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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 18.02.2026
Date of decision: 04.05.2026
Uploaded on: 04.05.2026
W.P.(C) 11095/2015 & CM APPL. 9194/2017
M/S. NOVARTIS INDIA LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Manoj and Ms. Aparna Sinha,
Advs.
versus
SARABHJEET SINGH & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Varun Chandiok, Ms. Riya Seth,
Advs. for R-1 with R-1 in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1.
The present petition, has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, by M/s Novartis India Limited (hereinafter referred to
as the “Petitioner/Management”), assailing the Award dated 24.02.2015
passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court–XIX, Karkardooma
Courts, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “Labour Court”) in LIR No.
547/2011.
2.
By the impugned Award, the Labour Court has set aside the
termination of services of Shri Sarabjeet Singh (hereinafter referred to as
“Respondent /Workman”) and directed his reinstatement with continuity of
service, along with consequential benefits and 25% back wages with effect
from 11.01.2010.
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BRIEF FACTS
3.
The Respondent No.1/Workman, Shri Sarabjeet Singh, was appointed
as a Medical Sales Representative (MSR) with M/s Sandoz (India) Limited,
which subsequently became M/s Novartis India Limited , on 26.08.1985. He
was initially appointed on probation and was thereafter confirmed in service
as a permanent employee on 04.06.1986. The terms of appointment, inter
alia, provided that his services were transferable to any establishment of the
Management in India and that his employment could be terminated by either
party upon one month’s notice or salary in lieu thereof.
4.
The Workman was initially posted at Chandigarh and came to be
transferred to New Delhi in or about January, 1990. While the Workman
asserts that such transfer was effected upon mutual discussion and consent,
the stand of the Management is that transfers were effected in the ordinary
course in terms of service conditions. It is not in dispute that a long-term
settlement between the Management and the Association of Chemical
Workers (ACW), governing service conditions, remained in force from
08.08.1990 to 30.06.1992. Upon expiry of the said settlement, fresh
negotiations commenced. One of the demands raised by the union, being
Demand No.20, stipulated that transfers of MSRs be effected only with their
consent; however, the Management did not agree to the said demand.
5.
It is also borne out by the record that the Workman was associated
with the ACW, and issues regarding his alleged resignation from union
membership in April, 1995 became a matter of controversy in subsequent
proceedings. The Workman contends that deductions towards union
subscription continued even thereafter, which aspect was not specifically
explained by the Management.
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6.
The dispute in the present case arises from a sequence of events
commencing in September, 1995. On 05.09.1995, the Management directed
that the Workman’s work be “frozen” till further instructions, without
assigning any reason whatsoever. The Workman, vide letter dated
13.09.1995, sought reasons for the said action; however, no response was
furnished by the Management at any stage.
7.
On 25.09.1995, the Government of Maharashtra referred an industrial
dispute between the ACW and the Management to the Industrial Tribunal,
Mumbai, being Reference IT No.55/1995. The said reference included, inter
alia, the issue relating to transfer of employees, as embodied in Demand
No.20. On the very next day, i.e., 26.09.1995, the Management issued an
order transferring the Workman from New Delhi to Ratlam, Madhya
Pradesh with effect from 09.10.1995 . It is not disputed that the Management
received notice of the said reference on 04.10.1995.
8.
The Workman received the transfer order on 05.10.1995 and,
thereafter, submitted a representation dated 07.10.1995 requesting that the
transfer be kept in abeyance pending adjudication of the dispute before the
Industrial Tribunal. The Management, however, rejected the said
representation on 13.10.1995, taking the position that the pending reference
was not relevant.
9.
Shortly thereafter, on 01.11.1995, the services of the Workman were
terminated by the Management upon payment of one month’s salary in lieu
of notice. Admittedly, no charge-sheet, show-cause notice, or domestic
enquiry preceded the said termination. The termination was thus effected
within a short span of time from the date of transfer and rejection of
representation.
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10.
Aggrieved thereby, the Workman instituted Complaint (IT)No.1/1996
before the Industrial Tribunal, Mumbai under Section 33-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act ( hereinafter referred to as ID Act ), challenging the legality of
the transfer and the consequential termination during the pendency of the
industrial dispute. The said proceedings, along with the industrial dispute
and subsequent challenges, culminated in a series of decisions. The
Industrial Tribunal, by order dated 30.06.2005, allowed the complaint and
held the termination to be invalid. However, the said decision was set aside
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay on 21.12.2006,
which was thereafter affirmed by the Division Bench on 07.08.2007,
essentially on the ground that the provisions of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID
Act were not attracted as the Workman was not a “concerned workman” in
the pending reference.
