Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 21st DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
R
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.31006 OF 2025 (GM - RES)
C/W
WRIT PETITION No.20063 OF 2022 (GM - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.25722 OF 2022 (GM - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.4968 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.27587 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
WRIT PETITION No.34702 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
IN WRIT PETITION No.31006 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
OZONE URBANA INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LIMITED,
A PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANY INCORPORATED
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE INDIAN COMPANIES ACT,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT:
NO.38, ULSOOR ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 042.
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
SHRI. VASUDEVAN SATHYAMOORTHY.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
DR.VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
BANGALORE ZONAL OFFICE,
BMTC BUILDING, SHANTHINAGAR,
KH ROAD, BENGALURU
REPRESENTED BY ITS
AUTHORIZED OFFICER.
VISHAL ARYA
DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT.
2.
PRASANJEET GHOSH
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS
S/O AJAY KUMAR GHOSH
RESIDING AT MANGALAM ECSTASY
TOWER-2, FLAT 904
HANS SATSANG ASHRAM ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 049.
3.
SANJEEVA C.,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
RESIDING AT 1/3, PROMOD NILAYA
2ND FLOOR, 13TH CROSS
8TH SUDINDHARANAGAR MAIN
MALLESHWARAM
BENGALURU – 560 003.
4.
MANISHA GUPATA
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
D/O N.G.GUPTA
RESIDING AT SLS SYMPHONY
NO.223, 2ND CROSS
BHUVANESWARI NAGAR
BENGALURU – 560 024.
5.
HARMANJIT GILL
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
S/O LATE INDERJIT SINGH GILL
RESIDING AT 41 SIGNALS VIHAR
MHOW MADHYA PRADESH – 453 442.
6.
MALATI HARISH
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
W/O HARISH VENKATESHWARAN
RESIDING AT 94 NARMADA
3RD FL. NARAYANA GURU CHS
P.L.LOKHANDE MARG, CHEMBUR
MUMBAI – 400 089.
7.
RAVI SWAMINATHAN
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.10-540, 32
JALAN BUKIT HO SWEE
SINGAPORE – 160 032.
8.
JAYATHEERTHA JOSHI
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
S/O MR.JOSHI, RESIDING AT F-302
SLV SPLENDOUR
HARINAGAR CORSS, KOTHANUR MAIN ROAD
KONANAKUNTE
BENGALURU – 560 062.
9.
MADHURA JAYATHEERTHA JOSHI
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
W/O JAYATHEERTHA JOSHI
RESIDING AT F-302 SLV SPLENDOUR
HARINAGAR CROSS
KOTHANUR MAIN ROAD
KONANANKUNTE
BENGALURU – 560 062.
10.
VISHNU KIRAN CHIRALA
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
S/O HANUMANTHA RAO CHIRALA
RESIDING AT PLOT NO.122, ESWAR VILLA
NIZAMPET ROAD
HYDERABAD – 500 090.
11.
PADMAJA ESSWARAPRAGADA
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
W/O VISHNU KIRAN CHIRALA
RESIDING AT PLOT NO.122, ESWAR VILLA
NIZAMPET ROAD, HYDERABAD – 500 090.
12.
GOURVENDU SAXENA
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
S/O JITENDRA BABU SAXENA
RESIDING AT 23-24
TIRUPATI VIHAR IZZATNAGAR
BAREILLY UP – 243 122
REPRESENTED THROUGH
GPA HOLDER SHUBHRENDU SAXENA
13.
KUMARAVEL KANDASAMI
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
S/O P.KANDASAMI
RESIDING AT 1560 FOUR OAKS CIR
SAN JOSE, CA 95131
14.
TR DEEPAK
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
S/O LATE T.S.RAJESHEKAR
RESIDING AT D.NO.531, 5TH MAIN
7TH CROSS ROAD, K.S.TOWN
BENGALURU – 560 060.
15.
REDDIPALLI ANILKUMAR
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
S/O R.KRISHNA REDDY
RESIDING AT D.NO.4/10C
REDDYPALLI (VILLAGE)
RODDAM MANDAL
SRI SATYASAI DISTRICT
ANDHRA PRADESH
PINCODE – 515 123.
16.
M.SHANTI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
W/O REDDIPALLI ANILKUMAR
RESIDING AT D.NO.4/10C
REDDYPALLI (VILLAGE)
RODDAM MANDAL
SRI SATYASAI DISTRICT
ANDHRA PRADESH
PINCODE – 515 123.
17.
DHARMENDRAN PALANI SWAMY
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
S/O PALANI SWAMY
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.AQ203
WHITE MIST, BRIGADE OMEGA
1ST BLOCK BSK 6TH STAGE
BENGALURU – 560 062.
18.
NAGARATHNA DHARMENDRAN
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
S/O DHARMENDRAN PALANI SWAMY
RESIDING AT FLAT NO.AQ203
WHITE MIST, BRIGADE OMEGA
1ST BLOCK, BSK 6TH STAGE
BENGALURU – 560 062.
19.
SHAILA MANOHAR
W/O MANOHAR C.R.,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
R/O 37, 38TH CROSS
EAST END ROAD
JAYANAGAR 9TH BLOCK
BENGALURU – 560 069.
20.
ERROL JOHN NORONHA
S/O LATE SH.RONALD NORONHA
R/O HOUSE OF HIRANANDANI
CALGARY B 103, DEVANAHALLI
BENGALURU – 562 110.
21.
RAJU SADHWANI
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
S/O KISHINCHAND SADHWANI
R/O 2311, 1 CROSS BDA LAYOUT
HAL 3RD STAGE EXTN., OPP.KEMP FORT
AIRPORT ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 017.
RESPONDENT NOS.2-21 ARE IMPLEADED VIDE COURT
ORDER DATED 04.03.2026
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
MS.ANUPARNA BORDOLOI, CGC FOR R-1;
SRI AKASH BANTIA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 TO 18;
SRI REYNOLD D.SOUZA, ADVOCATE FOR R-19;
SRI A.VELAN, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SATHIES KUMAR AND SRI NAVPREET KAUR, ADVOCATES
FOR R-20 AND R-21)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
BNSS, 2023 PRAYING TO DECLARATION THAT REGISTRATION OF
CASE UNDER PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT BY THE
RESPONDENT IN ED CASE ECIR/BGZO/01/2025 VIDE ANNX-H7 TO
THE WRIT PETITION AND ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS THEREOF
ARE WHOLLY ILLEGAL; RESULTANTLY ISSUE AN APPROPRIATE
WRIT OR ORDER TO QUASHING THE ECIR/BGZO/01/2025 VIDE
ANNEXURE-H7 TO THE WRIT PETITION AND ALL FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS THEREOF INCLUDING THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF
PROVISIONAL ATTACHMENT DATED 04.10.2025 VIDE ANNEXURE-J
TO THE WRIT PETITION ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE.
IN WRIT PETITION No.20063 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
1.
MR. VASUDEVAN
MANAGING DIRECTOR,
M/S.OZONE URBANA INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFFICE AT
NO. 38, ULSOOR ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 042.
2.
MR.SAI PRASAD
DIRECTOR,
M/S.OZONE URBANA INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFFICE AT NO. 38,
ULSOOR ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 042.
3.
SHRI. SHEKAR
CEO, DIRECTOR,
M/S. OZONE URBANA INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFFICE AT NO. 38,
ULSOOR ROAD, BENGALURU – 560 042.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
DR.VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
SHRI. PADMANABHA
S/O BASAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
PROPRIETOR OF JAGAJYOTHI EARTH MOVERS,
RAJAJI NAGAR,
BENGALURU – 560 010.
2.
STATE BY ULSOOR P.S.,
REPRESENTED BY HCGP,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE PRIVATE COMPLAINT AND THE
ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN P.C.R.NO.54725/2022 FOR THE
OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 420, 341, 323, 504, 506
READ WITH SEC 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860
ARRAIGNING THE PRESENT PETITIONERS AS THE ACCUSED NO.1
TO 3 RESPECTIVELY, PENDING ON THE FILES OF THE HON’BLE X
ADDL. CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE COURT AT BANGALORE
VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND B.
IN WRIT PETITION No.25722 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
SHRI VASUDEVAN SATHYAMOORTHY
S/O SHRI V.SATHYAMOORTHY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
M/S.OZONE URBANA INFRA
DEVELOPERS PVT. LIMITED
NO.38, ULSOOR ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 042.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
DR.VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
BANGALORE ZONAL OFFICE
BMTC BUILDING, SHANTHINAGAR
K.H.ROAD, BENGALURU
REPRESENTED BY ITS
AUTHORIZED OFFICER.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K.ARVIND KAMATH, ASG A/W
MS.ANUPARNA BORDOLOI, CGC)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., DECLARE THAT REGISTRATION OF CASE UNDER
PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT BY THE RESPONDENT
IN ED CASE ECIR/BGZO/70/2022 INCLUDING THE SUMMONING
UNDER SECTION 50 OF PMLA VIDE ANNEXURE -A TO THE WP ON
BASIS OF SUCH PREDICATE CASES THAT HAVE BEEN STAYED BY
THIS HON’BLE COURT; QUASH ALL THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN UP
BY THE RESPONDENT ED AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND HIS
COMPANY IN ED CASE ECIR/BGZO/70/2022 INCLUDING THE
SUMMONING UNDER SECTION 50 OF PMLA VIDE ANNEXURE-A TO
THE WP.
IN WRIT PETITION No.4968 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1.
MR.VASUDEVAN SATHYAMOORTHY
(CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR)
OZONE URBAN INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.32,
NORRIS ROAD, RICHMOND TOWN
BENGALURU – 560 025.
2.
MR.SATHYAMOORTHY SAI PRASAD
DIRECTOR
OZONE URBAN INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NISHANTH PRIME APARTMENTS
PRIME STREET, RICHMOND TOWN
OPP. HOCKEY STADIUM MUSEUM ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 025.
3.
PRIYA VASUDEVAN
W/O SHRI VASUDEVAN SATHYAMURTHY
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.32, NORIS ROAD
RICHMOND TOWN
BENGALURU – 560 025.
4.
MR.S.BAASKARAN
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
HAVING REGISTERED OFFICE AT
NO.38, ULSOOR ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 042.
5.
MR.SRINIVASAN GOPALAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.34, G2,
SONA PALACE APARTMENT
NORRIS ROAD, RICHMOND TOWN
BENGALURU – 560 025.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
DR.VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE BY DEVANAHALLI P.S.,
REPRESENTED BY HCGP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2 . SMT.BHAVANASADHVANI
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS,
RESIDING AT 3RD STAGE
OPPOSITE TO AXTON,
RED FORT ROAD, HAL
BENGALURU – 562 110.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I, FOR R-1;
SRI A.VELAN, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SATHIES KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT AND FIR IN CRIME
NO. 19/2024 DATED 31/01/2024 OF RESPONDENT DEVANAHALLI
POLICE STATION PENDING ON THE FILE OF HON’BLE CJ AND JMFC,
DEVANAHALLI, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, FOR THE ALLEGED
OFFENCES UNDER SEC. 406, 420, READ WITH SECTION 149 AND
UNDER SECTION 15 OF THE KARNATAKA OWNERSHIP FLATS
(REGULATION OF THE PROMOTION OF CONSTRUCTIONS SALE
MANAGEMENT AND TRANSFER) ACT, 1972 ARRAIGNING THE
PRESENT PETITIONERS AS ACCUSED NO. 1 TO 5 RESPECTIVELY
(VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND A).
IN WRIT PETITION No.27587 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1.
MR.VASUDEVAN SATHYAMOORTHY
(CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR)
OZONE URBAN INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.32
NORRIS ROAD, RICHMOND TOWN,
BENGALURU – 560 025.
COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT 1956.
2.
MRS.SATHYAMOORTHY SAI PRASAD
DIRECTOR,
OZONE URBAN INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NISHANTH PRIME APARTMENTS,
PRIME STREET, RICHMOND TOWN,
OPP. HOCKEY STADIUM, MUSEUM ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 025.
A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE COMPANIES ACT, 1956.
3.
DURBHAKULA VAMSI SAI
OZONE URBAN INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NISHANTH PRIME APARTMENTS,
PRIME STREET, RICHMOND TOWN,
OPP. HOCKEY STADIUM, MUSEUM ROAD,
BENGALURU – 560 025.
COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE COMPNAY ACT, 1956.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
DR.VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY HGCP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2.
SHASHIKANTA GUPTHA
S/O SANTHOSH KUMAR GUPTHA,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.101, SRI RAM APARTMENT,
BHATIYA ROAD, ULLASA NAGAR , THANE CITY,
MAHARASHTRA – 421 004.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1;
SRI S.K.RAVI, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 528 OF
BNSS, 2023 (482 OF CR.P.C.,) PRAYING TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE
WRIT AND ORDER OR DIRECTION QUASHING THE COMPLAINT
DATED 28.09.2024 LODGED BY THE R-2, THE RESULTANT FIR IN
CRIME NO. 161/2024 OF DEVANAHALLI POLICE STATION FOR THE
ALLEGED OFFENCES UNDER SEC 406, 420 IPC NOW PENDING
BEFORE THE HON’BLE CJ AND JMFC, DEVANAHALLI, BENGALURU
RURAL, VIDE ANNEXURE B AND A ARRAIGNING THE PETITIONER
AS ACCUSED NO. 2, 3 AND 4 RESPECTIVELY.
IN WRIT PETITION No.34702 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1.
M/S. OZONE URBANA INFRA DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
CIN: U45209KA2006PTC038236
THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFFICE
AT NO.38, ULSOOR ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 042.
2.
MR.VASUDEVAN SATHYAMURTHY
S/O SATHYAMURTHY VISHWANATHAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
DIRECTOR, OZONE URBAN INFRA
DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
RESIDING AT NO. 32, NORRIS ROAD
RICHMOND TOWN
BENGALURU – 560 025.
3.
PRIYA VASUDEVAN
W/O VASUDEVAN SATHYAMURHTY
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO.32,
NORRIS ROAD
RICHMOND TOWN
BENGALURU – 560 025.
4.
MR. SATHYA MOORTHY SAI PRASAD
S/O VELLORE SATHYA MOORTHY
DIRECTOR, OZONE URBANA INFRA
DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.,
RESIDING AT NO. 103
NISHANTH PRIME APTS, 5
PRIME STREET, RICHMOND TOWN
MUSEUM ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 025.
5.
BHASKARAN
S/O SHRI A V SUBAMANYA
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
HAVING ITS CORPORATE OFICE AT 38
ULSOOR ROAD
BENGALURU 560 042
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI M.S.SHYAM SUNDAR, SR.ADVOCATE A/W
DR.VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
STATE OF KARNATAKA BY
BENGALURU CITY CCB POLICE
REPRESENTED BY HCGP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2.
MR. ERROL JOHN NARHONA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
HAVING ADDRESS AT
OZONE URBANA BUYERS ASSOCIATION
NO.B 103, CALGARY HOUSE OF HIRANANDANI
DEVANAHALLI
BENGALURU – 562 110.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I FOR R-1;
SRI A.VELAN, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI SATHIES KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READ WITH SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO ISSUE AN APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR
DIRECTION QUASHING THE COMPLAINT DATED 18.10.2024 AND
FIR CRIME NO. 77/2024 OF RESPONDENT CCB POLICE STATION
FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 406,
409, 420, 120(B), READ WITH SECTION 34 OF IPC AND SECTION 9
OF
KPID
ACT
ARRAIGNING
THE
PRESENT
PETITIONERS
AS
ACCUSED NO. 1 TO 4 AND 10 RESPECTIVELY PENDING THE FILE
OF HON’BLE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE (CCH1) (ANNEXURES - B AND A TO THE PETITION).
THESE
WRIT
PETITIONS
HAVING
BEEN
HEARD
AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners in all these cases are the Company/Ozone
Urbana Infra Developers Private Limited (‘the Company’ for short)
and its office bearers. The respondents - complainants are primarily
home
buyers
who
have
registered
complaints
before
the
jurisdictional Police.
2. Before embarking upon narration of facts, I deem it
appropriate to notice the protagonists in each of the petitions. Writ
Petition No.31006 of 2025 is filed by the Company. The respondent
No.1 is the Directorate of Enforcement and respondents 2 to 21 are
home buyers; Writ Petition Nos.34702, 27587, 4968 of 2024 are
filed by the Company and its office bearers; Writ Petition No. 25722
of 2022 is filed by the Chairman and Managing Director of the
Company; and Writ Petition No. 20063 of 2022 is filed by the
Company and its office bearers. Respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition
No.34702 of 2024 is Ozone Urbana Buyers Welfare Association;
respondent No.2 in Writ Petition No.27587 of 2024 is one
Sashikanth Gupta, a home buyer; respondent No.2 in Writ Petition
No.4948 of 2024 is one Smt. Bhavanasadhvani, also a home buyer;
respondent in Writ Petition No.25722 of 2022 is the Directorate of
Enforcement and respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No.20063 of
2022 is one Padmanabha.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: The Company - Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Private
Limited is said to be a real estate builder and developer involved in
developing a township called “Ozone Urbana”. The development
Ozone Urbana contemplated 12 projects consisting of variety of
properties – single unit houses, low and mid rise units, high rise
apartments and surrounding infrastructure amenities for which
lands came to be acquired between 2006 and 2007 and the
construction commenced in the year 2012. It is this project that
forms the fulcrum of the lis. The parties to the lis are Vasudevan
Sathamoorthy, Promoter, Chairman and Managing Director of the
Company; Priya Vasudevan – wife of Vasudevan Sathyamoorthy;
Sathyamoorthy Sai Prasad, Director of the Company; Shekar, Chief
Executive Officer and Director of the Company; and Srinivasan
Gopalan and other Directors. The respondents in most of the
petitions are the de facto complainants who are home buyers; in
one of the case is Ozone Urbana Buyers Welfare Association. Apart
from the de facto complainants the respondents are either the
jurisdictional police or the Directorate of Enforcement. Since the
issue commences from a petition filed in the year 2022, I deem it
appropriate to begin the narration yearwise.
4. Facts in Writ Petition No.20063 of 2022:
4.1. The complainant – respondent No.1 in the case at hand
is the proprietor of a company by the name J.J. Earth Movers. A
private complaint is filed invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. against
few of the accused in this and other companion cases who are the
petitioners herein. These accused are the office bearers of the
Company. The allegation is that the accused had approached the
complainant for excavation and civil works and had handed over 12
projects to the complainant between the years 2013 to 2019-2020
for a sum of `4,40,50,000/-. It is the case of the complainant
herein that despite completing the project in time, the accused
made a payment of `2,49,00,000/- only and the remaining is not
paid.
4.2. The accused are said to have dragged the payment on
account of COVID-19 for over two years and therefore, the
complainant was constrained to approach H.A.L. Police Station for
registering the complaint but they refused to register the complaint.
It is then the complainant approaches the learned Magistrate in
P.C.R.No.54725 of 2022 who refers the matter for investigation
under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The subject petition is preferred
calling question the entire proceedings in P.C.R.No.54725 of 2022.
A coordinate Bench of this Court on 21-10-2022 grants an interim
order of stay of investigation and all further proceedings in
P.C.R.No.54725 of 2022. The said interim order is in subsistence
even today.
5. Facts in Writ Petition No.25722 of 2022:
5.1. The complainant - respondent in the case at hand is the
Directorate of Enforcement and the petitioner is the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Company. The Company had undertaken
the construction of residential projects forming part of it’s project
titled Ozone Urbana. Due to delay in completion of the project and
handing
over
possession
of
the
residential
units,
several
homebuyers initiate criminal proceedings against the Company, its
Directors, including its Chairman and Managing Director, and other
officials of the Company.
5.2. One such proceeding arose from an FIR registered in
Crime No.183 of 2021 on 21-12-2021 for the offences punishable
under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120B of the IPC. The allegation
in the said crime is that the complainant and his wife, being
homebuyers, had booked a flat in Ozone Urbana by obtaining a
housing loan, the amount of which was being directly disbursed to
the Company. Though the Company had undertaken to complete
the construction and deliver possession, the Company failed to
deliver possession of the flat. On this score, Crime No.183 of 2021
is registered for the aforementioned offences.
5.3. Another proceeding is instituted by filing a private
complaint under
Section 200
of the
Cr.P.C. by about 128
homebuyers in PCR No.20 of 2022 on 06-04-2022 alleging that the
petitioner and other accused had induced the homebuyers to
purchase units in Ozone Urbana, collected substantial amounts
towards the sale consideration and obtained direct disbursement of
home loans in favour of the Company. Despite the receipt of nearly
95% of the sale consideration, the construction is said to have not
been
completed.
The
accused
persons,
by
delaying
the
construction, are alleged to have held up the hard-earned money of
the complainants and failed to honour their obligations under the
subvention schemes, tripartite agreements, buy-back option, etc.
The funds received for the project Ozone Urbana were also diverted
to other projects and sister concerns of the Company. All these acts
constituted the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 417,
418, 420 and 120-B read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 9
of the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors in Financial
Establishments Act, 2004 (‘KPIDFE Act’ for short). The concerned
Court, by order dated 26-05-2022, referred the complaint for
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., pursuant to which
an FIR in Crime No.143 of 2022 comes to be registered on
17-07-2022 for the aforementioned offences.
5.4. On the predicate offence being registered in Crime
No.183 of 2021 and Crime No.143 of 2022 an Enforcement Case
Information Report (‘ECIR’ for short) in ECIR No.BGZO/70/2022
(‘2022 ECIR’ for short) is registered on 12-12-2022 by the
Directorate of Enforcement. In connection with the said ECIR,
summons under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 (‘Act’ for short) come to be issued to the petitioner on
20-12-2022.
Challenging
the
proceedings,
initiated
by
the
Directorate of Enforcement, arising from the 2022 ECIR and the
summons issued thereafter, the petitioner is before this Court in the
subject petition. A coordinate Bench of this Court on 22-12-2022,
grants an interim order staying the summons issued by the
Directorate of Enforcement, which is subsisting even today.
6. Facts in Writ Petition No.4968 of 2024:
6.1. The de facto complainant – respondent No.2 in the case
at hand is a home buyer named one Smt. Bhavanasadhvani. A
complaint comes to be filed for several offences including cheating
and criminal breach of trust by the complainants who are Senior
Citizens. The said complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.19 of
2024. The allegation in the complaint is that the office bearers of
the Company had entered into a sale agreement with the
complainants for purchase of a flat in their township named “Ozone
Urbana Pavilion”. An amount of `64,52,418/- was said to have been
made in full as demanded by the Company. However, no flat was
handed over within the time stipulated, as the construction was not
completed and required certificates, permissions and licences were
not taken from the authorities. While booking the flat two cheques
were issued for `3,00,000/- and `2,81,275/- by the complainants.
Whenever the complainants made enquiries regarding the status of
construction of the apartments, the complainants were given only
excuses without any proper response. 10 years pass by after the
initial booking for the apartment and full payment of the amount.
Despite this, there was no hope of getting the flat.
6.2. Then the complainants invoked two jurisdictions - one
before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (‘RERA’ for short) and
the other by registering the subject crime for the offences
punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 149 of the IPC. In the case
at hand, the company was not made a party but office bearers
were.
Aggrieved by the registration of crime in Crime No.19 of
2024 the subject petition is preferred. A coordinate Bench of this
Court on 19-02-2024, grants an interim order of stay of further
investigation in Crime No.19 of 2024, which is subsisting even
today.
7. Facts in Writ Petition No.27587 of 2024:
7.1. The de facto complainant – respondent No.2 in the case
at hand is also a home buyer. It is the case of the complainant that
he was induced into purchasing a flat in the project “Ozone Urbana
Avenue”
developed
by
the
Company
through
social
media
advertisements promising quality plots with requisite facilities. The
complainant had approached the Company in the year 2017 and
paid an advance towards the purchase of the flat. A sale agreement
is subsequently entered into in the year 2018, pursuant to which
the complainant obtains a bank loan and pays the entire sale
consideration. It is the case of the complainant that development of
the allotted flat was not completed within the time and later on
enquiry it is learnt that the Company had sold the flat to a third
person despite taking the entire consideration from the hands of the
complainant. The total amount that was taken by the Company
from the complainant in the subject petition for purchase of the flat
is said to be `1,32,10,000/-. The constructed flat is not handed
over to the complainant nor is the amount returned which was
taken way back in the year 2017. The further allegation is that the
license to continue with the development of the project given to the
Company itself was withdrawn. Therefore, the complainant registers
the complaint against the petitioners which becomes a crime in
Crime No.161 of 2024 for the offences punishable under Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC. The subject petition is preferred seeking
quashment of the said crime and an interim order of stay of
investigation in Crime No.161 of 2024 is granted by the coordinate
Bench on 27-02-2025. The same is subsisting even today.
8. Facts in Writ Petition No.34702 of 2024:
8.1. The 2nd respondent who is the complainant, is the
President of Ozone Urbana Buyers Welfare Association. A complaint
comes to be registered on 18-10-2024 alleging that the members of
the complainant’s Association had purchased flats and plots in
Company’s
project
named
Ozone
Urbana
Township
which
commenced in the year 2012 with projection of 1800 units and was
promised completion by 2017. The project remains substantially
incomplete as only 49% of the construction has taken place
to-date. The home buyers are said to have been lured through
subvention schemes. The Directors and officials of the Company are
also said to have induced the complainants through representations
of timely possession and facilitated loans from banks and housing
finance companies through tripartite agreements, sub-vention
schemes and buy-back schemes. It is alleged that, in collusion with
the officials of the Company, the banks released substantial
portions of the loan amounts to the Company, in some cases up to
90%, without adequately verifying the progress of construction, the
title, or the financial position of the project. The Company is also
alleged to have assured the buyers that it would bear the preEMI/EMI payments until handing over the possession. However, the
Company subsequently stopped making such payments, resulting in
the home buyers being compelled to bear the EMI payments.
8.2. The complainant narrates that today there is neither the
home nor the money and the banks have initiated proceedings
under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ for
short) for non-payment of the loan amounts. Several other
allegations including offences under Section 9 of the KPIDFE Act are
also alleged against the petitioner. This forms the fulcrum of the
crime in Crime No.77 of 2024 for the offences punishable under
Sections 406, 409, 420, 120B and 34 of the IPC and Section 9 of
the KPIDFE Act. Owing to the fact that all other proceedings are
stayed, this Court granted an interim order of stay of investigation
in Crime No.77 of 2024 on the score that initiation of proceedings
under Section 9 of the KPIDFE Act cannot be laid against the
accused – petitioners herein since they are developers and not a
financial institution as provided under the KPIDFE Act.
9. Facts in Writ Petition No.31006 of 2025:
9.1. The last of the case filed is Writ Petition No.31006 of
2025. What is sought in the case at hand is quashing of an ECIR
bearing No.ECIR/BGZO/01/2025 (‘2025 ECIR’ for short) registered
by the Directorate of Enforcement in the year 2025 and the
subsequent Provisional Attachment Order (‘PAO’ for short) issued
under Section 5(1) of the Act. The 2025 ECIR is registered by the
Directorate of Enforcement based upon five crimes which are Crime
Nos.183 of 2021; 19 of 2024; 77 of 2024; 161 of 2024 and 271 of
2024. Of these five crimes, Crime Nos.19 of 2024; 77 of 2024 and
161 of 2024 are challenged in the companion petitions i.e.,
W.P.Nos.4968 of 2024; 34702 of 2024 and 27587 of 2024, which
are stayed by this Court. Crime No.183 of 2021 comes to be
quashed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Crl.P.No.245 of
2022 vide order dated 07-03-2024, on account of settlement
between the parties before the RERA and Crime No.271 of 2024
arising out of a private complaint in P.C.R.No.8537 of 2024 is
quashed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.27473 of
2024 vide order dated 23-09-2024 on account of lack of jurisdiction
by the concerned Court to entertain the complaint. However, the
private complaint still remains.
9.2. Subsequently upon registration of the 2025 ECIR the
Directorate
of
Enforcement
conducts
search
and
seizure
proceedings on 01-08-2025 and 02-08-2025. During the search and
seizure proceedings digital devices and books of account are
gathered from the residence and office premises of the Company
and its office bearers. On 04-08-2025 summons are issued under
Section 50 of the Act to the petitioner.
9.3. In the interregnum, several proceedings are instituted
before the Apex Court in SLP(C)No.7649 of 2023. The said case was
filed by homebuyers, who claimed that they were being forced by
banks to pay EMI’s without having obtained possession of flats due
to delay by the builders and developers. Several similar cases come
to be filed before the Apex Court by similarly aggrieved home
buyers against various builders and developers and also against the
banks and housing finance companies, all of which are tagged to
the afore-mentioned case. A case is also said to have been filed by
home buyers of the Company which is tagged to the aforesaid case.
Between 2023 to 2026 several orders and directions are issued by
the Apex Court in the said case leading to registration of an FIR by
the CBI in FIR No.RC2192025E0031 for the offences punishable
under Sections 420 read with 120B of the IPC and Sections 13(2)
read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(‘PC Act’ for short).
9.4. This CBI FIR is then added to the 2025 ECIR by way of
an addendum dated 25-09-2025. The PAO is then issued under
Section 5(1) of the Act by the Directorate of Enforcement on
04-10-2025, attaching the properties belonging to the Company,
Mr. Vasudevan Sathyamoorthy and Mrs.Priya Vasudevan. On the
same date a press release is also issued stating that Rs.423.38
Crores is attached in connection with the investigation against the
Company. Challenging the registration of the 2025 ECIR and the
issuance of the subsequent PAO, the petitioner is before this Court
in the subject petition.
10. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri M.S. Shyam Sundar
for learned Counsel Smt. Vandana P.L. appearing for the petitioners
in all the petitions; the learned Additional Solicitor General Sri K.
Arvind Kamath along with the learned Central Government Counsel
Ms. Anuparna Bordoloi, appearing for the respondent – Directorate
of Enforcement in Writ Petition Nos.25722 of 2022 and 31006 of
2025; learned Special Public Prosecutor – I , Sri B.N. Jagadeesha
appearing for the respondent – State in Writ Petition Nos.20063 of
2022, 4968 of 2024, 27587 of 2024 and 34702 of 2024; learned
Counsel Sri A. Velan appearing for the respondent No.2 in Writ
Petition
Nos.4968
of
and
34702
of
and
respondent Nos.20 and 21 in Writ Petition No.31006 of 2025;
learned Counsel Sri Akash Bantia appearing for respondent Nos.2 to
18 in Writ Petition No.31006 of 2025; learned Counsel Sri Renoyld
D’zouza appearing for the respondent No.19 in Writ Petition
No.31006 of 2025 and learned Counsel Sri S.K. Ravi appearing for
the respondent No.2 in Writ Petition No.27587 of 2024. The
respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No.20063 of 2022 though served,
stands unrepresented.
SUBMISSIONS:
PETITIONERS:
11. The learned Senior Counsel, Sri M.S. Shyam Sundar,
appearing for the petitioners in all the cases, would submit petitionwise as follows:
11.1. Writ Petition No.20063 of 2022:
11.1.1.
The
learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
the
petitioners would submit that the very foundation of the complaint
discloses a civil dispute, as it arises out of the award of work
contracts, execution of contractual works, raising of invoices/bills
and alleged failure to clear the outstanding amounts. He would
submit that the complainant has also instituted O.S.No.128 of 2023
seeking recovery of the very same amounts which form the subject
matter of the private complaint, thereby demonstrating that the
cause of action in the civil and criminal proceedings is identical.
According to the learned Counsel, the allegations, even if taken at
their face value, do not satisfy the essential ingredients of Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC. He would therefore contend that the
continuation of the criminal proceedings, arising out of what is
essentially a contractual and recovery dispute, would amount to an
abuse of the process of law.
11.2. Writ Petition No.25722 of 2022
11.2.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would
submit that the 2022 ECIR and the consequential actions of the
Enforcement Directorate are illegal, as the ECIR is founded on
several complaints arising from the same set of facts, resulting in
multiple proceedings thereby exposing the petitioners to double
jeopardy under the guise of proceedings under the Act. Further, the
Enforcement Directorate has neither properly identified the alleged
“proceeds of crime” nor recorded sufficient material giving rise to
the requisite reasons to believe against the petitioners. On this
score, the learned Senior Counsel would seek for quashing of the
proceedings arising from the 2022 ECIR and the subsequent
summons issued under Section 50 of the Act.
