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Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC(MACApp.) No. 15 of 2022
M/s Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.
Vs.
Date of Order: 05.07.2023
Smti. Rakhi Chaudhari
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
For the Respondent(s)
:
:
Mr. A. Khan, Adv.
Mr. N.M. Mansuri, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
ORAL:
1.
An appeal against an award passed vide judgment and order dated
22.11.2019 passed in MAC Case No. 44 of 2012 (new MAC Case No. 246
of 2013) and also a judgment dated 31.01.2022 passed in MAC Review
Application No. 1 of 2020 by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, Shillong has been filed before this Court.
2.
Apparently, there has occurred a delay in filing of the said appeal,
for which the applicant has approached this Court with an application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 1035
days in preferring the said appeal.
3.
Heard Mr. A. Khan, learned counsel for the applicant who has
submitted that from the date when the impugned award under judgment and
order dated 22.11.2019 was passed, the applicant/Oriental Insurance
Company Limited has filed a review application before the self-same
Tribunal, which was eventually filed on 27.01.2020, though there had been
a delay of 66 days in filing of the said review application, the same was on
account of the fact that since 23.12.2019 when the limitation period for
filing the review expired, the actual review application was filed after the
winter vacation when the civil courts were closed.
4.
Again, the review application was finally disposed of on
31.01.2020 which took the learned Tribunal 734 days for the same. On the
date the appeal was filed before this Court, there was another period of
delay of about 325 days, that is, with effect from 01.02.2022 till
22.12.2022. Therefore, the learned counsel has submitted that what could
be considered as the actual delay is only 325 days.
5.
The learned counsel has further submitted that an explanation for
the delay is that the certified copy of the impugned judgment was obtained
only on 18.04.2022 which took about 63 days. Thereafter, the counsel for
the applicant had prepared the papers for the appeal to be filed only in the
month of April, 2022. However, since the draft appeal and the related
papers have to be corrected and vetted by the Regional Office of the
applicant/Insurance Company, the same was sent to the said Regional
Office to be vetted by a counsel therein. This process has also taken
considerable time and finally, when the final draft was received by the
Divisional Office of the applicant/Insurance Company at Shillong, it was
already in the month of October, 2022.
6.
In the month of October, in fact, on 10.10.2022, the daughter of
the counsel for the applicant/Insurance Company was injured as a result of
an accident, for which she has to be hospitalized and the counsel having to
visit the doctor and hospital regularly, he could not prepare the memo of
appeal expeditiously.
7.
The grounds indicated hereinabove are good grounds on sufficient
cause being shown, therefore, the learned counsel has submitted that this
Court in the interest of justice may be pleased to allow this application and
to condone the delay as indicated. In support of his submission, the case of
Mandal, Revenue Officer, Vishakapatnam v. Senapati Appalanaidu: 2012
(4) SCALE 43 was cited, wherein the delay of 295 days in preferring a writ
appeal before the High Court was condoned by the Apex Court.
8.
Mr. N.M. Mansuri, learned counsel for the respondent opposing
the application and the submission made by the learned counsel for the
applicant, would submit that the applicant has not been able to show
sufficient cause for the said delay to be condoned, inasmuch as, the grounds
given in the application is that delay was caused due to filing of a review
application before the learned Tribunal, secondly, that because of
procedural requirements within the organization of the applicant/Insurance
Company which requires vetting of the draft memo of appeal and as a result
of which a certain amount of delay was caused and thirdly, that on the
ground of personal inconvenience or difficulty of the particular counsel, the
said memo of appeal could not be filed in time, cannot be the reason or
good grounds for this Court to consider the said application.
9.
The learned counsel has further submitted that on the passing of
the impugned judgment and award, a valuable right has accrued upon the
respondent/claimant herein and which right cannot be lightly brushed off on
account of the fault of the applicant herein.
10.
The learned counsel has also submitted that even the fact that the
review application was filed, which application was bereft of merits and the
same being rightly rejected, the tactics of the applicant to delay satisfaction
of the award is very apparent.
11.
In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon
the following decisions:
i)
M/s Purnima Trading Company v. Sri. Sankar Sarkar:
S.B. IA No. 1/2017 in MAC APP. No. 72/2017, High Court
of Tripura;
ii)
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanda Kanai Pegu & 2
Ors: I.A. (Civil)/3/2021, para 10, Gauhati High Court and
iii)
New India Assurance Company v. Jitendra Kumar & Ors:
MAC APP 301/2010, para 2.
12.
Upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties, the issue to be
considered here is whether the reasons and grounds cited by the applicant
would constitute sufficient cause for condonation of the delay, whether of
1035 days or 325 days as the case may be. The number of days may not be
of relevant consideration herein as much as the cause of delay in filing the
appeal in question would be material.
13.
