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2026:HHC:92
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1211 of 2025
Reserved on: 17.12.2025
Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.
M/s Punjab Industries and another
...Petitioners
Versus
M/s Mansarovar Minerals and Chemicals, through its Partner
Vijender Kumar Walia
...Respondent
[
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Vinod Chauhan, Advocate.
For the Respondent
:
None.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition against
the order dated 20.11.2025, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate
First Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, HP, vide which the
application filed under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. by the respondent
(complainant before the learned Trial Court) was allowed. (Parties
shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were
arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:92
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an
offence
punishable
under
Section
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments Act (NI Act). The complainant applied for the
production of certified documents under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. The
learned Trial Court allowed the application. The order passed by
the
learned
Trial
Court
is
not
sustainable
because
the
complainant wanted to fill up the lacuna left by it, which is
impermissible. The accused had disclosed their defence in the
cross-examination of the witnesses, and the application was filed
to overcome the defence of the accused. The application was filed
at a belated stage and could not have been allowed. Therefore, it
was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order
passed by the learned Trial Court be set-aside.
3.
Mr.
Vinod
Chauhan,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners, submitted that the application was filed to fill up the
lacuna, which is impermissible. The learned Trial Court failed to
appreciate that the accused had disclosed their defence, and
allowing the application prejudiced the accused. Therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed
2026:HHC:92
by the learned Trial Court be set-aside. He relied upon the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.P. Tamilmaran Vs.
State and others 2025 INSC 576 and Varsha Garg Vs. State of 2023
(19) SCC 646 in support of his submission.
4.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
5.
The complainant had filed the complaint with the
averments that it is a Partnership Firm. The complainant filed an
application under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. to bring the Partnership
Deed on record. The complaint was filed with the averments that
the complainant is a partnership firm; hence, the Partnership
Deed was a relevant document.
6.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Varsha Garg v. State of M.P., (2023) 19 SCC 646: 2022 SCC OnLine SC
986 that the Court has the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. to
summon any witness, recall or re-examine any person for the just
decision of the case. It was observed at page 659: 31. Having clarified that the bar under Section 301 is
inapplicable and that the appellant is well placed to pursue
this appeal, we now examine Section 311 of CrPC. Section
311 provides that the court “may”:
2026:HHC:92
(i) Summon any person as a witness or to examine
any person in attendance, though not summoned as
a witness; and
(ii) Recall and re-examine any person who has
already been examined.
This power can be exercised at any stage of any inquiry,
trial or other proceeding under the CrPC. The latter part of
Section 311 states that the court “shall” summon and
examine or recall and re-examine any such person “if his
evidence appears to the court to be essential to the just
decision of the case”. Section 311 contains a power upon
the court in broad terms. The statutory provision must be
read purposively to achieve the intent of the statute to aid
in the discovery of truth.
32. The first part of the statutory provision, which uses the
expression “may”, postulates that the power can be
exercised at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other
proceeding. The latter part of the provision mandates the
recall of a witness by the court as it uses the expression
“shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any
such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to
the just decision of the case”. Essentially, the evidence of
the person who is to be examined, coupled with the need
for a just decision of the case, constitutes the touchstone
that must guide the decision of the court. The first part of
the statutory provision is discretionary, while the latter
part is obligatory.
33. A Two-Judge Bench of this Court in Mohanlal Shamji
Soni [Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1)
SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595] while dealing with pari materia
provisions of Section 540 of the Criminal Code of
Procedure, 1898 observed: (SCC p. 279, para 16)
“16. The second part of Section 540, as pointed out
albeit imposes upon the court an obligation of
summoning or recalling and re-examining any
witness, and the only condition prescribed is that the
evidence sought to be obtained must be essential to
the just decision of the case. When any party to the
2026:HHC:92
proceedings points out the desirability of some
evidence being taken, then the court has to exercise
its power under this provision — either discretionary
or mandatory — depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case, having in view that the
most paramount principle underlying this provision
is to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant
facts in order to meet the requirements of justice.”