11.
The matter was carried to the Supreme Court by the Workman by way
of a Special Leave Petition bearing SLP No. 1234 of 2008. The said SLP
was converted into Civil Appeal No. 6473 of 2009, which was disposed of
vide Order dated 18.09.2009. By the said Order, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that the controversy under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act stood
concluded. However, the Workman was granted liberty to raise an industrial
dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and it was
specifically directed that such adjudication would be undertaken on merits,
uninfluenced by the observations of the High Court on issues other than
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act, 1947.
12.
Pursuant thereto, the Government of NCT of Delhi, vide order dated
18.12.2009, referred the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour
Court–XIX, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, where it was registered as LIR No.
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547/2011. The term of reference, as specified by the Appropriate
Government, reads as under:
“Whether the services of Sh. Sarabhjeet Singh S/o Sh. Jialal
Singh have been illegally and/or unjustifiably terminated by
the management, and if yes, to what relief is he entitled?”
Upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence led by the parties,
the Labour Court passed the impugned Award dated 24.02.2015, whereby
the termination of the Workman was set aside and directions were issued for
reinstatement with continuity of service, along with consequential benefits
and 25% back wages with effect from 11.01.2010.
13.
The said Award was published on 20.07.2015. Aggrieved by the
aforesaid Award, the Petitioner/Management has preferred the present
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
14.
It is submitted that the impugned Award is unsustainable in law and
on facts, having failed to appreciate that the termination of the respondent
was a direct consequence of his wilful and deliberate disobedience of a
lawful transfer order. The respondent, despite being bound by the terms of
his appointment permitting transfer anywhere in India, failed to join duties
at Ratlam without any justifiable cause.
15.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned Labour
Court has erred in holding the respondent to be a “workman” under Section
2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, despite his admitted role as a
Medical Representative engaged primarily in sales promotion and
canvassing, which does not fall within the enumerated categories under the
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provision. Reliance is placed on the Constitution Bench judgment in H.R.
Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 737, which conclusively
holds that employees engaged in promotion of sales are not “workmen”; it is
thus contended that the impugned finding is unsustainable in law.
16.
Learned counsel submits that the respondent has, in his cross-
examination, admitted that he did not join duties at the transferred place and
that his services were terminated on account of such non-compliance. In
view of such admitted position, it is contended that the misconduct stands
established.
17.
It is further submitted that the transfer order was never challenged by
the respondent and has, therefore, attained finality. In the absence of any
finding declaring the transfer to be illegal, the respondent was under an
obligation to comply with the same, and his failure disentitles him to any
relief.
18.
Learned counsel submits that transfer is a normal incident of service
and an employee is bound to comply with such orders. Reliance is placed
onGujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, (1989) 2
SCC 602 to contend that mere submission of a representation does not
justify non-compliance, and failure to join pursuant to a transfer order
exposes the employee to disciplinary action.
19.
It is submitted that the Labour Court erred in proceeding on the
assumption that a domestic enquiry is indispensable in every case. In the
present case, where the misconduct is admitted and self-evident, the
requirement of holding a domestic enquiry would be an empty formality.
20.
Without prejudice, it is submitted that even in the absence of a
domestic enquiry, the petitioner was entitled in law to justify the termination
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by leading evidence before the Labour Court.
21.
It is further submitted that the respondent had resigned from the union
prior to the reference and was not concerned with the industrial dispute
relied upon by him. The findings of the Bombay High Court, which have
attained finality, establish that no Medical Sales Representative was
connected with the dispute, and therefore the respondent could not rely on
the said proceedings to justify his conduct.
22.
Learned counsel submits that the Labour Court erred in attributing a
bona fide belief to the respondent despite absence of any legal basis, and in
recording findings of malafides without evidence. It is further contended that
the grant of reinstatement is wholly disproportionate and would encourage
indiscipline by permitting employees to disregard lawful orders.
23.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the
following decisions in support of the aforesaid submissions: Workmen v.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India Pvt. Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813; and
Amar Chakravarty v. Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., (2010) 14 SCC 471.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
24.
