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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 27.02.2026
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ARB.P. 1022/2025
M/S PAISALO DIGITAL LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN
AS S. E. INVESTMENTS LIMITED)
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Harshal Kumar, Advocate.
versus
M/S SUN CORP & ORS.
Through:
.....Respondents
Ms. Nidhi Mohan Parashar, Mr.
Vikrant Kumar and Mr. Amar
Bajpayee, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition, filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeks appointment of a
Sole Arbitrator for the purpose of resolution of disputes that are stated
to have arisen inter se the parties arising out of the Clause 20 as set
out in Hypothecation/Loan Agreement dated 02.03.2015. The said
clause reads as follows:
“20. Any conflict, difference, controversies, or disputes arising
between the parties, if not resolved mutually, shall be
submitted/referred to the arbitration of the Sole Arbitrator. The
notices like Demand Notice, Loan Recall - cum - Demand Notice
and/or telephonic conversations/ mails shall be deemed to be
sufficient proof for opportunity given to the Borrower and/ or
Guarantor(s) for resolving the issues and efforts of Amicable
Act
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
Settlement made by the Company.
The Borrower and Guarantor (s) hereby agree and give their free
consent to the Company i.e. SEIL to appoint I nominate any
person/ professional as Sole Arbitrator without any prior consent or
reference to them. Such rights of appointing an arbitrator are not
questionable by the Borrower and /or the Guarantor (s). The notice
for Appointment of Arbitrator and the Statement of Claims can be
forwarded by the Company i.e. SEIL on the same day to the
Arbitrator and the Borrower as well as the Guarantor(s) so as to
facilitate early disposal of Arbitration proceedings.
The parties to this agreement agree for the following procedure
regarding Arbitration Proceedings:a) The Statement of Claims will be forwarded by the Company
i.e. SE IL along with all documents relied upon by the
Company i.e. SEIL.
b) The Borrower and Guarantor (s) shall file their reply along
with all the documents relied upon within 15 days of receiving
of Statement of Claim or such other period as may specified by
the Arbitrator.
c) The Company i.e. SEIL shall file rejoinder/ replication, if
any, within 7 days or such other period as may be specified by
the Arbitrator along with further documents. if required.
d) Sole Arbitrator will frame issues i.e. points of controversies
between the parties.
e) Thereafter the Parties will file their Affidavit in Evidence in
7 Days along with further documents, if any.
f)Thereafter
the
parties
will
submissions/arguments in 10 days.
file
their
written
g) If any party files any Application then the above
proceedings will be followed without prejudice to their rights
of that Application.
h) Hearing will be held on weekly basis or as the Sole
Arbitrator think fit and proper.
i) The Arbitration Case would be decided on documentary
evidence and Affidavits of parties and no verbal submissions
shall be taken on record.
j) The Sole Arbitrator may decide the other procedural aspects
and may change the above schedule if he/she thinks proper.
Any notice/ document pursuant hereto shall be deemed to be duly
served if sent by Registered Post/ Speed Post at addresses as
mentioned in this Agreement or to any changed address if such
change has been notified by either party hereto and such notice
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
shall be deemed to take effect on third working day following the
date of posting thereof. The parties have agreed that documents and
correspondence may be served by fax or email and it shall be
considered sufficient proof of delivery of documents.
The Parties have also agreed that in case of multiple loan
transactions in which all or any of the Borrower and Guarantor(s)
are same or belong to same group or family then the Company i.e.
SEIL at its sole discretion, may initiate single Arbitration
Proceedings for multiple loan transactions and multiple or single
statement of Claims may be filed by the Company i.e. SEIL.
The Arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Rules
thereunder and any amendments thereto and the language of the
Arbitration shall be English. The decision/ award of the Arbitrator
shall be final/conclusive and binding on the parties. The parties
have agreed that no reasons for the Award shall be stated by the
Sole Arbitrator. The venue of Arbitration shall be at Delhi.”
2.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Notice under
Section 21 of the Act was sent on 06.05.2025.
3.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents
submits that there has been no valid invocation of the arbitration
clause in accordance with Section 21 read with Section 11(4) of the
Act. She further contends that the alleged earliar notice dated
09.09.2017 was issued only after the learned Arbitrator had entered
upon the reference and, in any event, the receipt thereof is specifically
denied by the Respondents.
4.
Learned counsel further contends that the order dated
01.04.2025 does not confer any blanket permission upon the Petitioner
to institute the present petition. It is submitted that since the cause of
action had arisen as early as 25.02.2017, the notice dated 06.05.2025
issued under Section 21 of the Act, invoking arbitration, is ex facie
barred by limitation. Consequently, it is urged that the present petition
is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.
5.
This Court has perused the various documents, as well as the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
Orders passed by this Court. Particular attention is drawn to the
decision dated 04.04.2024, in FAO (COMM) 33/2024, passed by the
learned Division Bench of this Court. The relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereinbelow:
“14. At this stage, the learned counsel for appellant submits that
since the impugned award has also been set aside on the ground
that the learned Sole Arbitrator was unilaterally appointed, the
restoration of the respondent‟s petition would be a useless
formality. He states that the appellant would take steps for
appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with law.
15.