11.3. Writ Petition No.4968 of 2024:
11.3.1. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that the
dispute is purely civil and contractual in nature and that the
essential ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC are absent.
There is no allegation of deception or fraudulent intention from the
inception of the transaction, or of any false representation made by
the petitioners. He would contend that there is neither entrustment
nor dishonest misappropriation to attract Section 406 of the IPC,
and that payment of consideration towards purchase of a flat is part
of a commercial transaction. The proceedings before the RERA and
the execution proceedings, according to him, further demonstrate
the civil character of the dispute. He would submit that Section 15
of the Karnataka Ownership Flats (Regulation of Promotion,
Construction,
Sale,
Management
and
Transfer)
Act,
(‘Karnataka Ownership of Flats Act’ for short), being non-penal in
nature, cannot create criminal liability. There are also no specific
allegations against the Directors, the allegations being vague and
omnibus. Further, the Company has not been arraigned as an
accused in the subject crime without due to which the offence
against the petitioners cannot be permitted to continue.
11.3.2. Mere delay in completion of the project, according to
the learned Senior Counsel, cannot constitute cheating, particularly
when the FIR is lodged after an inordinate and unexplained delay.
He would further contend that vicarious criminal liability cannot be
fastened on the Directors in the absence of a statutory provision
and that the FIR discloses, at the highest, a recovery dispute. The
complainants, having already availed the remedy under the RERA,
cannot pursue parallel criminal proceedings on the same cause of
action. He would accordingly submit that continuation of the
investigation amounts to an abuse of the process of law and that
the case falls within the categories enunciated in STATE OF
HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
warranting quashing of the proceedings.
11.4. Writ Petition No.27587 of 2024 :
11.4.1.
The
learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
the
petitioners would submit that a perusal of the complaint, would
disclose that the dispute is purely civil and contractual in nature.
There is no material to demonstrate dishonest intention at the
inception of the transaction, an essential ingredient of cheating.
Further, the agreement itself contemplates for instances of delay,
cancellation and refund, while the ingredients of criminal breach of
trust are wholly absent. The tripartite loan agreement further
evidences the commercial nature of the transaction. The complaint
proceeds on the erroneous premise that a registered sale deed had
been executed in favour of the complainant, when admittedly none
was executed. Further, the contracting Company has not been
impleaded. The subsequent allegations regarding the apartment
and the delay in lodging the complaint do not alter the essentially
civil character of the dispute. Therefore, on this score the learned
Senior Counsel would submit that continuation of the criminal
proceedings against the petitioner would amount to nothing but an
abuse of the process of law.
11.5. Writ Petition No.34702 of 2022:
11.5.1
The
learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
the
petitioners would submit that the present proceedings are an
attempt to give a criminal colour to what is essentially a civil,
contractual and insolvency-related dispute. He would submit that,
once the police failed to act, the complainants had the remedy of
pursuing the private complaint before the learned Magistrate and
could not, on the very same set of facts, institute another complaint
resulting in the registration of the impugned crime. Private
Complaint in PCR No.20 of 2022 had already been filed on the same
facts, pursuant to which Crime No.143 of 2022 came to be
registered and was subsequently quashed by a coordinate Bench of
this Court in W.P.No.14484 of 2022 for failure to file an affidavit in
compliance with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
PRIYANKA SRIVASTAVA & ANR. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS.1,
while the private complaint itself continued to remain pending.
Instead of pursuing the said private complaint, the complainants
have
instituted
allegations.
(2015) 6 SCC 287
the
present
proceedings
on
the
very
same
11.5.2. He would further contend that invocation of the
KPIDFE Act is wholly without jurisdiction, as home buyers do not fall
within the ambit of “depositors” or “investors” under the KPIDFE
Act. The complainants having projected themselves as purchasers
before the RERA and as financial creditors before the National
Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’ for short), cannot, for the very same
transaction, claim the status of depositors under the KPIDFE Act.
Such mutually inconsistent stands, according to the learned Senior
Counsel, render the invocation of the KPIDFE Act artificial and
unsustainable.
He
would
further
submit
that,
with
the
commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process
(‘CIRP’ for short), the complainants are required to pursue their
claims within the insolvency framework and, in view of Section 238
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’ for short) the
provisions of the IBC have overriding effect over inconsistent laws.
The present criminal proceedings, founded upon the very same
underlying claims and instituted in the backdrop of the ongoing
insolvency proceedings, are therefore nothing but an attempt to
exert
pressure
and
secure
leverage
outside
the
insolvency
mechanism. He would accordingly submit that, particularly when
the terms of settlement have also been fulfilled, continuation of the
criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of
law.
11.6. Writ Petition Nos. 31006 of 2025
11.6.1. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would
contend
that
the
registration
of
the
ECIR
and
the
consequential proceedings under the Act are an attempt to
circumvent the stay granted by this Court in respect of the 2022
ECIR, which was registered without there being no change in
circumstances. The subsequent reliance on the CBI FIR which was
added to the 2025 ECIR through an addendum is impermissible, as
the same was not in existence when the 2025 ECIR was registered
and concerns distinct allegations. The amounts received from
homebuyers are ordinary business transactions and cannot be
treated as proceeds of crime merely on account of delay or noncompletion
erroneously
of
projects.
The
characterized
Directorate
legitimate
of
Enforcement
transactions,
has
including
repayment of loans, payments to group entities, vendors and
lenders, as diversion, layering and siphoning. The reasons to
believe provided in the PAO fail to establish any nexus between the
funds received from homebuyers and the alleged scheduled offence
for the funds to be characterized as proceeds of crime.
11.6.2. It is further submitted that substantial amounts were
utilized towards construction and pre-EMIs which material has been
ignored by the Directorate of Enforcement. The attachment of the
land parcels has no nexus with the alleged proceeds of crime,
particularly as the lands were acquired prior to the development of
the projects. The attachment of unsold inventory is prejudicial to
the homebuyers themselves. Repayments to group entities and
promoters of the Company were towards genuine inter-corporate
loans and prior advances are incorrectly characterized as layering
and siphoning. The findings in the PAO proceed on an erroneous
appreciation
of
legitimate
business
transactions
and
without
establishing the requisite nexus with the alleged proceeds of crime.
On this score, the learned Senior Counsel would contend that the
2025 ECIR and the subsequent PAO deserve to be quashed.
RESPONDENTS:
HOME BUYERS:
12. Per contra, the learned counsel Sri A. Velan appearing for
the home buyers/ de facto complainants i.e., respondent No.2 in
Writ Petition Nos.4968 of 2024 and 34702 of 2024 and for the
respondent No.20 and 21 in Writ Petition No.31006 of 2024, would
vehemently refute the submissions in each of the cases contending
as follows:
12.1. The petitioner – Company and it’s directors are accused
of large scale diversion and misappropriation of funds belonging to
the home buyers. Multiple FIR’s are filed against hem for the
offences of cheating, breach of trust and fraud on various
allegations including the double sale of residential units, creation of
fictitious loan agreements and diversion of money through escrow
accounts to related or offshore entities. The amounts involved
exceed Rs.3,300 Crores and constitutes the “proceeds of crime”
under the Act, leading to the Directorate of Enforcement initiating
investigation under the Act. The subject petition has filed to
paralyze
the
proceedings
initiated
by
the
Directorate
of
Enforcement and interference at such a nascent sage would
frustrate the object of the Act and all the petitioners to tamper with
the evidence and manipulate accounts.
12.2. The allegations against the petitioners have wide public
interest. The transactions involve systematic laundering of funds
collected from home buyers, concealment of illegal gains and
layering of money through shell entities. The Apex Court has also
recognized the criminal element in similar builder – bank nexus
matters in SLP(C)No.7649 of 2023.
12.3. It is his further submission that no amounts have been
recovered pursuant to the order of the RERA or the settlements
entered into as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners, and consequently, the homebuyers have not received
any payment. The terms of the settlements have also not been
fulfilled.
12.4. The petitioners have instead after obtaining a stay in
W.P. No. 14484 of 2022 arising from a crime filed by one of the
home buyers, relied upon the same to secure similar orders in the
other petitions before this Court.
13. The learned counsels Sri Akash Bantia, Sri Renoyld
D’Souza and Sri S.K. Ravi also appearing for the home buyers/de
facto complainants i.e., respondent Nos.2 to 18 and respondent
No.19 in Writ Petition No.31006 of 2025 and respondent No.2 in
Writ Petition No.27587 of 2024 respectively, would toe the lines of
the learned Counsel Sri A. Velan in submitting that the subject
petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners
have been committed fraud upon the home buyers and have lured
them into investing in the project but have not delivered possession
of the flats or apartments till date.
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT:
14. The learned Additional Solicitor General, Sri K. Arvind
Kamath appearing for the Directorate of Enforcement in Writ
Petition Nos.25722 of 2022 and 31006 of 2025 would submit as
follows:
14.1. The registration of an ECIR can be founded on more
than one FIR. The 2025 ECIR is distinct from the earlier 2022 ECIR,
as the predicate offences, transactions, entities and financial flows
forming their respective bases are different. The existence of a
single live FIR alleging the commission of scheduled offences is
sufficient for initiation of proceedings under the Act. An ECIR being
an internal document of the Directorate of Enforcement cannot be
quashed like an FIR.
14.2. The pendency, stay or quashing of proceedings relating
to a predicate offence does not, by itself, preclude investigation
under
the
Act,
particularly
where
fresh
material
disclosing
laundering of proceeds of crime has come to light. Further, the CBI,
pursuant to the directions of the Apex Court, has registered has
registered an FIR against the petitioner - Company and others for
offences including cheating, which forms part of the material being
investigated under the Act.
14.3. The PAO has been issued on the basis of sufficient
material and records sufficient reasons to believe to indicate that
the properties represent proceeds of crime or equivalent value
thereof and that there is a likelihood of dissipation of the assets.
The allegations in the PAO include diversion and siphoning of funds
received
from
homebuyers
to
other
entities
without
any
corresponding purpose connected with construction of the flats. The
PAO is only a provisional and protective measure, and the validity
of the attachment is required to be examined by the Adjudicating
Authority under Section 8 of the Act, with a further statutory
remedy before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of the Act.
14.4. The proceedings have been initiated and the provisional
attachment has been effected strictly in exercise of the statutory
powers under the Act and in view of the efficacious alternative
remedies available, this Court at the present stage ought not to
interfere. On this score the learned Additional Solicitor General
would seek for dismissal of the subject petitions.
STATE:
15.
The
learned
State
Public
Prosecutor
-
I,
Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, appearing for the respondent - State in Writ
Petition Nos.20063 of 2022; 4986 of 2024; 27587 of 2024 and
34702 of 2024, would submit that the
investigation in all
the crimes is still at a nascent stage and that a prima facie case is
made out against the petitioners from a reading of the complaints
in all the cases. Therefore, he would submit that the investigation
ought not to be throttled at this stage and must be permitted to
continue.
CONSIDERATION
16. I have bestowed my anxious consideration upon the
submissions advanced by the respective learned counsel and have
meticulously perused the material obtaining on record.
17. The issue that now falls for consideration is
whether
the
crimes
registered
against
the
petitioners
deserve to be obliterated and, as a consequence thereof,
whether the ECIR’s founded thereon and the provisional
attachment orders that have followed suit would also
warrant being quashed.
18. Since the facts, allegations and proceedings have been
narrated petition-wise, it would be both apposite and convenient
that the consideration of the challenge also travels along the same
path. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to consider the petitions in
seriatim, on the facts peculiar to each, against the backdrop of the
law governing the field.
19. Writ Petition No.20063 of 2022:
19.1. The subject petition is not between the home buyer and
the developer. It is between the proprietor of a company viz., J.J.
Earth Movers and Ozone Urbana. The issue is not with regard to
siphoning of funds of a home buyer or non-completion of projects
or
selling
away
apartments
which
were
subject
matter
of
agreements with third parties. The 2nd respondent/complainant and
the Company had entered into a contract with regard to excavation
and other civil works in 12 projects with the complainant between
the years 2013 to 2020. The bills that were submitted by the
complainant totally amounted to `4,40,50,000/-. It is the case of
the complainant that despite repeated requests being made by the
complainant seeking payment, the total amount is not paid. Nonpayment of the amount towards contract or the work that is said to
have been completed is projected to become a crime by registering
a private complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. before the
learned Magistrate. In the light of the issue springing from the
complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The
complaint reads as follows:
"....
....
....
5.
The complainant submits that, in the year 2013 to
2019-20 the accused has given 12 projects to the
complainant for a sum of Rs. 4,04,50,000/- (Rupees
Four Crores, Four Lakhs Fifty Thousand Only), the
complainant has completed the said project works
in time, the accused has made the payment of Rs.
2,49,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores Forty Nine Lakhs
Only), and the balance amount of Rs. 1,32,00,000/(Rupees One Crore Thirty Two Lakhs Only) the
accused assured that, he will pay shorty.
6.
The complainant submits that, after several request made
by the complainant, the accused has drag on the dates by
saying one or the other pretext for the payment of the
balance amount, and also informed that due to the Covid19 effect, he has suffered a huge loss in business, and he
seeks time with the complainant, the complainant has
agreed for the same, thereafter 2 years the accused was
not
contacted
the
complainant,
thereafter
the
complainant visited the accused office, at that time the
accused No. 2 & 3 has requested the complainant that,
they will pay the said amount within 5 months.
7.
The complainant submits that, after completion of 5
months, the accused persons have not paid the said
balance amount, on 05-05-2022 the complainant went to
the accused office, at that time the accused person along
with other person have started to abuse the complainant
and threatened him that, kidnap him and kill him, if again
he ask the balance amount, with great difficult the
complainant has escaped, with the clutches of the
accused. On the treat of the accused persons, the
complainant has not lodged any complaint and waited till
20-05-2022. But the accused persons has failed to do the
balance amount to the complainant.
8.
The complainant submits that, on 20-05-2022 before the
HAL police station, but the police officials have taken his
complaint, and not issued any acknowledgment, and also
not taken any action against the accused person. The
copy of the complaint is herewith produce for the kind
perusal of this Hon'ble Court.
9.
The complainant submits that, thereafter on 07-06-2022
the complainant has lodged the complaint before the
Commissioner of Police, Infantry Road Bangalore. The
copy of the complaint and acknowledgment is herewith
produce for the kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. So far
no action has been taken against him. Hence there is no
alternative the complainant is hereby approaching this
Hon'ble Court.
10.
The complainant submits that, after completion of the
entire work made by the complainant, the accused
persons have intentionally not paid the full amount, they
had paid partial amount, and balance amount they have
assured that, they will pay shortly, but till today with an
intention to cheat the complainant they have not paid the
said balance amount in order to his wrongful gain.
11.
The complainant submits that, the accused persons with
an common intention to cheat the complainant, they have
committed the offence punishable under section 420,
341, 323, 504, 506 R/w 34 of IPC.
12.
The complainant submits that, the accused persons have
local persons and highly influenced persons. Hence the
police have colluded with accused persons and hence the
complainant has no other alternative, hence approaching
this Hon'ble Court.
13.
The complainant submits that, the accused persons are
having common intention for cheat the complainant and
wrongful gain go grab the money illegally. Hence the
accused is committed an offence punishable under section
420, 341, 504, 506 R/w 34 of IPC.
14.
The complainant submits that, all the above said incidents
took place on the complainant residence in the
jurisdiction of the HAL police station.
15.
The complainant submits that, this Hon'ble court got
jurisdiction to try this matter."
(Emphasis added)
A mere perusal of the complaint would render it unmistakably clear
that the predominant, if not the solitary, object behind setting the
criminal law into motion is recovery of money. The complaint is
sought to be given the colour and complexion of criminality by
introducing an allegation that the petitioners threatened the
complainant that, if he were to once again demand repayment, he
would have to face consequences. This embellishment, however,
cannot obscure what lies at the heart of the complaint. Paragraph 5
thereof makes the purpose conspicuous—it is the recovery of the
alleged balance amount of `1,32,00,000/- that is sought to be
achieved through the coercive machinery of criminal law.
19.2. It is too well settled to warrant elaborate reiteration
that criminal law cannot be converted into an engine for
recovery of money. A monetary claim, arising out of a transaction
otherwise bearing the trappings of a contractual or civil dispute,
cannot be dressed in the robes of a crime merely by employing
expressions of threat, cheating or intimidation. The substance of
the allegations, and not the linguistic embellishments with which
the complaint is adorned, must guide the Court in discerning its
true character.
19.3.
The
jurisprudential
landscape
is
replete
with
pronouncements of the Apex Court cautioning against precisely
such an exercise. The criminal justice system cannot be permitted
to become a debt-collection mechanism, nor can the threat of
investigation, arrest and prosecution be employed as leverage to
compel payment of a disputed sum. Where the substratum of the
complaint unmistakably reveals a claim for recovery of money
emanating
from
a
contractual
transaction,
a
sprinkling
of
allegations intended to lend it a criminal hue would not, by itself,
transform a civil dispute into a criminal offence. What is civil in its
genesis cannot be permitted to masquerade as criminal
merely because criminal process promises greater coercive
efficacy in securing repayment.
19.4. The Apex Court in the case of ANUKUL SINGH v. STATE
OF UTTAR PRADESH2, observes as follows:
"....
....
....
13. The record reveals that within a short span, as many
as eight FIRs were registered against the appellant. The
gravamen of the allegations in the present FIR is that
Respondent No. 2/complainant approached the appellant for a
loan of Rs. 2,00,000/-, but was allegedly advanced only Rs.
1,40,000/-. It is further alleged that, in connection with the said
transaction, an agreement to sell dated 09.11.1998 was
executed in respect of a plot owned by the complainant, and
that the appellant procured three cheques from Respondent No.
2, which, upon presentation, were dishonoured for insufficiency
of funds. Even if accepted in entirety, these allegations disclose,
at best, a civil dispute and do not prima facie constitute the
essential ingredients of the criminal offences alleged.
....
....
....
16. Despite this background, the police proceeded to file
a charge sheet dated 16.04.2003 against the appellant for
offences under sections 420, 467, and 468 IPC. Even if the
allegations are assumed to be true, they unmistakably arise out
of a commercial/contractual transaction relating to loan and
repayment, which has been given a criminal colour. The case
thus falls squarely within categories (1) and (7) of Bhajan Lal,
namely, where the allegations do not disclose the commission of
an offence, and where the proceedings are maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive. Continuation of such prosecution would
amount to an abuse of process of law and consequently,
warrant quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions,
deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into
criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC
India Ltd.17, it was held that criminal law cannot be used
as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual
matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of
process. The following paragraphs from the decision are
apposite:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2060
“9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the
allegations made in the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out
the case alleged against the accused. For
this purpose, the complaint has to be
examined as a whole, but without
examining the merits of the allegations.
Neither
a
detailed
inquiry
nor
a
meticulous analysis of the material nor
an assessment of the reliability or
genuineness of the allegations in the
complaint, is warranted while examining
prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where
it is a clear abuse of the process of the
court, as when the criminal proceeding is
found to have been initiated with
malafides/malice
for
wreaking
vengeance or to cause harm, or where
the allegations are absurd and inherently
improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be
used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate
prosecution. The power should be used
sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence
alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is
laid in the complaint, merely on the ground
that a few ingredients have not been stated in
detail, the proceedings should not be
quashed. Quashing of the complaint is
warranted only where the complaint is so
bereft of even the basic facts which are
absolutely necessary for making out the
offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely
a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence;
or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence.
A commercial transaction or a contractual
dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of
action for seeking remedy in civil law, may
also involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceedings are different
from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that
the complaint relates to a commercial
transaction or breach of contract, for which a
civil remedy is available or has been availed,
is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal
proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a
criminal offence or not.
10. While on this issue, it is necessary to
take notice of a growing tendency in business
circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal
cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent
impression that civil law remedies are time
consuming and do not adequately protect the
interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is
seen in several family disputes also, leading to
irretrievable break down of marriages/families.
There is also an impression that if a person could
somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,
there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any
effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do
not involve any criminal offence, by applying
pressure though criminal prosecution should be
deprecated and discouraged.”
18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of
Uttaranchal18, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must
not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private
vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19, this Court
again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property
disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to
exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process.
19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @
Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh20, this Court
disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as
a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money
recovery
cannot
be
enforced
through
criminal
prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The
Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such
matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The
following paragraphs are relevant in this context:
“9. What we have been able to understand is that
there is an oral agreement between the parties. The
Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some money
in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be
that the appellant - herein owes a particular amount to
be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However, the question
is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be
said to have been committed by the appellant.
10. How many times the High Courts are to
be reminded that to constitute an offence of
cheating, there has to be something more than
prima facie on record to indicate that the intention
of the accused was to cheat the complainant right
from the inception. The plain reading of the FIR
does not disclose any element of criminality.
11. The entire case is squarely covered by a
recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of
“Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar
Pradesh”, (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision,
the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and
criminal breach of trust respectively has been
exhaustively explained. It appears that this very
decision was relied upon by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner before the High Court.
However, instead of looking into the matter on its
own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the
petitioner to go for mediation and that too by
making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th
respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to
understand why the High Court should undertake
such exercise. The High Court may either allow the
petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may
reject the petition saying that no case for
quashing is made out. Why should the High Court
make an attempt to help the complainant to
recover the amount due and payable by the
accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial
Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that
may be filed for recovery of money or in any other
proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996
or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016.
12. Why the High Court was not able to
understand that the entire dispute between the
parties is of a civil nature.
13. We also enquired with the learned counsel
appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client
has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other
proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that
no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this
date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a
civil dispute between the parties by filing a First
Information Report and seeking the help of the Police.
This amounts to abuse of the process of law.
14. We could have said many things but we
refrain from observing anything further. If the
Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular
amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other
appropriate remedy available to him in law. He
cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal
proceedings.
15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in
which the High Court has passed the impugned
order. The High Court first directed the appellant
to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4
and thereafter directed him to appear before the
Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose
of settlement. That's not what is expected of a
High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous
application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any
other criminal proceedings. What is expected of
the High Court is to look into the averments and
the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the
other material on record, if any. The High Court
seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles
as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the
“State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335”
20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the
present case, it is manifest that the dispute - concerning
repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in
execution of documents - is purely civil in character. The
essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima
facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick
succession, particularly after the appellant had already
initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of
mala fides."
19.5.
Subsequently,
PALINISWAMY
the
VEERARAJA v.
Apex
Court
STATE
in
OF
the
case
KARNATAKA3,
observes as follows:
"...
....
....
12. The appellants and the respondents are both business
owners. They allegedly entered into an agreement where one
party would make monetary investment and the other would
supply textile goods. One party says that the relationship
continued without any incident between 1995 and 2000 and it is
only thereafter that disputes arose regarding the nature of
arrangement particularly an attempt to make the agreement
between the parties exclusive which the appellants were not in
favour of, did the dispute arise. On the other hand, the other
party says that they had entered into an agreement and the
very terms of the initial agreement itself were not complied with
i.e., sharing of profits in return of capital investment in so far as
the trading of textiles in USA and Canada is concerned. Either
way, it is plain as day that the dispute between the
parties concerns the business relationship or in other
words concerning whether or not a joint venture stood
established between them and if yes, the distribution of
profits arising therefrom. That clearly is in the nature of
civil dispute.
2026 SCC OnLine SC 940
of
13. When it comes to alleged forgery of documents, why
is it that the allegation came only in the Court in Bangalore and
the suit filed before the District Court Illionis, does not make
any mention of the same. After all it is before that Court that
the alleged forged documents were filed. Still further, the report
of the handwriting expert on which reliance is placed to prove
that the documents were forged is dated prior to the judgment
of the District Court i.e., 1st September 2009 and the judgment
was entered on 2nd February 2004. It only stands to reason
that if such hard, conclusive evidence was in the possession of
the complainant, the same could have been furnished to the
Court and if accepted, could have led to further punitive
damages being awarded in his favour. This obviously was not
done. It be clarified here itself that the sanctity of the report of
the handwriting expert has not been examined by us and so we
do not comment thereupon. It is only the timing or the
sequence of events that renders the reliance placed thereon,
suspect, in our considered view.
14. It is also a matter of record that for the reasons as
recorded in the judgment, the civil suit of the complainant has
also been dismissed. Well, we do not comment on the merits of
that case and the complainant is obviously free to take recourse
to the law as he may be advised if not already taken.
15. In the cumulative view of circumstances
prevailing in this case, criminal action against the
appellants would be contrary to the authority of law and
therefore an abuse of process of law for the reason that
the third round of further investigation as a consequence
of which the chargesheet was filed, did not have the
concerned Magistrate's approval. That apart, in view of
ground (3) mentioned in Para 102 of State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, the FIR and subsequent proceedings which is
the subject matter of the present appeal as mentioned in
Para-1 are quashed and set aside.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In the light of the law declared by the Apex Court in the
afore-quoted judgments, when the facts obtaining in the
case at hand are placed on that touchstone, the conclusion
becomes inescapable. The complaint instituted against these
petitioners, being unmistakably animated by the object of
recovery of money, cannot be permitted to travel through
the
corridors
of
criminal
investigation
and
thereafter
culminate in a criminal trial. To permit such proceedings to
continue would be to lend the coercive arm of criminal law
to what is, in substance, a monetary claim and thereby
permit the criminal process to be employed as an instrument
of recovery. For the aforesaid reasons, permitting further
proceedings in P.C.R.No.54725 of 2022 would amount to an
abuse of the process of law. The proceedings, therefore,
deserve to be, and are, obliterated.
20. Writ Petition No.25722 of 2022:
20.1. In this petition what is challenged is the proceedings
arising from an ECIR registered on 12-12-2022 and the summons
issued under Section 50 of the Act subsequently. Since the
predicate offences forming part of the 2022 ECIR arise from two
crimes i.e. Crime No.183 of 2021 and Crime No.143 of 2022 the
allegations in the said two crimes are required to be noticed. The
gist of the allegations contained in Crime No.183 of 2021 read as
follows:
"
ಾ ದು ಾರ ಾದ
ೕ
ೕ ತ ಶ ಾ ಎಂಬುವವರು ಾ ೆ ೆ ಾಜ ಾ ದೂರನು! "ೕ#ದು$ ಸದ&
ದೂ&ನ'( )ಾನು *ೕಲ,ಂಡ ./ಾಸದ'( 0ಾಸ0ಾ ದು$, ಓ3ೋ4 ಅಬ 4, ಇ7ಾ8 9ೆ0ೆಲಪ;< ,
=ೆ>.'. ಕಂಪ"ಯ
ೆಪ BೆಂCೇDE ರವರು ನಮGನು! ಸಂಪH I ಓ3ೋ4 ಕ9ೆJಂದ ಉತLಮ
ಗುಣಮಟPದ ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ಗಳನು! " ಾ ಣ
ತಗಲುವ ಹಣವನು! 10 : 80 : 10 ಪ
ಾಡುSLದು$, ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂಟTಳನು! ಖ&ೕVಸುವW ಾದ ೆ
ಾಣದ'( =ಾವSಸಬಹು ೆಂದು ನಂ]Iದು$, ಇದ&ಂದ 7ಾನು
ಮತುL ನನ! ಪS! ಆ_ಾಂ` ಶಮ ರವರು Bೇ& ಸದ& ಓ3ೋನ ಕಂಪ"ಯ =ಾ 3ೆaQ4 Aqua 2 ರ'(, _ೆ202 ನಂಬ&ನ 3 BHK ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂಟನು! ಬುa
V7ಾಂಕ: 14/08/2015 ರಂದು ಅ *ಂQ
ಾ# ರೂ 858855/-ರೂ=ಾJಗಳನು! =ಾವSI
ಾ#_ೊಂ#ರು)ೆL0ೆ. ನಂತರ ಕಂಪ"ಯ Iಇಒ
ೋ=ಾಲನ ರವರು ನಮ ೆ HDFC 'sCೆt ನ
ೆಪ BೆಂCೇDE
ೕ"0ಾಸ
ಾಜ ಾ3ೇಶu& ಎಂಬುವರನು!
ಪ&ಚJI HDFC 'sCೆt "ಂದ Bಾಲವನು! ಪ9ೆಯುವಂ)ೆ SwIದು$ ಅವರಂ)ೆ 7ಾವW HDFC
'sCೆt "ಂದ ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ಖ&ೕVಸಲು 68,2000/- Bಾಲ_ಾ,
7ಾವW yಾzಂa ಓ3ೋನ
ಕಂಪ"ಯವರು ಮೂರು ಜನ Bೇ& (Cೆ>=ಾCೇ Q) ಅ *ಂQ ಅನು!
ಾ#_ೊಂ#ರು)ೆLೕ0ೆ.
ಅ *ಂQ ಪ _ಾರ ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ಕ9ೆವವ&ಗೂ Bಾಲದ ಕಂತನು! (ಇಎಂಐ) ಓ3ೋನ ಕಂಪ"ಯವ ೆ
=ಾವSಸುವW ಾ ಒ ;ರು)ಾL ೆ. ಅ *ಂQ ಪ _ಾರ ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ನು! #Bೆಂಬ~ 2017 ರ'( ಮು I
"ೕಡyೇHತುL, ಆದ ೆ ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ಗಳ€ ಇನೂ! " ಾ ಣ ಹಂತದ'(ದು$ _ೇವಲ 60% _ಾಮ ಾ&ಯು
ಮು VರುತL ೆ, Bಾಲದ ಶರತುL, ಪ _ಾರ HDFC ರವರು ಹಂತ ಹಂತ0ಾ ಹಣವನು! ]ಡುಗ9ೆ
ಾಡ ೇ
90% ಹಣವನು! ಅಂದ ೆ ರೂ 72,14,855/- ರೂ. ಗಳನು! HDFC ನವರು ನಮ ೆ Swಯದ ಾ ೆ ಓ3ೋ4
9ೆವಲಪ;<
ಕಂಪ"ಯವ& ೆ ]ಡುಗ9ೆ
ಾ#ರು)ಾL ೆ.
ಅ *ಂQ ಪ _ಾರ ಜೂ4-2019 ರವ ೆ ೆ
ೕsಯಂ ಅನು! =ಾವSIದು$ ನಂತರ #Bೆಂಬ~-2019 ರ'(, ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ನು! ಮು I ನಮ ೆ
"ೕಡುವW ಾ
ನಂತರ ಇ.ಎಂ.ಐ ಅನು! ನಮ ೆ =ಾವSಸುವಂ)ೆ ಮುಂದುವ ೆಸುವಂ)ೆ ಸೂƒIರು)ಾL ೆ.
2019ರಲೂ( ಕೂಡ ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂQ ನು! "ೕಡದ _ಾರಣ HDFC ನ'( .„ಾ&I ಾಗ ನಮG Bಾಲದ
ಸಂಪ…ಣ ಹಣವನು! ಓ3ೋ4 ಕಂಪ" ೆ =ಾವSIರುವW ಾ
SwI ನಮGನು! HDFC "ಂದ ೊರ ೆ
ಕಳ€ Iರು)ಾL ೆ, 2017 &ಂದ 2021 ರವ ೆ ೆ _ಾಮ ಾ&ಗಳನು! ಪ…ಣ
ಾ#ರುವWದು Swದು ಓ3ೋ4 ಕಂಪ" ೆ )ೆರw .„ಾ&I ಾಗ
ಾಡ ೆ ನಮ ೆ
ೕಸ
ಾರೂ ಕೂಡ ನಮ ೆ ಸ& ಾ
ಸ;ಂVಸ ೇ I. ಇ.ಓ ರವರನು! yೇD
ದೂರು "ೕ# ಾಗ ಜು†ೈ 2020
ಾಡಲು ೇw ೊರ ೆ ಕಳ€ Iರು)ಾL ೆ, ನಂತರ 7ಾನು ೇ ಾ ೆ
ೊಳ ೆ _ಾಮ ಾ&ಯನು! ಮು I_ೊಡುವW ಾ
ಂಪ#ಯಲು SwIದು$, ನಂ]_ೆJಂದ 7ಾವW ದೂರನು!
