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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 24.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on:18.08.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 206/2016
M/S NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Alok Kumar Jain, Mr.
Ashok Gurnani and Mr.
Abhishek Singh, Advocates.
versus
M/S ORIENTAL STRUCTURAL ENGINEERS PVT LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Anil K Airi, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Bindiya Logawaney
Airi,
Mr.
Ravi Krishan
Chandna, Mr. Vishal Tyagi, Ms.
Jasmin Sokhi, Mr. Harsh
Gautam and Mr. Udbhav K.
Garg, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
18.08.2026
%
1.
The present petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 19961 assailing the Arbitral Award2 dated
12.07.2012 passed by a three-member Tribunal in disputes arising out
of Contract dated 26.03.20023.
2.
The disputes between the parties arise out of a contract awarded
by the National Highways Authority of India4 for Four-Laning and
“the Act”, hereinafter
“impugned award”, alternatively
“Contract”, hereinafter
“Petitioner”, hereinafter
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strengthening of the existing two-lane highway from Km. 199.66 to
Km. 250.50 on NH-2 in the State of Uttar Pradesh (Construction
Package IA – Contract No. GTRIP/1)5.
3.
The said disputes were initially referred to the Disputes Review
Board6. When the issue did not get resolved before the DRB, the
disputes were referred to arbitration, whereupon a three-member
Arbitral Tribunal entered upon the reference and rendered the impugned
Award dated 12.07.2012.
4.
By the impugned Award, the Tribunal partly allowed Claim Nos.
1, 3 and 4 filed by the Respondent (claimant in the Arbitral
Proceedings). For Claim No. 1, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.
45,88,91,806/- together with interest. Under Claim No. 3, the
Respondent was held entitled to reimbursement of the additional
expenses incurred in Service Tax and Education Cess due to subsequent
legislation. With respect to Claim No. 4, the Tribunal held that the
Respondent was entitled to separate payment for “filler type expansion
joints” used in retaining walls, separators and drains.
5.
In both Claim Nos. 3&4, the Tribunal also directed the Engineer
to verify the admissible amounts or quantities, as the case may be, and
certify the amount payable to the Respondent.
6.
Aggrieved by the impugned Award, the Petitioner has preferred
the present petition under Section 34 of the Act.
“the project” hereinafter
“DRB” hereinafter
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FACTS
7.
The facts leading to the present controversy are briefly set out
hereunder:
8.
The Petitioner invited competitive bids for the project in which
M/s Oriental Structural Engineers Ltd. – Gammon India Ltd. (Joint
Venture)7 participated and were declared as the successful bidder. A
Letter of Acceptance was issued which was followed by an execution
of the Contract Agreement on 26.03.20028 for a value of
Rs.2,627,950,259/- and US $13,661,625/-.
9.
Due to the scale and duration of the project, the Contract had
clauses dealing with the consequences of delays during execution, price
adjustment on account of fluctuations in input costs, and additional
financial burdens arising from subsequent legislative changes etc. In
that regard, Clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 provide for extension of time
and reimbursement of additional costs in specified situations, Clause 70
provides for adjustment of the Contract Price, and Sub-Clause 70.8
deals with reimbursement of additional costs incurred due to change by
subsequent legislation. The disputes in the present petition substantially
arises as to the interpretation and application of these clauses.
10.
In terms of the contract, the project was required to commence
on 30.03.2002 and were to be completed within thirty-six months.
“Respondent”, hereinafter
“contract”, hereinafter
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Instead of a single completion date, the contract provided for phased
completion by dividing the project into three sections. The stipulated
scheduled date as per the contract were as follows:
Section
Scope of work
Stipulated
date
of
completion
Section-I
Km. 0 to Km. 30 (New 29.09.2003
Carriageway)
Section -II
Km. 30 to Km. 50.50 29.03.2004
(New Carriageway) and
Km.
to
Km.
(Existing Carriageway)
Section-III
Km. 15 to Km. 50.50 29.03.2005
(Existing Carriageway)
11.
The project, however, did not progress in accordance with the
original stipulated schedule. During its execution, the agreed dates of
completion was extended on several occasions and the period of
completion stood extended upto 31.03.2009. According to the
Respondent, the delay was caused by the Petitioner’s failure to hand
over the work front/site in time, physical obstructions, land acquisition
issues and delays relating to the Tundla Railway Over Bridge. The
Petitioner, on the other hand, attributed the delay to the Respondent’s
slow progress in execution of the works.
12.
During the execution of the Contract, Service Tax was enhanced
and Education Cess was introduced, resulting in an additional tax
burden on the Respondent in respect of goods and services availed for
execution of the works. Taking the position that the additional financial
burden had arisen after the bid date and was not covered by the price
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adjustment clauses given in the contract, the Respondent sought
reimbursement as per Clause 70 of the Contract which was denied by
the Petitioner.
13.
Disputes also arose between the parties with respect to the
Respondent’s claim for payment towards “filler type expansion joints”.
According to the Respondent, the Bill of Quantities9 did not provide for
payment of the “filler type expansion joints” used in retaining walls,
crash barriers, separators and drains. The Respondent, therefore,
claimed that the use of such “filler type expansion joints” constituted a
variation for which separate payment was payable. The Petitioner, on
the other hand, contended that the agreed BOQ rates were all-inclusive
and that no separate payment was payable.
14.
The aforesaid developments gave rise to disputes between the
parties.
15.
Broadly, the disputes related to three issues. Firstly, whether the
Respondent was entitled to compensation on account of the
prolongation of the contract and expenses incurred in the extended
period of execution. Secondly, whether the Respondent was entitled to
reimbursement of the additional expenditure incurred due to
imposition/enhancement of Service Tax and Education Cess, during the
execution of the contract. Thirdly, whether the Respondent was entitled
to separate payment for “filler type expansion joints” used in reinforced
“BOQ” hereinafter
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cement concrete structures, on the grounds that the said work
constituted a variation not covered by the original BOQ.
16.
In terms of Clause 67 of the Contract, the disputes were initially
referred to the DRB. As the recommendations of the DRB did not attain
finality, the disputes were, thereafter, referred to Tribunal under Clause
67.3 of the Contract.
17.
Upon invocation of the arbitration agreement, a three-member
Arbitral Tribunal comprising Shri Surjeet Singh as the Presiding
Arbitrator and Shri S. Venkatesan and Shri Prem Nath as Co-Arbitrators
entered upon the reference. The Respondent initially filed its Statement
of Claims raising four substantive claims.
18.
During the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, Claim No. 1,
relating to prolongation costs was amended two times due to the
continued extension of the Contract period. The Petitioner also filed its
amended reply to amended Statement of Claim. However, the
Respondent pressed only the following three claims for adjudication
and withdrew the Claim No.2:
i.
Claim No.1: Compensation due to delays during the period
from 1% July, 2003 till completion of the works.
ii.
