Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
( 2026:JHHC:5959 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Arbitration Application No. 54 of 2025
M/s. Royal- ITL, a Joint Venture, having its Corporate Office at Godrej Waterside
Building, Tower No-1, 4th Floor No 401, Plot No. 5, DP Block, Salt Lake Sector
V, P.O Bidhan Nagar, P.S Electronics Complex, District, Kolkatta- 700091 (West
Bengal) through its Authorised Signatory Mr Sudip Bhowmick, Aged about 55
Years, son of Ashim Bhowmick, Resident of 20, Purba Sinthee By Lane, P.O and
P.S Dumdum, District Kolkata - 700 030 (West Bengal).
…. Petitioner
Versus
1. M/s RITES Limited, Rites Bhawan, No. l, Sector-29, P.O Gurugram, P.S
Gurugram, District Gurugram-122 001.
2. Group General Manager, RITES Limited, RITES Office Building, Plot No
DJ/20, Action Area-1D, New Town Rajarhat, P.O Rajarhat, P.S Rajarhat,
District, Kolkata, Pin 700156.
3. G. M (C) RITES Limited, H.N 402 b, Road No 4C, Ashok Nagar, P.O &
P.S Ashok Nagar District Ranchi- Jharkhand.
…. Respondents
-----CORAM : HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
-----For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Vikash Pandey, Advocate
Ms. Diksha Dwivedi, Advocate
For the Respondents
:
Mr. Srijit Choudhary, Advocate
Ms. Tanya Rai, Advocate
Mr. Aayush Ojha, Advocate
Mr. Chiranjeev Mahto, Advocate
----Order No. 04
Dated : 27.02.2026
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
This application seeks appointment of an Arbitrator on account of
disputes arising out of Agreement No. RITES/RPO-KOL/CCLMagadh/Civil & P Way/PKG-III/2018/500 dated 11.06.2018.
3.
The applicant had, by notice dated 05.06.2025, invoked the Arbitration
Clause No. 25 in the contract between the parties and sought for the
resolution of disputes through arbitration. However, the respondents
did not consent for resolution of such disputes through arbitration.
Hence, this application seeking appointment of Arbitrator.
4.
Mr. Vikas Pandey, the learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
the scope of proceedings under Section 11 is extremely limited and is
confined to determining the existence of an arbitration agreement. He
further submitted that there is no question of unilateral appointment of
Arbitrator by the respondent, as held in Central Organisation for
Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (Joint Venture),
(2025) 4 SCC 641.
5.
Mr. Srijit Choudhary, the learned counsel for the respondents, at the
outset referred to the statement of objections and reasons of the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 and submitted
that such amendment was introduced to make the arbitration process
cost effective, speedy and with minimum Court intervention. He
pointed out that Clause 25, which the applicant invokes, requires the
contractor to first seek a decision from the Engineer-in-Charge. If
dissatisfied with such decision, the contractor, can appeal before the
appellate authority specified in Schedule-F. Only if the contractor is
still dissatisfied, can request be made to appoint Arbitrator. He
submitted that all this process has not been followed by the applicant
and, therefore, this application is quite premature and should not be
entertained. He submitted that if such application is entertained, then,
the object of minimum Court intervention would stand frustrated.
6.
The rival contentions now fall for determination.
7.
In this case, the existence of the arbitration agreement between the
parties cannot be disputed. Clause 25 is an arbitration clause, which is
in writing and in fact, signed by both the parties. In the counter filed to
oppose appointment of any Arbitrator, there is no dispute raised about
the existence of the arbitration agreement. The dispute is about noncompliance with certain pre-conditions before which, appointment of
an Arbitrator could be sought by the applicant.
8.
The scope of proceeding under Section 11 of the said Act is limited to
examining the existence of an arbitration agreement. Even the scope of
such examination is extremely limited. In Eminent Colonizers Private
Limited Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board and Others, (2026) SCC
OnLine SC 148, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to its
decision in re-interplay between arbitration agreements under the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1989, observed
as follows:23. The scenario would have been totally different if the 2015
(Amendment) Act had applied to the arbitral proceedings. The
scope of the inquiry has been clarified in In re Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 18995, in the following
terms:—
“164. The 2015 Amendment Act has laid down different
parameters for judicial review under Section 8 and
Section 11. Where Section 8 requires the Referral Court
to look into the prima facie existence of a valid
arbitration agreement, Section 11 confines the Court's
jurisdiction to the examination of the existence of an
arbitration agreement. Although the object and purpose
behind both Sections 8 and 11 is to compel parties to
abide by their contractual understanding, the scope of
power of the Referral Courts under the said provisions is
intended to be different. The same is also evident from
the fact that Section 37 of the Arbitration Act allows an
appeal from the order of an Arbitral Tribunal refusing
to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8, but not
from Section 11. Thus, the 2015 Amendment Act has
legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engg. [SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618] where it was
held that Section 8 and Section 11 are complementary in
nature. Accordingly, the two provisions cannot be read
as laying down a similar standard.