It is submitted that the impugned Award warrants no interference,
the Labour Court having, upon due appreciation of the material on record,
rightly held the termination of the Respondent to be illegal, unjustified, and
vitiated by mala fides. The Respondent was a confirmed employee with long
and unblemished service, whose conditions were governed not only by the
appointment terms but also by prevailing practice and settlements, wherein
transfers were effected with mutual consent; the unilateral transfer to
Ratlam, effected in the backdrop of ongoing industrial disputes, was thus
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contrary to established practice.
25.
It is contended that the sequence of events clearly demonstrates mala
fides, inasmuch as the work of the Respondent was first frozen without
justification, followed by issuance of a transfer order received belatedly, and
culminating in termination within eighteen days of the rejection of his
representation , without affording any opportunity of hearing or initiating
disciplinary proceedings.
26.
Learned counsel submits that the Respondent had, upon receipt of the
transfer order, submitted a representation seeking deferment in view of the
pending industrial dispute; however, the same was rejected and he was
precipitously terminated. The Labour Court has rightly held that the
Respondent was under a bona fide belief that his request would be
considered, and his non-compliance cannot be treated as misconduct in the
facts of the case.
27.
It is further submitted that even assuming non-compliance with the
transfer order, the same could at best constitute misconduct requiring a
proper disciplinary enquiry. In the admitted absence of any show cause
notice, charge-sheet, or enquiry, the termination is rendered procedurally
and substantively illegal. The material on record also indicates that the
action of the Petitioner was actuated by hostility towards the Respondent’s
association with the employees’ union and his refusal to accept altered
service conditions, thereby vitiating the action on grounds of victimisation
and unfair labour practice.
28.
It is urged that the findings returned by the Labour Court on
maintainability, status of the Respondent as a workman, non-compliance
with statutory requirements, and existence of mala fides are findings of fact
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based on evidence, which do not warrant interference in exercise of writ
jurisdiction. The direction of reinstatement with partial back wages is,
therefore, justified, and the present petition, being devoid of merit, is liable
to be dismissed
ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
29.
Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at
considerable length, and having examined the pleadings, the Award of the
Labour Court, the evidence adduced before it, and the written submissions
placed on record, this Court frames the following issues for its
determination:
I.
Whether the respondent qualifies as a ‘workman’ within the
meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
and whether the reference before the Labour Court was
maintainable in law?
II.
Whether the termination of the respondent/workman, being
founded on alleged misconduct, was illegal, unjustified, or
disproportionate in law?
III.
Whether the findings returned by the Labour Court suffer from
perversity, jurisdictional error, or patent illegality so as to
warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India?
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
30.
The present petition has been instituted under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to
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assail the Award dated 24.02.2015 passed by the
Labour Court. The
jurisdiction under Article 227 is one of superintendence and not of appeal,
and is accordingly limited in scope. This Court is concerned with ensuring
that the subordinate court or tribunal has acted within the bounds of its
authority and in accordance with law; it does not sit in appeal to correct
mere errors or to reappreciate evidence. Interference is warranted only
where the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error, patent illegality,
violation of principles of natural justice, or perversity, that is, where findings
are based on no evidence or are such as no reasonable tribunal could have
arrived at. The existence of another possible view, or even an erroneous
finding, does not by itself justify interference. This position stands settled in
Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215, and Shalini Shyam Shetty
v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329.
31.
A perusal of the impugned Award indicates that the Labour Court,
upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence, rejected the preliminary
objection as to maintainability and proceeded to adjudicate the dispute on
merits. It held that the termination of the respondent/workman was founded
on alleged misconduct, namely non-compliance with the transfer order, and
that no charge-sheet, show cause notice or domestic enquiry preceded such
termination, thereby rendering the action violative of the principles of
natural justice. While recognising that transfer is an incidence of service and
that non-compliance may constitute misconduct, the Labour Court
concluded that such misconduct could not justify termination in the absence
of a disciplinary enquiry. It further took into account the surrounding
circumstances, including the prior freezing of duties, the issuance of the
transfer order in the backdrop of a pending industrial dispute, and the
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proximity between the transfer and termination, to infer mala fides, and
accepted the plea that the respondent acted under a bona fide belief. On a
cumulative assessment, the Labour Court held the termination to be illegal
and unjustified and therefore granted reinstatement with continuity of
service along with partial back wages.
32.
The petitioner has placed reliance on the order dated 18.09.2009
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to contend that the issue relating to
Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act stood concluded and could not be re-agitated.
The said order reads as under:
“We once again re-iterate that as far as the applicability of
section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
concerned the dispute stands concluded and the appellant
will not raise the dispute under Section 33(2)(b). We clarify
that the Industrial Tribunal will decide the reference on
merits uninfluenced by the observations of the High Court on
the points other than on Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
33.