34. S. Ratnavel Pandian, J. speaking for the two-Judge
Bench, noted that the power is couched in the widest
possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with
regard to the stage at which it can be exercised or the
manner of its exercise. It is only circumscribed by the
principle that the “evidence to be obtained should appear
to the court essential to a just decision of the case by getting
at the truth by all lawful means. In that context, the Court
observed: (Mohanlal Shamji Soni case [Mohanlal Shamji
Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri)
595], SCC p. 280, para 18)
“18. … Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the
aid of the section should be invoked only with the
object of discovering relevant facts or obtaining
proper proof of such facts for a just decision of the
case, and it must be used judicially and not
capriciously or arbitrarily because any improper or
capricious exercise of the power may lead to
undesirable results. Further it is incumbent that due
care should be taken by the court while exercising
the power under this section and it should not be
used for filling up the lacuna left by the prosecution
or by the defence or to the disadvantage of the
accused or to cause serious prejudice to the defence
of the accused or to give an unfair advantage to the
rival side and further the additional evidence should
not be received as a disguise for a retrial or to change
the nature of the case against either of the parties.”
35. Summing up the position as it obtained from various
decisions of this Court, namely, Rameshwar Dayal v. State of
2026:HHC:92
U.P., (1978) 2 SCC 518: 1978 SCC (Cri) 311, State of W.B. v.
Tulsidas Mundhra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 413: 1963 Supp (1)
SCR 1, Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967
SCC OnLine SC 19 : (1967) 3 SCR 415: AIR 1968 SC 178, Masalti
v. State of U.P., 1964 SCC OnLine SC 30 : (1964) 8 SCR 133: AIR
1965 SC 202, Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B., 1965 SCC
OnLine SC 122 : (1966) 1 SCR 178: AIR 1965 SC 1887 and Ratilal
Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1 SCC 523: 1971
SCC (Cri) 231], the Court held : (Mohanlal Shamji Soni v.
Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595],
SCC p. 283, para 27)
“27. The principle of law that emerges from the
views expressed by this Court in the above decisions
is that the criminal court has ample power to
summon any person as a witness or recall and reexamine any such person even if the evidence on
both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court
must obviously be dictated by exigency of the
situation, and fair play and good sense appear to be
the only safe guides and that only the requirements
of justice command the examination of any person
which would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case.”
36. The power of the court is not constrained by the closure
of evidence. Therefore, it is amply clear from the above
discussion that the broad powers under Section 311 are to
be governed by the requirement of justice. The power must
be exercised wherever the court finds that any evidence is
essential for the just decision of the case. The statutory
provision goes to emphasise that the court is not a hapless
bystander in the derailment of justice. Quite to the
contrary, the court has a vital role to discharge in ensuring
that the cause of discovering truth as an aid in the
realisation of justice is manifest.
2026:HHC:92
7.
It was further held that filling up the loopholes is a
subsidiary factor, and the Court should be concerned with the
essentiality of the evidence. It was observed at page 662: 43. In the decision in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of
Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8, which was
more recently reiterated in Godrej Pacific Tech. Ltd. v.
Computer Joint India Ltd., (2008) 11 SCC 108 : (2009) 2 SCC
(Cri) 455], the Court specifically dealt with this objection
and observed that the resultant filling of loopholes on
account of allowing an application under Section 311 is
merely a subsidiary factor and the court's determination of
the application should only be based on the test of the
essentiality of the evidence. It noted that: [Zahira
Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374:
(2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8], SCC p. 393, para 28]
28. … The court is not empowered under the
provisions of the Code to compel either the
prosecution or the defence to examine any particular
witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left
to the parties. But in weighing the evidence, the
court can take note of the fact that the best available
evidence has not been given, and can draw an
adverse inference. The court will often have to
depend on intercepted allegations made by the
parties, or on an inconclusive inference from facts
elicited in the evidence. In such cases, the court has
to act under the second part of the section.