Claim No. 3: Payment of additional cost due to subsequent
Notification of Education Cess and Service Tax.
iii.
Claim No.4: Payment of Variation item of Filler
Expansion Joints:
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19.
Before the Tribunal, the Petitioner resisted all the claims in
entirety. Insofar as Claim No. 1 was concerned, it was contended that
the delay in completion was either attributable to the Respondent or, in
any event, did not entitle it to any additional compensation under
Clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 of the Contract.
20.
As regards Claim No. 3, the Petitioner submitted that no
reimbursement was payable in terms of 70.8 of the Contract towards
Service Tax and Education Cess. In relation to Claim No. 4, it was
contended that “filler type expansion joints” were already covered
under the BOQ read with Technical Specification Clause 809 and,
therefore, no separate payment was payable.
21.
By the impugned Award, the learned Arbitral Tribunal partly
allowed Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 4, and Claim No. 2 was dismissed as
withdrawn. Under Claim No. 1, the Tribunal awarded a sum of
Rs.45,88,91,806/- together with simple interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from 19.10.2007 till the date of the Award.
22.
In regard to Claim Nos. 3 and 4, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
rendered a declaratory Award. Under Claim No. 3, it held that the
Respondent is entitled to reimbursement of Service Tax and Education
Cess, subject to verification and certification of the admissible amount
by the Engineer.
23.
For Claim No.4, the Tribunal held that “filler type expansion
joints” used in retaining walls, separators and drains has to be paid
separately as they are not already covered in the BOQ and fixed the rate
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at Rs.480/- per sq. metre. It further directed the Engineer to verify the
actual quantities executed and determine the amount payable.
24.
The Tribunal also directed payment of the awarded amounts
within sixty days, failing which future interest at the rate of 12% per
annum would be payable till realization.
SUBMISSIONS
25.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner assailed the impugned Award
pertaining to Claim No. 1 on the ground that the Tribunal has awarded
this claim without recording the necessary findings on the causes of
delay or the actual loss allegedly suffered by the Respondent. Reliance
was placed on OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.10.
26.
Elaborating his submission, learned Counsel submitted that the
impugned Award does not identify the extent of delay in handing over
the site, issuance of drawings, removal of physical obstructions or
approvals from the Railway Authorities, nor does it examine the impact
of these events on the execution of the work.
27.
It was next contended that the Tribunal has acted contrary to
Clauses 6.4, 12.2, and 42.2 of the Contract. According to the Petitioner,
under these clauses, any claim for additional cost was required to be
determined by the Engineer. Since the Engineer had not certified or
(2025) 2 SCC 417
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recommended any additional cost, the Tribunal could not have awarded
prolongation costs.
28.
In support, it was pointed out that the Tribunal has also failed to
properly consider the Engineer’s letters. He submits that, while granting
extensions of time, the Engineer had consistently recorded slow
progress on the part of the Respondent and had not recommended any
additional cost.
29.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the Respondent failed to
prove the actual additional expenditure incurred during the extended
period. According to the Petitioner, in the absence of such material, the
Tribunal erred in quantifying the claim by adopting the Standard Data
Book of the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways11 and percentagebased calculations.
30.
It was further contended that the methodology adopted by the
Tribunal is dehors the Contract and, in any event, could not have been
applied in the absence of evidence showing the actual additional
expenditure allegedly incurred by the Respondent. It was also submitted
that the deduction of 20% towards mitigation is a guesswork and
unsupported by any material on record and therefore, perverse in nature.
31.
In view of the above reasons, the assessment of costs incurred
during prolongation, as well as the deduction towards mitigation, was
stated to be speculative, suffering from patent illegality and perversity
warranting interference under Section 34 of the Act. Reliance was
“MoRTH” hereinafter
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extensively placed on Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.12
32.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal has erred in allowing Claim Nos. 3 and 4. It
was contended that the Respondent had no entitlement either to
reimbursement of Service Tax and Education Cess under Sub-Clause
70.8 or to separate payment for “filler type expansion joints” as its cost
already stood included in the BOQ rates and specifications.
33.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the Tribunal could not
have left the quantification under Claim Nos. 3 and 4 to the Engineer.
According to him, once the claims were before the Tribunal, it was for
the Tribunal itself to determine the amount payable. By leaving the
quantification to the Engineer, what has been passed is only a
declaratory award, which, according to the Petitioner, lacks finality and
such a course was beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
34.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that the
award of interest on Claim No. 1 is unsustainable. Reliance was placed
upon Interstate Construction v. National Projects Construction
Corporation Ltd.13, to contend that the power under Section 31(7) of
the Act is procedural in nature and the entitlement to interest must have
its source in the Contract or other substantive law. According to the
him, as the Contract does not provide for payment of interest on the
2024 (2) SCC 375
(2026) 2 SCC 780
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costs awarded under Claim No. 1, the Tribunal could not have granted
interest.
35.
In support the above arguments, learned Counsel for the
Petitioner has also relied upon NHAI v. P. Nagaraju Cheluvaiah14,
NHAI v. M/S Uem Essar joint15, NTPC v. Deconar Services Private
Limited16, Penna Electricity v. Tamil Nadu17 , EFS Facilities Services
v. Indian Bio Power Limited18, K P and SONS v. UOI19, Nangia
Construction Pvt Ltd. v. National Building Construction Corporation
Limited20, HJ Bakers and Brothers v. Minerals and Metal Trade
Corporation21, Bawa Paulins Pvt. Ltd v. UPS Freight Services (India)
Pvt. Ltd. and Another22, Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and
Co. and Another23, NHAI v. IRB Pathankot Amritsar Toll Road24,
M/S GMR Pochanpalli expressway v. NHAI25, MD and Others ( J&K
power development corporation ) v. M/S Trust House Construction
Engineers and Builders26, M/s. Larsen Air Conditioning and
Refrigration Company v. Union of India and Others27, M/s Jsw Ispat
Steel Limited (Now Known As Jsw Steel Limited) v. M/S Gas
Authority Of India Limited28, Sujit Kumar Jaiswal v. Managing
2022 (4) R.A.J. 441(SC)
2022 (4) R.A.J. 469 (SC)
(2021) 19 SCC 694
(2023) 10 SCC 338
277 (2021) DLT 551
277 (2021) DLT 604 (DB)
269 (2020) DLT 502
(2023) 9 SCC 424
(2023) 2 SCC 330
AIR 1954 SC 44
306 (2024) DLT 48 (DB)
2022(3) R.A.J. 233 (Del)
2022(3) R.A.J. 270(J&K)
AIR 2023 SC 4452
2026:DHC:1922-DB
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Director Dalmia Research International Pvt. Ltd29, Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jindal India Ltd.30, India Yamaha Motors Pvt.
Ltd. v. M/S Millenium Automobiles and Ors.31 and Gayatri Balasamy
v. Technologies Limited32, Kabushiki Kaisha v. Toshiba v. Tosiba
Appliances Co.33 and B.C. Hasaram & Sons v. Smt. Nirmala
Agarwal34.