ಾಗು ದೂರನು!
ಪ9ೆದು_ೊಂ#ರು)ೆLೕ0ೆ. ಅ'(ಯವ ೆಗೂ
ಓ3ೋ4 ಕಂಪ"ಯವರು ನಮ ೆ 18,19,185/- ರೂಗಳ _ೆ #Q 7ೋQ ನು! "ೕ#ರು)ಾL ೆ. ಆ_ೊPೕಬ~
2021 ರ'(, 7ಾವW ಸದ& ಅ=ಾಟ *ಂDನ _ಾಮ ಾ&ಯನು! 7ೋಡಲು
ನಮGನು!
ೋ ಾಗ Bೆಕೂz&Dರವರು
ೊರ ಾHರು)ಾL ೆ. ಆಗ ಕಂಪ"ಯನವರನು! ಸಂಪH ಸಲು ಪ ಯS!I ಾಗ
ಾರೂ ಕೂಡ
ನಮ ೆ ಸ;ಂVIರುವWVಲ(, ಕಂಪ"ಯವರು ಾ ಹಕರ ಹಣವನು! yೇ ೆ ಕ9ೆ ೆ ಬಳI _ೆಲಸವನು! ಅಪ…ಣ
ಾ#ರು)ಾL ೆ. ನಮ ೆ ನಂ]_ೆ ೊ ೕಹ
ಾ# ವಂಚ7ೆ
ೋ=ಾಲ4, 9ೈ ೆಕPರಗ/ಾದ 0ಾಸು ೇವ4 ಸತzಮೂS
ೕಸ
ಾ#ರುವ ಕಂಪ" I.ಇ.ಓ
ೕ"0ಾಸ
ಾ 0ಾಸು ೇವ4, ಾˆೕE ಬಂ9ಾ&,,
IವWBಾಗ~ 7ೇsಚ4 ದಬ ಕುಲ ವಂ , ಎ<.yಾಸ,ರ4, ೆ ೕCಾ
ಾಗೂ
ೆ.#.ಎ‰.I 'sCೆt
ಅŠ_ಾ&ಗಳ .ರುದ‹ ಸೂಕL _ಾನೂನು ಕ ಮ ಜರು ಸyೇ_ೆಂದು "ೕ#ದ ದೂರು ಇ)ಾzV."
Crime No.183 of 2021 is registered under Section 403, 406, 420
and 120B of the IPC for the offences alleging that the complainants
who are homebuyers who booked a flat in a project of the Company
by paying the concerned amounts to the Company after obtaining a
house loan were not delivered possession of the flat. The said crime
is subsequently, challenged before this Court in Crl.P.245 of 2022
which comes to be quashed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court
vide order dated 07-03-2024 which reads as follows:
"This petition is filed by the petitioner accused Nos.1 and
2 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR in Crime
No.183/2021 registered by the Kodigehalli Police station for the
offences punishable under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120B of
IPC, pending on the file of IV Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru.
2. Heard the arguments of learned counsel for the
petitioners, learned HCGP for the State and learned counsel for
respondent No.2.
3. During the pendency of the petition learned
counsel for the petitioners and respondent No.2 submits
the matter has been settled between the petitioners and
respondent No.2 before the Real Estate Regulatory
Authority (RERA), and he has no objection for quashing
the criminal proceedings
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits the
accused Nos.1 and 2 are the main accused who is MD and
other two persons are only employees and there is no
objections for the respondent to quash the entire FIR in
view of the settlement between the parties before the
RERA. Hence, conducting investigation against the
petitioner is nothing but abuse of process of law in view
of the settlement between the parties.
5. In view of joint compromise between the parties
and in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another
reported in 2012 CRI.L.J.4934, the criminal proceedings
requires to be quashed.
6. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed.
7. The proceedings against petitioners/accused Nos.1 and
2 in Crime No.183/2021 registered by the Kodigehalli Police
station for the offences punishable under Sections 403, 406,
420 and 120B of IPC, pending on the file of IV Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, is hereby quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)
Crime No.183 of 2021 is quashed in Crl.P.245 of 2022 on account of
settlement between the parties before the RERA.
20.2. Now Crime No.143 of 2022 is required to be noticed
which is registered on account of an order of reference by the
concerned Court under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. arising from a
private complaint filed under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. in
P.C.R.No.20 of 2022 by 128 home buyers who have purchased
apartments in the project of the Company. Therefore, it becomes
apposite to notice the allegations in the private complaint which is
filed alleging the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 417,
418, 420, 120B read with Section 34 of IPC and Section 9 of
KPIDFE Act. The complaint reads as follows:
"....
....
....
3. The present complaint is being filed against the
Accused No. 1 to 7 and various other accused persons
being all officials of Accused No. 1, who are/were
responsible for the day-to-day management of the affairs
of the Company, and also against various Banks, Housing
Finance Companies, namely, Accused No. 8 to 11 and
their officials and various other unknown accused
persons involved in the conspiracy for commission of
offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 417, 418,
420 and 120B r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 and Section 9 of the Karnataka Protection of
Interest of Depositors Act, 2004.
4.
The Accused No. 2 to 7 are the Directors of
the aforementioned Company (Accused No.1) and have
deliberately committed the aforementioned offences on
behalf of the Company. The other Accused persons being
the channel
partners,
the
Banks/housing
finance
companies, namely, (1) Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd
(2) Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd (3)
Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Limited and (4) Bank
of Baroda, arrayed as accused Nos.8-11 above, and
various bank officials who have connived with Accused
Nos. 1-7 and have acted under their directions jointly for
illegal gains with dishonesty and have caused huge
financial loss to the Complainants. The total amount of
loss caused to the Complainants jointly is approximately
around Rs. 80,00,00,000/-(Rupees Eighty Crore only).
5. All the Accused, conspired together, portrayed a
very rosy and lucrative picture and fraudulently promoted
a real estate project being developed and constructed by
Accused No. 1 in 2014 under the name of 'Ozone Urbana'
situated at Kannamangala Village and Poojanahalli
Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural
District, Karnataka.
6. All the aforesaid Accused persons, with a
dishonest intention to cheat the Complainants, lured and
induced
the
Complainants
to
purchase
units/flats/apartments in the said real estate project by
offering various predefined schemes, like Subvention
Scheme; Buy-Back Scheme, 2X Scheme etc. jointly
launched by Accused Nos. 1-7 along with Accused No. 8
to 11. Based on the said schemes which were projected
as being most profitable and lucrative and being induced
by the representations made by the Accused, the
innocent Complainants booked the units with the
Company in its real estate project by paying almost 95%
of the initial sale consideration amount within 30 - 45
days from the date of signing of the Builder Buyers
Agreement.
7. Accused Nos. 1-7 represented that they are a
leading market player in the real estate industry and are
well known for providing timely possession of the
projects with good quality construction materials,
satisfied clients, etc. Accused Nos. 1-7 assured and
represented
to
all
homebuyers
including
the
Complainants herein that they have tie-ups with various
credible Banks and Housing Finance Companies (Accused
Nos. 8-11) who are willing to grant home loans to
homebuyers
by
taking
in
mortgage
the
flats/units/apartments under purchase. Thereafter, all
the Accused Nos. 1-11 acting jointly and severally
represented to the Complainants that the payment
options under the various Schemes, rates of interest etc.
were very, reasonable and further that the Accused Nos.
1-7 shall make payment of the installments of the preEMI/EMI amounts till the date of possession.
....
....
....
11. As mentioned hereinabove, all the Accused
persons proposed various schemes to allure and induce
the Complainants to purchase flats/units in the said real
estate project. Some of the schemes which were offered
are Buy-back scheme with assured returns, subvention
scheme with payment of Pre-EMIs till possession, freerental scheme with payment of rent by the accused
builder till possession, etc. Accused Nos. 1-7 employed
experienced and skilled personnel to mislead and deceive
the general public especially the NRI's to believe that the
promises made were true. The Accused Nos. 1-7 provided
assurances to the Complainants that they are very experienced
and efficient developers and by any means the dates as
stipulated in the Agreements would be met.
....
....
....
14. After the bookings and disbursal of the loan amounts,
the accused persons represented that they are following the
proposed
plans
to
gain
the
confidence
of
the
complainants/allottees and to allure new allottees for the vacant
flats.
15. After taking the advance payments, Accused Nos. 1-7
started to show their true colours inasmuch as Accused Nos. 1-7
made continuous and intentional defaults in the process
of construction and held-up the hard-earned money of
the complainant allottees for their illegal personal gain.
16. As stated already, in order to finance the sale of the
purchased flat, the Complainants had taken home loans from
the Banks and Housing Finance companies' abovementioned as
part of pre-condition of the various Scheme(s) by signing and
executing a Tri-Partite Agreement (the 3 parties to the said
Agreement were the Company, the Complainant/allottee and
the Bank/Housing Finance Company). It is important to point
out here that in accordance with the Tri-Partite
Agreement, the amount of loan was disbursed directly to
Accused No. 1, for purchase of the units. Most the sale
transactions took place/were executed in the year 2015-17. The
Complainants/allottees were promised possession of their
respective units/flats within 3 years from the date of signing of
the Construction Agreement. in particular, the Complainants
No.1 to 7 were promised the possession of their units by
31.03.2019, 31.03.2019, 01.12.2017, 01.12.2017, 01.10.2016,
31.03.2019 and 31.12.2022 respectively.
....
....
....
18. It will be further most important to point out
here that as per the contracted Subvention Scheme,
Accused No. 1 was obligated and mandated to make
payment of PRE-EMI/EMI till the date of possession of
the unit and/or exercise of the Buy-Back option by the
Complainants. However, Accused No. 1 along with
Accused Nos. 2-4 have drastically failed to honour their
various bounden commitments/promises and assurances
including their obligations under the Subvention Scheme,
2X Option, Buy-Back option, etc. Ever since 2016, there
has been no construction at the site of the Project. Thus,
it is evident that the project is struck and there is extraordinarily delayed by more than 4 years.
19. Since around 2016, the other Accused persons,
namely, the Banks and Housing Finance Companies, instead of
getting their Pre-EMIs/Money from Accused Nos. 1-7, are
harassing
the
innocent
homebuyers,
viz,
the
Complainants/allottees, through calls, legal notices, threat of
initiation of Civil and Criminal proceedings, etc., despite the fact
that they are aware that no fault can be attributable on the part
of Complainants in any manner whatsoever,
....
....
....
21. Finding themselves in a position where it was clear
that the Complainants had been cheated by all the Accused
persons, the Complainants tried to make efforts, and seek a
remedy to resolve their agony. For that, the Complainants tried
to find out the prevalent law on the subject and the requisites to
be mandatorily followed by Accused Nos. 1-7 at the time of
commencement of a real estate project under RERA Act. It was
at that time that the Complainants got to know that
Accused Nos. 1-7 have also violated various provisions of
law which includes but not limited to RERA Act, 2016, for
which various complaints have been filed and the same
are pending against Accused Nos. 1-7 before various
authorities.
22. It also came to the knowledge of the
Complainants that Accused Nos. 1-7 have also never
deposited or maintained 70% of the deposited amounts
into the Escrow account, specifically opened for this
purpose in accordance with the RERA Act. Further,
Accused Nos. 1-4 have also withdrawn the inordinate
amounts from the said Escrow account which was not in
proportion of the construction as required by the law.
23. Further, despite receiving 95% payment of the
sale consideration of the respective flats from the
Complainants, Accused Nos. 1-7 has grossly and
fraudulently failed to offer and hand over possession of
the purchased unit/flat on the time as stipulated in the
Construction Agreement. Be that as it may, Accused Nos.
1-7 have even failed to consider or even make sincere
attempts and efforts of completing the project in time or
even thereafter.
24. It is clear that Accused Nos. 1-4 along with all
other Accused persons employed this Ponzi scheme fraud
by alluring the Complainants/allottees with high return.
The facts reveal that as soon as the money was deposited by
the Complainants with Accused Nos. 1-7 through the aegis of
the other Accused persons who financed the sale consideration,
the Accused Nos. 1-7 siphoned off the deposits and took the
money from the bank that belonged for the construction of this
project to pay off or invest in its other projects/sister concerns.
Thereafter, having unjustly enriched itself after causing huge
financial loss to the Complainants/allottees, Accused Nos. 1-7
have been purposely delaying the construction of the project.
The Complainants/allottees have knowledge that Accused Nos.
1-7 have siphoned off the amounts deposited for this project to
other projects/sister concerns to employ them into several other
projects. Also, the other Accused persons without considering
the pace of the construction disbursed the loan amount directly
to Accused Nos. 1-7.
25. The Accused Nos. 1-7 proposed the scheme of
buyback with assured returns but intentionally defaulted to fulfill
their promise. Now, Accused Nos. 1-7 are purposely delaying
the performance with the motive of wrongfully enjoying the
money paid by the complainant allottees and are employing the
same in some other project(s) which tantamount to clear
criminal breach of trust.
26. Accused Nos. 1-7 along with the all other Accused
persons have pressurized, lured and coerced the complainants
herein, who have exercised or wish to exercise their buy-back
option as per the agreements, to execute supplementary or roll
over agreements to provide their consent to the accused builder
to retain their hard-earned money into the project without any
payments. Moreover, it was agreed between the accused builder
and the allottees that after exercising buy-back option, the
accused builder shall cancel the unit allotted, pay the agreed
amount to the said allottee within 45 days of exercising the
option and foreclose the loan taken by the allottee for the
payment of the said unit.
27. In the case of the allottees who have not surrendered
to the pressure, undue influence or coercion of the accused
builder and have not executed supplementary or roll over
agreement(s), the accused builder has forcefully got the
cancellation forms executed by them without making any
payments in return and thereby cancelled their units and sold
these units to some other persons and accepted the payments
from them also. These allottees are left to the mercy of the
accused builder and have nothing in their hands, their units
have been cancelled and resold but no payments are made to
them and the obligation of repayment of the loan is also left on
their heads.
28. The accused persons, even after cancelling the
unit and selling it to the other some persons,
intentionally defaulted to make the said payments within
the time agreed after, due exercise of the buy-back
option and has been wrongly enjoying the hard-earned
money of the innocent allottees.
29. The accused persons proposed the Subvention
scheme with no EMI till possession but they have been a
regular defaulter in fulfilling their promises. Beside taking
the exaggerated amount for the units from the allottees and
making the promise of paying the EMIs till possession, the
accused persons no. 1 to 4 have intentionally made defaults due
to which the allottees are suffering. Further, the accused
persons promised to pay the EMIs till possession which they
intentionally failed to perform due to which the banks started
pressuring and harassing the allottees to pay the EMIs,
intimidated and threatened by the accused bank officials, the
allottees were forced to file a writ petition before the Hon'ble
Karnataka High Court against the banks wherein interim relief
has been provided to the Allottees. A copy of the Interim Order
passed
by
the
Hon'ble
Court
of
Karnataka
in
W.P.NO.18713/2021 is produced herewith and marked as
ANNEXURE-E.
....
....
....
31. The accused bank officials in connivance with
the accused no. 1 to 7 and its officials, after the approval
of the loan in the name of the complainant, disbursed
whole of the loan amount directly to the accused no. 1
company without satisfying themselves as to the
genuineness of the project at the initial stages of the
construction and without conducting proper due diligence
w.r.t. the company which is in strict violations of the legal
policies formulated by the RBI and the Central
Government.
32. The accused no. 1 to 7 are liable for falsification
of accounts as they have got disbursed the amount from
the bank in regard of completion of the project but
wrongly allocated the money in some other projects due
to which the construction of this specific project is struck
and allottees are suffering.
....
....
....
37. To summarize, the Accused above named, with a
dishonest intention induced the Complainants to pay a
sums as aforesaid and being induced by the same, the
Complainants paid the said amounts to the Accused No. 1
to 7. Further, the all the Accused conspired and connived
together to raise loans in the name of the Complainants
and thereafter, the Accused No. 1 to 7 intentionally
defaulted in repaying the same to the Accused No. 8 to
11. The Accused Nos. 1 to 7 have now, neither given
possession of the property nor have repaid the loan to
the Accused No. 8 to 11 as agreed. The Accused No. 8 to
11, fully having knowledge of the intentions of the
Accused Nos. 1 to 7 disbursed the loan to the Accused No.
1 to 7 and now seek to recover the said loan from the
Complainants. The Accused No. 1 to 7 are also not
returning the money to Complainants. This way, the
Accused have conspired together and have defrauded the
Complainants. The 409, 417, 418, 420 and 120B r/w
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code 1960 and Section 9
of the Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors Act,
2004.
38. The above said facts and circumstances disclose
commission of various crimes under various laws which calls for
immediate and strict enquiry and investigation into the affairs of
the accused persons.
39. It is pertinent to mention here that, the Complainants
had approached the Halsoor Police Station and had informed
them similarly regarding the offences that have been committed
by the Accused, vide letter dated 20.02.2022. However, the
officers of the said Police Station refused to register the FIR and
also refused to acknowledge the receipt of the complaint, which
is in clear violation of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Lalita Kumari vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. Also, the Complainants
approached the Commissioner of Police seeking redressal of
their grievance vide letter dated 25.02.2022, but in vain. Thus
the Complainants having no other remedy have approached this
Hon'ble Court seeking a direction under Section 156(3) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Copy of the letter addressed
to the Halsoor Police Station and the Commissioner of Police are
produced herewith and marked as ANNEXURE - F and G
respectively."
(Emphasis added)
A perusal of the complaint would unmistakably reveal the manner in
which the complainants, who are home buyers, were allegedly
induced by the Company to purchase apartments by availing home
loans, structured through tripartite agreements and subvention
schemes. Acting upon such representations and arrangements, the
home buyers parted with substantial sums and, as alleged, nearly
95%
of
the
sale
consideration
came
to
be
deposited.
Notwithstanding receipt of such a substantial portion of the
consideration, possession of the apartments did not see the light of
day.
20.3. The allegations, therefore, cannot, at this stage, be
brushed aside as a mere contractual discord between a developer
and its purchasers. The complaint narrates the inducement, the
consequent parting with substantial monies by the home buyers
and the failure to deliver possession despite receipt of almost the
entirety of the consideration. These allegations, when taken at their
face value and without embarking upon a mini-trial, prima facie
exude the ingredients of the offences alleged. Whether the
allegations would ultimately withstand the rigours of trial is
altogether a different matter; but, at the threshold, they certainly
furnish
sufficient
criminal
content
to
permit
the
process
of
investigation to continue.
20.4. The said crime i.e., Crime No.143 of 2022 later comes
to be challenged before this Court in W.P.No.14484 of 2022. The
Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by way of a detailed order dated
12-08-2024 in W.P.No.14484 of 2022 quashes Crime No.143 of
2022, but retains the private complaint in P.C.R.No.20 of 2022. The
order reads as follows:
“....
....
....
3. The case of the petitioners is that the respondent
Nos.1 to 128 have filed private compliant before the Spl.
Court under Section 2 (d) read with Section 156(3) of
Cr.P.C. The same is registered as PCR No.20/2022 alleging
that the accused Nos.1 to 7 in the complaint and various
other accused being the officials of accused No.1, the
company called Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. LTD.,
and they were looking after the day-to-day managements of
the company. The accused Nos.2 to 7 are Directors of the
company and they are being channel partners, the
banking/housing finance companies, namely, 1) Indiabulls
Housing Development Finance Ltd. 2) Housing Development
Finance Corporation Ltd. 3) Piramal Capital & Housing
Finance Limited and (4) Bank of Baroda, arrayed as accused
Nos.8 to 11 and various bank officials who have jointly for
illegal gains with dishonesty and have caused huge financial
loss to the complainants to the worth of Rs.80,00,00,000/(Rupees Eighty Crore).
4. The accused persons have conspired together,
portrayed a very
rosy
and lucrative
picture
fraudulently promoted a real estate project being
developed and constructed by the accused No.1 in
2014. They have induced the complainants, who
purchased units/flats/apartments in the real estate
project
and
various
predefined
schemes
like
Subvention Scheme, Buy-Back Scheme, 2X-Scheme
etc., jointly launched by accused Nos.1 to 7 along with
accused Nos.8 to 11 and projected as being most
profitable and lucrative and being induced by the
representations made by the accused, the innocent
complainants
booked
the
units
with
accused
No.1/company in its real estate project by paying
almost 95% of the initial sale consideration amount
within 30 to 45 days by signing of the Builder Buyers
Agreement.
.... ....
....
19. Having heard the arguments and perused the
records, as per the complaint filed before the Special Court
by the respondents, who are the home buyers from the
petitioner company, the petitioner company entered into a
tripartite agreement with accused Nos.8 to 11 the bankers
and the complainants. As per the agreement, the accused
persons/developers used to construct the plots and allot it to
the respondent/complainant’s for making payment. The
accused Nos.8 to 11 being bankers agreed to lend financial
assistance. Accordingly, the loans were raised by the
complainants with accused Nos.8 to 11. The loans were
directly paid to the accused persons even though loans were
sanctioned to the complainants. Apart from that some of the
complainant also paid money to the petitioners as advance
consideration for allotting the plots. It is agreed between the
parties mutually in case the complainants are not able to pay
the full amount within the prescribed time, the accused
persons will buy back the plots by paying the money to the
complainants or they shall repay the loans directly to the
banker by way of EMI. Admittedly, the accused persons were
a developing company and they are owning land and they
started developing the same. Though, they started putting
up
construction on the plots, there were not able to
complete the plots due to various reasons, like not obtaining
the sanction plan from the concerned authority. Though,
they are said to have obtained a plan from the Village
Panchayat, it is not the competent authority. Therefore, the
building was not able to complete.
20. It is also admitted fact that in the meanwhile the
respondents have approached the RERA Court and the
accused persons have undertaken to complete the project,
but the same is not completed. Still the more than 50% of
the work is pending. It is also admitted fact that in the
meanwhile, against the accused person a dispute was raised
before NCLT, Bangalore Bench. Where the insolvency
proceedings were initiated and the NCLT initially dismissed
petition and later it was restored by the NCLT. Admittedly,
one proceeding is pending before the NCLT and another
before the RERA court in respect of same cause of action. In
the meanwhile the present complaint came to be filed by 128
complainants before the Special Court both under the IPC as
well KPID Act.
21. The leaner senior counsel as taken main contention
that KPID is not applicable in view of the Section 2(2) of the
KPID Act, as the petitioner company is not a financial
company. For the conveyance, the defines of Section 2(2)
read as under:
“Section 2(2): Definitions- In this Act unless the context
otherwise requires,(1) "Competent Authority" means the authority appointed
under Section 5;
(2) "Deposit” includes and shall be deemed always to have
included any receipt of money or acceptance of any
valuable commodity by any Financial Establishment to be
returned after a specified period or otherwise, either in
cash or in kind or in the form of a specified service with or
without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit or
in any other form, but does not include, (i) amount raised by way of share capital or by way of
debenture, bond or any other instrument covered under
the guidelines given and regulations made, by the
Security Board of India, established under the Securities
and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992;
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of a firm;
(iii) amounts received from a scheduled bank or a cooperative bank or any other banking company as defined
in clause (c) of section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 (Central Act 15 of 1992) :
(iv) any amount received from,(a) the Industrial Development Bank of India,
(b) a State Financial Corporation,
(c) any financial institution specified in or under
section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1
of 1956) or
(d) any other institution that may be specified by the
Government in this behalf:
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of business
by way of,(a) security deposit,
(b) dealership deposit,
(c)earnest money,
(d) advanced against order for goods or services;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a firm or
an association of individuals, registered under any
enactment relating to money lending which is for the time
being in force in the State: and
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions in
respect of a Chit.
Explanation I.- "Chit" has the meaning as assigned to it in
clause (b) of section 2 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982
(Central Act 40 of 1982);
Explanation II.- Any credit given by a seller to a buyer on
the sale of any property(whether movable or immovable)
shall not be deemed to be deposit for the purposes of this
clause,”
22. On careful reading of the provisions Sub-Section
2 (v) (d) and (vi) of the Act, which reveals that any
amount received from individual relating to the money
lending which is time being in force and any advance
amount received against the goods or services, the
KPID will attract. Here in this case, the accused
persons being a firm and a company under the
development projects, received more than 80 crores
from the companies from making them as a purchaser
and they made contract / agreement with the banking
company and showing the complainants as borrowers
of the loan. The amount has been received by the
company and tri-partite agreement and the said
amount repayable by the borrowers if the plots were
given to them or else there is a buy back condition
that plots shall be taken by the petitioner company
and EMI shall be paid to the banker directly. But
though they have received 80 crores on loan entered
into between the bankers respondents and the
petitioners, but they have neither given the services or
plots to the respondents as per Section 2 (v) (d) of
KPID Act. It is seems to be a bogus transactions in the
name of giving plots but they have not constructed the
building. They have not putting the sanction plots for
the purpose of putting up construction but they
nobalized the money from the respondents and used
the same in the other finance companies run by the
petitioners company as sister concerns. Therefore, the
KPID Act, is applicable to the case on hand.
23. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners
contended that there is violation of guideline issued by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivatsava’s case and
affidavit was not filed.
24. In this regard, on perusal of the records, the
respondents have represented by the authorized signatory of
07 persons who are signed the complaint. The respondents
have not filed any affidavit in respect of filing the complaint
to the police. Admittedly, there is no complaint filed to the
official of the police under Section 154 (3) of Cr.P.C. But the
private complaint directly filed without complying the part of
the guidelines of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Of course, the
Trial Court has not taken cognizance and just referred the
case to the police for investigation under Section 156 (3) of
Cr.P.C. Therefore, without compliance the very reference
itself is not in accordance with law.
....
....
....
27. Therefore, the very filing of the complaint before the
Prl. District and Sessions Judge, at Bengaluru is not correct.
The learned Prl. District and Sessions Judge, at Bengaluru
could have forward the complaint to the designated Court
and without doing so, by ignoring the its own order and
notification dated 09.07.2021 referring the compliant to the
police station, is not correct. That part there is no
application of mind by the learned Sessions Judge,
while referring the matter to the police and not
verified the affidavit and guidelines of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court issued in the case of Priyanka
Srivatsava. Therefore, the very reference of the
complaint and the registering the FIR is liable to be
set-aside.
28. Apart from that though the respondents have
already approached RERA Court and NCLT, that is a not
ground for quashing the case on merits. The FIR shall
be set-aside only on the technical grounds and the
complaint is entertainable by the Special Court under
the KPID Act. Accordingly, this Court may not be go into
the merits of the case. Hence, I proceed to pass the
following;
ORDER
i.
The petition is allowed in part.
ii.
The reference order dated 26.05.2022 in
PCR.No.20/2022 and consequential registering
the FIR by the police in Crime No.143/2022
dated 17.07.2022 is hereby set-aside. The FIR
and the reference order is quashed.
iii.
The complaint is restored to the Prl. City
Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru and
Special Court for
KPIDEF Act, at
Bangaluru (CCH-1) with a direction to
transfer the complaint to the CCH-92
Special Court.
iv.
The
complainants
have
liberty
to
approach the police higher authorities as
per the provisions of 156 (3) of Cr.P.C.
(Old Code). Thereafter they have required
to file detailed affidavit as per the
guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Priyanka Srivatsava.
v.
After the compliance by the complainants and
if they file affidavits before the Special Court,
the Special Court shall proceed in accordance
with law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Co-ordinate Bench has categorically noticed the gravamen of
the allegations against the Company. The accusation was that the
Company had induced the complainants to enter into transactions
which were alleged to be bogus, collected substantial amounts on
the representation that constructed premises would be delivered,
but neither delivered the promised constructions nor utilised the
monies for the purpose for which they had been collected. On the
contrary, the allegation was that the monies parted with by the
complainants were diverted and utilised for purposes alien to the
construction of the promised buildings.
20.5.
The
Co-ordinate
Bench
further
noticed
that
the
Company had received amounts exceeding `80 crores under loan
arrangements in which the complainants were shown as borrowers,
pursuant to tripartite agreements containing a buy-back
arrangement. Despite receipt of such enormous sums, the
accused allegedly neither delivered the promised plots/services nor
discharged the obligations undertaken under the arrangement. It
was in the backdrop of these allegations that the Co-ordinate Bench
found the provisions of the KPIDFE Act to be attracted and
declined to interdict the private complaint at its threshold.
20.6. What was obliterated by the Co-ordinate Bench was,
therefore, not the complaint or its substantive allegations. The
interference was confined to the order referring the complaint for
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and the
consequential FIR registered in Crime No.143 of 2022, solely on
account
of
non-compliance
with
the
procedural
safeguards
mandated by the Apex Court in PRIYANKA SRIVASTAVA supra.
Thus, the distinction is unmistakable: the criminal allegations
survived; it was only the procedurally infirm reference and
the consequential registration of the crime that did not. The
order of the Co-ordinate Bench, therefore, cannot be construed as
having effaced the substratum of the complaint; it merely required
the criminal process to be set in motion in accordance with law.
20.7. It is an admitted circumstance that, on the date of
registration of the 2022 ECIR, both the crimes which constituted
the predicate offences were very much in existence. It is only
subsequent to the registration of the ECIR that the said crimes
came to be quashed - one on account of settlement between the
parties and the other on a technical ground. The quashment,
therefore,
was
not
founded
upon
an
adjudication
that
the
allegations did not constitute the scheduled offences or that no
criminality existed in the transactions alleged.
20.8. As noticed hereinabove, though the FIR registered in
Crime No.143 of 2022 came to be obliterated, the private
complaint in P.C.R.No.20 of 2022 was consciously left untouched
by the Co-ordinate Bench. The complaint continues to subsist and,
with it, the allegations forming its substratum. The petitioner–
Company, therefore, cannot contend that it stood completely
absolved of the criminal proceedings or that the very foundation
upon which the proceedings under the Act rested had disappeared
altogether. The FIR may have fallen, but the complaint from
which the allegations emanated continues to survive.
20.9. It is in this circumstance that the submission of the
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner - that the 2022 ECIR
must necessarily perish because both the predicate offences have
been quashed and, consequently, no predicate offence survives
cannot be accepted. The premise on which the submission is built
does not obtain on the facts. One of the proceedings which forms
the very foundation of the scheduled offence, namely P.C.R.No.20
of 2022, continues to subsist. Therefore, this is not a case where
the predicate offence has been completely effaced or where the
petitioner has been finally absolved of the scheduled offence so as
to contend that the edifice of proceedings under the Act has been
left without a foundation. It is at this juncture that it becomes
apposite to notice the exposition of law by the Apex Court in VIJAY
MADANLAL CHOUDHARY v. UNION OF INDIA4, concerning the
indispensable relationship between the scheduled offence and
proceedings for money-laundering. The Apex Court holds as
follows:
“.... ....
....
109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived
or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal
(2023) 12 SCC 1
activity relating to a scheduled offence that can be regarded
as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act
cannot resort to action against any person for money
laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by
them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled
offence has been committed, unless the same is
registered with the jurisdictional police or pending
inquiry by way of complaint before the competent
forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is
indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence
already accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person
named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence
is finally absolved by a court of competent jurisdiction owing
to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of
the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there
can be no action for money laundering against such a person
or person claiming through him in relation to the property
linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation
alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of
the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section
3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these
provisions and disregarding the express language of the
definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as of now.
....
....
....
382.8. The offence under Section 3 of the 2002 Act is
dependent on illegal gain of property as a result of criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence. It is concerning the
process or activity connected with such property, which
constitutes the offence of money laundering. The
authorities under the 2002 Act cannot prosecute any
person on notional basis or on the assumption that a
scheduled offence has been committed, unless it is so
registered with the jurisdictional police and/or
pending enquiry/trial including by way of criminal
complaint before the competent forum. If the person is
finally discharged/acquitted of the scheduled offence or the
criminal case against him is quashed by the court of
competent jurisdiction, there can be no offence of money
laundering against him or any one claiming such property
being the property linked to stated scheduled offence
through him.”
The Apex Court categorically observes that prosecution for offences
under the Act can continue even when there is a pending
enquiry/trial by way of a criminal complaint before the competent
forum.