A plain reading of the aforesaid order makes it clear that while the
issue relating to the applicability of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act stood
concluded, adjudication of the dispute on merits was expressly left open to
be decided under Section 10 of the ID Act, uninfluenced by observations on
issues other than Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. Pursuant thereto, the
appropriate Government made a reference dated 18.12.2009 for adjudication
of the legality of the termination of the respondent/workman and the relief,
if any, to which he is entitled. The reference thus constitutes an independent
statutory proceeding, the scope of which is defined by its terms and is not
barred by the earlier proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act. The
Labour Court, therefore, committed no error in proceeding to adjudicate the
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dispute on merits.
34.
Before adverting to the merits, it is necessary to determine the
preliminary issue whether the respondent qualifies as a “workman” under
Section 2(s) of the ID Act, as the maintainability of the reference is
contingent thereon. The petitioner contends that the respondent, being a
Medical Sales Representative engaged in sales promotion, does not fall
within the definition of a “workman” under Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, placing reliance on H.R. Adyanthaya & Ors. v. Sandoz
(India) Ltd. & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 737 The said contention is considered
hereinafter.
35.
It is well settled that the status of an employee as a "workman" is a
jurisdictional fact; however, such determination is not a pure question of law
but one requiring factual enquiry into the nature of duties performed and the
capacity in which the employee was engaged. In the present case, no
objection to the respondent's status was raised in the written statement
before the Labour Court, nor was any amendment sought at any subsequent
stage; the plea was raised for the first time at the stage of final arguments,
after conclusion of evidence, thereby depriving the respondent of any
opportunity to meet it by leading evidence. The belated raising of such a
plea, without any factual foundation having been laid, cannot be permitted.
The conduct of the petitioner further disentitles it from raising this
contention having invoked the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal in
earlier proceedings under Section 33-A of the ID Act without ever disputing
the respondent's status as a workman, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
resile from that position at this stage. The challenge to the respondent's
status as a workman, raised belatedly and without factual foundation, does
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not merit acceptance and is rejected.
36.
Even otherwise ,The Constitution Bench in H.R. Adyanthaya v.
Sandoz (India) Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 737, held that employees engaged in
sales promotion do not, by virtue of such engagement alone, fall within the
categories enumerated under Section 2(s) of the ID Act. The said judgment,
however, recognises that the status of such employees is governed by the
applicable statutory framework. In this context, the Sales Promotion
Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 (hereinafter, "SPE Act"), as
amended by Act 48 of 1986 with effect from 06.05.1987, assumes
significance. By virtue of Section 6(2) of the SPE Act, sales promotion
employees not falling within excluded categories such as those employed in
a managerial or supervisory capacity beyond the prescribed limits are
deemed to be "workmen" for the purposes of the ID Act.
37.
In the present case, the termination took place on 01.11.1995, after the
coming into force of the amended statutory regime. There is no material on
record to indicate that the respondent was employed in a managerial or
supervisory capacity so as to fall within the excluded category. On the
contrary, the material on record indicates that the respondent was engaged as
a field-level Medical Sales Representative without any supervisory
authority. The respondent would, therefore, fall within the ambit of a "sales
promotion employee" under the SPE Act and consequently be deemed to be
a "workman" under the ID Act.
38.
The Labour Court, while arriving at this conclusion, referred to the
salary reflected in the appointment letter with reference to the preamendment wage ceiling, an approach not strictly aligned with the post1987 position. However, it is well settled that the validity of a conclusion
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does not stand vitiated merely because the reasoning is not entirely accurate,
so long as the conclusion is otherwise sustainable in law.
39.
In view of the aforesaid, the respondent is held to be a workman
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act, and the reference before
the Labour Court was accordingly maintainable. The challenge on this
ground is rejected.
40.
The principal question that arises for consideration before this court
in the present case is whether the impugned termination of the
respondent’s services is illegal or unjustified.
41.
The record indicates that on 05.09.1995, the Management froze the
respondent's work without assigning any reason, and despite his letter dated
13.09.1995 seeking reasons therefore, no response was ever furnished. By
order dated 26.09.1995, the respondent was transferred to Ratlam, Madhya
Pradesh .Upon receipt of the transfer order on 05.10.1995, the respondent
submitted a representation dated 07.10.1995 seeking deferment, which was
rejected on 13.10.1995 without any interim protection being granted. The
respondent did not join at the transferred place, which led to termination of
his services on 01.11.1995.