36.
Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent supported
the impugned Award. He submitted that the Tribunal, upon a detailed
appreciation of the pleadings, record and evidence, has returned a
categorical finding that the delay in execution of the project was
substantially attributable to the Petitioner. According to the him, these
are pure findings of fact, based on the material on record, and are not
amenable to interference in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act.
37.
It was further submitted that the Tribunal has neither accepted
the Respondent’s claim mechanically nor awarded a lump sum amount.
On the contrary, it scrutinised the material placed before it, rejected the
Respondent’s original computation, adopted a reasonable methodology
for quantification, and arrived at the amount awarded by making
appropriate exclusions and deductions.
38.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, such an exercise falls
squarely within the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal and does not
329 (2026) DLT 748
330 (2026) DLT 54
327 (2026) DLT 423
2025 (7) SCC 1
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5594
2025:DHC:9867-DB
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warrant reappreciation under Section 34. Reliance was placed upon
McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.35.
39.
Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Tribunal
rightly granted declaratory relief under Claim Nos. 3 and 4. It was
contended that the Tribunal adjudicated the Respondent’s entitlement
under the Contract and left only the task of verification and computation
to the Engineer. According to the Respondent, the Engineer was not
called upon to decide any disputed issue and, therefore, no part of the
Tribunal’s adjudicatory function stood delegated.
40.
For interest, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
submitted that the Tribunal has awarded interest only from the date of
invocation of arbitration and not for the pre-reference period in terms
of Section 31(7) of the Act.
ANALYSIS
Scope of interference
41.
As the present case requires this Court to exercise its power under
Section 34 of the Act, before examining the rival submissions, I find it
appropriate to briefly notice the scope of interference under Section 34
of the Act. The law in this regard is well settled and has been
consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. More recently,
in Ramesh Kumar Jain v. Bharat Aluminium Company Limited36, the
Supreme Court reiterated the principles in the following terms:
(2006) 11 SCC 181
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2857
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“28. The bare perusal of section 34 mandates a narrow lens of
supervisory jurisdiction to set aside the arbitral award strictly on
the grounds and parameters enumerated in sub-section (2) & (3)
thereof. The interference is permitted where the award is found to
be in contravention to public policy of India; is contrary to the
fundamental policy of Indian Law; or offends the most basic notions
of morality or justice. Hence, a plain and purposive reading of the
section 34 makes it abundantly clear that the scope of interference
by a judicial body is extremely narrow. It is a settled proposition of
law as has been constantly observed by this court and we reiterate,
the courts exercising jurisdiction under section 34 do not sit in
appeal over the arbitral award hence they are not expected to
examine the legality, reasonableness or correctness of findings on
facts or law unless they come under any of grounds mandated in the
said provision. In ONGC Limited. v. Saw Pipes Limited, this court
held that an award can be set aside under Section 34 on the
following grounds:“(a) contravention of fundamental policy of
Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.”
42.
Similar observations are also found in the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Consolidated Construction Consortium
Ltd. v. Software Technology Parks of India37:
“46. Scope of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is now well crystallised by
a plethora of judgments of this Court. Section 34 is not in the nature
of an appellate provision. It provides for setting aside an arbitral
award that too only on very limited grounds i.e. as those contained
in sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 34. It is the only remedy for
setting aside an arbitral award. An arbitral award is not liable to be
interfered with only on the ground that the award is illegal or is
erroneous in law which would require re-appraisal of the evidence
adduced before the Arbitral Tribunal. If two views are possible,
there is no scope for the court to re-appraise the evidence and to
take the view other than the one taken by the arbitrator. The view
taken by the Arbitral Tribunal is ordinarily to be accepted and
allowed to prevail. Thus, the scope of interference in arbitral
matters is only confined to the extent envisaged under Section 34 of
the Act. The court exercising powers under Section 34 has per force
to limit its jurisdiction within the four corners of Section 34. It
cannot travel beyond Section 34. Thus, proceedings under Section
34 are summary in nature and not like a full-fledged civil suit or a
civil appeal. The award as such cannot be touched unless it is
(2025) 7 SCC 757
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contrary to the substantive provisions of law or Section 34 of the
1996 Act or the terms of the agreement.”
43.
It is apparent from the aforesaid decisions that the jurisdiction of
this Court under Section 34 is circumscribed and a limited one. This
Court does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal
and, therefore, cannot re-appreciate the evidence or interfere merely
because another view on the facts or interpretation of the Contract is
possible. Interference is warranted only where the Award is shown to
suffer from one of the statutory grounds recognised under Section 34,
including conflict with the public policy of India, contravention of the
fundamental policy of Indian law or patent illegality appearing on the
face of the Award.
44.
As the challenge in the present petition is based on the ground of
patent illegality and perversity, I am mindful that not every error of fact
or law would amount to a patent illegality. The illegality should be of
such a nature that goes to the root of the Award and not be confined to
a mere erroneous application of law or appreciation of evidence. In a
similar manner, a finding can be characterised as perverse only where
it is based on no evidence, ignores material evidence having a direct
bearing on the controversy, or is such that no reasonable person could
have arrived at it. In OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has succinctly explained the concepts of patent
illegality and perversity in the following terms:
“Patent illegality
***
67.
In Associate Builders, this Court held that an award would
be patently illegal if it were contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of the law of India;
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(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract30.
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of the law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a)31 of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of the
contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the 1996
Act.
68.
In Ssangyong, this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment, which inserted Sub-section (2- A) in Section 34 of the
1996 Act. It was held that "patent illegality appearing on the face of
the award" refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter,
but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of law. It
was also clarified that what is not subsumed within "the fundamental
policy of Indian law", namely, the contravention of a statute not
linked to 'public policy' or 'public interest’, cannot be brought in by
the back door when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground
of patent illegality. Further, it was observed that reappreciation of
evidence is not permissible under this category of challenge to an
arbitral award.
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69.
Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award
was recognised in Western Geco. Therein, it was observed that an
arbitral decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at the same. It was observed
that if an award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of
India.
70.
In Associate Builders, certain tests were laid down to
determine whether a decision of an arbitral tribunal could be
considered perverse. In this context, it was observed that:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an arbitral tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to
the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision; such a
decision would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that when a
court applies these tests, it does not act as a court of appeal and,
consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected. Though a possible
view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster, as the
arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and quality of
evidence to be relied upon. It was also observed that an award based
on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in
quality to a trained legal mind would not be held to be invalid on
that score.”
45.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, I shall now examine the
challenge to the impugned Award in a claim-wise manner.
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CLAIM NO.1
46.