20.10. Further the issue of whether an ECIR can be quashed
on account of the FIR’s forming the predicate offence being
quashed on technical grounds is discussed by a Division Bench of
the High Court of Madras in the case of VIJAYRAJ SURANA v.
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE5, wherein the Division Bench
observes as follows:
“ …. ….
….
31. When there are findings arrived at
independently in both the FIR and ECIR, can the
Court completely disregard those findings and bring
the proceedings to an unjustified end just because
one
of
the
proceedings
was
quashed
on
procedural/technical grounds without due impetus to
the substantive grounds? This question requires an indepth consideration.
F) DELIBERATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
AUTOMATIC QUASHING OF ECIR ONCE FIR STANDS
QUASHED:
32. It shocks the conscience of the Court that
in recent cases involving money laundering, a certain
2024 SCC OnLine Mad 8404
pattern has emerged, whereby, the FIR quashed
through minor technical glitches or procedural
irregularities and with that as a ground they seek for
quashing of ECIR also. The wordings in the final
summary portion of the Vijay Madanlal's judgment in
paragraph 467 (5)(d) is used in isolation without due
consideration to the judgment as a whole to wriggle
away from the clutches of PMLA. The wordings in
Vijay Madanlal's case cannot be accorded a narrow
meaning by relying only on the summarisation
towards the end of the judgment, but the
observations in various paragraphs and the findings
made therein must be read in tandem to extract its
true essence. At the outset, this Court would clarify that
we are neither attempting nor intending to rewrite the Vijay
Madanlal's judgment. This Court is merely restraining from
a pick and choose application of the principle established in
Vijay Madanlal case and rather, is for the complete
harmonious application of the judgment as a whole in letter
and spirit. Any application of principle, even if in its literal
form paves way for injustice, then the Court is allowed to
take a detour to expound the law in such a way which
serves the cause of justice. If the principles of automatic
quashment of ECIR is adopted arithmetically, the very
purpose and objective of PMLA is defeated.
33. This point of contention in the present Petition
falls within the contours of the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal case. The Vijay
Madanlal case extensively dealt with the validity of different
provisions in the PMLA, 2002. The observations made in the
Paragraph No. 281 relevant to the case on hand is
extracted below:
“281. The next question is : whether the
offence under Section 3 is a standalone offence?
Indeed, it is dependent on the wrongful and illegal
gain of property as a result of criminal activity
relating to a scheduled offence. Nevertheless, it is
concerning the process or activity connected with
such property, which constitutes offence of moneylaundering. The property must qualify the definition
of “proceeds of crime” under Section 2(1)(u) of the
2002 Act. As observed earlier, all or whole of the
crime property linked to scheduled offence need
not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all
properties qualifying the definition of “proceeds of
crime” under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be
crime properties. Indeed, in the event of acquittal
of the person concerned or being absolved from
allegation of criminal activity relating to scheduled
offence, and if it is established in the court of law
that the crime property in the concerned case has
been rightfully owned and possessed by him, such
a property by no stretch of imagination can be
termed as crime property and ex-consequenti
proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section
2(1)(u) as it stands today. On the other hand, in
the trial in connection with the scheduled offence,
the Court would be obliged to direct return of such
property as belonging to him. It would be then
paradoxical to still regard such property as
proceeds of crime despite such adjudication by a
Court of competent jurisdiction. It is well within the
jurisdiction of the concerned Court trying the
scheduled offence to pronounce on that matter.”
34. A blanket application of the observations
made in the aforementioned judgment will not
advance the object set out under the PMLA, 2002 and
in turn will defeat its primary object. The Vijay
Madanlal case is a binding precedent for all Courts
below. And on careful application of the judgment,
analysing on a case to case basis, the output shall
defer for each case and not render the same result.
35. Every case is marinated with different facts and
circumstances and the application of law should not only
meet the ends of Justice, but should also further the object
behind the statute. The principles in Vijay Madanlalis set
out clear with respect to proceeds of crime under PMLA,
2002, as under;
“281……….In the event of acquittal of the
person concerned or being absolved from allegation
of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence,
and if it is established in the court of law that the
crime property in the concerned case has been
rightfully owned and possessed by him, such a
property by no stretch of imagination can be
termed as crime property and ex-consequenti
proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section
2(1)(u) as it stands today..”
36. The Court's observations above hold that
where a person is acquitted or absolved of a criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence and on
establishing in a Court of law that the crime property
is in legitimate ownership, such property cannot be
termed as crime property and in consequence the
PMLA offences loses its significance. Hence, to
warrant a quashing of the ECIR, mere quashing of
the FIR on technical grounds by itself does not make
the ECIR liable to be quashed. That is not the
observations set out in the Vijay Madanlal case.
Rather in proceedings pertaining to the quashing of
the FIR in a scheduled offence, the Court must have
dealt with not mere procedural irregularities, but
something more in the nature of substantive
grounds.
37. The exact wordings of the Court culls out the
object. That the accused person should have been
acquitted or absolved from the allegations of criminal
activity relating to the scheduled offence and that the crime
property should be rightfully owned and possessed by him.
So the essence of the observations made herein is
that the accused person should be exonerated from
the charges levelled against him.
38. Though there are multiple grounds for
quashing an FIR, and in one of the many grounds an
FIR can be quashed, when it comes to proceedings
pertaining to quashing the ECIR, the Court must
examine the grounds based on which FIR concerning
the scheduled offence was quashed and after careful
examination on a case to case basis, if the FIR was
quashed on substantive grounds of absence of prima
facie offence and not mere procedural irregularities,
then the ECIR loses its significance and is liable to be
quashed. Since the scheduled offence itself is not
made out, then automatically no predicate offence
can hold good in the ECIR. However, if the FIR was
quashed purely on technical grounds or procedural
irregularities, then it is to be understood that mere
quashing of the FIR does not absolve the accused
under the PMLA proceedings and inturn cannot
collapse the predicate offence in the PMLA
proceedings.
39. Further, when the PMLA proceedings is set in
motion and prima facie findings are already made,
including completion of filing of chargesheet, then an FIR
quashed after this stage cannot be a viable ground to
quash the ECIR also. More so, the PMLA requires the
presence of a scheduled offence to initiate proceedings
under the Act. So it also becomes a mandate that the
grounds on which scheduled offence was quashed is
thoroughly examined before rendering the PMLA offence
ineffective.
40. This Court is not venturing into the grounds of
quashing an FIR as the principles pertaining to the same
has already been laid down elaborately by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. But the rationale here is to cull out the
level of bearing that a quashed FIR has on an proceedings
challenging the ECIR. This Court feels that all cases
where FIR is quashed shall not automatically become
a ground for quashing an ECIR. Instead a case to
case analysis is a pre requisite for deciding on the
sustenance of an ECIR. To put it in comprehensive
terms, When the Court in an FIR quash proceedings
has not delved into the merits of the offence, but
rather found technical errors on the face of it, then
the Court directs the quashing of the said FIR. The
accused then goes on to challenge the ECIR by
placing reliance on the said FIR Quash order to quash
the ECIR also. But a reading of relevant paragraphs
in the Vijay Madanlal's case clearly showcases that
this is not the object behind the said judgment. The
final summarisation, when read in tandem with the
observations set out in paragraphs of the judgment
and also keeping in line with the explanation to
Section 44 of the PMLA, 2002, this Court comes to
the irresistible conclusion that cases where FIR
pertaining to the scheduled offence is quashed it
does not automate the exoneration of the accused
from the predicate offence. Rather FIR quashes on
grounds of mere technicalities or procedural
irregularities in the FIR, cannot by itself form a basis
to grant an automatic quash of ECIR. Also in the
aforementioned instance, there needs to be a case to
case examination of the offence registered under the
PMLA before the offence is rendered ineffectual.
41. Hence, the moot point for consideration whether
all cases where FIR has been quashed can pave way for
quashing of ECIR? This Court feels that each case must
be tested on its own, in consonance with the Vijay
madanlal judgment and a blanket application of the
principle without due regard to the facts of each and
every case shall render both the judgment and the
object of the PMLA ineffective.
G) IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATIC QUASHING
OF ECIR BASED ON FIR QUASH:
42. In cases as such where on initiation of PMLA
proceedings, prima facie proceeds of crime has been
traced, there arises a pertinent question as to whether this
Court can stall such proceedings inspite of preliminary
findings of the existence of proceeds of crime. The
conscience of this Court is directed towards delivery of
justice and though the FIR of scheduled offence stands
quashed, it is merely on technicalities without analysing the
merit of the scheduled offence. Hence, when “proceeds
of crime” is traced in a parallel investigation by the
Enforcement Directorate, this gives rise to another
question that, once proceeds of crime isprima facie
unearthed can ECIR be quashed on the ground that
FIR was quashed. This clearly is an unjustified
approach.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Division Bench, while considering the interplay between the
subsistence of a predicate offence and proceedings under the Act,
observes that an ECIR cannot be obliterated merely because the
predicate FIR has subsequently been quashed on a technical
ground. The Division Bench holds that to permit the ECIR to perish
on account of a technical infirmity in the predicate proceedings,
without there being an adjudication on the merits of the allegations
constituting the scheduled offence, would run contrary to the
purport of the law declared by the Apex Court in VIJAY
MADANLAL
CHOUDHARY
supra.
The
distinction
drawn
is,
therefore, between quashment on merits, which strikes at the
very substratum of the scheduled offence, and quashment
on a technical ground, which merely terminates a particular
proceeding without effacing the underlying allegations of
criminality.
20.11. If the law declared by the Apex Court in VIJAY
MADANLAL CHOUDHARY supra, as followed and applied by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in VIJAYRAJ SURANA
supra, is juxtaposed with the facts obtaining in the case at hand,
the submission seeking obliteration of the 2022 ECIR becomes
unacceptable. As observed hereinabove, the predicate proceedings
have not disappeared on an adjudication exonerating the petitioner
on merits. More importantly, the private complaint in P.C.R.No.20
of 2022, containing the allegations which form the foundation of
the scheduled offence, continues to subsist. The substratum,
therefore, remains. In such circumstances, neither the 2022 ECIR
nor the consequential summons issued in exercise of power under
Section 50 of the Act can be said to have been rendered
foundationless
merely
because
the
predicate
FIR
suffered
quashment on a technical ground. They, therefore, do not warrant
interference at the hands of this Court and cannot be
obliterated at this stage.
21. Writ Petition No.4968 of 2024:
21.1. The crime in Crime No.19 of 2024 that is called in
question in the subject petition springs from a complaint registered
31-01-2024 before the jurisdictional police by a home buyer. The
complaint reads as follows:
“Date 31/01/2024
To
The Station House Officer
Devanahalli Police Station.
Bengaluru, Karnataka
Complainant:
Bhavna Sadhwani/Raju Sadhwani
9886406779 9845425000
Complaint against:
1. Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt Ltd.
No.38, Ulsoor Road, Bangalore 560042.
Web site: www.ozonegroup.com
2.Mr.Vasudevan Satyamoorthy
(Chairman and Managing director)
DIN:00022732
Resident of No.32, Norris Road, Richmond Town,
Bengaluru 560025,
Mob:9845016477
3.Mr.Satyamoorthy Sai Prasad(director)
DIN:00022813
Resident Of : Nishanth Prime Apartments
5, Prime Street, Richmond Town,
mOpp Hockey stadium, Museum road,
Bengaluru 560025.
4.Mrs. Priya Vasudevan (Ez-Director and
wife of Chairman and MD of Ozone Group)
DIN:00774484
Resident of No.32, Norris Road, Richmond Town,
Bengaluru 560025.
5.Mr.S.Baaskaran (Ex CEO)
Address: Not Known Mob:9606035340
6.Mr Srinivasan Gopalan(Ex CEO)
DIN:06414360
Resident of No.34.G2.Sona Palace Apartments,
Norris Road, Richmond Town,
Bengaluru 560025
7.Rajeev Bhandari (nominee Director)
DIN:01176913 Address: NOT KNOWN
8.Mr.Seewoosagar Nemchand (nominee Director)
Din:08365678 Address: NOT KNOWN
Respected Sir,
Date: 31/01/2024
SUBJECT: Written Compliant
We, Bhavna Sadhwani (age 68) and Raju Sadhwani (age 70)
(Complainants) residing at 2311, 1st Cross, HAL 3rd Stage, Extn,
Opp Kemp Fort, Airport Road, Bangalore 560017, are Home
Buyers in the residential township Ozone Urbana "Pavillion" Flat
no. K 403 located at Devanahalli, Kannamangla village,
Bangalore 562110('Apartment') and said to be constructed by
Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt Ltd (part of Ozone Group)
having their office at No.38, Ulsoor Road, Bangalore
560042.('Ozone Group').
We the complainants are ordinary Senior Citizens of India
and as flat purchasers constitute the vulnerable sections
of society who have invested their life time savings for
their dream home in Ozone Urbana "Pavillion" which was
to be constructed by Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt
Ltd having their office at the address as stated above.
We state that Ozone group falsely represented to us that
they are a leading company in real estate and are known
for timely delivery of projects and use of the best quality
construction materials. They advertised as building a fully
contained township with Villa plots (meadows), senior
living complexes (Serene, Irene Etc), various residential
apartment projects (Aqua, Pavillion, Avenue Etc). With all
quality amenities and facilities (Hospital,5 Star Hotel,
School, retail Mall, Cineplex, Essentially promising a City
within a City) necessary for a quality living in 185 acres
of land situated in Kannamangla Village, Devanahalli,
Bangalore 562110. They then marketed the above project
township
by
taking
out
misleading
full
page
advertisments in leading newspapers, Magazines, social
Media etc and also falsely marketed themselves thru their
own staff, channel partners and hired marketing
agencies.
My husband and I on 04/02/2014 met with few Ozone group
sales persons at their office in their project site at
Kannamangala Village, Devanahalli, Bangalore. They took us
around the model flat that they had constructed streeing upon
their uncompromising attention to quality and detail of both
materials and construction, they also stressed that they had the
reputation of timely construction and hand over of flats to
purchasers for possession. During this meeting they convinced
us to put a down payment and book a 3 BHK flat in project
"Pavillion" in Ozone Urbana. On 10/02/2014 we made two
payments to Ozone by cheque no.065387 for Rs.3,00,000/-and
cheque no.003406 for Rs.2,81,279/-drawn on HDFC bank and
Standard Chartered Bank respectively.
Payment and book a flat :
We, quote, the following facts and details, We have invested in
their project "Pavillion" in Ozone Urbana in a 3 BHK apartment
bearing no.K 403 bought in March 2014 for delivery in Oct 2016
with grace period of 6 months that is March 2017, the building
is yet NOT COMPLETE and there is no hope of it being
completed. We paid the full value of the flat as demanded by
the developer Ozone which is Rs,64,52,418/-(Rupees sixty Four
Lakhs Fifty Two Thousand Four hundred and Eighteen) payment
details attached, from our hard earned retirement savings. Due
to all the broken promises by the builder we have been put in to
a lot of Physical, Financial and Mental hardship. We have lost
our health completely due to Ozone's malafide intentions. Please
note they have not got the occupancy certificate hence there is
no legal electricity, water connection, fire and pollution NOC's
and other statutory clearancies since the building is not
complete. As a result of the broken promises by the builder we
Ordinary Law Abiding Senior Citizens with no source of income
have had to borrow money from our son to survive.
When we questioned on several occasions about not handing
over of the apartment as agreed the CRM manager have only
given us excuses and have taken months and months to
respond to us. Every March became December and every
December became March of the following year. This again shows
that all of the persons such as the Directors, CEO, the CRM
Manager, Sales Representatives have colluded to Defraud and
Cheat HomeBuyers like us. We have been in constant touch with
their sales representative Ms.Bhuvna in person as well as
email/letters. We had written to them on 29/08/2020 wherein
we had highlighted that they are late by 4 yrs, Ms Bhuvna
(CRM) assured us that the flat would be handed over in March
2021. Hence it is evident that grave injustice has been done to
us as well as several Home buyers such as us. Ozone Group has
CHEATED us.
Cause of Compliant:
The main reason for us filing a complaint and to register a F.I.R.
is as follows
1.Ozone has its License revoked by RERA for all its projects in
Bangalore, hence it cannot construct nor will it be able to
sell. At present the project construction and completion
in the near future is completely out of the question.
Inspite of this the Ozone Company is still continuing to
market and sell flats/Apartments to the general innocent
public which truly reveals the true characters behind this
company.
2.Ozone and its Chairman and MD Mr. Vasudevan
Satyamoorthy has used the proposed project 185 Acres
land to mortgage and fund his other company projects
and ventures
3.Mr.Vasudevan Satyamoorthy
has
diverted funds
received from bookings and sale of apartments/Flats as
Ozone Urbana project to offshore accounts, fund his
personal estate purchases and other companies.
4.It has come to our notice thru some confidential
sources that Mr.Vasudevan Satyamoorthy the Chairman
and MD of Ozone group is planning and making all
arrangements to flee the country.
5.Mr.Vasudevan Satyamoorthy has already sold Two
patches of the proposed land and buildings (National
Public School and Hotel) in late 2023. And he is into
negotiations with some prospective buyers to sell other
assets.
6.Mr.Vasudevan Satyamoorthy has not displayed any
character befitting a businessman and Chairman and a
MD of a reputed construction company, instead he has
displayed lack of espect towards Law, Rules and
regulations, Court Orders, lack of Compliance etc,
everything that a crook in a suit employs.
7.Its about 10 Years since we made the initial booking for
this apartment from then till today we have suffered and
continuing to suffer irreparable damage all around (360
degrees, and at the end of it our life is still in disarray.
This man Satyamoorthy is oblivious to all this and
unwilling to refund our amount with even simple interest.
This man has scammed Hundreds of innocent people and
should not be allowed to escape and go free.
We therefore humbly request that your good offices take
cognizance of this compliant, investigate the matter and
help us recover our money from this fraudulent developer
and book Ozone Group, Its Directors and its Group
companies involved under relevant provisions of the
law.”
(Emphasis added)
21.2. The afore-quoted complaint is instituted against the
office-bearers of the Company, including its Directors, Managing
Director, Chairman and other officials. The gravamen of the
allegation is that the complainants had entered into an agreement
with the representatives of the Company for purchase of a flat in
the project christened “Ozone Urbana Pavilion” and, pursuant
thereto,
had
parted
with
the
entire
sale
consideration
of
`64,52,418/-. What followed, according to the complainants, was
a decade-long wait without the promised flat seeing the light of
day. Despite passage of nearly ten years from the date of
booking,
neither
was
the
construction
completed
nor
was
possession of the apartment handed over to the complainants.
Repeated enquiries are alleged to have met only with assurances—
assurances which, according to the complaint, remained assurances
and never fructified into delivery of possession.
21.3. It is on the foundation of these allegations that Crime
No.19 of 2024 comes to be registered against the petitioners for
the offence punishable under Section 15 of the Karnataka
Ownership of Flats Act and Sections 406, 420 and 149 of the
IPC. What assumes significance for the present consideration is
that, though the Company is specifically named and its acts form
the very fulcrum of the complaint, the Company itself is not
arrayed as an accused. The petitioners, who are its Directors and
officials, alone are drawn into the web of the crime.
21.4. It is this circumstance that forms the sheet-anchor of
the submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners. The contention is that the alleged contravention under
the Karnataka Ownership Flats Act is essentially attributed to the
Company and, therefore, in the absence of the Company being
arraigned as an accused, its Directors or other officials cannot,
merely by reason of the offices they hold, be prosecuted for the
alleged offence. The submission, in essence, is that when the
principal alleged offender - the Company is kept outside the
array of accused, criminal liability under the statute cannot
be fastened upon its officers in isolation, unless the statutory
scheme
expressly
permits
such
prosecution.
Whether
the
submission merits acceptance would necessarily depend upon the
language employed by the statute and the manner in which it
fastens liability for its contravention. It, therefore, becomes
apposite to notice Section 15 of the Karnataka Ownership of
Flats Act, around which the challenge revolves. Section 15 reads
as follows:
“15. Offences by Companies.—(1) If the person
committing an offence under this Act is a company,
every person who at the time the offence was committed
was in charge of, and was responsible to the company
for the conduct of business by the company, as well as
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly:
Provided that, nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render any such person liable to such punishment provided
in this Act if he proves that the offence was committed
without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence
to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
where an offence under this Act, has been committed with the
consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any negligence
on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer
of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other
officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section,—
(a) ‘company’ means a body corporate and includes a
firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) ‘director’ in relation to a firm means a partner in the
firm.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21.5. Section 15 of the Karnataka Ownership of Flats Act
specifically deals with offences by companies and delineates the
circumstances in which the Company as well as the persons who
were in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of its business
can be brought within the fold of prosecution. In the light of the
statutory architecture, when the very allegations emanate from acts
attributed to the Company, the Company ought, in the ordinary
course, to have been arrayed as an accused in the subject crime.
Its omission from the array of accused, despite being specifically
named in the complaint and despite the transaction being one
entered into with the Company, is undoubtedly an infirmity that
cannot be brushed aside. That, however, would not mean that the
entire crime must perish at its threshold.
21.6. The Company is unmistakably named in the complaint;
the transaction complained of is with the Company; and the
allegations, when taken at their face value, prima facie make out
the ingredients of the offences alleged. The omission to formally
array the Company as an accused is, therefore, an infirmity capable
of being remedied in the course of investigation and cannot become
a premium for obliteration of the crime itself. A curable omission
in the array of accused cannot be permitted to eclipse
allegations which otherwise disclose a cognizable offence.
Therefore, the prayer for obliteration of Crime No.19 of 2024 on
this score does not merit acceptance. The crime shall continue to be
investigated in accordance with law. The respondent–Jurisdictional
Police are, however, at liberty to array the Company as an
accused in the subject crime in accordance with law and
thereafter proceed with the investigation in accordance with law.
22. Writ Petition No.27587 of 2024:
22.1. The crime in Crime No.161 of 2024 that is called in
question in the subject petition also springs from a complaint
registered before the jurisdictional Police by a home buyer. The
complaint reads as follows:
“To,
The Police Inspector,
Devanahalli Police Station,
Bengaluru.
Respected Sir/Madam,
Subject: Written Complaint
I am a home buyer in the residential township Ozone Urbana
"Avenue" Flat no. S1102 located at Devanahalli,
Kannamangala village, Bangalore 562110 ('Apartment) and
said to be constructed by Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt
Ltd (part of Ozone Group) having their office at No.38,
Ulsoor Road, Bangalore, 560042 (' Ozone Group'). Ozone
group falsely represented to us that they are a leading
company in real estate and are known for timely delivery of
projects and use of the best quality construction materials.
They advertised as building a fully contained township with
Villa plots (meadows), senior living complexes (Serene, Irene
Etc), various residential apartment projects (Aqua, Pavillion,
Avenue Etc) With all quality amenities and facilities (Hospital,
5 Star Hotel, School, retail Mall, Cineplex, Essentially
promising a City within a City) necessary for a quality living
in 185 acres of land situated in Kannamangla Village,
Devanahalli, Bangalore 562110. They then marketed the
above project township by taking out misleading full
page advertisments in leading newspapers, Magazines,
social Media etc. and also falsely marketed themselves
through their own staff, channel partners and hired
marketing agencies. I purchased dream home in the
said project in the year 2017 after inspecting the
project which was introduced and personally shown to
us by the company officials, I was taken to the
company office in Ulsoor and was given a trust and
asssurance by the directors of the company hence I
was convinced to pay booking amount and I paid
booking amount but the booking was not confirmed by
the company, after due course of time and after
constantly pushing for the receipts the company
compelled me to change my choice of flat to another
one by giving excuses. After a year the company
headed by the people listed below convinced me and
finally gave me a allotment letter in the year 2018.
Subsequently I was made to enter into a sale
agreement between me and the company. They gained
my trust and confidence that the house/flat will be
delivered and given possession by Dec 2022. They
even offered me a attractive tripartite agreement
between me, officials of the company and the bank,
thereby the company ensured that I get the loan for
the said purchase. I was ensured by the said company
officials that they would be paying the Pre-emi up till
the date of possession. In due course of time the
company sent me a letter stating that the I will have
to pay the Pre-emi before the possession was given.
Ultimately the burden of paying for the delay was cast
on me. Banks released 93 percent of funds to the said
accused people without checking into the actual
progress of the property. The flat that I booked was
taken as a surety by the bank and they funds were
released. Ultimately the possession was never given to
me. A sum of 1,32,10,000/- (one crore thirty two lakh
ten thousand rupees only) has been paid to the said
accused company officials. As on date I do not have
the flat, the building construction has been stalled.
The developer and the company officials have lost the
license to continue with the development of the
project.
In due course of time in search of solution to this issue
of not getting the flat and no refund from the builder
for defaulting the possession of the property. I joined
group of people who had purchased the flats in the
same project. When I interacted with them I got to
know that there was yet another person who had been
sold the flat which was previously sold to me. When
we exchanged the documents to see the details and
reverify, I discovered that the flat which I purchased
in the year 2017 was later sold to the other person on
09/11/2021 without informing me, without my
consent, without giving me back the money I have
paid, etc. The other person to whom the flat was sold
also was offered bank loans organised by the
developer builder accused. My property was given as a
surety and security to get the bank loan, amount was
dispersed by the bank. Later the developer took money
from both of us and has now defaulted the possession.
Now the banks are after me for the payments as the
flat is mortgaged by multiple banks. They do not have
exclusive rights over the property to be proceeding
against. Ultimately the developer has cheated me,
breached my trust, taken double the money, has not
completed it, has not given possession, and also is not
refunding me even after I got to know about such
illegal acts.
It is also important to note that there are many people
who have been cheated and who have face the similar
situation and are systematically cheated by the
officials of the company. Hence it is requested of this
authority to register an FIR and immediately take
actions against the said Accused people.
Complaint against :
1. Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt Ltd.
No.38, Ulsoor Road, Bangalore 560042.
Web site: www.ozonegroup.com
2. Mr. Vasudevan Satyamoorthy
R/O No.32, Norris Road,
Richmond Town, Bengaluru 560025.
Mob: 9845016477
3. Mr.Satyamoorthy Sai Prasad,
R/O Nishanth Prime Apartments,
Prime Street, Richmond Town,
Opp Hockey stadium, Museum road,
Bengaluru 560025.
4. Durbhakula Vamsi Sai
Mob No: 9845000799
5. Seewosagar Nemchand
6. Rajeev Bhandari”
(Emphasis added)
22.2. The allegations in the afore-quoted complaint merit a
closer notice. The complainant, a home buyer, was induced to
invest in the residential township christened “Ozone Urbana”,
projected and promoted as a premium development comprising
high-quality residential villa plots and apartment complexes as a
“city within a city”. Acting upon such representations, an allotment
letter came to be issued in favour of the complainant in the year
2018, followed by execution of an agreement of sale. The promise
held out was that possession of the allotted property would be
delivered in the year 2022.
22.3. A tripartite agreement was thereafter entered into
amongst the complainant, the petitioner - Company and the lending
Bank. Pursuant thereto, the Bank sanctioned the loan and disbursed
the monies directly to the developer. In all, a staggering sum of
`1,32,10,000/- travelled from the Bank directly into the hands of
the petitioner - Company. Under the arrangement, the Company
was required to service the EMI’s. The allegation is that the
Company failed to honour even this obligation, leaving the
complainant to shoulder the burden of repayment of a loan raised
for acquisition of a property which was never delivered to him.
Thus, while the money reached the developer, the home
never reached the home buyer; what remained with the
complainant was only the burden of the EMI.
22.4.
significance.
What
follows
Neither
was
in
the
complaint
possession
assumes
delivered
nor
greater
was
the
construction completed. When the complainant sought to ascertain
what had become of the property for which such substantial
consideration had been paid, he allegedly discovered that the very
apartment allotted to him had been sold to another purchaser
on 09-11-2021, behind his back and without his knowledge, much
less his consent.
22.5. The allegations do not stop there. The complainant
further alleges that the property booked by him and already
forming part of the financing arrangement had been subjected to
mortgages with multiple Banks and that funds had been raised by
the petitioner–Company from different financial institutions on the
strength of the same or overlapping properties, thereby deceiving
unsuspecting home buyers. Repeated demands and entreaties of
the complainant allegedly fell on deaf ears. It is in this backdrop
that the complaint came to be registered for offences punishable
under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC.
22.6. The allegations, viewed as they must be at this stage at
their face value cannot be brushed aside as a mere breach of
contract or an ordinary dispute between a developer and a
purchaser. The complaint presents a far more disquieting picture.
An amount of `1,32,10,000/- is alleged to have been received by
the
Company
through
the
Bank
pursuant
to
the
tripartite
arrangement; possession of the promised property has not been
delivered; the complainant continues to bear the burden of EMI’s;
and, above all, the very property allotted to him is alleged to have
been sold to a third party without his knowledge or consent. The
money is received, the property is not delivered, the loan
burden remains with the home buyer, and the very property
promised
to
him
is
allegedly
sold
to
another.
These
allegations, if established, travel far beyond the realm of a mere
contractual default and prima facie bear the ingredients of the
offences alleged.
22.7. The investigation, it must be remembered, is still at its
threshold. It could not travel further on account of the interim
protection operating in favour of the petitioners. At such a
nascent stage, this Court cannot embark upon a roving
enquiry into disputed facts or conduct a mini-trial to
determine the ultimate culpability of the petitioners. The
complaint
discloses
sufficient
material
warranting
investigation into the flow of funds, the alleged multiple
mortgages,
the
subsequent
alienation
of
the
allotted
property and the role of the persons concerned.
22.8. Therefore, in the teeth of the allegations obtaining in
the complaint and the investigation having scarcely commenced,
obliteration of the crime at its inception would amount to
stifling
a
legitimate
investigation
before
the
truth
is
permitted to unfold. The prayer for quashment, on this score,
must necessarily meet its rejection.
23. Writ Petition No.34702 of 2024:
23.1. The 2nd respondent is the complainant. A complaint
comes to be registered before the Commissioner of Police which is
later transmitted to the jurisdictional Police which becomes a crime
in Crime No.77 of 2024 for the offences punishable under Sections
406, 409, 420, 120B read with 34 of the IPC and Section 9 of the
KPIDFE Act. Since the entire issue now gets triggered from
registration of complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the
complaint. The complaint reads as follows:
"…..
…..
…..
3. The present complaint is being filed against the
Accused No. 1 to 7 and various other accused persons
being all officials of Accused No. 1, who are/were
responsible for the day-to-day management of the
affairs of the Company, and also against various
Banks, Housing Finance Companies, namely, Accused
No. 8 to 11 and their officials and various other
unknown accused persons involved in the conspiracy
for commission of offences punishable under Sections
406, 409, 417, 418, 420 and 120B r/w Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 9 of the
Karnataka Protection of Interest of Depositors Act,
2004.
4. The Accused No. 2 to 7 are the Directors of the
aforementioned Company (Accused No. 1) and have
deliberately committed the aforementioned offences
on behalf of the Company. The other Accused persons
being the channel partners, the Banks/housing finance
companies, namely, (1) Indiabulls Housing Finance Ltd
(2) Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd (3)
Piramal Capital & Housing Finance Limited and (4)
Bank of Baroda, arrayed as accused Nos.8-11 above,
and various bank officials who have connived with
Accused Nos 1-7 and have acted under their directions
jointly for illegal gains with dishonesty and have
caused huge financial loss to the Complainants. The
total amount of loss caused to the Complainants
jointly is approximately around Rs. 80,00,00,000/(Rupees Eighty Crore only).
…..
…..
…..
11. As mentioned hereinabove, all the Accused
persons proposed various schemes to allure and
induce the Complainants to purchase flats/units in the
said real estate project. Some of the schemes which
were offered are Buy-back scheme with assured
returns, subvention scheme with payment of Pre-EMIs
till possession, free-rental scheme with payment of
rent by the accused builder till possession, etc.
Accused Nos. 1-7 employed experienced and skilled
personnel to mislead and deceive the general public
especially the NRI's to believe that the promises made
were true. The Accused Nos. 1-7 provided assurances
to the Complainants that they are very experienced
and efficient developers and by any means the dates
as stipulated in the Agreements would be met. The
Complainants believing in the assurances of the
accused persons as true, booked various units in the
said project during the years 2014 to 2016. Particularly, the
Complainants No. 1 to 7 booked their units in their
respective order on the following dates: 20.12.2016.