Sometimes, the examination of witnesses as directed by
the court may result in what is thought to be “filling of
loopholes”. That is purely a subsidiary factor and cannot
be taken into account. Whether the new evidence is
essential or not must, of course, depend on the facts
of each case, and has to be determined by the
Presiding Judge.” (emphasis supplied)
44. The right of the accused to a fair trial is constitutionally
protected under Article 21. However, in Mina Lalita Baruwa
2026:HHC:92
v. State of Orissa, (2013) 16 SCC 173 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 218,
while reiterating Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6
SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062, the Court observed that it is
the duty of the criminal court to allow the prosecution to
correct an error in interest of justice. In Rajendra Prasad v.
Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062, the Court
had held that : (Rajendra Prasad case [Rajendra Prasad v.
Narcotic Cell, (1999) 6 SCC 110: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062], SCC p.
113, para 8)
“8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as
the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the
matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it
should normally go to the accused in the trial of the
case, but an oversight in the management of the
prosecution cannot be treated as an irreparable
lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from
correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or
a relevant material was not brought on record due to
any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in
permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all, the
function of the criminal court is administration of
criminal justice and not to count errors committed
by the parties or to find out and declare who among
the parties performed better.” (emphasis supplied)
45. In the present case, the importance of the decoding
registers was raised in the examination of PW 41.
Accordingly, the decoding registers merely being
additional documents required to be able to appreciate the
existing evidence in the form of the call details, which are
already on record but use codes to signify the location of
the accused, a crucial detail, which can be decoded only
through the decoding registers, the right of the accused to
a fair trial is not prejudiced. The production of the
decoding registers fits into the requirement of being
relevant material which was not brought on record due to
inadvertence.
46. Finally, we also briefly deal with the objection of the
respondents regarding the stage at which the application
2026:HHC:92
under Section 311 was filed. The respondents have placed
reliance on Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC
328 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 839, a two-Judge Bench decision of
this Court, to argue that the application should not be
allowed as it has been made at a belated stage. The Court in
Swapan Kumar Chatterjee v. CBI, (2019) 14 SCC 328: (2019) 4
SCC (Cri) 839 observed: (SCC p. 331, paras 11-12)
“11. It is well settled that the power conferred under
Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to
meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised
only for strong and valid reasons, and it should be
exercised with great caution and circumspection.
The court has wide power under this Section to even
recall witnesses for re-examination or further
examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but
the same has to be exercised after taking into
consideration the facts and circumstances of each
case. The power under this provision shall not be
exercised if the court is of the view that the
application has been filed as an abuse of the process
of law.
12. Where the prosecution evidence has been closed
long back, and the reasons for non-examination of
the witness earlier are not satisfactory, the
summoning of the witness at a belated stage would
cause great prejudice to the accused and should not
be allowed. Similarly, the court should not encourage
the filing of successive applications for recall of a
witness under this provision.”
47. In the present appeal, the argument that the
application was filed after the closure of the evidence of the
prosecution is manifestly erroneous. As already noted
above, the closure of the evidence of the prosecution took
place after the application for the production of the
decoding register and for the summoning of the witness
under Section 311 was dismissed. Though the dismissal of
the application and the closure of the prosecution evidence
both took place on 13-11-2021, the application by the
2026:HHC:92
prosecution had been filed on 15-3-2021, nearly eight
months earlier. As a matter of fact, another witness for the
prosecution, Rajesh Kumar Singh, was also released after
examination and cross-examination on the same day as
recorded in the order dated 13-11-2021 of the trial court.