As to what is “sufficient cause”, in a catena of judgments by the
Supreme Court as well as various High Courts, this term has been explained
in details. One of such authority can be found in the case of Basawaraj v.
LAO: (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Supreme Court at para 9 of the same has held
as follows:
“9. …The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or
"enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the
purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no
more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts
and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the
view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this
context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on
its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it
cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or
"remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever
the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case,
and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court
should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The
court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was
merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.”
14.
In the case of Purnima Trading Company (supra) though,
reference was made by the High Court to the fact that the applicant therein,
had filed a review application against the impugned award of compensation
in a Motor Accident Claims case and upon such review application being
dismissed, an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was
preferred before the court, the same was rejected by the court who has
looked into the totality of the matter. This may not be so relevant in this
case as the review application has since been disposed of and the contention
of the learned counsel for the respondent that the same was dismissed as
devoid of merits, could not have been gone into by this Court at this point
of time. The alleged delay in filing the review application would not have
matter much as far as these proceedings are concerned.
15.
The ground cited by the applicant that delay was caused due to
the processing of the preparation of the memo of appeal, internally, within
the organization of the applicant/Insurance Company may not be a good
ground as was observed by the Gauhati High Court in the case of Nanda
Kanai Pegu (supra) wherein at paragraph 10 of the same, a number of
authorities have been cited by the court to bring home the point that delay
as a result of bureaucratic mechanization in an organization cannot be a
ground for condonation of the same as far as filing of an appeal is
concerned. The relevant extract of para 10 is reproduced herein below:
“10.
…
…24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause”
would get in the factual matrix of a given case would
largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If
the court finds that there has been no negligence on the
part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay
does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay.
If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the
applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly
negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a
legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the
delay.”
(c) CWT Vs. Amateur Riders Club, reported in 1994 Supp
(2) SCC 603, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
observed as follows:
“….. There is a point beyond which even the courts
cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is Government
which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which
binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be treated as
any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the
former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are
not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily
bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are
limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the
explanation offered for the delay in this case merely
serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the
Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit
is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it
susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not
seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude
even where it affects its own interest……”
(d)
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs.
Rup Nath Brahma Choudhury & Anr., reported in 2017
(2) GLT 487, wherein the Gauhati High Court has
observed that the procedure of internal management of the
affairs of the applicant company are not statutory
procedures and if the applicant devise a procedure of
moving the file from one table to another, the applicant
does no at their own risk. Hon’ble Court also observed
that “except in a few cases majority of insurance claims
are generally on preset pattern and the applicant who are
in the business of insuring risk is supposed to be equipped
with some sort of mechanism to calculate the estimated
award expected in a case and, as such, it is for the
applicant to devise a way and means to expeditiously
challenge those award, to which they do not agree to”.
(e) State of Assam & Others Vs. Gita Rani Kalita,
reported in 2017 (2) GLT 1190, wherein the Gauhati High
Court has referred to a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court
in “ Office of the Chief Post Master General Vs. Living
Media India Ltd.” Reported in AIR 2012 SC 1506,
wherein in it was held that the claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted
in view of modern technologies being used and available
and that the law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody including the Government. Relying on
aforesaid rulings, Mr. B.N. Sarmah, learned counsel for
the respondent no. 1, has submitted that the insurance
companies has taken the law of limitation for a ride in
spite of being aware of the statutory period of limitation
prescribed by law for preferring an appeal and in the
instant case they have miserably failed to show sufficient
cause for not approaching the appellate Court within the
period prescribed by law.”
16.
On the reason cited that the learned counsel for the applicant is
indisposed on grounds of personal difficulty on account of his daughter
being involved in an accident, this Court is in respectful agreement with the
view expressed by the High Court of Delhi in the case of Jitendra Kumar
(supra) wherein it was observed that “…Similarly, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not envisage the inability of advocate to file appeal due
to his personal reasons as a ground for condonation of delay. The
insurance company could have contacted any other advocate available for
filing the appeal. In fact, the insurance company even in this High Court
has many advocates on its panel. If one advocate is ill or his mother was ill,
any other panel advocate could have filed the appeal or a new advocate
could have been engaged…”
17.
The case cited by the applicant is not applicable to the facts of the
case herein since the Supreme Court had condoned the delay of 295 days
relevant to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case before it, which
has no similarity to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand.
18.
On an overall analysis of the reasons and cause for which the
delay in filing the appeal has occurred as was contended by the learned
counsel for the applicant, this Court finds that “sufficient cause” has not
been evinced by the applicant to convince this Court to condone the delay
in filing the appeal.
19.
Accordingly, this application is hereby dismissed as devoid of
merit and the same is disposed of. The related memo of appeal is not to be
taken on board.
20.
No order as to costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
05.07.2023
“D. Nary, PS”
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