42.
In the aforesaid backdrop, the respondent’s failure to report at the
transferred place, despite rejection of his representation and in the absence
of any restraint on the transfer order, may ordinarily invite disciplinary
action. That position is not in dispute. However, the admission of noncompliance establishes only the factum of non-joining; it does not, by itself,
establish wilful or contumacious misconduct. Whether the conduct warrants
the extreme penalty of termination must be assessed in the light of the
surrounding circumstances, including the context of the transfer, the time
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afforded for compliance, the pendency of the industrial reference, and the
manner in which the termination followed. Significantly, between the
rejection of the representation on 13.10.1995 and the termination on
01.11.1995, the management issued no show-cause notice, charge-sheet,
warning, or communication affording the respondent an opportunity to
explain his conduct. The termination was thus effected without any
disciplinary process. The mere fact that the transfer order was not
challenged does not dispense with this requirement. Non-compliance with a
transfer order is the starting point of an enquiry, not its conclusion.
43.
In view of the above, the petitioner contends that the termination
dated 01.11.1995 is a discharge simpliciter effected under Clause (C) of the
confirmation letter dated 04.06.1986 by payment of one month’s salary in
lieu of notice, and, being non-punitive, did not require compliance with
disciplinary process.
44.
The distinction between a discharge simpliciter and a punitive
termination is well settled in law. A discharge simpliciter rests on neutral or
administrative considerations and is not founded on any charge or adverse
material against the employee. A termination, however, assumes a punitive
character where its real and operative foundation lies in the conduct
attributed to the employee. The form of the order or the contractual
mechanism invoked is not determinative; it is the substance of the action
that governs its true character.
45.
Tested on the aforesaid principles, the termination in the present case
cannot be regarded as a discharge simpliciter. The termination letter
dated
01.11.1995
expressly
proceeds
on
the
basis
that
the
respondent/workman failed to comply with the transfer order and neglected
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his contractual obligations, thereby making his conduct the foundation of the
action rather than any neutral or administrative consideration. This position
is further reinforced by the stand taken by the management in its Written
Statement before the Labour Court, wherein the respondent’s conduct has
been characterised as deliberate and in defiance of lawful directions, even
described as having been committed “with impunity.” Having thus founded
its action on misconduct, and having so pleaded before the Labour Court,
the petitioner cannot now adopt an inconsistent position by describing the
termination as a mere contractual discharge. The factual background further
fortifies this conclusion: the respondent’s work was frozen by the
management vide communication dated 05.09.1995 without assigning any
reason; a transfer order was thereafter issued on 26.09.1995 and received by
the respondent on 05.10.1995, leaving him only a few days to comply before
its operative date of 09.10.1995; the respondent submitted a representation
dated 07.10.1995, which was rejected on 13.10.1995; and thereafter, without
issuance of any show cause notice, framing of any charge-sheet, or conduct
of any domestic enquiry, the respondent’s services were terminated on
01.11.1995. These events from the unexplained freezing of work, to the
transfer, and the hasty termination are wholly inconsistent with a neutral
administrative discharge and are consistent only with a punitive action
founded on the respondent’s failure to comply with the transfer order.
46.
It is well settled that where termination is founded on misconduct, it
cannot be sustained as a contractual discharge, irrespective of the form
adopted .This principle has been affirmed in Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi
Bhan, (1998) 6 SCC 538, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“Conferment of ‘permanent’ status on an employee
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guarantees security of tenure. It is now well settled that the
services of a permanent employee, whether employed by the
Government, or Govt. company or Govt. instrumentality or
Statutory Corporations or any other "Authority" within the
meaning of Article 12, cannot be terminated abruptly and
arbitrarily, either by giving him a month’s or three months’
notice or pay in lieu thereof or even without notice,
notwithstanding that there may be a stipulation to that effect
either in the contract of service or in the Certified Standing
Orders.”
47.
The termination dated 01.11.1995 being punitive in nature,
compliance with the principles of natural justice was imperative. No showcause notice was issued, no charge-sheet was framed, and no domestic
enquiry was conducted prior to termination. In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A.
Industries, (1993) 3 SCC 259, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
termination affecting livelihood must be preceded by a just, fair and
reasonable procedure in compliance with the principles of natural justice , as
the right to livelihood forms part of Article 21 of Constitution of India , and
that an employee is entitled to a fair hearing before any adverse civil
consequence is imposed. The action of the management, taken in disregard
of this requirement, cannot be sustained.