Since this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34
of the Act, is required to examine the correctness of the findings by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal, I find it necessary to first reproduce the
relevant findings rendered by the learned Arbitral Tribunal while
adjudicating Claim No.1:“13. We have carefully gone through the voluminous documents
filed by the parties. We have heard the parties at length and have
gone through the written synopsis of their arguments. There is no
denying that extensions of time sanctioned by the Employer beyond
the stipulated date for completion of various sections of the road
were because of delay in handing over site, physical obstruction at
site such as buildings, telephone poles, electric poles, delay in
handing over the land, delay in approval for Railway over - bridge
etc. On a careful perusal of Sub Clause 20.4 (COPA) of the contract,
it is evident that all the reasons based on which extension of time
has been granted, fall under the Employer's risks. Progress slower
than that originally expected is rather natural in the light of
hindrances described above.
…
16.
The project commenced on 30th March 2002 and the entire
work was stipulated to be completed by 29th March 2005. While we
acknowledge that prolonged stay in a project due to reasons beyond
the control of the claimant results into a loss and additional cost to
it as its resources are rendered underutilized or idle, it is imperative
for us to assess the cost compensation only as per the terms of the
contract. The contract does provide for cost to be determined under
Sub-clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 in such circumstances. The "cost" as
defined in Sub-clause l.1(g)(i) of the conditions of contract, means
all expenditure properly incurred or to be incurred, whether on or
off the Site, including overhead and other charges properly
allocable thereto but does not include any allowance for profit. The
claim of loss of profit cannot, therefore, be included in the cost. We
also observe that the contract start and completion dates for the
three sections are different, requiring appropriate quantity of
resources, especially equipment, at different stages and consequent
de-mobilization on completion of respective sections, so that the
deployment of resources is optimum, obviating non- utilization costs
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being charged to the work. In this context, the calculation of
additional cost by the claimant, assuming entire resources as
rendered idle on a uniform basis for the entire delay period, may not
be consistent and precise, although the deployment of equipment at
different periods is available in evidence by way of contemporary
record of monthly reports submitted by the claimant. The documents
placed on record do not show whether the equipment and resources
deployed over the duration of the works were deficient, surplus or
optimal, although we must concede that the approved work
programme does indicate the requirement of minimum essential
equipment to be made available at site. There are delays/slow
progress reported in the documents for which the contractor has
been asked to take action (e.g., pages RD/ 5 and RD/11), but with so
many obstructions and hindrances, some such effect on the
programmed progress of work is inevitable. During the course of the
execution of work, road- sections were revised because of non availability of unhindered site at certain locations of the sections.
This has rendered assessment of compensation cost rather
complicated. Had the originally designated sections with the phased
possessions of site been maintained, the deployment of manpower
and equipment would be of a certain scale at the start of section-1,
increasing after 6 months to coincide with the start of section 2 and
peaking at start of section3 and then decreasing on the completion
of section-1 & section -2. Even under such deployment some
equipment like large batching plant, hot -mix plants, pavers etc. may
be idling for want of sufficient quantity of work but still required to
be kept on hold for completing balance works. Thus some idling may
be inbuilt into the contract.
17.
The issue of apportioning delay attributable to the three
sections of the contract has been further complicated by the
modifications of the scope of work in the originally designated
sections by redistributing various stretches and calling them "
Revised Sections 1, 2 & 3 ", based on equivalent lane kilometerlengths of original sections. These revised milestones of equivalent
lane-km were proposed by the Claimant vide its letter dated
8.4.2006 (Ex .Cl/66 - p600 ) and approved by the Respondent
(Ex.C1/68-p605) .
…
19.
The delays have been analyzed and Extensions of Time
(EOT) recommended by the Engineer at various stages of work. The
delays continued even after the last EOT of 12.6.2007 due to
physical obstructions in small stretches and delay due to approvals
required for the Railway Over-bridge (ROB) at Tundla. The right
hand side carriageway of Tundla ROB was completed and traffic
diverted on it on 26.9.2007(Ex. CD/9 - p24). Further extensions in
this regard were recommended by the Engineer, the last being
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interim extension for the balance work of Tundla ROB (LHS) up to
31.3.2009 (Ex. CD/23 - p36), although the Employer is yet to
respond to these recommendations. As the remaining works in
section 3 (except the Tundla ROB-LHS and its approaches) got
completed on 7th March 2009 (Ex .CD/ 23 -p33). the claimant, by
an Amendment Application, had sought quantification of
compensation for delay limited only up to that date of 7th March
2009.
20.
The delay cost computed by the contractor is based on
equipment and manpower deployment during March 2002 to March
2005, proportionately extrapolated for the entire period of delay
thereafter. Such a calculation is likely to give an inaccurate result
for the post March 2005 period. The arbitral tribunal, in the
circumstances, had to arrive in a fair manner, at a method of
computation of delay cost within the terms of the contract and
wherever not possible, as per general engineering practice for such
works. To this end, the cost of works has been proportionately split
into the three sections and separately for the Tundla Railway over bridge and its approaches. The delay cost has been computed on the
basis of percentages indicated in the contract for different items
such as equipment & overheads and the delay suffered in proportion
to contractual period. The claim for loss of profit and opportunity
cost are not allowed since the definition of " cost " in the contract
expressly excludes profit. The overhead cost for delay as a
proportion of the sanctioned duration, was assessed on the basis of
percentage; 8% for road work & a weighted 12% for Tundla ROB
and its approaches, on the basis of the figures in the Standard Data
Book of the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways (MORTH); (It
stipulates 8% overheads for road works & 25% for bridge works).
The equipment utilization/non utilization cost was derived from the
percentage (20%) given in Sub-clause 70.3(xi) of the " Conditions
of Particular Application (COPA) " in the contract. The claimant
argued that the rainy season should not be excluded for
compensation as it could have been utilized for mobilization at some
other site had the work been completed in time and that work
continues even during the rainy season, there being no prohibition
in the contract for doing so. This period could have been utilized for
mobilization elsewhere or not is questionable, but in the rainy
season, work such as WMM, crushing of aggregate and that of
structures can definitely continue during in - between dry spells.
Bituminous work however, stands almost entirely suspended. We,
accordingly, consider it just and fair to deduct only 80% of rainy
season from the delay for assessing the compensation for delay.
21.
Since the respondent -Employer and the Claimant are party
to the concept of equivalent lane -km length for completion of section
1 & 2, we would take into account the delay attributable to the
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respondent for the purpose of compensation, only based on the
extension of time already granted by it for section 1 & 2. We find
that section 1 & 2 were actually completed on 15.4.2006. The
commencement date for Section-1 was 30.3.2002 and that for
Section- 2 was 30.9.2002. The stipulated dates for completion of
Section -1 and Section- 2 were 29.9.03 and 29.3 .04 respectively.