30.12.2016.
23.09.2015.
08.04.2015.
01.03.2014
18.08.2016 08.07.2015 23.12.2017. In pursuance thereto,
complainants were allotted various units in the said project
and loans were also immediately processed and sanctioned
on all the units by the other accused persons, viz.. banks and
housing finance companies abovementioned. Particularly, the
Complainants No. 1 to 7 were allotted the following units in
their respective order: 'S-1002', 'S-7001, 'D-501' 'H-404', 'K302', 'U-604'. 'E-G003'. 'C-601'. Copies of the allotment
letters issued to the Complainants No. 1 to 7 are the
respective order and are marked as ANNEXURE - A.
13.
Consequently,
various
agreements,
namely
agreement for sale, construction agreement, tripartite
agreement, buy-back agreement, etc., were executed
between the complainants/allottees, the Accused Nos.
1 real estate company and the other Accused i.e.
Banks/Housing Finance companies to represent the
allottees that the whole project will proceed as per the
assurances only but alas, that was not the case in real.
The said agreements were executed between the Accused
No. 1, the Accused Finance Company and the Complainants
No. 1 to 7, in particular, on the following dates in the
respective order of the Complainants: 21.12.2016,
08.12.2016,
03.07.2015,
12.05.2015,
01.03.2014,
04.08.2016, 11.12.2017. Copies of the Agreements entered
into by the Complainants No. 1 to 7 are produced in the
respective order herewith and collectively marked as
ANNEXURE - B.
14. After the bookings and disbursal of the loan
amounts, the accused persons represented that they
are following the proposed plans to gain the
confidence of the complainants/allottees and to allure
new allottees for the vacant flats.
15. After taking the advance payments, Accused Nos. 1-7
started to show their true colours inasmuch as Accused Nos.
1-7 made continuous and intentional defaults in the
process of construction and held-up the hard-earned
money of the complainant allottees for their illegal
personal gain.
16. As stated already, in order to finance the sale of the
purchased flat, the Complainants had taken home loans from
the Banks and Housing Finance companies' abovementioned
part of pre-condition of the various Scheme(s) by signing
and executing a Tri-Partite Agreement (the 3 parties
Agreement were the Company, the Complainant/allottee and
the Bank/Housing Finance Company). It is important to point
out here that in accordance with the Tri-Partite Agreement,
the amount of loan was disbursed directly to Accused No. 1,
for purchase of the units. Most the sale transactions took
place/were
executed
in
the
year
2015-17.
The
Complainants/allottees were promised possession of their
respective units/flats within 3 years from the date of signing
of the Construction Agreement. In particular, the
Complainants No. 1 to 8 were promised the possession of
their units by 31.03.2019, 31.03.2019 01.12.2017,
01.12.2017. 01.10.2016. 31.03.2019 and 31.12.2022
respectively.
…..
…..
…..
19. Since around 2016, the other Accused persons,
namely, the Banks and Housing Finance Companies,
instead of getting their Pre-EMIs/Money Nos. 1-7, are
harassing the innocent homebuyers, viz, the allottees,
through calls, legal notices, threat of initiation of legal
proceedings, etc., despite the fact that they are aware
that no fault can be attributable manner whatsoever
on the part of Complainants in any.
…..
…..
…..
22. It also came to the knowledge of the Complainants
that Accused Nos. 1-7 have also never deposited or
maintained 70% of the deposited amounts into the
Escrow account, specifically opened for this purpose in
accordance with the RERA Act. Further, Accused Nos.
1-4 have also withdrawn the inordinate amounts from
the said Escrow account which was not in proportion
of the construction as required by the law.
23. Further, despite receiving 95% payment of the sale
consideration of the respective flats from the
Complainants, Accused Nos. 1-7 has grossly and
fraudulently failed to offer and hand over possession
of the purchased unit/flat on the time as stipulated in
the Construction Agreement. Be that as it may,
Accused Nos. 1-7 have even failed to consider or even
make sincere attempts and efforts of completing the
project in time or even thereafter.
24. It is clear that Accused Nos. 1-4 along with all
other Accused persons employed this Ponzi scheme
fraud by alluring the Complainants/allottees with high
return. The facts reveal that as soon as the money was
deposited by the Complainants with Accused Nos. 1-7
through the aegis of the other Accused persons who
financed the sale consideration, the Accused Nos. 1-7
siphoned off the deposits and took the money from the
bank that belonged for the construction of this project
to pay off or invest in its other projects/sister
concerns. Thereafter, having unjustly enriched itself
after
causing
huge
financial
loss
to
the
Complainants/allottees, Accused Nos. 1-7 have been
purposely delaying the construction of the project. The
Complainants/allottees have knowledge that Accused Nos. 17 have siphoned off the amounts deposited for this project to
other projects/sister concerns to employ them into several
other projects. Also, the other Accused persons without
considering the pace of the construction disbursed the loan
amount directly to Accused Nos. 1-7.
25. The Accused Nos. 1-7 proposed the scheme of
buyback with assured returns but intentionally
defaulted to fulfill their promise. Now, Accused Nos. 17 are purposely delaying the performance with the
motive of wrongfully enjoying the money paid by the
complainant allottees and are emploving the same in
some other project(s) which tantamount to clear
criminal breach of trust.
…..
…..
…..
27. In the case of the allottees who have not surrendered to
the pressure, undue influence or coercion of the accused
builder and have not executed supplementary or roll over
agreement(s), the accused builder has forcefully got the
cancellation forms executed by them without making any
payments in return and thereby cancelled their units and
sold these units to some other persons and accepted the
payments from them also. These allottees are left to the
mercy of the accused builder and have nothing in their
hands, their units have been cancelled and resold but no
payments are made to them and the obligation of repayment
of the loan is also left on their heads.
28. The accused persons, even after cancelling the unit and
selling it to the other some persons, intentionally defaulted
to make the said payments within the time agreed after due
exercise of the buy-back option and has been wrongly
enjoying the hard-earned money of the innocent allottees.
29. The accused persons proposed the Subvention scheme
with no EMI till possession but they have been a regular
defaulter in fulfilling their promises. Beside taking the
exaggerated amount for the units from the allottees and
making the promise of paying the EMIs till possession, the
accused persons no. 1 to 4 have intentionally made defaults
due to which the allottees are suffering. Further, the accused
persons promised to pay the EMIs till possession which they
intentionally failed to perform due to which the banks started
pressuring and harassing the allottees to pay the EMIs.
Intimidated and threatened by the accused bank officials, the
allottees were forced to file a writ petition before the Hon'ble
Karnataka High Court against the banks wherein interim
relief has been provided to the allottees. A copy of the
Interim Order passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka
in W.P.No.18713/2021 is produced herewith and marked as
ANNEXURE-F.
30. The accused persons no. 1 to 7 have breached the trust
of the allottees by mentioning the different dates of
possession irrespective of the tower, floor and date of sale.
As observed in many agreements the builder has proposed
different dates of possession without considering the factual
and logical working of construction. The accused persons
have intentionally proposed different dates of possession to
different allottees with a motive to illegally and unlawfully
retain and use the hard-earned money paid by the
complainant allottees. This conduct of the accused builder
makes it apparent that the accused builder is not interested
in sale or completion of the project but only interested in
enjoying the hard earned money paid by the allottees and to
employ it in its other projects.
31. The accused bank officials in connivance with the
accused no. 1 to 7 and its officials, after the approval of the
loan in the name of the complainant, disbursed whole of the
loan amount directly to the accused no. 1 company without
satisfying themselves as to the genuineness of the project at
the initial stages of the construction and without conducting
proper due diligence w.r.t. the company which is in strict
violations of the legal policies formulated by the RBI and the
Central Government.
32. The accused no, 1 to 7 are liable for falsification of
accounts as they have got disbursed the amount from
the bank in regard of completion of the project but
wrongly allocated the money in some other projects
due to which the construction of this specific project is
struck and allottees are suffering.
33. When the accused persons were satisfied that there was
no scope for further sale, they started making defaults and
ignoring the queries of the complainants herein and it was
apparent that the accused persons no. 1 to 7 have no
intention to deliver the project and have dishonestly
cappropriated the amount for their personal use and gain
due to which stalled and no construction was in process, the
accused person stopped paying the Pre-EMIS and also
stopped following all other obligations which they agreed to
perform into various agreements.
34. The accused persons no. 1 is a private limited company
having authorised capital of Rs. 10,60,00,000/- and paid-up
capital of Rs. 9,18,14,000/-but in connivance with the some
banks and their officials it has secured various loans from
which Rs. 29,05,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand Nine
Hundred and Five Crores only) is still pending on records and
all this amount is over and above the payments received
from all of the allottees.
35. The actions of the accused persons are completely
unethical and unscrupulous manner which calls for a strict
enquiry and investigation into the affairs of the accused
persons.
36. The Accused No. 1 to 7 have stopped the complainants
herein from visiting their allotted unit by using criminal force
and has also threatened the complainants of dire
consequences if they file any complaint against them. The
said Accused have used foul and filthy language against the
Complainants when they tried to communicate with the
former in order to reslove the issue.
37. To summarize, the Accused above named, with a
dishonest intention induced the Complainants to pay a
sums as aforesaid and being induced by the same, the
Complainants paid the said amounts to the Accused
No. 1 to 7. Further, the all the Accused conspired and
connived together to raise loans in the name of the
Complainants and thereafter, the Accused No. 1 to 7
intentionally defaulted in repaying the same to the
Accused No. 8 to 11. The Accused Nos. 1 to 7 have
now, neither given possession of the property nor
have repaid the loan to the Accused No. 8 to 11 as
agreed. The Accused No. 8 to 11, fully having
knowledge of the intentions of the Accused Nos. 1 to 7
disbursed the loan to the Accused No. 1 to 7 and now
seek to recover the said loan from the Complainants.
The Accused No. 1 to 7 are also not returning the
money to Complainants. This way, the Accused have
conspired
together
and
have
defrauded
the
Complainants. Thus the Accused have committed
offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 417,
418, 420 and 120B r/w Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 and Section 9 of the Karnataka Protection
of Interest of Depositors Act, 2004.
38. The above said facts and circumstances disclose
commission of various crimes under various laws which calls
for immediate and strict enquiry and investigation into the
affairs of the accused persons
39. It is pertinent to mention here that, the Complainants
had approached the Halsoor Police Station and had informed
them similarly regarding the offences that have been
committed by the Accused. vide letter dated 20.02.2022.
However, the officers of the said Police Station refused to
register the FIR and also refused to acknowledge the receipt
of the complaint, which is in clear violation of the judgment
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lalita Kumari vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh. Also, the Complainants approached the
Commissioner of Police seeking redressal of their grievance
vide letter dated 25.02.2022 but in vain. Thus the
Complainants having no other remedy have approached this
Hon'ble Court seeking a direction under Section 156(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973. Copy of the letter
addressed to the Halsoor Police Station and the
Commissioner of Police are produced herewith and marked
as ANNEXURE - F and G respectively.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, the Complainants above named most
respectfully pray that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct
the Halsoor Police Station to register FIR and investigate into
the offences alleged hereinabove and pass such other orders
that this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the interest of justice and
equity."
(Emphasis added)
23.2. The case projected by the complainant is that the
petitioners/accused induced respondent No.2 and the members of
the Home Buyers Association to purchase apartments in the project
promoted by the Company by entering into subvention schemes,
allegedly in collusion with the lending Bank. Acting upon the
representations
substantial
so
sums
held
out,
towards
the
home
purchase
of
buyers
the
parted
with
apartments.
The
grievance is stark. The monies have gone out of their hands, but
the promised homes have never come into them. The complainants
allege that they have been left without their money and without
possession of the apartments for which the money was paid.
23.3. The allegation travels further. It is asserted that the
amounts collected from the home buyers, instead of being deployed
for construction and completion of the project for which they were
collected, were diverted to other businesses or siphoned off by the
Company. Proceedings against the developer are also stated to be
pending before the RERA, which has, in certain proceedings,
directed refund of the amounts paid by the home buyers. The
complaint further alleges that this is not an isolated grievance and
that numerous other complaints founded upon similar allegations
are pending against the accused. These are, however, matters
whose
ultimate
truth
accordance with law.
would
necessarily
have
to
emerge
in
23.4. The fulcrum of the submission of the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioners is, however, one of statutory
applicability. The contention is that a home buyer is neither a
“depositor” nor an “investor” within the contemplation of
the KPIDFE Act and that monies paid towards purchase of an
apartment cannot be metamorphosed into a “deposit” merely
because possession has not been delivered or the amount has not
been refunded. On that premise, it is contended that the very
invocation of Section 9 of the KPIDFE Act against the petitioners
is fundamentally misconceived and cannot be sustained.
23.5. The submission strikes at the applicability of the
statute itself and, therefore, requires consideration in the
light of the language employed by the legislature. Whether
monies collected from home buyers under arrangements of
the kind alleged in the complaint would answer the statutory
description of a “deposit”, and whether the entity receiving such
monies would fall within the sweep of the Act, cannot be answered
dehors the definitions contained therein. It, therefore, becomes
apposite to notice Sections 2(2), 2(3), 2(4) and 9 of the
KPIDFE Act, which read as follows:“…..
…..
…..
2. Definitions.—In this Act unless the context otherwise
requires,—
…..
…..
…..
(2)
“Deposit” includes and shall be deemed always to
have included any receipt of money or acceptance
of any valuable commodity by any Financial
Establishment to be returned after a specified
period or otherwise, either in cash or in kind or in
the form of a specified service with or without any
benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit or in
any other form, but does not include,—
(i) amount raised by way of share capital or by way of
debenture, bond or any other instrument covered under the
guidelines given and regulations made, by the Security
Board of India, established under the Securities and
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992;
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of a firm;
(iii) amounts received from a scheduled bank or a co-operative
bank or any other banking company as defined in clause (c)
of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (Act 15 of
1992);
(iv) any amount received from,—
(a) the Industrial Development Bank of India,
(b) a State Financial Corporation,
(c) any financial institution specified in or under Section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956 (Act 1 of 1956) or
(d) any other institution that may be specified by the
Government in this behalf;
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of business by way
of,—
(a) security deposit,
(b) dealership deposit,
(c) earnest money,
(d) advanced against order for goods or services;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a firm or an
association of individuals, registered under any enactment
relating to money lending which is for the time being in force
in the State: and
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions in respect of
a Chit.
Explanation I.—“Chit” has the meaning as assigned to it
in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Chit Funds Act, 1982 (Act 40
of 1982);
Explanation II.—Any credit given by a seller to a buyer on
the sale of any property (whether movable or immovable)
shall not be deemed to be deposit for the purposes of this
clause;
(3)
“Depositor” means a person who has made deposits with
Financial Establishment hereinafter defined but excludes
any former or present promoter, owner, partner in any
form, Director, manager, member, administrator,
accountant or collaborator, employee or any other person
with the said establishment or its subsidiaries, whose
complicity in the fraudulent activity is proved.
(4)
“Financial Establishment” means any person or a group of
individuals accepting deposit under any scheme or
arrangement or in any other manner but does not include
a corporation or a co-operative society owned or
controlled by any State Government or the Central
Government or a banking company as defined under
clause (c) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949 (Act 10 of 1949);
…..
…..
…..
9. Fraudulent default by Financial Establishment.—(1)
Any Financial Establishment, which fraudulently defaults any
repayment of deposit on maturity or on demand or
otherwise by the depositor or his successor along with or
without benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit or in
any other form as promised or fraudulently fails to render
service as assured against the deposit, every person
including the promoter, director, partner, manager former
directors, partners, promoters who have demitted or
resigned from establishment provided their liability is
limited to the period of office or any other person or an
employee responsible for the management or conducting of
the business or affairs of such Financial Establishment, shall
on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term not
less than three years and which may extend to seven years and
with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and such Financial
Establishment also shall be liable for a fine which may extend to an
amount equivalent to five lakh rupees or where such deposits is
quantifiable in terms of money twice the amount of aggregate funds
collected from subscriber or member whichever is more.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section a Financial
Establishment, which commits default in repayment of such
deposit with such benefits in form of interest, bonus, profit or in
any other form as promised or fails to render any specific
service promised against such deposit, or fails to render any
specific service agreed against the deposit with an intention of
causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another
person or commits such defaults due to its inability arising out of
impracticable or commercially not viable promises made while
accepting such deposit or arising out of deployment of money or
assets acquired out of the deposits in such manner as it involves
inherent risk in recovering the same when needed shall, be
deemed to have committed a default or failed to render the
specific service, fraudulently.
(2) Whoever having been previously convicted of an offence
punishable under this Act, is subsequently convicted of an offence
punishable under this Act, shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term of not less than five years which may extend to seven years
and a fine which shall not be less than ten lakh rupees and which
may extend to fifty crore rupees.
(3) (i) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a
financial establishment other than an individual, every person who,
at the time the offence was committed, was in conduct of its
business, as well as the financial establishment, shall be deemed to
be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against
and punished accordingly.
(ii) Nothing contained in clause (i) above, shall render any such
person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves
that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence.
(iii) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (i)
above, where an offence under this Act has been committed
by a financial establishment other than an individual, and it
is proved that the offence,—
(a) has been committed with the consent or
connivance: or
(b) is attributable to any negligence on the part of any
such
current
or
former
Director,
Manager,
Secretary, Promoter, Partner, Employee or other
Officer of the financial establishment;
such persons shall also be deemed to be guilty of that
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly.”
Now whether the amounts invested by the home buyers in the
Company would fall within the meaning of deposits under Section 9
of the KPDIFE Act is required to be noticed. The issue need not
detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter.
23.5.1.
The
Apex
Court
in
MAHARASHTRA v. 63 MOONS
the
case
of
STATE
TECHNOLOGIES
OF
LIMITED6
observes as follows:
“….
….
….
C.3. Definitions
of
“Deposit”
and
“Financial
Establishment” : Interpretation of Sections 2(c) and 2(d)
of the MPID Act
44. The notifications attaching the properties of the
respondent were issued under Section 4 of the MPID Act.
Section 4 covers only those situations where a “financial
establishment” is a defaulting entity. Section 4 is reproduced
below:
“4. Attachment of properties on default of
return of deposits.—(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in any other law for the time being in force—
(i) where upon complaints received from the
depositors or otherwise, the Government is satisfied that
any financial establishment has failed—
(a) to return the deposit after maturity or on
demand by the depositor; or
(b) to pay interest or other assured benefit; or
(c) to provide the service promised against such
deposit; or
(ii) where the Government has reason to believe
that any financial establishment is acting in a calculated
manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors
with an intention to defraud them;”
(emphasis supplied)
45. The primary issue is whether NSEL is a “financial
establishment” within the meaning of Section 2(d). Section 2(d)
reads as follows:
“2.(d) “Financial Establishment” means any
person accepting
deposit under
any
scheme
or
(2022) 9 SCC 457
arrangement or in any other manner but does not
include a corporation or a co-operative society owned or
controlled by any State Government or the Central
Government or a banking company as defined under
clause (c) of Section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949;”
(emphasis supplied)
46. “Financial establishment” is defined as any
person accepting a “deposit”. The definition excludes from
its purview (a) a corporation or cooperative society controlled or
owned either by the State or the Central Government; and (b) a
“banking company” as defined under Section 5(c) of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Since NSEL does not fall within
any of the exceptions, it would be a “financial establishment” for
the purposes of the Act if it is a “person accepting deposit”.
Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides an
inclusive definition of “person” to include both incorporated and
unincorporated
companies
[New
Horizon
Sugar
Mills
Ltd. v. State of Pondicherry, (2012) 10 SCC 575, para 58 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 516 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1061] as:
“3. (42) “person” shall include any company or
association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
or not.”
47. The expression “deposit” is defined in Section
2(c) of the MPID Act in the following terms:
“2. (c) “deposit” includes and shall be
deemed always to have included any receipt of
money or acceptance of any valuable commodity
by any financial establishment to be returned after
a specified period or otherwise, either in cash or in
kind or in the form of a specified service with or
without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus,
profit or in any other form, but does not include—
(i) amount raised by way of share capital or by
way of debenture, bond or any other instrument covered
under the guidelines given, and regulations made, by
the SEBI, established under the Securities and Exchange
Board of India Act, 1992;
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of
a firm;
(iii) amounts received from a scheduled bank or a
cooperative bank or any other banking company as
defined in clause (c) of Section 5 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949;
(iv) any amount received from—
(a) the Industrial Development Bank of India,
(b) a State Financial Corporation,
(c) any financial institution specified in or under
Section 6-A of the Industrial Development Bank of India
Act, 1964, or
(d) any other institution that may be specified by
the Government in this behalf;
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of
business by way of—
(a) security deposit,
(b) dealership deposit,
(c) earnest money,
(d) advance against order for goods or services;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a
firm or an association of individuals not being a body
corporate, registered under any enactment relating to
money lending which is for the time being in force in the
State; and
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions
in respect of a Chit.
Explanation I.—“Chit” has the meaning as
assigned to it in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Chit Funds
Act, 1982;
Explanation II.—Any credit given by a seller to a
buyer on the sale of any property (whether movable or
immovable) shall not be deemed to be deposit for the
purposes of this clause;”
48. The statutory definition of the expression
“deposit” comprises of the following ingredients:
(i) Any receipt of money or the acceptance of a
valuable commodity by a financial establishment;
(ii) Such acceptance ought to be subject to the
money or commodity being required to be returned after
a specified period or otherwise; and
(iii) The return of the money or commodity may be
in cash, kind or in the form of a specified service, with or
without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit
or in any other form.
These elements of the definition are followed by
specific exclusions contemplated in clauses (i) to (vii).
Clause (i) of the exceptions covers an amount which is
raised by way of share capital or by debenture, bond or
other instrument governed by the guidelines and
regulations of SEBI. Clause (v) states that money
received in the ordinary course of business by way of
security deposit, dealership deposit, earnest money or
advance against an order of goods or services shall be
excluded. The exclusions in clauses (i) to (vii) indicate
that transactions which would otherwise fall within the
broad sweep of the definition are excluded.
49. The legislature may define a word artificially by
restricting or expanding its natural meaning. When the
legislature employs the phrase “means”, the definition is
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
In Indra
Sarma v. V.K.V.
Sarma [Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755 :
(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 440 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 593] , this Court
observed that the definition of the expression “domestic
relationship” in Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is restrictive since it is defined by
the use of the term “means”. On the other hand, the Court has
taken a consistent view that where the definition of a word is
inclusive, as presaged by the adoption of the expression
“includes,” it is prima facie extensive [Karnataka Power
Transmission Corpn. v. Ashok Iron Works (P) Ltd., (2009) 3 SCC
240 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 802; Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of
Gujarat, (2008) 5 SCC 449] . The definition of “deposit”
uses the phrase “includes and shall be deemed to have
always included”. The import of this is to create a legal
fiction by which actions which though not included within
the natural meaning of the expression are intended to be
included. The combined use of “includes” and “deemed to
have always included” while defining the term “deposit”
makes the term inclusive and not restrictive.
50. The expression “deposit” is conspicuously broad
in its width and ambit for it includes, not only any receipt
of money but also the acceptance of any valuable
commodity by a financial establishment under any
scheme or arrangement. As a matter of interest, we may
note at this stage that the expression “any” is used in the
substantive part of the definition of the expression
“deposit” on five occasions, namely:
(i) Any receipt of money;
(ii) Any valuable commodities;
(iii) By any financial establishment;
(iv) With or without any benefit; and
(v) In any other form.
51. Likewise,
the
definition
of
financial
establishment refers to the acceptance of deposits:
(i) Under any scheme or arrangement; or
(ii) In any other manner.
52. The repeated use of the expression “any” by the
statute while defining both the above expressions is a clear
reflection of the legislative intent to cast the net of the
regulatory provisions of the law in a broad and comprehensive
manner. Unlike many other State enactments which
govern the field, clause (c) of Section 2 of the MPID Act
comprehends within the meaning of a deposit not only
the receipt of money but of any valuable commodity as
well. For example, in contrast, Section 2(2) of the Tamil Nadu
Act defines “deposit” only in terms of money and not
commodity. Section 2(2) reads as follows:
“2. (2) “deposit” means the deposit of money
either in one lump sum or by instalments made with the
financial establishments for a fixed period, for interest or
for return in any kind or for any service;”
53. Similarly, statutes protecting the interest of
depositors in Orissa [ The Odisha Protection of Interests of
Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 2011.] , Kerala [
The Kerala Protection of Interests of Depositors in Financial
Establishments Act, 2013.] , Himachal Pradesh [ The Himachal
Pradesh [Protection of Interests of depositors (in Financial
Establishments)] Act, 1999.] , Goa [ The Goa Protection of
Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999.]
, Telangana [ The Telangana Protection of Depositors of
Financial Establishments Act, 1999.] , Andhra Pradesh [ The
Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial
Establishments Act, 1999.] and Sikkim [ The Sikkim Protection
of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act,
2000.] define the phrase “deposit” only in terms of money and
not the acceptance of a commodity.
54. According to the second ingredient of Section
2(c), the money or commodity must be liable to be
returned. However, such return need not necessarily be
in the form of cash or kind but also in the form of a
service, with or without any benefit such as interest. It
needs to be recalled that clause (v) of Section 2(c) states
that a deposit of money or commodity made as a security
deposit, dealership deposit or an advance amount is
excluded from the definition of the phrase “deposit”. To
illustrate, if a member of a financial establishment deposits Rs
25,000, and that money is returned on cessation of membership
by making deductions, the issue of whether the deposit is a
security deposit or of the nature covered under Section 2(c)
should be determined with reference to the structure of
operation and functioning of the financial establishment. It is to
be noted that the definition also states that the return may be
with or without interest or any benefit. Therefore, the
submissions made by both the sides on whether NSEL had
through its representations assured a 16% return on trading in
the platform is immaterial for the purpose of determining if
NSEL accepted deposits.
55. Having referred to the relevant bye-laws, we shall
determine if NSEL receives “deposits” as defined by Section 2(c)
of the MPID Act. The bye-laws elucidate that NSEL receives both
money and commodities from trading members. In order to
decide if these receipts by NSEL could be regarded as
“deposits”, the test of “return” will have to be satisfied.
The test is that the return be in cash, kind or service. It is
not necessary that the return should be with the benefit
of interest, bonus or profit. Therefore, if the financial
establishment is obligated to return the deposit without
any increments, it shall still fall within the purview of
Section 2(c) of the MPID Act, provided that the deposit
does not fall within any of the exceptions. The exception
of relevance to our case is clause (v) which states that
amounts received in the ordinary course of business by
way of (a) security deposit; (b) dealership deposit; (c)
earnest money; and (d) advance against order for goods
or services shall be excluded from the purview of the
term “deposit”.”
23.5.2. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of ALKA
AGRAWAL v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA7 observes as follows:
“….
….
….
5. The MPID Act, which received the assent of the
President on 20th January 2000 and published in the
Maharashtra Government Gazette, Part IV, dated
21st January 2000, was enacted with a view to protect the
interests of depositors in the financial establishments and
the matters relating thereto. At the time of introduction
of the Bill in the Legislature, the Statement of Objects
and Reasons mentioned that the Statute was designed to
protect the public from the increasing menace of
2026 SCC OnLine SC 866
Financial Establishments which, very often, grab money
from the public in the form of deposits.
5.1 Noticing at the outset the purpose and spread of the
MPID Act, following was stated in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons,
“There is a mushroom growth of Financial
Establishments in the State of Maharashtra in the
recent
past.
The
sole
object
of
these
establishments is of grabbing money received as
deposits from public, mostly middle class and poor
on the promises of unprecedented high attractive
interest rates of interest or rewards and without
any obligation to refund the deposit to the
investors on maturity or without any provision for
ensuring rendering of the services in kind in
return, as assured. Many of these Financial
Establishments have defaulted to return the
deposits to public. As such deposits run into crores
of rupees, it has resulted in great public
resentment and uproar, creating law and order
problem in the State of Maharashtra, especially in
the city like Mumbai which is treated as the
financial capital of India. It is, therefore,
expedient to a make a suitable legislation in the
public interest to curb the unscrupulous activities
of such Financial Establishments in the State of
Maharashtra.”
…..
…..
…..
5.1.3 Thus, the MPID Act is served by elaborate
provisions both regulatory and penal in nature enacted to
protect the depositors' interest. The Act could be said to
be providing a quasi-criminal remedy, as Section 3 makes
the offence of fraudulent default by the Financial
Establishment to be an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six years
with fine to extend to one lakh rupees on conviction.
Criminal action for the said offence would lie against the
defaulter and FIR could be lodged under the said Section
3 of the MPID Act.
5.1.4 The MPID Act is a self-contained Code, which
creates an independent machinery and mechanism to
provide remedial measures to the victim depositors and
to check and punish Financial Establishments, which will
include any person accepting deposit has fraudulently
committed default duping the investors.
5.2 As the dispute in the present case, in its
ultimate analysis, revolves around as to whether the
payment made or amounts given by the appellants fall
within the ambit of “deposit” as defined under the MPID
Act, the relevant definition becomes pivotal to be
considered. Section 2(c) of the MPID Act defines
“deposit”.
5.2.1 The definition is extracted hereinbelow:
“2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
…………..
(c) “deposit” includes and shall be deemed
always to have included any receipt of money or
acceptance of any valuable commodity by any Financial
Establishment to be returned after a specified period or
otherwise, either in cash or in kind or in the form of a
specified service with or without any benefit in the form
of interest, bonus, profit or in any other form, but does
not include—
(i) amount raised by way of share capital or by
way of debenture, bond or any other instrument covered
under the guidelines given, and regulations made, by
the SEBI, established under the Securities and Exchange
Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992);
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of
a firm;
(iii) amounts received from a scheduled bank or a
co-operative bank or any other banking company as
defined in clause (c) of section 5 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);
(iv) any amount received from,—
(a) the Industrial Development Bank of India,
(b) a State Financial Corporation,
(c) any financial institution specified in or under
section 6A of the Industrial Development Bank of India
Act, 1964 (18 of 1964), or
(d) any other institution that may be specified by
the Government in this behalf;
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of
business by way of,—
(a) Security deposit,
(b) dealership deposit,
(c) earnest money,
(d) advance against order for goods or services;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a
firm or an association of individuals not being a body
corporate, registered under any enactment relating to
money lending which is for the time being in force in the
State; and
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions
in respect of a Chit.
Explanation I.— “Chit” has the meaning as
assigned to it in clause (b) of section 2 of the Chit Funds
Act, 1982 (40 of 1982);
Explanation II.— Any credit given by a seller to a
buyer on the sale of an property (whether movable or
immovable) shall not be deemed to be deposit for the
purposes of this clause;”
5.2.2 The above definition inter-alia includes any
receipt of money or acceptance of any valuable
commodity by a Financial Establishment. The term
“Financial Establishment” is defined in Section 2(d) of the MPID
Act, which is as under,
“2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
…………..
(d) “Financial Establishment” means any person
accepting deposit under any scheme or arrangement or
in any other manner but does not include a corporation
or a co-operative society owned or controlled by any
State Government or the Central Government or a
banking company as defined under clause (c) of
section 5 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949;”
5.2.3 “Financial Establishment” as defined in
Section 2(d) means “any person” accepting deposit either
under any scheme or arrangement or “in any other
manner”. The definition takes out from its purview a
corporation or cooperative society controlled or owned either by
the State or the Central Government. It also excludes a banking
company as defined under Section 5(c) of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949.
5.2.4 The definition of “financial establishment” in
Section 2(d) of the MPID Act has also a wide coverage to
mean “any person accepting deposit under any
arrangement or in any other manner”. The expanse of
Section 2(d) of the MPID Act undoubtedly covers “any
person accepting deposit”.
5.3 As stated, Section 3 of the MPID Act is in
respect of fraudulent default committed by Financial
Establishments. The section provides for punishment
upon conviction of every person including the promoter,
partner, director, manager or employee found responsible
for the management or in conducting the business or
affairs of the Financial Establishment which has
fraudulently defaulted in the repayment of deposits.