48. The court is vested with a broad and wholesome power,
in terms of Section 311CrPC, to summon and examine or
recall and re-examine any material witness at any stage,
and the closing of prosecution evidence is not an absolute
bar. This Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999 while dealing
with the prayers for adducing additional evidence under
Section 391CrPC at the appellate stage, along with a prayer
for examination of witnesses under Section 311CrPC
explained the role of the court, in the following terms :
(SCC pp. 188-89, para 43)
“43. The courts have to take a participatory role in a
trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to
record whatever is being stated by the witnesses.
Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the
Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on
presiding ofÏcers of the court to elicit all necessary
materials by playing an active role in the evidencecollecting process. They have to monitor the
proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that
something, which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily
brought into the record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss
in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively
so that the ultimate objective, i.e. truth, is arrived at.
This becomes more necessary where the court has
reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the
prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The
court cannot afford to be wishful or pretend to be
blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or
dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency.
The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more
like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair
judicial system, and courts cannot also play into the
hands of such a prosecuting agency, showing
2026:HHC:92
indifference or adopting an attitude
aloofness.” (emphasis supplied)
of
total
49. Further, in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) v. State of
Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 8, the Court
reiterated the extent of powers under Section 311 and held
that: (SCC p. 392, para 27)
“27. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is
that there may not be failure of justice on account of
mistake of either party in bringing the valuable
evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the
statements of the witnesses examined from either
side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential
to the just decision of the case. The section is not
limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will
not be an improper exercise of the powers of the
court to summon a witness under the section merely
because the evidence supports the case of the
prosecution and not that of the accused. The section
is a general section which applies to all proceedings,
enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers
the Magistrate to issue a summons to any witness at
any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In
Section 311, the significant expression that occurs is at
any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under
this Code. It is, however, to be borne in mind that
whereas the section confers a very wide power on the
court on summoning witnesses, the discretion
conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider
the power, the greater is the necessity for application
of judicial mind.” (emphasis supplied)
50. The Court while reiterating the principle enunciated in
Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC
271: 1991 SCC (Cri) 595 stressed upon the wide ambit of
Section 311 which allows the power to be exercised at any
stage and held that : (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of
Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: 2004 SCC (Cri) 999], SCC p. 189,
para 44)
2026:HHC:92
“44. The power of the court under Section 165 of the
Evidence Act is, in a way, complementary to its
power under Section 311 of the Code. The section
consists of two parts, i.e., (i) giving a discretion to
the court to examine the witness at any stage, and
(ii) the mandatory portion which compels the court
to examine a witness if his evidence appears to be
essential to the just decision of the court. Though the
discretion given to the court is very wide, the very
width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohanlal
Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271:
1991 SCC (Cri) 595 this Court has observed, while
considering the scope and ambit of Section 311, that
the very usage of the words such as, “any court”, “at
any stage”, or “any enquiry or trial or other
proceedings”, “any person” and “any such person”
clearly spells out that the section has expressed in
the widest-possible terms and do not limit the
discretion of the court in any way. However, as noted
above, the very width requires a corresponding
caution that the discretionary powers should be
invoked as the exigencies of justice require and
exercised judicially with circumspection and
consistently with the provisions of the Code. The
second part of the section does not allow any discretion
but obligates and binds the court to take necessary steps
if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just
decision of the case, “essential” to an active and alert
mind and not to one which is bent to abandon or
abdicate. The object of the section is to enable the court
to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the
prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some
evidence which is necessary for a just and proper
disposal of the case. The power is exercised, and the
evidence is examined, neither to help the
prosecution nor the defence, if the court feels that
there is a necessity to act in terms of Section 311, but
only to subserve the cause of justice and public
interest. It is done with an object of getting the
2026:HHC:92
evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the
truth.” (emphasis supplied)
51. While reiterating the decisions of this Court in Karnel
Singh v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 518: 1995 SCC (Cri) 977,
Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 2 SCC 126: 1999 SCC
(Cri) 104, Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1998) 4 SCC
517: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1085 and Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh,
(2003) 2 SCC 518: 2003 SCC (Cri) 641 this Court held that the
court may interfere even at the stage of appeal : (Zahira
Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158:
2004 SCC (Cri) 999], SCC p. 196, para 64)
“64. It is no doubt true that the accused persons have
been acquitted by the trial court and the acquittal has
been upheld, but if the acquittal is unmerited and
based on tainted evidence, tailored investigation,
unprincipled prosecutor and perfunctory trial and
evidence of threatened/terrorised witnesses, it is no
acquittal in the eye of the law and no sanctity or
credibility can be attached and given to the so-called
findings. It seems to be nothing but a travesty of
truth, fraud on the legal process and the resultant
decisions of courts — coram non judis and non est.
