduct of
Respondent No.1 reflects a failure to adhere to the terms of the
Agreement, of which it is itself the author, and constitutes an attempt
to ascribe an interpretation that is manifestly onerous and contrary to
the express terms.
23.
Considering the foregoing, this Court is of the view that the
objections, as raised by Respondent No. 1, are unmerited and, the
disputes would require to be referred to arbitration.
24.
At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the legal position
governing the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section
11(6) of the A&C Act is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench
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of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krish Spinning10, after taking into consideration the authoritative
pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between
Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp
Act, 1899, In re11, comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial
intervention at the stage of Section 11 of the A&C Act. The excerpt
of Krish Spg (supra) reads as follows:
“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
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Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted in NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
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require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
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Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
25.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the A&C Act, is required to confine itself to a prima
facie examination of the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement
and
nothing
beyond.
The
Court’s
role
is
facilitative
and
procedural, namely, to give effect to the parties’ agreed mechanism of
dispute resolution when it has failed, without embarking upon an
adjudication of contentious factual or legal issues, which are reserved
for the Arbitral Tribunal.
26.
It is further noted that the Agreement, as between the parties,
provides for a unilateral appointment of the Arbitrator by Respondent
No.1; however, the same is impermissible in the view of the settled
principles of law as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd.12.
2019 SCC OnLine SC 1517
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27.
The material placed on record indicates that the valuation of the
subject matter of the disputes is approximately Rs. 3.5 crore.
28.
In view of the abovesaid, this Court deems it appropriate to
appoint Mr. V. K. Jain, (Retd.) (Former Judge of Delhi High
Court), (
) as the Sole arbitrator to enter upon
reference and adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
29.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12(2) of the A&C Act within a period of one
(01) week of entering the reference.
30.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
31.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
32.
Needless to say, nothing in this Order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties.
33.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with all pending
Application(s), if any, is disposed of.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J
APRIL 22, 2026/JYH/kr/sg
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