Accordingly, the delay as per the approved extension of time is of
929 days for Section 1 and 747 days for Section 2. The period of
extension determined by the Engineer for the period prior to 30/ 06/
2003 is 99 days for section -1 and 141 days for Section-2. (The
period up to 30 / 06/ 2003 is of no concern to us since this reference
to us is for the period beginning from 01/07/ 2003). Deducting this
extension of time up to 30/06/2003, the net delay post 30/06/2003
period for Section-1 is (929 - 99) = 830 days. There was rainy
season period of 180 days in between these 830 days. We have
already mentioned above that we are inclined to deduct 80% of the
rainy season from the period of delay for compensation.
Accordingly, net delay for Section-1 for the purpose of
compensation is (830 - 80% of 180) = 686 days. Similarly, the
period of delay reckoned post 30/06/ 2003 for Section 2 is (747 141) = 606 days and deducting 80% of the intervening period of
rainy season, the net delay for compensation is (606 - 80% of 180)
= 462 days.
22.
So far as Section-3 is concerned, the road work was
completed on 7th March 2009. The claimant had completed 94% of
the work in this section-3 by 14/ 09/ 2006 and demobilized most of
its men & machine thereafter (Ex, RD/21-p28). It would thus be
unfair to take into account the entire delay from 29.3. 2005 to
7.3.2009 for compensation. We are, accordingly, inclined to reckon
the period only up to 14/09 /2006 for the purposes of compensation
for delay for Section-3. This period up to 14/09 /2006 works out to
534 days, and deducting 80% of the intervening rainy season period,
the net delay for the purpose of compensation works out to (534 80% of 180) = 390 days.
23.
We have separated the work of Tundla Over - bridge because
of the peculiar circumstances of the case, so far as this over -bridge
is concerned. This overbridge has two carriageways, left hand side
and right hand side. Like Section- 3, it was also stipulated to be
completed by 29/03 / 2005.The right hand side carriageway was
completed on 26/09/ 2007 but the left hand side carriageway was
held up because of obstructions, changes in design and want of
approval from the railway authorities. Last extension of time for this
work was recommended by the Engineer up to 07 /03/ 2009, but the
hindrances could not be removed even after that date. The claimant,
in these circumstances, prayed for limiting the compensation only
up to 07/03/2009 by this arbitral tribunal. The total delay up to 07
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/03 / 2009 works out to 1439 days. Deducting 80% of the rainy
season period, net delay works out to (1439 - 80% of 360) = 1151
days.
24.
Mitigation of losses by the claimant: The claimant was
obliged to arrange site staff, plant and equipment as per the
approved programme during the stipulated period. But because of
prolongation of contract due to various hindrances, the plant,
equipment and manpower had to be kept in place for a longer
period. We recognize that in such a project, it is not feasible to
demobilize men and machines to a large measure strictly according
to the availability of work space, especially plants like crushers,
batching plant, hot mix plant and allied machines and manpower,
but the claimant is legally obliged to mitigate the losses to an extent
practicable by redeploying men and machines elsewhere. Since no
specific quantification of such mitigation is possible, we estimate
that the mitigation component at 20% would be a fair estimation
considering the facts of the case. We accordingly, consider it just for
both the parties, to reduce the compensation payable by 20%.
25.
The computation of compensation on the basis of details
supra is tabulated below:
S.No
.
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M
N
Particulars
Section 1
Section Length
Pro-rata
Contract
(Rs.)
Commencement dated
Stipulated date of
Completion
Delay/EQT
Granted/recommende
d up to:
Stipulated Contract
Period (Days)
Total Delay in days
Less Delay up to
30/06/2003
Net Delay in days (‘G’
– ‘H’)
Deduct 80% of Rainy
Season
Net Delay attributable
to Employer in days
(“J”- “K”)
Machinery Cost @
20% of Contract Cost
(Less Overheads &
Profit)
(20%
of
“B”*100/118)
“L”/”F” (Rs.)
Deduct
10%
for
unutilized
spares
during
under-
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Section 2
Section 3
Tundia RDB
79.081km
86.801km
954,560,000 1,037,250,000
66.290km
791,547,236
3.600km
86,642,764
30/03/2002
29/09/2003
30/09/2002
29/03/2024
31/01/2003
29/03/2005
31/01/2003
29/03/2005
15/04/2006
15/04/2006
12/06/2007
07/03/2009
534**
Remarks
** up to
14/9/2006
202,532,525
148,486,196
66,315,100
20,720,526
20,253,253
14,848,620
6,631,510
2,072,052
O
P
Q
R
T
U
utilization/ idle period
(10% of ‘M’)
Net Compensation for
underutilized/idle
machinery ('M' - 'N')
(Rs)
Compensation
for
Overheads (8% for
Road & weighted 12%
for Over-Bridge work,
of
('B'*100/118))
'L'/'F' (Rs)
TOTAL Compensation
in Rupees
Grand
Total
of
Compensation
for
Entire Work (Rs)
Less
20%
for
Mitigation Measures
by the Claimant (Rs)
Net
Compensation
('R’- ‘T1’-‘T2') in
Rupees
182,279,273
133,637,576
59,683,590
18,648,474
81,013,010
59,394,478
26,526,040
12,432,316
263,292,283
193,032,055
86,209,630
31,080,790
573,614,758
114,722,952
458,891,806
The claimant is, accordingly, awarded a sum of 45 ,88, 91,806/- with
12% per annum interest from the date of reference of the claim to
this arbitral tribunal to the date of award.”
47.
A perusal of the aforesaid findings shows that the impugned
Award under Claim No. 1 rests on certain findings of fact rendered by
the learned Arbitral Tribunal after appreciation of the pleadings,
evidence and the terms of the contract. Broadly, those findings are as
follows:
i.
The Tribunal found that the delay in completion of the
project was largely on account of delay in handing over the
site, physical obstructions, delay in land acquisition, delay
in obtaining approvals for the Tundla Railway Over
Bridge and other hindrances. On reading Sub-Clause 20.4
of the Conditions of Particular Application38 in the
“COPA” hereinafter
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Contract, it held that these were risks within the domain of
the Petitioner, who failed to take appropriate steps.
ii.
The Tribunal proceeded on the footing that the Petitioner
was responsible to make available a hindrance-free site.
The contention that the Respondent ought to have
anticipated such obstructions was rejected, since removal
of those obstructions was the Petitioner’s responsibility
under the Contract.
iii.
While dealing with the Claim for prolongation costs, the
Tribunal read Clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 along with the
definition of “Cost” under Clause 1.1(g)(i). It came to the
conclusion that the Respondent could recover the actual
costs incurred, including overheads, but not loss of profit.
The claim towards loss of profit was, accordingly,
rejected.
iv.
It also appears that the Tribunal was, however, not inclined
to accept the Respondent’s calculation as it stood. It
noticed that the project underwent changes during
execution, the original sections were reworked into
equivalent lane-kilometre sections and the deployment of
manpower and machinery varied from time to time.
Therefore, the Tribunal was of the view that a uniform
extrapolation for the entire extended period would not
present a correct picture.
v.