5.3.1 Section 3 is extracted hereunder,
“3. Fraudulent
default
by
Financial
Establishment.— Any Financial Establishment, which
fraudulently defaults any repayment of deposit on
maturity alongwith any benefit in the form of interest,
bonus, profit or in any other form as promised or
fraudulently fails to render service as assured against
the deposit, every person including the promoter
partner, director, manager or any other person or an
employee responsible for the management of or
conducting of the business or affairs of such Financial
Establishment shall, on conviction, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six years
and with fine which may extend to one lac of rupees and
such Financial Establishment also shall be liable for a
fine which may extend to one lac of rupees.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, a
Financial Establishment, which commits default in
repayment of such deposit with such benefits in the
form of interest, bonus, profit or in any other form as
promised or fails to render any specified service
promised against such deposit, or fails to render any
specific service agreed against the deposit with an
intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or
wrongful loss to another person or commits such default
due to its inability arising out of impracticable or
commercially not viable promises made while accepting
such deposit or arising out of deployment of money or
assets acquired out of the deposit in such manner as it
involves inherent risk in recovering the same when
needed shall, be deemed to have committed a default or
failed to render the specific service, fraudulently.”
5.4 While extensively discussing the scheme of the
MPID Act, this Court in State of Maharashtra v. 63 Moons
Technologies Ltd. adverted to discuss the scope of the
expression “deposit” in Section 2(c) of the MPID Act and
observed that the definition has these ingredients, “(i)
Any receipt of money or the acceptance of a valuable
commodity by a financial establishment (ii) Such
acceptance ought to be subject to the money or
commodity being required to be returned after a specified
period or otherwise, and (iii) The return of the money or
commodity may be in cash, kind or in the form of a
specified service, with or without any benefit in the form
of interest, bonus, profit or in any other form.”
5.4.1 It was observed that specific exclusions are
provided in clauses (i) to (vii) of Section 2(c) of the MPID
Act. The Court highlighted that when the legislature
mentioned in the definition in Section 2(c) the word
“means”, the definition becomes exhaustive. It was
pinpointed that Section 2(c) uses the phrase “includes
and shall be deemed to have always included”. The Court
further stated that the import of the same creates a legal
fiction and the use of the words “includes” and “deemed
to have always included” make the term “deposit”
inclusive and not restrictive.
5.4.2 Following
was
observed
in 63
Moons
Technologies Ltd. (supra) regarding the expression “deposit”,
“The expression “deposit” is conspicuously
broad in its width and ambit for it includes, not
only any receipt of money but also the acceptance
of any valuable commodity by a financial
establishment under any scheme or arrangement.
As a matter of interest, we may note at this stage
that the expression “any” is used in the
substantive part of the definition of the expression
“deposit” on five occasions, namely:(i) Any receipt
of money; (ii) Any valuable commodities; (iii) By
any financial establishment; (iv) With or without
any benefit; and (v) In any other form.”
(Para 50)
5.4.3 In the same way, the Court in the very
decision, stated that the definition of “Financial
Establishment” was indicated to be referring to the
acceptance of deposits under any scheme or arrangement
or “in any other manner”. The repeated use of the
expression “any” by the statute while defining both the
above expressions namely “deposit” in Section 2(c) and
“Financial Establishment” in Section 2(d) is a clear
reflection of legislative intent to cast the net of the
regulatory provisions of the law in a broad and
comprehensive manner.
5.4.4 It was further observed that “unlike many other
State enactments which govern the field, clause (c) of Section 2
of the MPID Act comprehends within the meaning of “deposit”
not only the receipt of money but any valuable commodity as
well”. The Court juxtaposed the definition in Section 2(c) of the
MPID Act with the definition of “deposit” in the similar laws by
the State of Tamil Nadu, State of Orissa, State of Kerala, State
of Himachal Pradesh, State of Goa, State of Telangana, State of
Andhra Pradesh and State of Sikkim, which define the term
“deposit” only in terms of acceptance of money and not the
acceptance of commodities.
5.4.5 What is to be underlined is that the import of
“deposit” under Section 2(c) of the MPID Act is wide
enough so as to include the acceptance of money in any
manner, whatever may be the nomenclature. Similarly,
the definition of “Financial Establishment” in Section 2(d)
uses the group of words “any person accepting deposit”
and “in any other manner” to spread its net or coverage.
6. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case,
admittedly, the amount of Rs. 2.51 crore was advanced by the
appellants to respondent Nos. 2 to 6 with the promise for
repayment of the same with quarterly interest. The factum of
the transaction and the receipt of the amounts are not disputed
by respondent Nos. 2 to 6. As could be easily noticed from
the definition of the term “deposit” in Section 2(c) of the
MPID Act, reproduced above, the “deposit” is a term with
a wide amplitude. It encompasses “any receipt of money
to be returned after a specified period or otherwise with
or without benefit of interest”.
6.1 The definition of “deposit” has three facets in
the nature of ingredients. First is that there should be any
receipt of money or acceptance of a valuable commodity
by a financial establishment. On the second, the
acceptance contemplated should be returnable after a
specified period and thirdly, the return of such money or
commodity could be in cash, kind, with or without any
benefit of interest. All the above necessary ingredients to
constitute “deposit” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of
the MPID Act stands satisfied in respect of the
transaction between the appellants and respondent Nos.
2 to 6.
6.2 Such “deposit” should be accepted by a
“financial establishment”. Looking to the wide import of
the definition of Section 2(d) of the Act, since it includes
any person accepting deposits, a private respondent like
respondent Nos. 2 to 6 who accepted the money which
was deposited stand covered within the concept of
“Financial Establishment”. The individual persons like
respondents
herein
accepting
the
deposit
and
fraudulently
defaulting
become
a
“Financial
Establishment” within the definition of Section 2(d) of
the Act, and could be subjected to legal action under the
provisions of the MPID Act.
6.3 The contention that giving of amounts to
respondent Nos. 2 to 6 was a transaction of “loan”, is a
convenient suggestion. Even if the transaction is named
as “loan”, it would not take it out of the scope of the term
“deposit” as defined. Nomenclature of the transaction is
not relevant. It is not the nomenclature but the
ingredients or the basic attributes with which the
transaction is informed and characterised that would
make and mould the transaction to become “deposit”
under Section 2(c) of the MPID Act. Therefore, even if
lending of money by the appellants to respondent Nos. 2
to 6 was to be treated and termed as “loan”, it would
remain a “deposit” in the nature of money received by
respondent Nos. 2 to 6 who have the robes of “financial
establishment” as contemplated under Section 2(d) of
the MPID Act.
6.4 It is true that the appellants filed proceedings before
the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur seeking
registration of FIR against respondent Nos. 2 to 6 alleging the
offences
under
Sections 420, 409 and 405 read
with
Section 34, IPC, and that the appellants could not succeed
inasmuch as the courts held that no offence under the IPC as
alleged was made out. But then, the merits of the aspect as to
whether the lending of amount is “deposit” within the meaning
of MPID Act and whether the machinery under Section 3 of the
MPID Act could be set into motion cannot take colour from the
consideration that the criminal offences under the IPC could not
be made out.
6.5 While the criminal proceedings in respect of the
offences under the IPC in their outcome operate in their
own sphere, the machinery under the MPID Act has a
different field to operate. Both are the different statutory
regimes. Merely because the offences under the IPC were
not established before the criminal court, it would not
imply that it becomes a kind of embargo against putting
into motion the provisions of the MPID Act or that the
invocation of provisions of the MPID Act is barred
thereby.
6.6 It is not possible to take a view that the two
areas of remedies namely under the criminal law and by
invoking the provisions of the MPID Act, have the
common aspects and ingredients to follow, for, both
operate in a distinct field and in different ways. Nonmaking out of offences under the IPC cannot be equated
with non-applicability of the provisions of MPID Act. The
concepts thereunder have distinct and separate legal
connotations and a complaint under Section 3 of the
MPID Act is an independent recourse under the specific
law.
6.7 The
contention
is
therefore
entirely
misconceived that having failed to establish the offences
under the IPC, the complaint under Section 3 of the MPID
Act could not be maintained. In the same way, the plea
that the dispute is of civil nature bear no relevance, once
it is found that the transaction between the appellants
and respondent Nos. 2 to 6 satisfies the essentials of the
definition under Section 2(c) read with Section 2(d) of
the MPID Act to become “deposit”, accepted by “Financial
Establishment” entitling the appellants to file a complaint
under Section 3 of the MPID Act.
6.8 In light of the foregoing discussion and reasons,
there is no escape from the conclusion that the amounts
lent by the appellants to respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were
“deposit” within the scope and ambit of the definition in
Section 2(c) of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of
Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999.
Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 as recipients of the amounts
assume the character of a “Financial Establishment” as
defined in Section 2(d) of the MPID Act.”
23.5.3. In MANOHAR BHIMRAOJI MAHALLE v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA8 a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay
observed as follows:
“….
….
….
19. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that
Section 4 of the MPID Act is attracted when property is
acquired by using depositors money and acquisition
means the property should absolutely vest in the
“Financial Establishment”. The factual position on record
shows that substantial payments were made to the
appellants
after
“Builders/Developers”
sold
flats
proposed to be constructed on said plot to flat purchasers
and, therefore, it is clear that the depositors' monies
were used substantially in acquiring the said property.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants is
conscious of this position and therefore has not argued
much on this aspect. However, his emphasis is on the
word “acquire” which according to him is absolute
acquisition of rights regarding the property. As observed
earlier, the ‘property’ is a term of the widest import and
is subject to any limitation or qualification which the
context might require. It signifies every possible interest
which a person can acquire, hold and enjoy. If we
examine
the
said
rights
acquired
by
“Builders
Developers” i.e Financial Establishment within the frame
work of MOFA, then it is clear that the property which is
the subject matter of the present appeal need not be the
absolute property of the appellants. This is so as on the
basis of said agreement of sale dated 04.06.2012, flats
were sold to about 514 flat purchasers. Thus, it is clear
that the “Financial Establishment” has got rights in the
said property. Apart from this aspect both appellants as
well
as
the
respondents
i.e
“Builders/Developers/Financial
Establishments”
are
under obligation to perform their statutory duties under
2020 SCC OnLine Bom 368
the MOFA. In fact Section 8 of the MOFA creates charge of
flat purchasers on the said property. Thus, it is clear that
not only the said property is the property of the
“Financial Establishment” as set out herein above but
there is also a charge of the flat purchasers on the said
property. Therefore, looking from any angle it cannot be
said that no right is created by the said agreement dated
14.06.2012 and in fact, as set out herein above as the
“Financial Establishment” has rights in the said property,
Section 4 of the MPID Act is applicable to the same. Thus,
it is very clear that the property which is the subject
matter of the present appeal comes under the purview of
Section 4 of the MPID Act.
20. The MPID Act was enacted to protect the
interest of depositors in the Financial Establishments and
matters relating thereto. The term “Deposit” as defined in
Section 2(c) of the MPID Act inter alia includes any
receipt of money by any “Financial Establishment” to be
returned after a specified period or otherwise either in
cash or in kind or in the form of specified service with or
without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus, profit
or in any other form. Thus, what is contemplated is
receipt of money by the “Financial Establishment” and
return of the same in any other form. In the present case,
about 514 flat purchasers have paid substantial amounts
to
the
“Financial
Establishment”
as
“Financial
Establishment” agreed to hand over to them possession
of the flats to be constructed on the same plots. Thus, it
is clear that the purchase of flats by flat purchasers from
the “Financial Establishment” and for that purpose
payment of money to the “Financial Establishment” by
flat purchasers is covered under the definition of the term
“Deposit” under MPID Act. The exceptions mentioned in
the definition of “Deposit” are not applicable to such
purchase of flats by flat purchasers from “Financial
Establishment”. It is also to be noted that neither the
appellants nor any of the respondents contended that
money advanced by the flat purchasers to said M/s. Rana
Landmark Pvt. Ltd. is not deposit as per MPID Act and
only argument was that the title of the property has not
transferred to M/s Rana Landmark Pvt. Ltd. and that the
same is not the absolute property of said M/s. Rana
Landmark Pvt. Ltd. and therefore, Section 4 of the MPID
Act is not applicable. We have already discussed in detail
this aspect and held that the said property comes within
the purview of Section 4 of the MPID Act.
21. Section 4 of the MPID Act contemplates that two
types of properties can be attached:
(i) Property believed to have been acquired by the
“Financial Establishment” either in its own name or in
the name of any other person from out of the deposits,
collected by the “Financial Establishment”.
(ii) If it is found that property as contemplated
above is not available for attachment or not sufficient for
repayment of the deposits, such other property of the
said “Financial Establishment” or the promoter, director,
partner or manager or member of the said “Financial
Establishment”.
22. The Notification dated 29.03.2016 issued by the
Home Department of the Government of Maharashtra by
exercising power under Section 4(1) and Section 5 of MPID Act
shows that only two properties at Sr. No. 2 and 3 in the
Schedule to the said Notification are in the name of M/s. Rana
Landmark Pvt. Ltd. having approximate value of Rs.
1,20,00,000/- and Rs. 3,50,000/-. The property as Sr. No. 1 of
the said Schedule is the subject matter of the present appeal.
The properties at Sr. No. 10 and 11 are in the name of third
persons and said M/s. Rana Landmark Pvt. Ltd. are shown to be
the purchasers and that they have paid certain earnest amount.
As far as the other properties are concerned, either they are in
the name of third persons or in the name of Directors.
Therefore, only properties at Sr. No. 2 and 3 which are in the
name of M/s. Rana Landmark Pvt. Ltd. i.e. “Financial
Establishment” can be considered as properties of said
“Financial Establishment” and aggregate value of both these
properties is Rs. 1,23,50,000/-. In this background of the
matter, the affidavit in reply of Pravinkumar Bansilal Patil, PSI,
Economic Offence Wing, Amravati City dated 14.12.2018 filed
on behalf of the respondent No. 1 - State of Maharashtra states
that the total fraud committed by the accused persons is to the
tune of Rs. 13.88 Crores. Thus, it is clear that even if it is
assumed that the said property is not the property
acquired by the “Financial Establishment” out of the
deposits collected by the “Financial Establishment”, the
said property will fall in the category of “such other
property” of the said “Financial Establishment” coming in
the purview of Section 4 of the MPID Act as the
properties in the name of the “Financial Establishment”
acquired out of the deposits collected by the “Financial
Establishment” or otherwise are not sufficient for
repayment of the deposits to the depositors. If we consider
all the properties mentioned in Notification dated 29.03.2016
irrespective whether they are in the name of the “Financial
Establishment” or not then also the aggregate approximate price
of the said properties is Rs. 17,85,85,900/- and if the price of
the present property of Rs. 5,75,00,000/- is excluded from the
same then it is clear that the same will not be sufficient for
repayment of the deposits. Therefore, it is clear that the
property which is subject matter of the present appeal is the
property which is acquired by M/s. Rana Landmark Pvt. Ltd. i.e.
“Financial Establishment” in its own name from out of the
deposits collected by said “Financial Establishment” or other
property belonging to the “Financial Establishment” and
therefore, Section 4 of the MPID Act is squarely attracted to the
same.
23. As we have held for the reasons set out herein
that the said property is the property of financial
establishment, the contention that the earnest money is
excluded from the definition of “deposits” becomes
irrelevant.”
23.5.4. Again, the High Court of Bombay in the case of
SHUKUL s/o DHARMAJI MAKDE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA9
observes as follows:
“….
….
….
Criminal Application No.673 of 2021, disposed on 17-02-2026
15. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that
provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the MPID Act are not applicable
as allegations levelled against the applicant nowhere show that
the “deposits” with the said Society are misappropriated.
16. Clause(c) of Section 2 of the MPID Act defines
'deposit' as under :
"(c) "Deposit" means the deposit of money
either in one lump sum or by installments made
with the Financial Establishment for a fixed period
for interest or for return in any kind or for any
service and includes and shall be deemed always
to have included any receipt of money or
acceptance of any valuable commodity by any
Financial Establishment to be returned after a
specified period or otherwise, either in cash or in
kind or in the form of specified service with or
without any benefit in the form of interest, bonus,
profit, or in any other form, but does not include—
(i) amount raised by way of share capital or by
any way of debenture, bond or any other instrument
covered under the guidelines given, and regulations
made, by the SEBI, established under the Securities and
Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992) ;
(ii) amounts contributed as capital by partners of
a film;
(iii) amounts received from a Scheduled bank or
Shraddha Talekar PS Co-operative Bank or any other
banking company as defined in clause (c) of Section 5 of
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949);
(iv) any amount received from—
(a) the Industrial Development Bank of
India;
(b) a State Financial Institution;
(c) any financial institution specified in or
under section 6-A of Industrial Development
Bank of India Act, 1964 (18 of 1964) ; or
(d) any other institution that may be
specified by the Government in this behalf;
(v) amounts received in the ordinary course of
business by way of –
(a) security deposit;
(b) dealership deposit; and
(c) earnest money;
(vi) any amount received from an individual or a
firm or an association or individuals not being a body
corporate, registered under any enactment relating to
money lending which is for the time being in force in the
State ; and
(vii) any amount received by way of subscriptions
in receipt of a Chit.
Explanation I -- "Chit" has the meaning as
assigned to in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Chit Funds
Act, 1982 (40 of 1982);
Explanation II .-- "Any credit given by a seller to
a buyer on the sale of any property (whether movable or
immovable) shall not be deemed to be a deposit for the
purposes of this clause."
Whereas clause (d) of Section 2 defines "Financial
Establishment" as:
"(d) Financial Establishment" means any person
defined under clause (c) of Section 5 of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949)." accepting deposit
under any scheme or arrangement or in any other
manner but does not include a corporation or a cooperative society owned or controlled by any State
Government or the Central Government or a banking
company defined under clause (c) of Section 5 of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of 1949)."
17. Thus, definitions of 'deposit' and 'financial
establishment' are rather expansive. The inclusive
definition of 'deposit' covers any receipt of money or
acceptance of any valuable commodity, except those
amounts which have been specifically excluded by subclauses (i) to (vii) thereof. Thus, any person accepting
deposits under any scheme or in any other manner
satisfies the description of financial establishment except
a corporation or a co-operative society owned or
controlled by any State Government or the Central
Government or a banking company defined under the
Banking Regulation Act.
18. In the present case, admittedly, the said Society, a
cooperative institute, registered under the Cooperative Societies
Act, is running a financial establishment and statements of
witnesses disclose that they have collected “deposits.”
19. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted
that the entire controversy revolves around question as
to whether loan amounts given to various investors are
within the definition of “deposit.”
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of State of
Maharashtra vs. 63 Moon Technologies Limited, reported
in (2022)9 SCC 457, dealt with the scope and ambit of
“deposit” and “financial establishment” and held as under:
“(i) the expression 'deposit' is conspicuously
broad in its width and ambit for it includes, not
only any receipt of money but also the acceptance
of any valuable commodity by a financial
establishment under any scheme or arrangement;
(ii) the money or commodity must be liable to be
returned. However,
such return need not
necessarily be in the form of cash or kind but also
in the form of a service, with or without any
benefit such as interest;
(iii) it is not necessary that the return should be
with the benefit of interest, bonus or profit.
Therefore, if the financial establishment is
obligated to return the deposit without any
increments, it shall still fall within the purview of
Section 2(c) of the MPID Act, provided that the
deposit does not fall within any of the exceptions;
(iv) the phrase 'valuable commodity' cannot be
restricted
to
only
mean
precious
metals.
Agricultural commodities which NSEL trades in will
fall within the purview of the term, and
(v) the definition is broadly worded to include
even the possession of the commodities for a
limited purpose.”
Thus, expression 'deposit' is conspicuously broad in
its width and ambit for it includes, not only any receipt of
money but also the acceptance of any valuable
commodity by a financial establishment under any
scheme or arrangement. The expression ‘any’ is used in
the substantive part of the definition of the expression
'deposit' on five occasions namely;
“i) Any receipt of money;
(ii) Any valuable commodities;
(iii) By any financial establishment;
(iv) With or without any benefit; and
(v) In any other form.
The Hon’ble Apex Court further explains that there
is nothing in the definition of the term “deposit” to mean
that the acceptance of the commodity should be
accompanied by a transfer of title to the commodity. Even
if the financial establishment is only in “custody” of the
commodity, it would still fall within the purview of the
phrase “acceptance of commodity”.
According to the second ingredient of Section 2(c),
the money or commodity must be liable to be returned.
However, such return need not necessarily be in the form
of cash or kind but also in the form of a service, with or
without any benefit such as interest. It needs to be
recalled that clause (v) of Section 2(c) states that a
deposit of money or commodity made as a security
deposit, dealership deposit or an advance amount is
excluded from the definition of the phrase “deposit”.
21. On going through the entire record and
investigation papers, especially statements of witnesses,
it reveals that various investors have deposited the
amounts. Admittedly, the said amounts are to be
returned on maturity period. It reveals that daily deposits
are also accepted by the said Society, which are also,
admittedly, to be returned back to the investors.
22. Thus, the entire investigation papers show that
amounts are obtained by way of “deposits” from the
various investors and, therefore, the same are required to
be repaid by the said Society. Therefore, it would amount
to “deposit” within the meaning and for the purpose of
MPID Act.
23. The object of the MPID Act is only to protect the
interests of small depositors from fraud perpetrated on
unsuspecting investors, who entrusted their life’s savings
to unscrupulous and fraudulent persons and who
ultimately betrayed their trust. The said enactment was
enacted to protect the interests of small depositors from
fraud. The nature of legislation is to protect the interests
of small depositors, who invest their life’s earnings and
savings in schemes for making profit floated by
unscrupulous
individuals
and
companies,
both
incorporated and unincorporated which needs to be kept
in mind while testing the provisions of the MPID Act.
24. On going through the definition of “financial
establishment”, admittedly, the applicant, who was the
Director and responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the
Society, accepted the amounts from the various investors
and disbursed the loan amount which is public money and
has not taken steps to recover the same. It is not a
simple breach of trust but it is an offence under breach of
trust contemplated under Section 403 of the IPC.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
In the case of 63 MOONS TECHNOLOGIES supra, the Apex Court
undertook an elaborate interpretation of the expressions “deposit”
and “financial establishment” under Sections 2(c) and 2(d) of
the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors Act, 1999
(‘MPID Act’ for short). It held that the definition of “deposit” is
deliberately of wide and inclusive amplitude. The expression
covers any receipt of money or acceptance of a valuable commodity
by a financial establishment, provided it is liable to be returned—
whether in cash, kind or by rendering a specified service, with or
without interest, bonus, profit or other benefit. The expression
“deposit” under the MPID Act is intentionally broad; the
decisive considerations are receipt and an obligation of
return in cash, kind or service, subject to the express
statutory exclusions.
23.6. In ALKA AGRAWAL supra, the Apex Court reaffirmed
and
carried
forward
the
principles
declared
in
MOONS
TECHNOLOGIES. The Apex Court first emphasised the protective
object of the MPID Act namely, safeguarding depositors against
financial establishments which collect public monies and thereafter
fraudulently default. It characterised the enactment as a selfcontained statutory regime containing regulatory as well as
penal remedies.
23.7. The Apex Court further held that failure to establish IPC
offences does not prevent proceedings under the MPID Act. The two
statutory regimes operate in distinct fields, and proceedings
under the special enactment constitute an independent statutory
remedy. Whether a transaction constitutes a deposit depends
upon its substantive characteristics and not the name given
to it. A loan may constitute a deposit, and failure of an IPC
prosecution does not bar independent proceedings under the
MPID Act.
23.8. The judgment of the High Court of Bombay in
MANOHAR BHIMRAOJI MAHALLE supra, is particularly significant
to
the
issue
of
home
buyers/flat
purchasers.
The
case
concerned approximately 514 flat purchasers who had paid
substantial amounts to a builder/developer for flats proposed to be
constructed. The Court held that the builder/developer answered
the description of a “financial establishment”, and the monies
paid by flat purchasers in consideration of the promise to
construct and hand over flats were covered by the statutory
definition of “deposit” under the MPID Act. Therefore the
Money paid by flat purchasers to a builder/developer,
against the promise of construction and delivery of flats, can
constitute a “deposit” under the MPID Act; the promised
flat/service can constitute the statutory form of “return”.
23.9. In DHARAMAJI MAKDE supra the High Court of
Bombay again emphasised the expansive character of the
definitions of “deposit” and “financial establishment”. It held that
the inclusive definition of deposit embraces any receipt of money or
valuable commodity except those transactions specifically excluded
by the statute. Correspondingly, any person accepting such
deposits under a scheme, arrangement or otherwise may answer
the description of a financial establishment, subject to the statutory
exceptions. The MPID Act must be understood in light of its
depositor-protection
object;
“deposit”
and
“financial
establishment” receive a broad construction, and monies
collected from investors with an obligation of return fall
within the statute.
23.10. Read together, the judgments establish a consistent
thread: the nomenclature of the transaction is not decisive;
its substance is. A “deposit” is capable of encompassing money
received with an obligation to return the value in cash, kind or
specified service. MANOHAR BHIMRAOJI MAHALLE goes a
significant step further in the specific context of real estate by
holding that payments made by flat purchasers to a developer
against the promise of construction and delivery of flats can fall
within the definition of “deposit”.
24. Writ Petition No.31006 of 2025:
24.1. The subject petition calls in question proceedings
instituted by the Directorate of Enforcement arising from an ECIR
registered in the year 2025, which has now resulted in a PAO dated
04-10-2025. The 2025 ECIR arises from the registration of five
regular FIR’s, of which two were quashed on the ground of regular
FIR’s, of which two were quashed on the ground of settlement or
technicality like lack of jurisdiction of the concerned Court. The
other three crimes are challenged in the companion petitions which
are now dismissed for the reasons noted above. Since the entire
dispute arises from the registration of the 2025 ECIR on 05-022025, the said ECIR is required to be noticed. It reads as follows:
The afore-quoted ECIR delineates, in considerable detail, the
allegations forming the substratum of the scheduled offences, the
particulars of the transactions alleged and the material gathered
concerning their commission. It specifically records that the
offences punishable under Sections 307, 419, 420 and 120-B of
the
IPC
constitute
the
scheduled/predicate
offences
which
furnished the foundation for registration of the ECIR.
24.2. The 2025 ECIR does not rest merely upon a bald
reproduction of the offences alleged in the predicate crimes. It
proceeds
to
record
the
material
which,
according
to
the
Enforcement Directorate, demonstrates the petitioner’s involvement
in acts of fraud and his alleged participation in an organised
criminal group and activities described as racketeering. Reference is
also made to investigations undertaken by different investigating
agencies in connection with several crimes in which such allegations
have surfaced. These are the allegations and the material that form
the foundation upon which the proceedings under the Act have
been set in motion against the petitioner.
24.3. The sixth crime stands on a somewhat different footing.
It comes to be registered subsequently by the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI), pursuant to the directions issued by the
Apex Court in HIMANSHU SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA, SLP(C)
No.7649 of 2023. The genesis of this crime, therefore, is not an
independent complaint simpliciter, but the proceedings before the
Apex Court concerning the grievances of home buyers and the
manner
in
which
transactions
between
home
buyers,
builders/developers and lending Banks/Financial Institutions had
been structured and operated.
24.4.
It,
therefore,
becomes
necessary
to
notice
the
trajectory of the proceedings in HIMANSHU SINGH supra, the
orders passed from time to time, and the circumstances which
ultimately impelled the Apex Court to direct investigation by the
CBI. Equally necessary would be to notice the observations of the
Apex
Court
concerning
builders/developers
on
the
the
conduct
one
hand
and
alleged
against
Banks/Financial
Institutions on the other, in disputes arising out of builder–home
buyer transactions. Those proceedings were not confined to the
petitioner–Company alone, but encompassed similar grievances
against several other developers and lending institutions.
24.4.1. The proceedings in HIMANSHU SINGH supra soon
assumed a wider canvas. Following institution of the said petition,
several home buyers, placed in similar circumstances, approached
the
Apex
Court
against
different
builders/developers
and
Banks/Financial Institutions raising substantially similar grievances.
Those petitions came to be tagged with the principal proceedings in
HIMANSHU SINGH. Among them was a petition instituted by
home buyers of the petitioner - Company as well.
24.4.2. On 05-11-2024, the Apex Court, with a view to
ascertain the true state of affairs obtaining in the projects and the
financial arrangements surrounding them, directed the home
buyers, builders/developers and the concerned Banks/Financial
Institutions to place their respective affidavits on record. The
exercise was intended to bring before the Court, inter alia, the
stage of completion of the projects and the financial sums
involved, thereby enabling the Court to have a comprehensive
picture of the transactions which had generated the multitude of
grievances before it. The order dated 05-11-2024 reads as follows:
“…..
…..
…..
9. The controversy in these matters has arisen out of
tripartite agreements between the home buyers, the
developers, and the financial institutions. Though there
is variance in facts in this batch of matters, we broadly
find that the following information is required to be
furnished by the builder-cum developers, financial
institutions, or the home-buyers:
(i) The status and details of the payments made by
the
builder-cum-developers
to
the
financial
institutions or such payments made by the homebuyers to the financial institutions/builder-cumdevelopers.
(ii) The date of offering possession to the home-buyers,
where the project is stated to have been completed.
(iii) The current status of completion of the project,
including the details of the Completion Certificate
and other statutory certificates granted by the
prescribed authorities, along with details of the
possession given or offered to the home-buyers.
(iv) The status of recovery from the home-buyers,
namely, whether they have made EMI payments to
the banks or not.
(v) The amenities advertised by the builder-cum
developers at the time of launching the project and
the status re: completion thereof.
(vi) The status as to whether the builder-cum
developers has undergone CIRP (under IBC) or any
other coercive or non-coercive recovery procedure,
and the stage of such proceedings.
(vii) Whether the home-buyers have received any
relief or remedial order from the statutory
authorities like Real Estate Regulatory Authority
(RERA). If so, the details of such orders be also
furnished.
10. The aforesaid order contains obligations for the home
buyers/builders-cum-developers as well as the financial
institutions. All of them are, accordingly, directed to furnish
the requisite information within four weeks”
24.4.3. Despite the direction of the Apex Court in the aforequoted order most of the builders/developers and banks/financial
institutions fail to file their compliance affidavits due to which the
Apex Court thought it fit to constitute an Special Investigation Team
to uncover the nexus between the Banks/Financial Institutions and
builders/developers and therefore by order dated 04-03-2025
directs the CBI to be present on the next date of hearing. The order
dated 04-03-2025 reads as follows:
“1. The instant batch of petitions concern the
disbursement of funds by banks to builders-cumdevelopers through subvention schemes for various
housing development projects in Noida, Greater Noida,
Gurugram, and other nearby areas.
2. There are three parties to the subvention schemes –
the
aggrieved
homebuyers,
the
builders-cumdevelopers, and the banks/financial institutions. The
aggrieved homebuyers are the Petitioners before this
court.
3. All the aggrieved homebuyers purchased units in
some or the other development projects launched by the
builders-cum developers. Through the subvention
scheme, the builders-cum developers advertised that
they would pay the EMI/pre-EMI of the loans taken by
the homebuyers to purchase the said units in their
development projects, till the specified cut-off taken or
till the date of possession, depending on the terms of
each tripartite agreement. The homebuyers obtained
loans from the respondent-banks.
4. In furtherance of these tripartite agreements, the
banks disbursed majority of the loan amounts to the
builders-cum developers upfront. In 2018 and 2019,
when the builders-cum developers defaulted on the
required EMI/pre-EMI payments, the banks began to
demand payments from the homebuyers. It is pertinent
to note that at the time of demanding payment from
them, the homebuyers had not still received possession
of their purchased units. In fact, the development
projects were still under construction, incomplete, or
had not even begun construction till then. Many of these
projects incomplete and to this day, most homebuyers have
not been granted possession of their units. Owing to this, in
2020, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (in short,
“CIRP”) proceedings commenced under the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the builders-cum-developers,
before various National Company Law Tribunals across those
regions.