It is also relevant to note that during the course of the
arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant made a suggestion
that a sole arbitrator be appointed by the consent of both the
parties. However, the learned counsel for the respondents states, on
instructions, that the respondents are not agreeable to do so in these
proceedings and the appellant may file an appropriate application
under Section 11 of the A&C Act. She also states that in the
meanwhile, the respondents would attempt to resolve the disputes
with the appellant, amicably.
16.
In view of the above, we dispose of the present appeal by
leaving it open for the appellant to take appropriate steps for
appointment of an arbitrator in accordance with law.”
6.
Subsequent to the passing of the aforesaid decision, the
Petitioner filed a Petition, being ARB.P 1862/2024, under Section
11(6) of the Act, without issuing a notice under Section 21 of the Act.
The said petition came to be disposed of by a learned Co-Ordinate
Bench of this Court by order dated 01.04.2025, which reads as
follows:
“1.
This petition has been preferred on behalf of the Petitioner
under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(„1996 Act‟).
2.
As per the averments in the petition, this is a second round
of litigation between the parties. In the first round of litigation,
Petitioner had invoked the arbitration clause pertaining to loan
account No. LD3764. As per the Petitioner, Respondent No. 1 had
approached the Petitioner Company for availing loan and after
executing the requisite documents, loan of Rs.2,50,00,000/- was
extended to Respondent No. 1 vide hypothecation/loan Agreement
dated 02.03.2015 and Respondents No. 2 to 4 stood as guarantors.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
However when Respondent No. 1 failed to pay the outstanding
dues, Petitioner invoked the arbitration agreement and the arbitral
proceedings commenced. Arbitral award dated 10.07.2019 was
challenged by the Respondents in OMP (COMM) No. 124/2019
before the learned Trial Court and the petition was allowed vide
order dated 08.01.2024 on ground of unilateral appointment of the
Arbitrator. In an appeal filed by the Petitioner being FAO
(COMM) 33/2024, Petitioner took an objection to the jurisdiction
of the Trial Court to entertain the objections under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. Division Bench vide order dated 04.04.2024 agreed
with the contention of the Petitioner. Since the Petitioner also
pointed out that the award had been set aside on ground of
unilateral appointment of arbitrator, the Court granted permission
to the Petitioner to take steps for appointment of an Arbitral
Tribunal in accordance with law. Pursuant to the liberty granted,
Petitioner has filed the present petition.
3.
From the chronology of dates and events narrated in the
petition, it is clear that after the order of the Division Bench,
Petitioner has not issued a notice to the Respondents invoking
arbitration under Section 21 of the 1996 Act. Division Bench had
granted liberty to take steps for appointment of the Arbitral
Tribunal in accordance with law, which the Petitioner construes to
be a liberty to file the present petition without issuing a notice of
invocation, which is impermissible in light of the provisions of
Section 11 of the 1996 Act. In light of this, this petition is disposed
of granting liberty to the Petitioner to invoke the arbitration clause
in accordance with Section 21 of the 1996 Act read with Section
11(4) and thereafter approach the Court for appointment of the
Arbitrator in case of failure of the Respondents to so appoint.”
7.
A reading of paragraph 3 of the aforesaid order makes it evident
that this Court had clarified that the judgment of the learned Division
Bench did not permit the Petitioner to institute a petition under
Section 11 of the Act, without first issuing a notice invoking
arbitration under Section 21 of the Act. The order clearly contemplates
that, upon the Petitioner taking the requisite steps for invocation of
arbitration, it would be open to the Petitioner to take further steps for
seeking the appointment of an Arbitrator in accordance with law.
8.
The issue relating to whether there was a valid invocation in the
first instance or not is clearly not something which was raised in either
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
of the proceedings earlier. This is a fresh objection which has been
raised in the present proceedings. Prima facie, it appears that the
objection is merely an attempt to avoid adjudication of the disputes
between the parties.
9.
As a matter of fact, this aspect does not even appear to have
been raised before the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
10.
Furthermore, this Court is of the opinion that, in proceedings
under Section 11 of the Act, the scope of examination being extremely
limited, the Court is only required to appoint an Arbitrator for the
purpose of adjudication of the disputes between the parties.
11.
It is apposite to note that the legal position governing the scope
and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act is no
longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning2, after
taking into consideration the authoritative pronouncement of the
seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements
under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re3,
comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial intervention at the
stage of Section 11of the Act. The excerpt of Krish Spg (supra) reads
as under:“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11of the Act, is required to confine itself to a prima facie
examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and nothing
beyond. The Court‟s role is facilitative and procedural, namely, to give
effect to the parties‟ agreed mechanism of dispute resolution when it
has failed, without embarking upon an adjudication of contentious
factual or legal issues, which are reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal.
13.
Material on record indicates that the valuation of the present
dispute is stated to be approximately Rs. 2,50,00,000/-.
14.
Accordingly, Hon’ble Ms. Justice Shailender Kaur, (Mobile
No. 9910384702 and e-mail : sallydaljit@gmail.com), is appointed
as the Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties.
15.
The learned Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
16.
The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to a fee in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise be agreed to
between the parties and the learned Arbitrator.
17.
The parties shall share the learned Arbitrator's fee and arbitral
costs equally.
18.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
19.
Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved.
20.
Let the copy of the said order be sent to the learned Arbitrator
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
through the electronic mode as well.
21.
Accordingly, the present Petition stands disposed of in the
above-stated terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 27, 2026/tk/kr
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:24:00
ARB.P. 1022/2025
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