Although the Engineer had attributed certain delays to the
Respondent in some letters, those delays were treated as
concurrent and overlapping delays and were held to be
insignificant in view of the Petitioner failure to provide a
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hindrance-free site. Except for the delay due to rains, the
reasons for grant of extension of time were found
attributable to the Employer.
vi.
It then proceeded to quantify the number of days of delays
and the claim independently. Instead of accepting the
Respondent’s calculation, the Tribunal worked out the
compensation independently by treating Section I, Section
II, Section III and the Tundla Railway Over Bridge
separately. In doing so, it adopted the overhead
percentages from the MoRTH Standard Data Book and the
machinery component from Clause 70.3(xi) of COPA.
vii.
While determining the days for which compensation to be
provided, the Tribunal did not exclude the rainy season
altogether. Taking the view that certain activities could
continue during that period, it deducted only 80% of the
rainy season.
viii. Applying the above methodology, the Tribunal found the
Petitioner responsible for a delay of 686 days in Section I,
462 days in Section II, 390 days in Section III and 1,151
days in the Tundla Railway Over Bridge.
ix.
The total
prolongation
cost
was, thus, assessed
at Rs.57,36,14,758/-. A further deduction of 20% was
made towards mitigation of loss, resulting in an impugned
award of Rs.45,88,91,806/-.
48.
Now adverting to the objections raised by the Petitioner, the first
limb of the Petitioner’s challenge rests on interpretation of the Clauses
6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 of the Contract. According to the Petitioner, under
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these clauses it was for the Engineer to determine whether any
additional cost was payable while granting an extension of time.
49.
Since the Engineer did not recommend any such additional cost
and had also recorded that the Respondent’s progress was slow, the
Tribunal could not have awarded the costs incurred during the
prolongation period by taking a different view. It was further submitted
that the Tribunal had ignored the Engineer’s letters and proceeded only
on the basis that extension of time had been granted.
50.
I am unable to accept the aforesaid submission. I have gone
through Clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 of the Contract. These clauses
require the Engineer to determine the extension of time and the
additional cost, if any, payable to the Contractor. However, they do not
attach finality to the Engineer’s determination or exclude the
jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal in cases where such determination
itself becomes the subject matter of dispute. Clause 44 also merely sets
out the procedure for claiming and determining extension of time in the
circumstances specified and does not disentitle the Contractor from
raising its claim before the Arbitral Tribunal or take away the Tribunal’s
power to adjudicate upon it.
51.
Further, the impugned Award does not proceed on the premise
that the grant of extension of time, by itself, entitled the Respondent to
claim prolongation costs. The Tribunal independently examined the
reasons which led to the grant of those extensions and found that the
delay was primarily due to delay in handing over of the site, physical
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obstructions, delay in land acquisition and delay in obtaining approvals
for the Tundla Railway Over Bridge.
52.
It can also not be said that the Tribunal ignored the Engineer’s
letters. It took note of the letters recording slow progress on the part of
the Respondent but treated those delays as concurrent and insufficient
to displace its finding that the principal cause for the delay was the
Petitioner’s failure to provide a hindrance-free site. Whether another
view could have been taken on the same material is not the enquiry
under Section 34. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and
substitute its own view when the view taken by the Tribunal is a
possible and plausible view.
53.
Once the above findings were rendered, the Tribunal proceeded
further. Reading Clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 together with the definition
of “Cost”, it concluded that the Respondent was entitled to recover the
additional costs incurred during the extended period. The impugned
Award, therefore, rests on an independent appreciation of the clauses in
the contract, the evidence on record, and not merely on the Engineer’s
recommendations or the grant of extensions of time.
54.
The power of the Arbitral Tribunal relating to interpretation of
the clauses are also not res integra. This view also finds support from
the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in NHAI v. BELTBL39, wherein it was held that once the delay is found to be attributable
to the employer, Clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 entitles the contractor to
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recover the additional costs incurred during the extended period. The
relevant observations are as follows:
“26. Firstly, I shall deal with claim No. 2 i.e. additional costs in
the extended period of the contract. The said Claim No. 2 was raised
by the respondent which relates to the additional cost incurred by it
while staying on site for the extended period of the contract. The
Arbitral Tribunal has given its findings with regard to this claim.
The relevant findings of the Arbitral Tribunal have been reproduced
here as under:
*****
2.4.14 Arbitral Tribunal has come to the conclusion that as the
extension of time was granted from 28.9.2001 to 30.9.2002 for
reasons attributable to the Respondent, without levy of liquidated
damages, the claimant is entitled to recover additional cost under
clause 42.2, 6.4 and 12.2 of the conditions of contract for the
extended period of 12 months. (emphasis supplied)
27.
It is evident from the findings that the Arbitral Tribunal has
come to a conclusion that (a) the reasons for delay in the completion
of the work were attributable to the petitioner, particularly its failure
to make available the requisite land; (b) the contract contains
clauses that provide an explicit entitlement to the respondent to
claim additional cost on account of this delay for the extended stay
at the site, namely clauses 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2. Whereas clause 6.4
deals with delay and cost of delay of drawings; clause 12.2 deals
with unforeseeable physical obstructions or conditions and clause
42.2 deals with failure on the part of the petitioner to give possession
of the site to the respondent. All these clauses envisaged additional
costs to be awarded to the respondent; (c) there is extensive evidence
led by the respondent to prove the damages suffered by it; and (d)
the petitioner itself had consistently extended the time for completion
without imposing any liquidated damages on the respondent.”
*****
32. From the aforesaid judgments and settled law, it appears to the
Court that the Arbitral award in the present case can be sustainable
in law as also in the context of the particular contractual provisions.
It has been laid down in the referred judgments for award of
additional cost i.e. finding of fault, existence of relevant evidence
and similar contractual clauses like 6.4, 12.2 and 42.2 are present
in the case. The Arbitral Tribunal has in fact rejected the claim Nos.
2.3 and 2.4 of the respondent pertaining to loss of profit and delayed
accrual of contract price in the extended period and only awarded
the component of damages suffered on account of machinery cost
and overheads in the extended period.
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55.
A similar view was also taken by the Division Bench of this
Court in National Highways Authority of India v. Patel KNR40, where
the award of additional costs under Clause 42.2 was upheld by the Court
on the ground that the delay in handing over the site and the removal of
physical obstructions was attributable to the employer. The relevant
observations are as follows:
“29. We may also note that considering the pleadings and
evidence on record, and a communication dated 05.11.2004 of the
Supervision Consultant, by June, 2002, only 20.28 kms of the site
had been handed over instead of 50.112 kms decided. Also, the site
that was handed over was divided into several stretches over the
entire land and the length of each section ranged between 0.045 kms
to 2.2 kms as against minimum of 5 kms. Learned Single Judge has
also taken note of the report where it indicated that 11.75 kms was
obstructed at the time of handing over of the complete stretch of
50.112 kms on 27.03.2002 and the phase clearance of the
obstruction was done from May, 2003 to June, 2004. Paragraphs 25
& 26 of the order of the learned Single Judge read as under:
“25.