5. Aggrieved by the banks claiming monthly instalments from
them, the homebuyers approached the High Court of Delhi for
a writ of mandamus, inter alia, directing, among others: (i) the
banks to charge EMI/pre-EMI payments from the builderscum-developers, not the homebuyers; (ii) to refund the
already recovered amount to the homebuyers and recover it
from the builders-cum-developers; and (iii) the RBI to take
strict action against the banks. Parallelly, some homebuyers
approached the Real Estate Regulatory Authorities and various
consumer fora for relief. The High Court, vide a common
judgment dated 14.03.2022, dismissed the writ petitions
owing to the alternate remedy available before the Real Estate
Regulatory Authority.
6. Challenging the same, the homebuyers have
approached this Court. The homebuyers allege that: (i)
Since the subject matter of the writ petitions concerned
public interest and thousands of homebuyers, the writ
petitions ought not to have been dismissed by the High
Court; (ii) Almost 70-80% of the loan amounts were
disbursed by the banks to the builders-cum-developers
as ‘first tranche,’ despite project milestones not being
achieved; and (iii) The banks and financial institutions
violated several provisions of the 2013 RBI Guidelines
when disbursing the amounts as the disbursal was done
without any form of due diligence on behalf of the
banks.
7. On 05.11.2024, in order to have a better understanding of
the latest stage of construction for the development projects
and the large financial sums involved, and to ultimately ensure
that reliefs are granted in a timely manner, this Court directed
the homebuyers, builders-cum-developers, and banks/financial
institutions to furnish the following information by way of
compliance affidavits within 4 weeks:
(i)
The status and details of the payments made by
the builder cum-developers to the financial
institutions or such payments made by the homebuyers to the financial institutions/builder-cumdevelopers.
(ii)
The date of offering possession to the homebuyers, where the project is stated to have been
completed.
(iii)
The current status of completion of the project,
including the details of the Completion Certificate
and other statutory certificates granted by the
prescribed authorities, along with details of the
possession given or offered to the home-buyers.
(iv)
The status of recovery from the home-buyers,
namely, whether they have made EMI payments to
the banks or not.
(v)
The amenities advertised by the builder-cum
developers at the time of launching the project and
the status re: completion thereof.
(vi)
The status as to whether the builder-cum
developers has undergone CIRP (under IBC) or any
other coercive or non-coercive recovery procedure,
and the stage of such proceedings.
(vii)
Whether the home-buyers have received any relief
or remedial order from the statutory authorities
like Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA). If so,
the details of such orders be also furnished.
8. As a last opportunity, on 07.01.2025, this Court granted the
Respondent-banks/financial institutions and builders-cum
developers 4 more weeks to file their compliance affidavits.
9.
Despite
this
Court’s
repeated
instructions,
emphasizing the seriousness of the matter, out of
roughly 40 builders-cum developers and roughly 30
banks/financial institutions, only 9 banks/financial
institutions and 5 builders-cum-developers have filed
their compliance affidavits for the order dated
05.11.2024.
10. This blatant disregard and ignorance of the Court’s
directions,
coupled
with
their
reluctance
in
appropriately assisting the Court, hints towards a
possible collusion between the builders-cum-developers
and the banks/financial institutions.
11. In such circumstances, it may be necessary to
constitute a Special Investigation Team (in short, “SIT”)
to uncover the nexus between the banks/financial
institutions and the builders-cum developers with
respect to the development projects where the
homebuyers have paid substantial amounts and where
the development projects have not even been launched,
have not completed construction, or have not begun
construction.
12. The Standing Counsel for the Central Bureau of
Investigation (in short, “CBI”) is directed to remain present in
this Court on the next date of hearing for the purpose of
constituting an SIT. He may also have instructions as to
why the CBI should not be asked to register a case and
then proceed to investigate the nexus between the
banks and the builders. Alternatively, constitution of a SIT
at its own will also be considered by this Court.”
24.4.4. Later, on 18-03-2025 the Apex Court appoints an
Amicus Curiae to assist the Court and the learned Amicus was
directed to submit a brief note on how to proceed further with the
matter. The order dated 18-03-2025 reads as follows:
“1. In deference to the order dated 04.03.2025, Ms. Aishwarya
Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, has entered
appearance on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI). She informs that some CBI officers are also present. We
have impressed upon her to discuss with the CBI authorities
and put up a proposal as to how would they intend to proceed
with the enquiry/investigation into the issues that are briefly
noticed in our order dated 04.03.2025 and those passed prior
thereto. She assures that such a proposal shall be put up
before the Court within two weeks.
2. We also feel that in order to effectively unearth the
underlying issues, an amicus curiae need to be
appointed, especially someone having expertise and
vast investigative/administrative experience besides a
command over the legal intricacies. In this regard, we
request Mr. Rajeev Jain, Advocate, former Director,
Intelligence Bureau and a former Member of the
National Human Rights Commission to assist the Court
as an amicus curiae. He is also requested to submit a
brief note as how to proceed further in the matter.
3. The Registry is directed to supply an up-to-date soft copy of
the SLP paperbooks to the learned amicus forthwith.”
24.4.5. The Apex Court on 29-04-2025 directs the CBI to
conduct
a
preliminary
enquiry
in
terms
of
the
suggestions
submitted by the learned Amicus. The order dated 29-04-2025
reads as follows:
“1. This batch of cases, comprising more than 170
petitions
have
been
filed
by
over
homebuyers/borrowers. They have raised an issue of
paramount importance re: the systematic failure of
statutory and government authorities to discharge their
functions, circumvention of regulatory framework by
Banks and Housing Financial Corporations, and the
resultant illicit benefits said to have been drawn by
builders/developers at the cost of the homebuyers, who
are now bearing the brunt of such failures.
2. The common background of each of these matters, as
noted by this Court on 04.03.2025 also, is that the
builders/developers
advertised
the
‘subvention
schemes’ assuring payment of the EMI/pre-EMI(s) of
the home-loans taken by the homebuyers to purchase
the units in their projects till a specified cut-off date or
till the date of delivery of possession. The scheme was
implemented in most cases by taking loans through a
tripartite
agreement
among
the
bank/financial
institution, homebuyer(s), and the builder/developer.
While these projects were launched in the years 20132015, most of the builder/developers started defaulting
in payment of EMIs in the years 2018-2019. Resultantly,
the banks began to demand payments from the
homebuyers, and consequential failure to make the
payments led to the coercive actions against the
homebuyers, despite the units being incomplete and
there being no occasion to offer possession.
3. Some of the aggrieved homebuyers approached the High
Court of Delhi, and having failed to get the desired relief, they
have approached this Court under Article 136, while some
others have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court for
similar reliefs.
4. When the matter came up for hearing on 05.11.2024, this
Court directed the parties to furnish the detailed information
relating to the following aspects:
“(i) The status and details of the payments made by the
builder-cum-developers to the financial institutions or such
payments made by the home-buyers to the financial
institutions/builder-cum-developers.
(ii) The date of offering possession to the home-buyers, where
the project is stated to have been completed.
(iii) The current status of completion of the project, including
the details of the Completion Certificate and other statutory
certificates granted by the prescribed authorities, along with
details of the possession given or offered to the home-buyers.
(iv) The status of recovery from the home-buyers, namely,
whether they have made EMI payments to the banks or not.
(v) The amenities advertised by the builder-cum developers at
the time of launching the project and the status re: completion
thereof.
(vi) The status as to whether the builder-cum developers has
undergone CIRP (under IBC) or any other coercive or noncoercive recovery procedure, and the stage of such
proceedings.
(vii) Whether the home-buyers have received any relief or
remedial order from the statutory authorities like Real Estate
Regulatory Authority (RERA). If so, the details of such orders
be also furnished.”
5. On receipt of that information, this Court, on
04.03.2025, prima facie found that there was some
unholy nexus between the banks/Housing Financial
Corporations on one hand and the builder cumdevelopers on the other. It was in this context that the
Central Bureau of Investigation was asked to be
represented on the next date of hearing.
6. On 18.03.2025, learned Additional Solicitor General of
India, along with some officers of the CBI, was present in
Court. They were requested to suggest the manner in which
the CBI would proceed with the inquiry or investigation into
the issues that were briefly formulated in our previous order.
With a view to have qualitative assistance to unearth the truth
behind the challenges laid by the homebuyers/borrowers, we
also requested Mr. Rajiv Jain, adv. (former Director,
Intelligence Bureau and former member of the National Human
Rights Commission) to assist this Court as an Amicus Curiae.
He was also requested to submit a brief note with respect to
the future course of action.
7. In deference to the order dated 18.03.2025, learned Amicus
Curiae has after deep analysis, submitted a self-explanatory
report identifying (i) the builder-cum-developers; (ii) the
banks and HFCs; and the approximate loan amount secured by
them through the subvention schemes. The aforesaid note
reveals that; (a) one of the builder-cum-developers, Supertech
Limited, has over 21 projects in six cities; (b) it entered into
tripartite agreements under the subvention scheme with 19
different banks/HFCs, concerning approximately 800 aggrieved
homebuyers before us; (c) of the 19 banks/HFCs, 8
institutions, namely, Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited,
Punjab National Bank Housing Finance Limited, Dewan Housing
Finance Limited, HDFC Housing Finance Limited, ICICI Bank
Limited, India Infoline Housing Finance Limited, L&T Housing
Finance Limited, and Aditya Birla Housing Finance Limited,
figure in most of the 21 projects of Supertech Ltd.; and (d) the
rest of 11 banks/HFCs and funding of some projects by them
are also duly mentioned in the report. Learned Amicus Curie
has further recommended that the underlying nexus between
Supertech Ltd. and these 8 banks deserves to be investigated
on priority.
8. The report further reveals that Supertech Ltd. alone has
secured loans worth approximately Rs.5,157.86 crores since
1998. In this respect, the learned amicus has opined that the
concerned agency should also examine the nexus of Supertech
Ltd. with such other banks, namely, Corporation Bank, IDBI
Bank, Punjab and Sind Bank, India Bank, and Punjab National
Bank, who have extended separate loans of large amounts to
the former.
9. The details of the other builder-cum-developers and
the financial institutions with whom there were
tripartite agreements, have been executed are also
highlighted in the note submitted by the learned
Amicus.
10. The learned Amicus Curiae has, in conclusion, made the
following consolidated recommendations as to how to proceed
further in the matter:
“39. In view of the above, it is imperative to reach a fair, just
and equitable resolution; hence, an appropriate framework for
this purpose needs to be evolved. To proceed further in the
matter, this Hon’ble Court should consider thorough investigation
in the matter. While some recommendations have been indicated
in the contextual paragraphs above, following are the
consolidated recommendations :a. The CBI be directed to initiate Preliminary
Enquiries (PE) in this batch of cases to investigate
the
alleged
collusion
of
Banks
and
builders/developers, etc. It has an all-India
jurisdiction and the expertise to handle such cases.
b.
Since
a
large
number
of
Banks
and
builders/developers are involved in this batch of
petitions, the CBI may initiate multiple PEs based on
territorial and / or thematic considerations.
c. The PEs should be prioritised in the following order: on
Supertech Ltd., on projects in the NCR region, on the
remaining projects.
d. The CBI should immediately initiate a PE on the case
relating to Supertech Ltd. (refer para 32 above). The
enquiry should encompass the alleged underlying nexus
between Supertech Ltd. and the above mentioned 8 Banks
/ HFCs (who have extended subvention loans in most of
the projects) should be investigated by the concerned
agency in priority. In addition, the agency should also
examine the nexus, if any, with the 3 other Banks and their
relevant related entities who have extended large amounts
of separate loans to Supertech Ltd., including Corporation
Bank, IDBI Bank and Punjab & Sind Bank. The agreements
of Supertech Ltd. with the Lessees and developers should
also be examined.
e. The CBI should thoroughly investigate the functioning of
builders, and a forensic audit may be directed for this
purpose. (Refer para 24 above).
f. The CBI should also examine the Joint Development
Agreements (between the Lessee and developer) so that
the entity which is liable to carry out the obligations and
commitments of the builder to the Banks is identified and
the homebuyers can have protection from the financial
duress they are being put into. Noticeably, the Tripartite
Agreement of Axis Bank, referred to hereinabove,
specifically reserves the right to proceed against the
builder/developer. (Refer para 28 above).
g. In the light of the issues highlighted hereinabove, the
lukewarm stand of RBI and the apparent disdain of
Banks/HFCs for RBI/NHB Regulations, the CBI should also
enquire into the following with respect to each Bank :i.
Whether
the
Banks
disbursed
amounts
to
builders/developers
in
contravention
of
Directions/Guidelines of the RBI/NHB prohibiting upfront
disbursal disconnected with stages of construction and
also the construction linked payment plans and
correlation, if any, between direct and upfront disbursals
by the Banks (of loans sanctioned to homebuyersborrowers) to builders/developers and the stages of
construction of different projects.
ii. If such disbursals had been made, then under whose
authorization and with whose involvement.
iii. Whether the amounts were in fact disbursed to the
builder and not to any third party on their behalf. The
said aspect may require a forensic audit of the Banks.
iv. The manner in which tripartite/quadripartite loan
agreements (which appear to be in a standard format
for respective Banks) were formulated by different
Banks and extended to customers, i.e., Board
Resolutions/actions of key managerial personnel
sanctioning it. Pertinently, the RBI has maintained that
“innovative housing loans” are an instrument on the
operational side of Banks who have independence on
how to formulate them.
v. Some Banks also entered into separate bilateral
agreements with builders/developers on the subvention
scheme. These also need to be investigated.
vi. The policies formulated by Banks/HFCs on making
customers aware of the risks associated with subvention
plans and outright/bulk disbursals by Banks to builders
may be directed to be produced. It needs to be inquired
if the operational branches of Banks cautioned the
borrowers accordingly.
vii. Further, information may also be called regarding
steps, if any, taken by Banks to recover the loan
amounts from the builders/developers. (Refer para 19
above).
h. Directions be issued to authorities like the RBI, NHB,
NOIDA Authority, Greater Noida Authority, Yamuna
Expressway Development Authority, to appoint a Nodal
Officer each to respond to queries of the CBI and to
coordinate accordingly.
i. The CBI will require additional resources to undertake
this huge task. Hence, a team of officers headed by a
Gazetted officer each from the concerned states like UP
and Haryana should be sent on deputation by the state
Police to the CBI. They will be involved in the PEs under the
supervision of the CBI officers.
j. The CBI be directed to submit relevant information to the
amicus curiae.
k. The RBI be directed to examine the case of a borrower
each of a half a dozen different Banks who had opted for
the subvention scheme to check whether the Banks
complied
with
the
provisions
of
extant
RBI
Guidelines/Circulars, particularly relating to disbursal of
loan amounts based on stage of construction and suitable
cautioning of borrowers by Banks about the potential
pitfalls of innovative home loan schemes. (Refer para 14
above).
l. The NHB be directed to submit its report in the matter
and also to examine the case of a borrower each of a half a
dozen different HFCs who had opted for the subvention
scheme to check whether the Banks complied with the
provisions of its extant Circulars, particularly relating to
disbursal of loan amounts based on stage of construction,
suitable cautioning of borrowers by Banks about the
potential pitfalls of innovative home loan schemes, Board
approval for the schemes, etc. (Refer para 17 above).
m. All the parties be reminded to submit their reports as
ordered vide Order dated 5.11.2024 of this Hon’ble Court.
n. All the parties and the CBI be directed to send a copy of
each of their reports being submitted to the court directly
to the amicus curiae.
o. Since there are a large number of petitions, all the
parties having common Banks as Respondents should
appoint a Nodal Advocate who can coordinate the
submissions.
p. Interim protection to homebuyers to continue as per
earlier orders.”
11. Mr. Ram Singh, Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau
of Investigation, EO-1, New Delhi has also submitted a
proposal by way of an affidavit. It is pointed out that there are
174 petitions filed by 1205 homebuyers–petitioners, who had
approached the Court with the following directions:
(i) The banks/financial institutions to charge EMI/pre-EMI
from the builders-cum-developers and not from the
homebuyers;
(ii) The banks/financial institutions to refund the already
recovered amount to the homebuyer and recover it from
the developers; and
(iii) the RBI to take strict action against the banks.
12. In his affidavit, the Superintendent of Police, CBI has
explained that there are in total 40 builder-cum-developers
who are involved in these matters, out of whom the largest
number of petitioners (799) pertain to Supertech Ltd.
13. The CBI has, thereafter, proposed that Preliminary
Enquiries be undertaken, underlining that with the information
available as of now being limited, commission of cognizable
offence on the part of the builders and financial institutions is
not clear. It is suggested that, with a view to arrive at a
finding as to what actually transpired; what was the exact
modus operandi of the builders; if and how they colluded with
the financial institutions; and what was the exact criminality
on the part of the builders or the financial institutions, it is
necessary that 7 Preliminary Enquiries are registered and
taken forward. The affidavit explains the details of the
proposed 7 Preliminary Enquiries as follows:
9. … … …
a) Since, out of 174 SLPs filed by 1205 petitioners, 84 SLPs
filed by 799 petitioners pertain to one builder group i.e. M/s.
Supertech Ltd. and there are multiple projects of M/s
Supertech Ltd. located in 8 different cities. It is propsoed
that 01 Preliminary Enquiry may be initiated against the
builder M/s Supertech Ltd. projects which is impleaded in
these 174 SLPs.
b) For rest of the builders, the maximum number of projects
of the respondent builders are in NCR region i.e. Noida,
Greater Noida, Gurugram, Yamuna Expressway and
Ghaziabad. As, there would be separate development
authority for each city, it is proposed to register 05
Prelimiary Enquiries, 1 each for the projects falling under
one development authority i.e., Noida, Greater Noida,
Yamuna Expressway, Gurugram and Ghaziabad.
c) For the projects of the respondent builders except
M/s Supertech Ltd. falling outside NCR region i.e.,
Mumbai, Bangalore, Kolkata, Mohali and Allahabad, it
is proposed that 01 Preliminary enquiry may be
registered for all such projects.
10. That thus, in total 07 Preliminary Enquiries are being
proposed to be registered with a prayer that 03 months’
time period may kindly be provided to submit the reports.”
…..
…..
…..
16. We find that the consolidated recommendations
made by learned Amicus Curiae and the suggestions
given by CBI to commence with 7 Preliminary Enquiries
for the time-being are in tandem.
17. While we propose to issue directions from time to
time, pursuant to various recommendations made by the
learned Amicus Curiae, as of now, we direct the Central
Bureau of Investigation to register seven Preliminary
Enquiries, in the manner as suggested in the affidavit
filed on its behalf. To be specific, the scope of these
Preliminary Enquiries shall be as per paragraph 9 of the CBI’s
affidavit (reproduced above), namely;
(i) One Preliminary Enquiry in respect of the projects
launched by M/s Supertech Ltd;
(ii) One Preliminary Enquiry each (total five) in respect of
projects in NCR in different areas, namely, NOIDA,
Greater NOIDA, Yamuna Expressway, Gurugram, and
Ghaziabad; and
(iii) One Preliminary Enquiry in respect of the projects
outside of NCR, in which M/s Supertech Ltd. is not a
builder/developer.”
24.4.6. On 22-07-2025, the CBI files the interim status report
in respect of the preliminary enquiry being conducted pursuant to
the directions of the Apex Court. By order dated 22-07-2025, the
Apex Court proposes that, the CBI should register regular cases and
proceed with the investigation. The order dated 22-07-2025 reads
as follows:
“…..
…..
…..
9. In compliance with the order dated 29.04.2025, the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has filed an interim status
report, inter alia, stating: (i) the gist of common allegations of
preliminary enquiries; (ii) Focal point of enquiry in 7
preliminary enquiries, registered pursuant to the earlier
orders; (iii) summary of common action taken; (iv) discussion
about subvention scheme; (v) outcome of enquiry from
Reserve Bank of India and National Housing Bank; (vi) the
preliminary enquiry against M/s. Supertech Ltd. highlighting
the analysis of preliminary outcome based in physical
inspection of projects etc. Similar analysis in respect of the
other projects located in Greater Noida Authority, Gurugram
Authority, Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development
Authority, Ghaziabad Authority.
10. As regard to the preliminary enquiry registered in respect
of projects outside NCR, the report indicates that the said
enquiry is still continuing and it will be completed in the next
six weeks time period.
11. So far as the preliminary enquiries undertaken in six
cases is concerned, the CBI has proposed the further
course of action in paragraph 83 of the report. The CBI
has recommended registration of 22 regular cases to
enable it to undertake further investigation into these
matters. As of now, we accept the recommendations
contained in Paragraphs 83, 84 and 85 of the report.
Consequently, the CBI shall register the regular cases
and proceed further in accordance with law.
12. In the process of investigation, if the CBI finds any kind of
impediment or additional support, they shall be at liberty to
approach this Court and appropriate directions to that effect
will be issued.
13. So far as the preliminary enquiry in respect of the
projects outside NCR, six weeks more time is granted to
complete the preliminary enquiry.
14. We appreciate the outstanding efforts made by the CBI in
completion of the six preliminary enquiries for which, we
believe that more than 1000 persons have been examined and
voluminous records have been looked into by them, besides
visiting 58 project sites. We expect that even after registration
of the regular cases, the CBI will, having regard to the
magnitude and gravity of the issues, promptly investigate and
take the investigation to its logical conclusion.
15. Mr. Rajiv Jain, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted
a comprehensive note dated 20.07.2025. His report has
critically analysed the issues like: (i) unequal bargaining
power between the parties resulting in contravention of
guidelines of RBI and NHB; (ii) the status of the projects
and payment plans; (iii) information about loan
disbursements; (iv) lopsided terms of builder –
homebuyer agreements; (v) possible recourse by
banks/HFCS; (vi) property security myth and mortgage
in
builder
builder
and
tripartite/quadripartite
agreements and the role of development authorities;
(vii) status of developers and hidden players – role and
impact; (viii) on efficacy of RERA and disclosures on
their websites; (ix) regulatory lapses by development
authorities; and, (x) honoraria.
16. In the aforesaid report, Note No. 1 highlights the
transparency and responsibility of development authorities
including RERA and the necessity to reconsider their role with
reference to the protection of home buyers from unscrupulous
builders.”
24.4.7. On 23-09-2025, CBI submits before the Apex Court
that the preliminary enquiry in terms of the directions issued by the
Apex Court on 29-04-2025 was complete and that post the
preliminary enquiry it was found that a cognizable case was made
out and directs that the CBI should register a case and proceed with
the investigation. The order dated 23-09-2025 reads as follows:
“1. On oral mention, the main case is taken on the Board.
2. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India, on
instructions, informs that the preliminary enquiry by the
CBI, in terms of the directions issued earlier, is
complete and as per such enquiry, a cognizable offence
is made out.
3. That being so, the CBI will register the case under the
appropriate provisions of law and proceed to investigate
the same.
4. A copy of the preliminary enquiry report be handed over to
the learned amicus after completion of the search and seizure
to enable him to assist the Court on the date fixed, i.e.,
16.10.2025”
24.4.8. On 20-01-2026, the learned Amicus submitted a
comprehensive status report running into more than two volumes.
The report sets out, in detail, the actions of seven Banks/Financial
Institutions and examines the issues surrounding the projects of the
petitioner-Company, along with the further course of action. It also
undertakes
an
in-depth
examination
of
the
role
of
the
Banks/Financial Institutions and the Builders/Developers, and the
alleged frauds committed by them, leaving the landowners and
homebuyers
with
very
limited
recourse.
The
order
dated
20-01-2026 reads as follows:
“…..
…..
…..
7. This matter pertains to the systematic misuse of the
subvention scheme by various private builders-cumdevelopers, apparently in collusion and connivance with
the banks and the financial institutions. On 22.07.2025,
comprehensive directions were issued, and pursuant
thereto, a brief note was handed over on behalf of the
CBI to the effect that, in compliance with those
directions, 22 regular cases were registered on
28.07.2025 as per the provisions of law. Thereafter,
searches were carried out at the residential/ official
premises of the accused persons. Out of these 22 cases,
investigations in the following 3 cases are complete,
and pursuantly, chargesheets have been filed against
the builder companies and their directors:
“1. RC 219 2025 E0015 (M/S. Rudra Buildwell
Constructions Pvt. Ltd.), Project: 'KBNOWS Apartments'
Greater Noida.
2. RC 219 2025 E0017 (M/S. Dream Procon Private Ltd.)
Project: 'Victory Ace' Noida.
3. RC 219 2025 E0020 (M/S. Jaypee Infratech Ltd.)
Project: "Orchards" Noida.”
8. During the course of the hearing, we are informed that the
above-stated chargesheets have been filed in the Court of
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Rouse Avenue Courts, Delhi.
We direct the Court concerned to consider the chargesheets
filed and proceed with the matter in accordance with law
within two weeks.
9. With reference to the subsequent order dated
23.09.2025, the note submitted by the CBI reveals that
6 regular cases were registered on 25.09.2025, and
some
searches
were
carried
out
at
the
residential/official premises of the suspects. All these
cases are still under active investigation. The extract of
the status report is said to have been shared with the learned
Amicus Curiae. It is also explained that the requisite police
officers/officials have been taken on deputation from the State
Police of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. Learned Additional
Solicitor General of India representing the CBI states that the
investigation will be completed promptly, and a fresh status
report shall be filed before the next date of hearing.
10. Mr. Rajiv Jain, learned Amicus Curiae, has submitted a
very comprehensive status report comprising two volumes. It
delves into the details of the actions of 7
banks/financial
institutions,
particularly
the
circumstances surrounding the Ozone projects and the
further course of action. The report provides an in-depth
analysis of the role of the banks and financial
institutions, leaving the land owners with very limited
recourse but to agree to the terms of their respective
agreements. In many Tripartite agreements, the banks
have ample power to move against the builders for the
recovery of money. They can also seek a full refund
from the builders if the unit is abandoned by the
purchasers, while the builders are only entitled to retain
the earnest money paid by the purchasers. The report
shockingly reveals how unfairly the home buyers or the
land owners have been treated.
11. It seems to us that the report submitted by the learned
Amicus Curiae will be extremely helpful for the CBI to take the
ongoing investigation to a logical conclusion. We have,
therefore, impressed upon Mr. Rajiv Jain, learned Amicus
Curiae, to handover a soft copy of the report to Ms. Aishwarya
Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General of India,
representing the CBI, for further information and necessary
action.
12. The note submitted on behalf of the CBI reveals that, at
present, 25 regular cases are under active consideration.
These FIRs pertain only to those cases that came up for
consideration before this Court when the orders dated
22.07.2025 and 23.09.2025 were passed. Thereafter, various
other home buyers have also approached this Court by filing
independent writ petition(s) or as intervenor(s).
13. The counsel for the petitioners in the writ petition(s) as
well as those who have applied to become intervenor(s) are
directed to handover soft copies of their respective
petitions/applications to Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned
Additional Solicitor General of India representing the CBI, so
as to enable the CBI to examine those matters and register
further regular cases, wherever required”
24.4.9. Subsequently, on 06-08-2026, the Apex Court issues
certain interim directions to facilitate expeditious and time-bound
investigation by the CBI. The CBI was directed to furnish to the
Directorate of Enforcement the details of cases in which the
Directorate was required to take cognizance of offences relating to
proceeds of crime. The CBI was further particularly directed to
conduct
a
thorough
investigation
into
the
allegations
and
documents contained in the representations alleging offences by the
Banks, land authorities and the builder, namely, the petitionerCompany, Ozone Group, in the States of Karnataka, Maharashtra
and Tamil Nadu. The order dated 06-08-2026 reads as follows:
“1. This batch of petitions, largely instituted at the
instance of certain home buyers-cum-borrowers, have
been directed against the systemic failure of the
statutory and Government authorities to discharge their
functions, as also against the circumvention of the
regulatory framework by Banks and Housing Financial
Corporations (HFC), resulting in alleged illicit benefits
drawn by the builders cum-developers at the cost of
homebuyers, without completing the subject-projects
and handing over possession of the allotted premises.
2. This Court, having considered the recommendations of Shri
Rajiv Jain, learned Amicus Curiae, in a self-speaking order
dated 29.04.2025 and subsequent orders, initially directed the
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to complete preliminary
enquiries and thereafter register regular cases for investigation
into the alleged offences. In due course of time, the CBI has
registered 56 FIRs, of which final reports have been filed in 18
cases, along with 17 charge-sheets and 1 closure report.
3. The CBI has now filed its 5th Supplementary Status Report,
according to which, out of the 17 cases where a chargesheet
was filed, cognizance has been taken in 3 cases. In 5 cases,
the delinquent role of officials of the financial institutions has
also emerged during the course of investigation, and they too
have been chargesheeted under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988. However, sanction under Section 19 of that Act is
awaited from the competent authority/authorities. We are
informed that, in total, 34 prosecution sanctions are awaited in
respect of different officials, the details whereof have also
been mentioned in the Report.
4. It is further stated that the learned Amicus Curiae has
forwarded an additional set of 38 Special Leave Petitions and
52 Interlocutory Applications on 04.05.2026 to the CBI for
further examination and appropriate action thereon. These
matters also pertain to similar allegations concerning real
estate projects, but relate to the same companies and
projects, in regard whereof CBI has already registered cases.
5. The CBI has further pointed out that due to the increase in
the volume and national scale of these investigations,
additional police officials need to be requisitioned. Accordingly,
requests for requisitioning police officers from the States of
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Haryana,
Punjab, and Karnataka were made through a communication
sent by the Director, CBI. However, the aforementioned States
have neither provided the requisite additional police personnel,
nor responded to the CBI Director’s request. Consequently, the
CBI has prayed for certain interim directions.
6. The learned Amicus Curiae has filed his status reports in the
form of Note Nos. 7 and 8, both dated 06.08.2026. In Note
No. 7, it has been pointed out that a total of 283 Special Leave
Petitions, Writ Petitions, Transfer Petitions, and Interlocutory
Applications
have
been
filed,
relating
to
petitioners/applicants. Out of them, only 977 persons have
furnished the requisite information as on 01.08.2026, as per
the Form provided by the learned Amicus, while he has been
able to obtain the necessary information for 45 more such
persons from their filings. However, information qua several
hundred petitioners/applications is still not available.
7. The Report submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae is self
speaking with respect to: (i) the present status of the projects
and builders; and (ii) the exposure faced by the Banks and
HFCs. At its conclusion, the Note contains certain
recommendations made by the learned Amicus, which warrant
necessary directions by this Court.
8. Learned Amicus Curiae has also, through Note No. 8,
submitted his comments on the investigation by the CBI and
his comments on various representations seeking CBI
enquiry/investigation. It is, inter alia, pointed out that the CBI
has made available the investigation reports of three cases
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Report. The learned Amicus
has also provided soft copies of 81 Special Leave Petitions and
52 Interlocutory Applications to the CBI, which have been filed
meanwhile and have been scrutinised by him. Thereafter, it is
explained that the learned Amicus Curiae has received detailed
representations, notes, and supporting documents from the
learned advocates/counsel and homebuyers across multiple
States in connection with the subject-matter(s). The
categorization of these representations too has been included
as part of the Note. Finally, learned Amicus has also sought
certain directions to the CBI.
9. We have heard learned Amicus Curiae and other learned
senior counsel/counsel for the parties. In addition, Ms.
Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General
representing the CBI, has also been heard.
10. In order to facilitate the expeditious and time-bound
investigation by the CBI and as prayed for by it in its 5th
Supplementary Status Report along with the directions sought
by learned Amicus Curiae to CBI, we issue the following
interim directions:
(i)
The Directors General of Police of the States of Uttar
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Haryana,
Punjab, and Karnataka are directed to expeditiously
provide additional suitable police officials as per the
request received from CBI, on deputation. The requisite
suitable officers shall be nominated/deputed as early as
possible, but not later than two weeks. In the event of
any delay or failure, this Court will be constrained to take
a serious view of the non-compliance;
(ii)
The competent authorities of the Bank of India, the State
Bank of India, the United Commercial Bank, HDFC Bank
Ltd., ICICI Bank, and Samman Capital Ltd. are directed
to expeditiously process and accord necessary sanction
under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 for prosecution of their officers/officials who have
been prima facie found involved by the CBI during the
course of investigation. The needful shall be done within
two weeks, failing which the competent authority shall
submit an explanation to this Court;
(iii) The CBI is directed to convey to the Directorate of
Enforcement the details of such cases where the
Directorate is required to take cognizance of
offences relating to the proceeds of crime;
(iv) The CBI is directed to scrutinise and take cognizance of
the representations, documentary evidence, and further
material as forwarded by the learned Amicus Curiae;
(v)
The CBI shall conduct a thorough investigation into the
aspects highlighted by the learned Amicus Curiae, in his
comments on the 3 charge-sheets. The detailed
comments form part of Note No. 8, a soft copy whereof
will be supplied by the learned Amicus Curiae in a pen
drive or through email to the office of the learned
Additional Solicitor General for the CBI’s consideration;
(vi) The CBI is further directed to conduct a thorough
investigation into the allegations and relied upon
documents of the six representations alleging
offences by the Banks, land authorities, and the
builder, namely, Ozone Group in the States of
Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu; Vivansaa
Baalsam in Bengaluru; Rudra Buildwell Construction Pvt.