48.
The petitioner contends that since the factum of non-joining at the
transferred place stands admitted, the holding of a domestic enquiry would
have served no purpose and amounted to an empty formality. The
requirement of a prior hearing is not confined to establishing the bare factum
of conduct; it extends to affording the employee an opportunity to explain
the circumstances in which such conduct occurred, including whether the
non-compliance was wilful or arose from a bona fide belief, and whether
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any mitigating factors warranted a lesser consequence.
49.
In Novartis India Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors, (2009) 3 SCC
124, ( CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7011 of 2008 ) arising in a similar factual
context involving the same petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
as under:
“ 18. When an employee does not join at his transferred
place, he commits a misconduct. A disciplinary proceeding
was, therefore, required to be initiated. The order of
discharge is not a substitute for an order of punishment. If
an employee is to be dismissed from services on the ground
that he had committed a misconduct, he was entitled to an
opportunity of hearing. Had such an opportunity of hearing
been given to them, they could have shown that there were
compelling reasons for their not joining at the transferred
places. Even a minor punishment could have been granted.
Appellant precipitated the situation by passing a post haste
order of termination of their services.”
50.
The submission of the petitioner that the decision in Novartis India
Ltd. v. State of West Bengal ( supra ) is confined to the issue of back wages
was also raised before the Labour Court and was rejected on the ground that
the observations of the Supreme Court on the requirement of disciplinary
proceedings and a pre-termination opportunity of hearing are of general
application and do not lose relevance merely because the case also involved
back wages. This Court finds no reason to take a different view. Relevant
para of the judgment reads as follows:
“Respondents were in private employment and not in public
employment. Their services were permanent in nature. The
termination of their services was held to be illegal as prior
to issuance of the orders, no enquiry had been conducted.
The order of discharge was, thus, void ab initio. Back
wages, therefore, could have been granted from the date of
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termination of service.”
51.
Applied to the present case, the termination, being founded on the
respondent’s failure to comply with the transfer order, could not have been
effected without affording him an opportunity of hearing. A domestic
enquiry was, therefore, necessary.
52.
Similarly, in Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that even where termination is sought to be effected
under a provision of the Standing Orders, it must satisfy the requirements of
fairness and natural justice, and the employee must be afforded an
opportunity of hearing. The Court observed as under:
“ ….….What it says is that "the services are liable to
automatic termination." This provision, therefore, confers a
discretion upon the management to terminate or not to
terminate the services of an employee who overstays the
leave. It is obvious that this discretion cannot be exercised,
or permitted to be exercised, capriciously. The discretion
has to be based on an objective consideration of all the
circumstances and material which may be available on
record. What are the circumstances which compelled the
employee to proceed on leave; why he overstayed the leave;
was there any just and reasonable cause for overstaying the
leave; whether he gave any further application for extension
of leave; whether any medical certificate was sent if he had,
in the meantime, fallen ill? These are questions which
would naturally arise while deciding to terminate the
services of the employee for overstaying the leave. Who
would answer these questions and who would furnish the
material to enable the management to decide whether to
terminate or not to terminate the services are again
questions which have an answer inherent in the provision
itself, namely, that the employee against whom action on the
basis of this provision is proposed to be taken must be given
an opportunity of hearing........”
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53.
The aforesaid principle applies to the present case, where the
termination, though effected under the applicable service conditions , is
founded on the respondent’s conduct and could not have been made without
affording an opportunity of hearing.
54.
The petitioner has placed reliance on Workmen v. Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813, and Amar Chakravarty v. Maruti Suzuki
(I) Ltd., (2010) 14 SCC 471 to contend that absence of a domestic enquiry
does not vitiate the termination, as the management may justify its action by
leading evidence before the Labour Court. The proposition is not in dispute.
However, the reliance does not advance the case of the petitioner. The said
principle permits the employer to adduce evidence to establish misconduct
where no enquiry has been held; it does not dispense with the requirement of
affording a pre-termination opportunity of hearing where the action is
founded on misconduct. In the present case, although evidence has been led
to establish non-compliance with the transfer order, the termination, having
been effected without any notice, charge-sheet or enquiry, suffers from a
defect going to the root of the action and does not obviate the requirement of
fairness at the stage of termination. Further, even under the Firestone (
supra) principle, the management is required to establish not merely the
factum of misconduct but that the action taken was proper; as noticed in
Amar Chakravarty (supra), that burden is not discharged by proof of nonjoining alone.