The fact, that the acquisition of the complete
stretch of site was not complete inasmuch as
compensation for stretches of land had not been
disbursed, was not seriously disputed. Even before this
Court, Ms. Anand had contended that the delay on this
count had been compensated by Patel by accelerating
the progress of works.
26.
Patel had also produced material to indicate
that there were other obstructions on the site including
temples, building, wells and other structures which had
not been removed.”
30.
In this backdrop, the Tribunal, while placing reliance upon
Clause 42.2 of the GCC, held that the contractor was entitled to
costs towards entitlement of additional resources over the extended
period of the GCC. The learned Single Judge, while relying upon
Clause 42.2 of the GCC, has returned a categorical finding that the
contractor was entitled to compensation for delay for handing over
the site. The learned Single Judge also and rightly so, held that
reliance on Clause 110.1 of the Technical Specifications was
without any force. We find no infirmity in the view so taken by the
arbitrator as also by the learned Single Judge. All the contentions
sought to be raised by the counsel for the appellant have been duly
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considered by the learned Single Judge and the same have rightly
been rejected.”
56.
However, the challenge of the Petitioner does not rest only on the
Tribunal’s interpretation of the Contract. The Petitioner next contends
that the impugned Award is also vitiated by perversity for want of
specific findings on the causes of delay. According to the Petitioner, the
Tribunal did not examine the extent of delay in handing over the site,
the delay in issuance of drawings, the nature and duration of the
physical obstructions or whether the delay in obtaining approvals for
the Tundla Railway Over Bridge could be attributed to the Petitioner.
57.
In my view, the above submission of the Petitioner also cannot
stand after a whole reading of the Award. As noticed while dealing with
the earlier objection, the Tribunal did not proceed merely on the grant
of extensions of time. It independently examined the reasons for the
prolonged execution of the project and recorded specific findings on the
causes of delay. Those findings cannot be read in isolation or by
searching for a separate discussion on every document or every instance
of delay. The Award has to be read as a whole.
58.
On a holistic reading of the impugned Award, the basis of the
Tribunal’s conclusion is clearly made out. It identified the causes
which, in its view, led to the prolongation of the project, considered the
allocation of risk in terms of the contract and only thereafter, reached
its conclusion on the attribution of delay. The mere absence of a
separate discussion on each letter or every period of delay does not, by
itself, render the impugned Award vulnerable under Section 34.
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59.
Moreover, the attribution of delay is a finding of fact resting on
the Tribunal’s examination of the evidence before it. Unless such a
finding is shown to be perverse or based on no evidence, it is not open
for this Court to undertake a fresh appraisal of the material under
Section 34.
60.
That brings me to the principal challenge raised by the Petitioner
about the quantification of prolongation costs. According to the
Petitioner, the Respondent failed to produce evidence of the actual
expenditure incurred during the extended period and, in the absence of
such evidence, the Tribunal could not have devised its own
methodology for quantification.
61.
The submission, in my view, proceeds on an incorrect reading of
the impugned Award. Before undertaking the quantification, the
Tribunal first examined whether the Respondent had, in fact, incurred
additional expenditure on account of the prolonged execution. In that
context, it considered the audited details of salaries and wages, site and
corporate overheads, the monthly progress reports, and minimum
essential requirements as per the contract. On the basis of this material,
the Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondent had established the
additional expenditure incurred during the extended period. The
authenticity or reliability of these records has neither been questioned
nor disputed by the Petitioner.
62.
Further, this Court finds that the Arbitral Tribunal has not
accepted the Respondent’s computation in its entirety. While the
material placed on record was accepted, the method adopted for
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quantification was found to be inaccurate, having regard to the phased
execution of the project and the varying deployment of resources. The
Tribunal, therefore, undertook the exercise of quantification afresh.
63.
Once the entitlement to compensation stood established and the
relevant material was available on record, the choice of methodology
lies primarily within the arbitral domain and does not warrant
interference under Section 34 merely because another method of
assessment may also have been possible. This principle stands
recognised by the Supreme Court in McDermott International Inc.
(supra), where it was held that, in the absence of direct proof of every
item of minute expenditure, the use of standard formulae is a
permissible method to compute these damages.
64.
An identical challenge, arising out of similar terms of the
contract, came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this
Court in National Highways Authority of India v. Oriental Structural
Engineers (P) Ltd.41. While dealing with objections substantially
similar to those argued in the present case, the Division Bench observed
as follows:
“6.
Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the
Arbitral Tribunal has awarded the amount under Claim No. 2 on
presumptions; there were no actual figures available before
him; even otherwise compensation for delay in work was adequately
covered by the escalation clause for which purpose attention has
been drawn to Clause 44 of the contract. Submission being that in
all cases where extension of time was granted to the contractor he
would be adequately compensated; further submission being that the
formula adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal for the computation of the
claim contained an element of profit and this is evident from the
calculation chart given by him while allowing the aforesaid
compensation. Submission being that the definition of ‘cost’ as
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defined under Clause 1.1(g)(i) of the contract in no manner includes
any allowance for profits; it is only “the expenditure properly
incurred or to be incurred, whether on or off the Site”, which has to
be afforded; this fact has been overlooked by the Arbitral Tribunal
and the learned single Judge endorsing the finding of the Arbitral
Tribunal on this count has committed an illegality. In support of his
submissions reliance has been placed upon (2004) 5 SCC
109 Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. L.K. Ahuja. Submission being what
has been awarded under Claim No. 2 is the loss of profit which could
not have been awarded; the contract specifically excludes the grant
of loss of profit; the error is apparent.
*****
9.
The Tribunal had noted that the highway which was the
subject matter of the contract was split into three sections; the
possession of the site was given on different dates for the three
sections. During the progress of work impediments occurred and
extensions of time has been given for all three sections. Salaries,
wages, overhead expenses, proportionate corporate overheads were
claimed by the claimant. Fixed machinery cost based on actual
deployment was also claimed on pro-rata basis. The calculation
made by the claimant in computing the cost was verified by the
monthly reports submitted by him and verified and forwarded to the
Engineer of the respondent. MORTH method was applied in
computation of this claim. This was noted to be a reasonable and
appropriate method which methodology is even otherwise not the
subject matter of challenge. The factual delays and consequent
extension of time recommended by the Engineer of the respondent
were noted in detail by the Arbitral Tribunal. Relevant would it be
to state that the initial dates of completion of Section-I was enlarged
by the respondent up to 30.10.2007; for completion of Section-II it
was enlarged up to 03.4.2007 and for Section-III it was extended up
to 03.4.2007. All these extensions stood approved by the respondent.