Ltd. in Greater NOIDA; and Omaxe Group in Chandigarh.
A separate status report with respect to the
investigation
against
these
builders/banking
institutions shall be submitted before this Court;
and
(vii) In the course of ongoing investigation, particularly
where there is no quadripartite agreement, despite
the lessee and developer/builder being different,
the CBI shall examine whether the banks/HFCs,
either ignorantly, negligently, or consciously,
signed an agreement to create a mortgage over the
flat/apartment in the absence of the actual
leaseholders and whether any wrongful loss was
caused to the banks/HFCs due to such exclusion.”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
24.5. The sixth FIR, registered by the CBI as FIR No.
RC2192025E0031 on 25-09-2025 pursuant to the directions issued
by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted orders, is for offences
punishable under Sections 420 read with 120-B of the IPC and
Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The gist of the
allegations in the FIR read as follows:
“In compliance to Order dated 29.04.2025 of Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India In SLP (Civil) No. 7649/2023
titled Himanshu Singh vs Union of India & others;
Preliminary Enquiry No. 2192025E0007 of projects falling
outside Delhi/NCR was registered against various
builders including M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Developers
Pvt. Ltd having its project ""Ozone Avenue" addressed at
NH-7, Kannamangalla Village, KasabaHobli, DevanahalliTaluk,
Bangalore Rural District, Bengaluru, Karnataka, Unknown Bank
Officials, Unknown Private Persons and Other Unknown.
Enquiry revealed that there are 01 SLP and 03 petitioners
involved in the SLPs pertaining to M/s Ozone Urbana
Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. as mentioned below:
SLP No.
No. of Petitioners
SLP/ Diary No. 49573 of 2024
It is revealed that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Developers
Pvt. Ltd. through its Directors, in connivance with
officials of Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited (Now
Sammaan Capital) innovated a subvention scheme for
sale of its residential project stating "No Pre-EMI till
delivery of possession of residential unit" and thereby
lured the homebuyers for booking / purchasing
residential units in its project. The homebuyers were
induced by its attractive scheme and parted with their
own fund to book the flats.
Enquiry revealed that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra
Developers Pvt. Ltd. further entered into a Builder Buyer
Agreement mentioning therein that the possession of the
allotted unit shall be given to the allottee/s by the
Company within a fixed period.
Enquiry revealed that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra
Developers Pvt. Ltd. prima facie entered into criminal
conspiracy with unknown officials of Indiabulls Housing
Finance Limited (Now Sammaan Capital)from whom
home loans were availed by the homebuyers. Officials of
these financial institutions approved the subvention plan
of the builder and financed home loans accordingly.
Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited (Now Sammaan
Capital) in pursuance thereof sanctioned and disbursed
home loan to the account of M/s Ozone Urbana Infra
Developers Pvt. Ltdwithout exercising any due diligence
and caused undue pecuniary advantage to the Builder
and ignored the directives of RBI/NHB.
Enquiry revealed that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra
Developers Pvt. Ltd. defaulted in payment of Pre-EMIs as
promised till handing over the possession of the flat to
homebuyers and did not complete the project/flats.
Builder neither delivered possession of the residential
units to homebuyers nor refunded their deposited amount
and misappropriated the
entire upfront
booking
amount/loan amount. It clearly indicates that the
homebuyers have been cheated by M/s Ozone Urbana
Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd in conspiracy with unknown
officials of M/s Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited (Now
Sammaan Capital) thereby causing wrongful loss to the
homebuyers and corresponding wrongful gain to
themselves.
Enquiry revealed that the M/s Indiabulls Housing Finance
Umited (Now Sammaan Capital) started deducting EMI
from the homebuyers and in the event of default reported
the homebuyer's accounts as NPA and thereby CIBIL of
the homebuyers were degraded.
Enquiry also revealed that the builder has sold the same
flat to multiple homebuyers and same unit was also
financed by the financial institution twice
On the basis of finding of preliminary enquiry, Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India vide Order dated 23.09.2025 directed CBI to
register regular case (copy enclosed).The Preliminary Enquiry
prima facie discloses that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Developers
Pvt. Ltd had cheated the homebuyers in conspiracy with
unknown officials of bank / financial Institution and their acts
constitute the commission of offences of cheating, criminal
conspiracy and criminal misconduct by public servants. Hence, a
regular case is registered under section 120-B r/w 420 IPC and
13(2) r/w 13 (1)(d) of PC Act, 1988 against; 1.M/s Ozone
Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. and its directors at the
relevant time,, 2. Mr. S. Vasudevan Managing director of M/s
Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. 3. Unknown officials of
M/s Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited (Now Sammaan Capital)
4. Unknown private persons and 5. Unknown others. The
investigation of this case is entrusted to Sh. Avinash Kumar,
Inspector, CBI, EO-1, New Delhi.”
(Emphasis added)
This CBI FIR is then added to the 2025 ECIR by way of an
addendum dated 03-10-2025. The addendum reads as follows:
(Emphasis added)
24.6. Subsequently, on 04-10-2025, a PAO was issued under
Section 5(1) of the PMLA read with Rule 3 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering (Issuance of Provisional Attachment Order)
Rules, 2013, provisionally attaching the properties of the petitionerCompany, Mr. Vasudevan Sathyamoorthy and his wife, Mrs. Priya
Vasudevan, to the extent of approximately Rs.423.38 Crores. The
reasons to believe recorded in the order of attachment dated
04-10-2025 read as follows:
“ …..
8.
…..
…..
RECORDING OF REASON TO BELIEVE UNDER
SECOND PROVISO TO SECTION 5(1); AND
UNDER SECTION 5(1) READ WITH SECTION
2(1)(u) OF PMLA:
i.
M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter
"OUIDPL"), promoted and
controlled by Shri S. Vasudevan, collected
approximately `927.22 crores from around
1351 homebuyers in its Ozone Urbana
township project at Devanahalli, Bangalore,
apart from loans raised from financial
institutions. The company failed to deliver
possession of apartments/units against the
said money, thereby dishonestly retaining
and diverting the funds.
ii.
That the funds so collected from gullible
customers and banks, instead of being
applied for construction and delivery of the
projects,
were
diverted,
layered
and
siphoned-off to various group companies
and personal bank accounts of Shri S.
Vasudevan and his wife, Smt. Priya
Vasudevan. These diversions include intercorporate deposits of `49.07 crores to several
group concerns, and transfer of over `180 crores
to M/s Tuscan Consultants and Developers Pvt.
Ltd., out of which large sums were immediately
routed to the personal accounts of Shri S.
Vasudevan and his wife Smt. Priya Vasudevan.
iii.
That Shri S Vasudevan himself admitted on oath
under section 50 of the PMLA, 2002 that escrow
funds were utilized for purposes other than
construction, including corporate overheads,
salaries,
loan
repayments
and
marketing
expenditure. Further, substantial amounts were
layered through multiple entities and were routed
abroad into overseas ventures such as Ozone
Agrow Pte. Ltd. (Singapore), Ozone Bolevine
Agrow Ltd. (Laos), and Ozone Global DMCC
(Dubai). This entire process resulted in
layering and integration of the proceeds of
crime, generated by cheating customers.
iv.
That the books of accounts of OUIDPL falsely
reflect a Work-in-Progress (WIP) of `1,310
crores, comprising largely of finance costs and
overheads, despite the project land remaining
undeveloped. This establishes manipulation of
accounts to conceal the diversion of proceeds of
crime.
v.
That
despite
directions
of
K-RERA
(Karnataka, RERA) to refund amounts to
homebuyers, Shri S. Vasudevan wilfully
failed to comply with such orders. thereby
reinforcing his fraudulent intent. Moreover,
the company has not obtained RERA
approval for construction post-2023, leading
to a complete standstill of construction
activity. Defaults in vendor payments have
further worsened the standstill, creating a
vicious
cycle
detrimental to innocent
homebuyers who are left remediless that is
they neither have possession of their flats
nor they have been refunded of monies
already paid. Further, there is no active
construction on-going the project due to
expiry of RERA approval and non- payment
of dues to the vendors.
vi.
This situation has forced around 100 families to,
reside in incomplete Ozone Urbana units, without
possession letters or completion/occupancy
certificates from the statutory authorities. This
unfortunate situation has been created by the
promoters by misappropriation of customer funds
and in complete disregard for statutory
obligations.
vii.
That Shri S. Vasudevan, with ill-intent, has
further alienated Ozone Urbana properties
by selling large parcels of land to third
parties like Sattva Resi Pvt. Ltd., and used
the proceeds thereof to settle debts with
ACRE ARC and JC Flowers ARC, thereby
alienating
properties
acquired
out
of
customers' funds and depriving them of
their right over such assets.
viii.
Sh. S Vasudevan in order to safeguard properties
of M/s OUIDPL and other group companies from
any legal action from various agencies including
K-RERA, had taken loans from various banks after
mortgaging the same, which has now been taken
over by JC Flower for Rs. 1030 Crores. It is
mentioned here that the real value of the assets
mortgaged to JC Flower is much more that the
book value as the same were purchased and
mortgaged around the Year 2018.
ix.
It is also stated that the unsold inventory
(only RC structure) in Urbana projects
(Aqua2, Avenue, Prime etc.) measuring 8.83
lakh sq.ft. have also been constructed from
the funds received from the customers (part
of the Proceeds of Crime) and the same has
not been completed till date, which has kept
the customers waiting for delivery of the
units. However, the funds received from
them were used elsewhere illegally.
x.
It is pertinent to mention here that in many
cases, the customer has arranged funds
through a tri-party agreement with the
financial institution, wherein M/s OUIDPL
has promised to pay the pre-construction
EMIs. However, the company has failed to
honour that commitment for hundreds of
customers, leaving them exposed to the
high-handed loan recovery practices of
these financial institutions. Further, in many
cases CIBIL score of the customers have
been adversely impacted due to inability to
pay EMIs.
xi.
Shri S. Vasudevan with ill intention, instead of
constructing flats/apartments and delivering the
same to the gullible customers, sold some of
these prime properties at very high value to third
parties. The proceeds of the sale are still not
being used for construction of apartments.
Instead, the same are being used for
development of new projects in other group
entities and for reimbursement of loan to JC
Flower and others. This has rendered hundreds of
customers as helpless and vulnerable.
xii.
Therefore, the below mentioned properties are
liable to be attached in M/s OUIDPL Project as
value thereof of the proceeds of crime to
safeguard the interests of the customers, leaving
other properties for the financial institutions
keeping in mind of their interest as well-
xiii.
•
4.5 Acres of Commercial Land registered
vide document nos. 5234/2005-06 in
CD-DNHD 73 dt. 20.01.2006 and
3301/2004-05 in CD DNHD 29 dt
01.12.2004 situated at Sy. Nos. 115, 116
and 117, Kannamangala Village, Kasaba
Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural
District.
•
Unsold inventory in Urbana Projects i.e.
Aqua 2 and Avenue (Total number of 105
unsold flats admeasuring 2,04,919 Sq.
Ft.)
Sh. S. Vasudevan and Priya Vasudevan have
received Proceeds of Crime to the tune of more
than Rs. 28 Crores and exhausted the same for
other purposes and hence, the properties below
as the proceeds of crime are liable to be
attached. In addition to this, Shri S. Vasudevan
has also received Rs. 7.8 Crores from Ozone
Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd., which is still
outstanding
and
exhausted
for
other
purposes/personal benefits.
•
Immovable property admeasuring 294
acres situated at Kannehalli Village,
Gonibeedu
Hobli,
Mudigere
Taluk,
Chikkamagaluru District valuing to Rs.
47,40,00,000/- (To the extent of Rs. 35.8
Crores)
xiv.
That the totality of facts and evidences
demonstrate that funds collected from
gullible customers constitute "proceeds of
crime" within the meaning of Section
2(1)(u) of the PMLA, 2002, having been
derived or obtained as a result of criminal
activity relating to the scheduled offence of
cheating, criminal breach of trust, and
Criminal conspiracy under the IPC.
xv.
That the said proceeds of crime have been
(a) concealed in manipulated books of
accounts,
(b)
layered
through
intercorporate deposits and overseas transfers,
and
(c)
integrated
into
immovable
properties, group concerns, and personal
assets of Shri S. Vasudevan and his wife
Smt. Priya Vasudevan, thereby completing
the cycle of money laundering.
xvi.
Thus, there are reasons to believe that
properties mentioned at
Schedule-A of
properties
at
Para-6
above
will
be
transferred or dealt with in any manner
which may result in frustrating any
proceedings relating to confiscation of such
proceeds
of
crime,
if
not
attached
immediately. The subject assets may be
transferred/disposed-of/encumbered
without notice of this Directorate may result
in frustrating any proceedings relating to
confiscation of such proceeds of crime.
xvii. Therefore,
to
ensure
that
properties
involved in the offence of money laundering
are not concealed. transferred. alienated,
disposed of or dealt with in any manner that
may frustrate the proceedings under PMLA,
there are reasons to believe that the
properties, as detailed in Schedule A in
Para-6 above are involved in money
laundering are liable for attachment under
section 5(1) read with section 2(1)(u) of
PMLA, 2002.
9.
THEREFORE, in view of the above discussion and
material and evidences placed before me, I have
reasons to believe that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra
Developers Pvt. Ltd. and its promoters Shri S.
Vasudevan along with others, who have been
charged with Scheduled Offences i.e. Sections 419,
420 and 120B of IPC, 1860, within the meaning of
Section 2(1) (y) of the PMLA, have indulged in
criminal activities and committed scheduled offences
and have generated proceeds of crime and from the
part of the proceeds of crime they had acquired the
immovable properties having total value of Rs.
423,37,84,000/- (FOUR HUNDRED TWENTYTHREE CRORES THIRTY-SEVEN LAKHS AND
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND) as mentioned above
in detail in Schedule A of the properties at Para
- 6 of this attachment order, and identified as
proceeds of crime are hereby attached under section
5(1) read with section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, 2002. Such
proceeds of crime are in conformity with the
definition of proceeds of crime provided under
section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, and the same are involved
in money laundering. If such proceeds of crime in
the form of immovable property (ies) involved in
money laundering are not attached immediately
under the provisions of the Act, the non-attachment
of the properties are likely to frustrate any further
proceedings under the Act. In addition, if the
Proceeds of Crime are not attached, I have reasons
to believe that the Proceeds of Crime would further
be laundered;
10. NOW THEREFORE on the basis of material in my
possession and in exercise of the powers conferred
under Second Proviso to Sub-Section (1) of the
Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering (15
of 2013) read with Rule 3 of The Prevention of
Money
Laundering
(Issuance
of
Provisional
Attachment Order) Rules, 2013 and in terms of
authorization to act as statutory authority under
PMLA, I, Brij Shankar, Deputy Director, Directorate
of Enforcement, Bengaluru Zonal Office, Bengaluru,
hereby order provisional attachment of movable
properties duly mentioned in the schedule - A of the
properties at Para-6 above, for a period of 180 days
(One Hundred and Eighty Days) from the date of
issuance of this Order, and further order that the
same shall not be transferred, disposed of,
alienated, removed or parted with or otherwise dealt
with in any manner whatsoever until or unless
specifically permitted to do so by the undersigned.”
(Emphasis added)
The PAO sets out in detail the investigation undertaken, the
materials forming the basis for registration of the ECIR, the search
and seizure proceedings, and the details of the buy-back and
subvention schemes. It further details the financial transactions,
including the alleged diversion and siphoning of funds, the
properties of the Company, its promoters, directors and associated
persons, and the manner in which the financial transactions were
layered. Accordingly, the PAO records that the money generated
from the aforesaid activities constitutes the “proceeds of crime”. On
the basis of the afore-quoted PAO a press release is also issued on
the same day by the Directorate of Enforcement. It reads as
follows:
“ PRESS RELEASE
4/10/2025
Directorate of Enforcement (ED), Bangalore has
issued a Provisional Attachment Order dated
04.10.2025
under
the
Prevention
of
Money
Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, attaching immovable
properties amounting to Rs. 423.38 Crores, in
connection with an investigation against M/s Ozone
Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Others.
Investigation in this case by ED was initiated on the
basis of multiple FIRs under sections 419, 420 and
120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered at various
police stations of Bengaluru City against M/s Ozone
Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd and its promoters.
Further, a FIR was also registered against the
company and its promoter by the CBI, EO-1, New
Delhi on the direction of Hon'ble Supreme Court.
The main allegation against the company M/s Ozone Urbana
Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. is that it has defaulted in
completion of construction of projection in time and failed to
hand over the possession to the customers. It is alleged
that the company induced the gullible customer by offering
to pay pre-construction EMIs till handing over the
possession of the flat to homebuyers. However, it has failed
to honour its commitments and did not complete the
project/flats. The builder neither delivered possession of the
residential units to homebuyers nor refunded their
deposited amount and misappropriated the entire upfront
booking amount/loan amount.
Earlier, (ED), Bangalore Zonal Office has conducted search
operations under section 17 of PMLA,2002 on 01/08/25 at
10 premises in this case and seized various incriminating
documents related to diversion and misappropriation of
project fund from the various premises.
Further, during the course of ED investigation, it is revealed
that M/s Ozone Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. along with
Sh. S Vasudevan (main promoter) have defrauded the
home buyers to the tune of Rs. 927.22 Crores and did not
deliver possession of apartments/units against the said
money, thereby dishonestly retaining and diverting the
funds. The accused diverted the funds to the other group
entities and associated individuals including Sh. S.
Vasudevan himself and his family members. Therefore, the
company and Sh. S Vasudevan have generated proceeds of
crime to the tune of Rs. 927.22 Crores and routed the same
through various entities and used for the purpose other
than the funds actually meant for i.e. for construction and
development of projects in Ozone Urbana Infra Developers
Pvt. Ltd.
Thus, in order to safeguard the interest of the
customers, immovable properties of the M/s Ozone
Urbana Infra Developers Pvt. Ltd. (Unsold stock in the
Avenue (92 flats) and Aqua 2 projects (13 flats), 4.5
Acres of commercial land) and personal properties of
itspromoter S. Vasudevan along with his wife (179
acres of land at Kannehalli Village, Mudigere) all
totalling to the tune of Rs. 423.38 Crores has been
provisionally attached.”
(Emphasis added)
The press release is issued stating that property of the petitioners
worth Rs.423.38 Crores was attached in connection with the
investigation against them by the Directorate of Enforcement in
order to safe guard the interests of the customers – home buyers.
24.7. In the light of the allegations obtaining in the 2025
ECIR, the orders and directions issued by the Apex Court from time
to time in HIMANSHU SINGH supra, culminating in investigation
by the CBI, and the dismissal of the companion petitions calling in
question the predicate FIRs, the submission of the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that there exists no predicate offence to
sustain continuation of the 2025 ECIR cannot merit acceptance.
24.8. The very foundation on which the contention is built
that the scheduled/predicate offence has ceased to exist does not
obtain on the facts. The predicate proceedings continue to subsist
and, more importantly, one of the crimes owes its genesis to an
investigation undertaken by the CBI pursuant to the directions of
the Apex Court. The allegations forming the substratum of those
crimes, therefore, remain alive and are yet to undergo the rigours
of investigation and trial. At this stage, this Court cannot presume
their extinction and, on that premise, pull down the consequential
proceedings under the Act.
24.9. So long as the scheduled offence subsists and the
proceedings concerning it have not been obliterated, the contention
that the 2025 ECIR has been rendered foundationless is
plainly unavailable to the petitioner. The challenge to continuation
of the 2025 ECIR on the ground of absence or non-existence of a
predicate offence, therefore, fails and is accordingly rejected.
24.10. Further, the subsequent PAO sets out clear reasons for
attachment of the properties. The contentions of the learned Senior
Counsel
for
the
petitioner
on
the
merits
of
the
PAO
and
determination of “proceeds of crime” also deserve to be rejected, as
the properties have only been provisionally attached. What cannot
be lost sight of is that the attachment at this stage is only
provisional. A provisional attachment is not the final word on the
character of the property; it is an interim statutory measure,
subject to the further adjudicatory process contemplated under the
Act. Questions concerning the nexus between the alleged criminal
activity and the properties attached, their character as “proceeds of
crime”, and the sustainability of the attachment on merits are
matters which can appropriately be urged before the statutory
forum in the proceedings that follow.
24.11. In light of the
aforesaid observations
becomes
apposite to notice the observations of the Apex Court in the case of
JSW STEEL LTD. v. ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE10, wherein
the Apex Court holds that the Appellate Tribunal must first examine
whether the attached property constitutes “proceeds of crime”. The
Apex Court observes as follows:
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2150
“ ….. …..
…..
27. It is submitted that the Directorate of
Enforcement recorded ECIR/09/BZ/2012 on 25.09.2012
and after investigation found that INR 33,80,87,617/(Thirty-Three Crore Eighty Lakh Eighty-Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Seventeen Rupees) remained payable by JSW to
AMC which constituted “proceeds of crime” under Section
2(1)(u) of PMLA. To secure this amount, PAO No. 08 of
2015 dated 27.03.2015 for INR 24,37,00,733.50 (TwentyFour Crore Thirty-Seven Lakh Seven Hundred Thirty-Three
Rupees and Fifty Paise Only) and PAO No. 11 of 2016 dated
30.03.2016 for INR 9,43,86,883.50 (Nine Crore FortyThree Lakh Eighty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred EightyThree Rupees and Fifty Paise Only) were issued under
Section 5(1) of PMLA, attaching specific amounts in three
JSW bank accounts. The PAOs were duly confirmed by the
Adjudicating Authority on 09.04.2021.
28. It is argued that despite a clear statutory bar,
JSW, in collusion with bank officials, frustrated the
attachment by withdrawing funds immediately after the
issuance of PAO 08 of 2015 on 27.03.2015. He placed
reliance on contemporaneous emails and letters from
Vijaya Bank/Bank of Baroda, particularly communications
dated 29.03.2016 and 25.05.2016, to submit that the lien
on account no. 139500301000053 was wrongfully lifted
despite written directions from the ED not to do so. The
withdrawals left only INR 7.81 Crore available out of the
attached sum, causing a shortfall of INR 16.55 Crore, which
continues to be in the possession of JSW.
29. It is stated that possession of confirmed
attached property by the accused, in defiance of
lawful attachment, squarely falls within Section 8(4)
of PMLA and constitutes “concealment, possession,
acquisition and use” of proceeds of crime punishable
under Section 3 of PMLA. The High Court had
dismissed writ petitions of the Appellants challenging
the PAOs on 11.12.2020 and the two Writ Appeals
Nos. 68 of 2021 and 97 of 2021 were also dismissed
on 04.05.2021. Hence, the attachment has attained
finality.
30. The further contention is that, in pursuance to
multiple summons issued under Section 50(2) of the PMLA
to Shri M.V.S. Seshagiri Rao and Appellant No. 2, the
officials of JSW Steel Ltd., on 10.12.2021, 15.12.2021,
04.02.2022, and 25.02.2022, there was no cooperation
extended, and no authorised representative appeared to
depose which shows the mens rea of the Appellants.
31. The learned ASG submitted that bank
accounts are considered “property” within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(v) of the PMLA, as
established by this Court in State of Maharashtra v.
Tapas D. Neogy[State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D.
Neogy, (1999) 7 SCC 685]. He further argued that
the attachment of a specified quantum from these
accounts
is
therefore
valid.
Additionally,
he
contended that the withdrawal of funds, even during
the pendency of a stay order, does not absolve JSW
of liability. This is because the stay order was
prospective in nature and did not annul the lien that
had already been marked on the accounts.
32. In the light of the deliberate conduct of the
appellants in dissipating attached amounts and their
continued possession of INR 16.55 Crore of proceeds
of crime, this Court ought not to exercise
extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the cognizance
order and prayed for dismissal of the appeals.
33. Having heard learned Counsel for both the
parties and on perusal of the records, we note that
the Appellants have already invoked their statutory
remedy before the Appellate Tribunal under Section
26 of the PMLA, which remains pending.
34. It is important to note that the PMLA
provides
a
comprehensive
and
self-contained
adjudicatory
mechanism.
Section
enables
Provisional Attachment, Section 8 contemplates
confirmation by the Adjudicating Authority, and
Section 26 provides an appellate remedy before the
Appellate Tribunal. The appellants, in the present
case, have already invoked their statutory remedy of
Appeal, which remains pending.
35. This Court has consistently held that
constitutional or appellate jurisdiction should ordinarily not
be exercised where an efficacious alternate remedy is
available and is actively being pursued. Reference may be
made to Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Limited[Union
of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC 651],
which cautions against bypassing statutory forums except
in cases of patent illegality or jurisdictional error.
36. We further note that it is undisputed that the
ECIR registered by the ED does not name the appellants as
accused persons. The charge-sheet filed by the CBI under
RC 18(A)/2011/CBI/ACB/BLR also does not array them as
accused, having dropped them in the supplementary report
after finding no material to proceed. The complaint filed by
the ED is predicated not on any independent act of
laundering but on the allegation that the appellants
withdrew certain sums from the attached bank accounts in
violation of the PAOs, thereby frustrating the recovery of
INR 33.80 Crore, alleged to be “proceeds of crime.”
37. The core issue before us is not whether the
appellants' entire banking operations are tainted, but
whether the specific sum of INR 33,80,87,617/- (ThirtyThree Crore Eighty Lakh Eighty-Seven Thousand Six
Hundred
Seventeen
Rupees),
representing
unpaid
consideration for iron ore supplied by AMC, can be treated
as “proceeds of crime” and whether its withdrawal postPAO constitutes an offence under Section 3 PMLA. The
apprehension that the entire account balance constitutes
proceeds of crime is misplaced, particularly when the
admitted position is that payments were made and received
through regular banking channels and are duly reflected in
the books of account.
38. Viewed thus, the appropriate course would
be to permit the statutory process to run its route to
reach its logical conclusion. Interference at this
stage would prejudge issues that are squarely within
the domain of the Appellate Tribunal, including
whether the attached property represents “proceeds
of crime” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u)
PMLA and whether the withdrawals were in violation
of law.
39. In light of these findings, we are unable to hold
that the case for quashing the cognizance order or
interdicting proceedings is made out. The allegations, at
this stage, are confined to the recovery of the quantified
amount of INR 33.80 Crore and do not extend to fastening
criminal liability upon the appellants beyond that process.
The apprehension of arbitrary prosecution is, therefore,
misplaced.
40. Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the
proceedings at this stage. The appellants shall be at liberty
to pursue their statutory appeals before the Appellate
Tribunal, which shall decide the same on their own merits
and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any
observations contained herein above.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court observes that the Act itself engrafts a selfcontained adjudicatory mechanism for testing the validity and
continuance of an attachment. Section 5 enables provisional
attachment of the property; Section 8 places such attachment
before the Adjudicating Authority for consideration and confirmation
in accordance with the procedure stipulated therein; and Section 26
provides a further statutory remedy of appeal before the Appellate
Tribunal. Thus, the statute does not leave a person aggrieved by an
attachment remediless, but provides a complete hierarchy of
adjudication for ventilation of every grievance concerning such
attachment. The Apex Court further observes that constitutional or
appellate jurisdiction ought not, ordinarily, to be exercised where
an
efficacious
alternative
statutory
remedy
is
available,
particularly when such remedy has already been invoked and the
proceedings are pending consideration. In the teeth of the remedies
available before the Adjudicating Authority and thereafter the
Appellate Tribunal, interference with an order of provisional
attachment at its very threshold would amount to short-circuiting
the statutory mechanism deliberately engrafted by Parliament.
24.12. Interference at this stage would also run the risk of
prejudging issues which lie squarely within the province of
the statutory authorities, including whether the properties
provisionally attached answer the description of “proceeds of
crime” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act,
whether the requisite nexus between the property and the alleged
criminal activity exists, and whether the withdrawals or transactions
complained of were contrary to law. These are matters requiring
consideration on the material placed before the statutory forum and
cannot appropriately be pronounced upon by pre-empting the
adjudicatory process. Therefore, when the attachment is yet
provisional and the statute provides a complete avenue for its
adjudication, confirmation and appeal, interference at this stage
would be both premature and unwarranted.
24.13. What also cannot escape consideration is the
nature and magnitude of the allegations obtaining against
the petitioner. The offences alleged are not ordinary crimes
confined
to
transaction.
an
individual
They
bear
complainant
the
or
unmistakable
an
isolated
features
of
economic offences, with ramifications extending far beyond
the immediate parties to the proceedings. The allegations
concern financial transactions of considerable magnitude,
diversion
and
siphoning
of
funds
and
their
alleged
deployment for purposes other than those for which they
were collected, thereby affecting the interests of several
stakeholders, most significantly, scores of home buyers.
24.14. Economic offences stand on a footing distinct
from conventional crimes, for their consequences are seldom
confined to an identifiable victim. Their ripples travel wider.
Where
monies
collected
from
members
of
the
public,
particularly home buyers, are alleged to have been diverted
or siphoned away, the injury complained of is not merely
monetary; it strikes at the confidence reposed by ordinary
citizens in commercial and financial arrangements through
which they commit, often, the savings of a lifetime towards
securing a home. For a home buyer, the transaction is
seldom a mere investment in brick and mortar; it is
frequently the culmination of years of savings, coupled with
the continuing burden of a loan.
24.15. The allegations in the case at hand, therefore, cannot
be viewed through the narrow prism of individual contractual
disputes. They concern the alleged movement and diversion of
substantial funds and the resultant prejudice to a multitude of
persons whose financial interests are intertwined with the projects
in question. Such allegations possess far-reaching economic and
societal
ramifications
and
warrant
a
full
and
unhindered
investigation in accordance with law. At this stage, when the
allegations are yet to be tested in the manner known to law,
interdiction of the proceedings would be wholly inappropriate.
24.16. Where allegations disclose a complex web of financial
transactions, diversion or siphoning of funds, the Court at the
threshold cannot undertake a microscopic examination of the
material, weigh its probative worth or pronounce upon defences
which properly belong to the realm of investigation and trial.
Quashment at an embryonic stage should not become an
instrument by which an investigation into an economic
offence is strangled before the investigating agency has had
a fair opportunity to unravel the transactions and trace the
trail of money. Unless the complaint or FIR, taken at its face
value, fails to disclose the ingredients of any offence or continuation
of the proceedings demonstrably amounts to an abuse of process,
the investigative process ought ordinarily to be permitted to run its
lawful course.
24.17. Therefore, on a conspectus of the reasons rendered
hereinabove, no circumstance is made out which would warrant
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to interdict
either the predicate proceedings or the proceedings initiated under
the Act. The allegations are yet to travel through the process of
investigation and adjudication, and this Court, at this stage, cannot
embark
upon
prematurely
an
exercise
putting
the
which
would
quietus
to
have
the
effect
proceedings
of
that
otherwise warrant investigation in accordance with law. The
challenge laid by the petitioners, viewed from any angle, does not
merit acceptance, except in W.P.No.20063 of 2022. The subject
petitions other than W.P.No.20063 of 2022, therefore, deserve to
be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.
25. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i)
Writ Petition No.20063 of 2022 is allowed.
(ii)
All proceedings arising from P.C.R.No.54725 of 2022,
pending on the file of the X Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, qua the petitioners, stand quashed.
(iii)
All other Writ Petitions, stand dismissed.
As a consequence, pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed.
This Court places its appreciation to the able assistance
rendered by Miss. Sai Suvedhya R., Law Clerk cum Research
Assistants attached to this Court.
Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp
CT:MJ
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review