55.
In view of the above, no infirmity is found in the Labour Court’s
conclusion that the termination stood vitiated for non-compliance with the
principles of natural justice.
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56.
While the conduct of the respondent in not complying with the
transfer order after rejection of his representation cannot be said to be
justified, it cannot, in the circumstances, be regarded as wilful. The Labour
Court, on an appraisal of the material on record, found that the respondent
was under a bona fide impression that the management would consider his
request for withdrawal of the transfer order, particularly in view of the
reference dated 25.09.1995 made by the Government of Maharashtra to the
Industrial Tribunal, Mumbai, which included Demand No. 20 relating to
transfer of Medical Sales Representatives by mutual consent. The
respondent had specifically relied upon the said pending reference in his
representation dated 07.10.1995, requesting reconsideration of the transfer
order, and upon termination, pursued remedies under the ID Act by initiating
proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal. The Labour Court treated this
course of conduct as indicative of the respondent’s belief that the pending
proceedings afforded him protection. It also took note of the surrounding
circumstances, including the prior freezing of the respondent’s work on
05.09.1995 without explanation, the limited time available to comply with
the transfer order, and the termination of his services within a short span
thereafter. The findings of the Labour Court on this aspect are supported by
the material on record and do not suffer from perversity.
57.
The petitioner’s contention based on the alleged resignation from
ACW is of no assistance. The observation of the Bombay High Court arose
in proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and, as clarified by the
order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 18.09.2009, was confined to that
context. In any event, there is nothing on record to indicate that, at the
relevant time in October 1995, the respondent was aware that no other
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Medical Sales Representative continued to be a member of ACW. The
enquiry in the present case is confined to the respondent's bona fide belief in
the facts and circumstances relating to his transfer in Ratlam to the reference
pending before the Industrial Tribunal, and not about the facts which came
into the light in subsequent proceedings.
58.
In support of the above submission, the petitioner has placed reliance
on Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani, (1989) 2
SCC 602,contending that once a representation against a transfer order is
rejected and no stay is obtained, the employee must comply. The proposition
is well settled. However, its application depends on the factual context in
which the non-compliance occurs. The Labour Court distinguished the said
decision on the ground that, in the present case, a reference concerning the
transfer of Medical Sales Representatives was already pending before the
Industrial Tribunal at the relevant time, which gave rise to a bona fide belief
on the part of the respondent that compliance could await its resolution. This
Court concurs; the decision is distinguishable on facts and does not aid the
petitioner.
59.
The petitioner further relies on Y.P. Sarabhai v. Union Bank of
India, (2006) 5 SCC 377. The Labour Court distinguished the said decision
on the ground that therein the employee remained absent from duty for a
very long time i.e. from 03.06.1997 to 23.11.1997 without any reasonable
cause or justification, despite repeated requests and further time being
granted to join duty, disclosing that he was bent upon evading the transfer
order. In the present case, the respondent acted under a bona fide belief
arising from the pending industrial dispute and was terminated within
eighteen days of the rejection of his representation ,without any domestic
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enquiry or opportunity of hearing. This Court finds no infirmity in the said
distinction. The decision does not assist the petitioner.
60.
The Labour Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 11-A
of the ID Act, was competent to examine the proportionality of the
punishment. The alleged misconduct is confined to non-joining in
circumstances where the respondent acted under an impression that his
grievance was under consideration. He had rendered about ten years of
service without any adverse record, and the action stands vitiated by absence
of a disciplinary process. Notably, the termination was effected within about
eighteen days of the rejection of his representation, without any intervening
corrective step, rendering the imposition of the extreme penalty
disproportionate. The finding of the Labour Court, therefore, does not suffer
from any infirmity.
61.
At the same time, the Labour Court did not treat the respondent’s
conduct as justified. It has been recorded that the respondent’s failure to join
at the transferred place was not without fault. However, having regard to the
surrounding circumstances, including the pendency of the industrial dispute,
the prior freezing of work without any justification, explanation and the
absence of any opportunity before termination, the Labour Court proceeded
to balance the equities between the parties. This is reflected in the nature of
the relief granted, whereby back wages were denied for a substantial part of
the period and only partially awarded thereafter. The approach of the Labour
Court thus demonstrates a considered calibration of relief, taking into
account both the conduct of the respondent and the illegality in the action of
the management. This Court finds no infirmity in the said approach and
concurs with the manner in which the Labour Court has balanced the
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equities between the parties.