165. The legislature confined the scope of reference
under Section 11(6-A) to the examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement. The use of the
term “examination” in itself connotes that the scope of
the power is limited to a prima facie determination. Since
the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the
requirement of “existence” of an arbitration agreement
draws effect from Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.
In Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram
Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729, this Court held that the
Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to
determine the existence of an arbitration agreement —
whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration
agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to
the disputes which have arisen between the parties to the
agreement. Therefore, the scope of examination under
Section 11(6-A) should be confined to the existence of an
arbitration agreement on the basis of Section 7.
Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, in
view of Section 7, should be restricted to the requirement
of formal validity such as the requirement that the
agreement be in writing. This interpretation also gives
true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by
leaving the issue of substantive existence and validity of
an arbitration agreement to be decided by Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 16. We accordingly clarify the
position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia [Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 in the
context of Section 8 and Section 11 of the Arbitration
Act.
167. Section 11(6-A) uses the expression “examination
of the existence of an arbitration agreement”. The
purport of using the word “examination” connotes that
the legislature intends that the Referral Court has to
inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the parties for
the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover, the
expression “examination” does not connote or imply a
laborious
or
contested
inquiry.
[P.
Ramanatha
Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (2nd Edn., 1997) 666.] On the
other hand, Section 16 provides that the Arbitral
Tribunal can “rule” on its jurisdiction, including the
existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A
“ruling” connotes adjudication of disputes after
admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore, it is
evident that the Referral Court is only required to
examine the existence of arbitration agreements,
whereas the Arbitral Tribunal ought to rule on its
jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the
existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. A
similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu
Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC
234].
169. When the Referral Court renders a prima facie
opinion, neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the Court
enforcing the arbitral award will be bound by such a
prima facie view. If a prima facie view as to the existence
of an arbitration agreement is taken by the Referral Court,
it still allows the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the issue in
depth. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court
in weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration
agreements. It will also protect the jurisdictional
competence of the Arbitral Tribunals to decide on issues
pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration
agreement.”
9.
Since the existence of an arbitration agreement cannot be disputed in
this case and the inquiry is extremely limited, this application must be
allowed. Insofar as the objection raised on behalf of the respondents is
concerned, the same can always be raised before the Arbitral Tribunal,
and the Arbitral Tribunal would be bound to consider the same in
accordance with law. However, based on the objections so raised, it
would not be appropriate not to appoint any Arbitrator or constitute an
Arbitral Tribunal, given the limited scope of enquiry under section 11
of the said Act.
10. Sustenance can be drawn from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, (2024) 12
SCC 1 and the order dated 04.02.2026 disposing of Arbitration
Application No. 34 of 2025 (M/s. P.K. Agarwala versus Mecon
Limited & Ors) in support of the above view.
11. The reply on behalf of the respondents does not categorically raise any
objection in the context of the powers of the respondents to appoint an
Arbitrator of their choice. At least, prima facie, the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Central Organisation for Railway
Electrification (supra) would apply. In any event, even this issue is not
being decided in the limited scope of inquiry under section 11 of the
said Act.
12. Accordingly, Mr D.G.R. Patnaik, Former Judge of this Court,
residing at 1, Rajendra Nagar, Sakchi, Jamshedpur, 831001, is
appointed as an Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties. The appointment is subject to the learned Arbitrator not being
subject to any of the disqualifications prescribed under the said Act and
issuing a declaration to that effect before he enters upon reference.
Learned Arbitrator's fees shall be in terms of the Fourth Schedule to the
said Act, and both the parties shall bear such fees in equal proportion.
13. The Learned Arbitrator will endeavour to conclude the arbitration
proceedings within the period prescribed under Section 29-A of the said
Act.
14. Once again, it is clarified that all contentions of the parties, including
the respondents' objections, remain explicitly open for the learned
Arbitrator to decide in the first instance.
15. All concerned must act on an authenticated copy of this order.
16. This application is disposed of, in the above terms, without any order
for costs.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)
February 27, 2026
Ranjeet / R.Kr.
NAFR
Uploaded on
01.03.2026
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review