There is, therefore, every justification to call for
interference in these appeals.”
8.
A similar view was taken in K.P. Tamilmaran (supra)
wherein it was observed: 47. Before moving further, we consider it necessary to deal
with the law relating to section 311 CrPC under which PW49 was summoned as a witness. Section 311 CrPC reads as
follows:
“311. Power to summon a material witness or examine
a person present.— Any Court may, at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code,
summon any person as a witness, or examine any
person in attendance, though not summoned as a
witness, or recall and re-examine any person already
2026:HHC:92
examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or
recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence
appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the
case.”
This Section 311 of the CrPC provides wide powers to a
Criminal Court, to do the following:
I. Summon any person as a witness, or
ii. Examine any person present in court, though not
summoned as a witness, or
iii. Recall and re-examine any person already examined.
The above powers can be exercised ‘at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding’ under the CrPC. The
provision can be divided into two parts. The word ‘may’ is
used in the first part of the section, which grants the Court
the discretion to summon a witness. In contrast, the
second part of the Section uses the word ‘shall’, which
casts a duty on the Court to summon and examine or recall
or re-examine any such person as a witness when it
appears to the Court that it is essential to do so for a just
decision in the case. In other words, the second part is
mandatory, and Courts are obligated to exercise their
powers under Section 311 CrPC when the evidence of any
person is essential for a just decision of the case. (See:
Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC
OnLine SC 19)
48. As is clear from the language of the provision itself,
there is a wide discretion with the Courts under Section 311
CrPC. These powers can be exercised suo motu or on an
application moved by either side. After all, the object is that
the Court must not be deprived of the benefit of any
valuable evidence. It is absolutely necessary that the Court
must be apprised of the best evidence available. Thus,
Courts have been given wide powers to decide on their own
if a witness is required to be called or recalled for
examination or re-examination. This power under Section
311 CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial, even after
the closing of the evidence. Section 311 CrPC can also be
2026:HHC:92
read along with Section 165 of the Evidence Act, as the
powers of the Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act
are complementary to Section 311 of CrPC. As discussed
above, powers under Section 311 CrPC can either be
exercised on an application moved by either side to the
case or suo moto by the Court. In case a person is not listed
as a witness in the charge-sheet but later the prosecution
desires to bring that person as an additional prosecution
witness, then the prosecution can move an application to
bring this person as a prosecution witness. It is then for the
Court to decide whether such a person is required as a
witness or not. If the Court finds that such a person should
have been examined as a prosecution witness and he/she
was omitted from the list of witnesses due to some
oversight, mistake or for any other reason, the Court may
allow the application and such a person can be examined as
a prosecution witness. Thereafter, the normal course of
examination-in-chief, cross-examination, etc., would
follow as per the procedure. On the other hand, when the
Court calls a person as a Court witness, there are some
restrictions regarding the cross-examination of such a
witness.
9.
In the present case, the partnership deed was
necessary to adjudicate the complaint pending before the learned
Trial Court, and the learned Trial Court had rightly exercised the
jurisdiction vested in it to prove the partnership deed; hence, no
interference is required with the order passed by the learned Trial
Court.
10.
dismissed.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
2026:HHC:92
11.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
1st January, 2026
(Chander)
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