62.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned Award does not
suffer from any jurisdictional error, patent illegality or perversity
warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The finding of the Labour Court that the termination of the respondent’s
services was illegal and unjustified is upheld.
63.
As regards the relief, the Labour Court, having found the termination
to be illegal, unjustified and vitiated by mala fides, directed reinstatement of
the respondent/workman with continuity of service and consequential
benefits. While doing so, it denied back wages for the period from
01.11.1995 to 10.01.2010 having regard to the conduct of the workman and
the surrounding circumstances , and awarded back wages at the rate of 25%
of the last drawn wages for the period from 11.01.2010, being the date of
receipt of the reference, till the date of the Award, i.e., 24.02.2015.
64.
The petitioner assails the grant of reinstatement on the ground of lapse
of time and further contends that the respondent was gainfully employed,
placing reliance on alleged business activity in Delhi and income tax returns
reflecting amounts of ₹4,60,705/- and ₹1,87,673/-. These submissions do not
merit acceptance. The allegation of business activity is unsupported by any
material on record, and the reliance on isolated income tax entries does not
establish gainful employment in a comparable capacity. As held in Deepali
Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and Others ,
(2013) 10 SCC 324, the burden to prove gainful employment lies on the
employer and is not discharged by such material.
65.
The Labour Court, on appreciation of evidence, found that the
management had led no material to establish employment in a comparable
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capacity; that the income reflected in the returns was explained as family
deposits and sale proceeds; that the suggestion of a dog-breeding business
remained unsubstantiated; and that the respondent had stated on oath that he
had remained unemployed since 1995. On this basis, the Labour Court
declined to treat the said material as proof of gainful employment. This
Court finds no infirmity in that view.
66.
The grant of 25% back wages from 11.01.2010, while denying wages
for the earlier period, reflects a balanced exercise of discretion, taking into
account both the illegality of the termination and the conduct of the
workman. The said determination warrants no interference.
67.
The contention that reinstatement should be denied on account of
lapse of time is also without merit. The respondent was terminated on
01.11.1995 and has undergone prolonged litigation spanning three decades.
Delay attributable to adjudicatory processes cannot operate to the detriment
of the workman or defeat the relief otherwise due. As recognised in Deepali
Gundu Surwase (supra), the passage of time does not extinguish the
entitlement arising from an illegal termination. No ground is made out to
substitute reinstatement with compensation.
68.
However, since the respondent has attained the age of superannuation
during the pendency of the proceedings, physical reinstatement is no longer
feasible. The relief is accordingly moulded by directing that the respondent
shall be deemed to have continued in service from 01.11.1995 till the date of
superannuation as per applicable service rules , with full continuity of
service and all consequential retiral and monetary benefits.
69.
The application under Section 17-B of the ID Act, 1947 (CM No.
9194 of 2017) stands disposed of in view of the final relief granted herein.
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Any amount deposited pursuant thereto shall be adjusted against the
amounts finally payable so as to avoid double recovery.
CONCLUSION
70.
In view of the foregoing, the Award dated 24.02.2015 warrants no
interference and is upheld, subject to the modification on account of
superannuation. Accordingly:
(i) The termination dated 01.11.1995 is set aside as illegal and
unjustified.
(ii) The respondent/workman shall be deemed to have continued in
service from 01.11.1995 till the date of superannuation as per
applicable service rules , with continuity of service for all
purposes.
(iii) The respondent/workman shall not be entitled to back wages
for the period from 01.11.1995 to 10.01.2010, in terms of the
Award, which is upheld.
(iv) The respondent/workman shall be entitled to back wages at the
rate of 25% of the last drawn wages for the period from
11.01.2010 to 24.02.2015, in terms of the Award, which is upheld.
(v) For the period from 24.02.2015 till the date of superannuation
as per applicable service rules , the respondent/workman shall be
entitled to full wages on the basis of deemed continuation in
service, along with all increments and benefits applicable to the
post.
(vi) The petitioner/management shall compute and release all
consequential monetary and retiral benefits, including gratuity,
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provident fund and other admissible dues, on the basis of notional
continuity of service, within twelve weeks from the date of this
judgment.
(vii) Any amount deposited under Section 17-B shall be adjusted
against the aforesaid dues.
(viii) In the event of default, the amounts shall carry interest at 6%
per annum from the date of expiry of the stipulated period till
realization.
The petition and all pending applications stand disposed of. No order
as to costs.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
MAY 04, 2026
RM
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