The Arbitral Tribunal had in fact noted seven reasons for the delays
which included belated possession of site; delay in issue of
construction drawings and their revision; delay due to adverse law
and order condition including terrorist attacks; delay due to strike,
delay due to additional work. These facts are not disputed. The
Tribunal had also noted that climatic and weather condition which
would delay the work could not be attributable to the respondent but
to provide an encumbrance free site and designs/drawing at
appropriate time was definitely the responsibility of the respondent;
similarly terrorist attack, law and order condition also fell under the
respondent risk list. These delays were attributed to the respondent.
The Tribunal had noted that compensation for delays could be
worked out in favor of the claimant in terms of the definition of ‘cost’
to be determined under sub clause 6.4, 12.2, 42.2 in terms of its
definition as contained in sub-clause 1.1(g)(i) of the contract
conditions. Clause 6.4 dealt with delay and cost of delay of
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drawings; Clause 12.2 dealt with unforeseeable physical
obstructions or conditions and so also Clause 42.2 which dealt with
failure on the part of the respondent to give possession of the site to
the claimant. All these clauses envisaged additional costs to be
awarded to the contractor. The Arbitral Tribunal has noted with
caution that the claimant is not entitled to claim loss of profit and
cost compensation for delay is alone to be considered.
10.
These factual findings which were based on voluminous
evidence i.e. the monthly reports submitted by the claimant and
verified by the Engineer of the respondent and by applying the
MORTH formula to determine the ‘cost’ and noting the facts that
the delays in the work being attributable to the respondent, the
claimant was accordingly awarded the aforenoted amount.
11.
These finding were rightly not interfered with by the learned
Single Judge. Objections under Section 34 of the said Act are limited
in scope; the learned single Judge while dealing with such
objections is not an appellate form. Unless there is a plain perversity
appearing on the face of the Award there is little scope for
interference; non-interference was accordingly rightly adhered to
by the learned single Judge.”
(emphasis supplied)”
65.
A similar challenge was considered by this Court in DMRC v.
GYT TPL Joint Venture42. In this case as well, it was contended that
the Tribunal had quantified prolongation costs by adopting a formulabased approach without sufficient documentary proof and reliance was
placed on Batliboi Environmental Engineers Limited (supra).
Rejecting the challenge, this Court held as follows:
“42. The principal objection of the Petitioner is that the Tribunal
erred in determining the effective period of prolongation and in
computing overheads and P&M idling charges on assumed
parameters. It is contended that the Tribunal ought to have called
for further documentary substantiation and that its adoption of
industry norms amounts to conjecture.
43.
The record reflects that the Tribunal examined the
pleadings, the evidence adduced, and the sequence of extensions
granted. It returned a finding that the delay in completion extended
beyond the scheduled date and that such prolongation was
attributable to the Petitioner. The quantification of prolongation
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costs was thereafter undertaken by adopting a formula based on the
contract value and accepted industry practice. The Petitioner did
not place before the Tribunal any specific and cogent quantification
of the time exclusively attributable to variations, nor did it produce
material segregating the value of work executed during the alleged
variation period. In such circumstances, the Tribunal cannot be
faulted for proceeding on the basis of the material available.
44.
The Arbitral Tribunal in paras 220, 222, 225 has dealt with
the facts of the case and held that the extensions sought by the
Respondent, and the delay in works were due to the conduct of the
Petitioner entirely. It further held that all the extensions were
granted without the levy of liquidated damages upon the Petitioner.
The Tribunal held that the Respondent is benefitted under
Section 54, 55, and 73 of the Indian Contract Act. The Tribunal has
fairly held that if there is a contractual clause prohibiting a claim
for loss/damages, then such contractual clauses have to be ignored
and the contractor is liable to damages as per law. The Tribunal
relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in G. Ramachandra
Reddy v. Union of India; (2009) 6 SCC 414 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ)
903 and K.N. Sathyapalan v. State of Kerala; (2007) 13 SCC 43.
45.
The Tribunal further held in paras 228 and 229 of the
Impugned Award that notices of delay and cost implications were
tendered by the Respondent to the Petitioner. The Supreme Court
in Northern Railway v. Sarvesh Chopra; (2002) 4 SCC 45, has held
that if such notice is tendered, then in law, such claims can be
provided despite of a clause prohibiting the same.
46.
It is settled that while damages must be founded on
evidence, mathematical precision is not an indispensable
requirement where exact computation is impracticable. An
Arbitral Tribunal is entitled to adopt a reasonable and recognised
methodology for estimating loss, provided the estimation is not
arbitrary and is supported by the evidentiary record. The adoption
of a 10% parameter for overheads and a proportionate approach
for P&M does not, in the facts of the present case, amount to
creation of a new case. It constitutes a quantification exercise
within the domain of the Tribunal.
47.
The decisions relied upon by the Petitioner to contend that
an award based on “assumptions” is liable to be set aside would
apply only where the finding is based on no evidence or where
material evidence has been ignored. The Impugned Award in the
present case does not disclose such infirmity. The Tribunal in para
233 of the impugned Award has already dismissed the objection of
the Petitioner that the Claim No. 1 is based on assumed figures.
The Tribunal has held that the claim has been quantified on the
basis of evidence before it i.e. CW-1 and CW-2. Further, the
Tribunal has relied upon the report of the EY to assess the claim.
This Court is of the opinion that the Tribunal has passed a wellreasoned order taking into consideration all the evidence put
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before it for assessment of claim and therefore, this Court is not
inclined to interfere with the aforesaid claim under Section 34 of
the Act.”
66.
The same view has been taken by the Division Bench of this
Court in NHAI v. Oriental Pathways43. It was observed that the choice
of a particular method for quantification lies with the Arbitral Tribunal
and would not justify interference under Section 34 merely because
another method could also have been adopted, so long as the one
adopted is a reasonable one. The relevant observations read as thus“38. It is trite that it is open to the arbitrator to adopt any
reasonable formula for arriving at the computation of the
compensation. In this regard, reference may be made to the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court in, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015)
2 SCC (Civ) 204, Associate Builders v. Delhi Development
Authority extracted above.
39.
In para 43 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has held that
the construction of the contract by the arbitrator is also within the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator. It is trite law that such construction is
clearly beyond the scope of consideration by the Court while
considering objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
40.
In para 56 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has held
that the adoption and application of a formula by an arbitrator is
a pure question of fact. Clearly, the same is beyond the purview of
objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act.
41.
In view of the above statement of law, the objections of NHAI
to the Arbitral Award were clearly beyond the scope and purview of
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and have been
rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge.”
67.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case,
no substance remains in the Petitioner’s objection. The Tribunal was
satisfied that the Respondent had incurred additional expenditure and
therefore, it was open to the Tribunal to adopt a reasonable
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methodology for assessing the compensation. Whether a different
formula or method could also have been adopted is not a matter for
discussion under Section 34. It is definitely not a case where there was
nothing before the Tribunal to satisfy itself that during the prolongation
expenses were actually incurred.
68.
The challenge, however, does not rest there. The Petitioner
further contends that the Tribunal travelled beyond the Contract by
adopting the MoRTH Standard Data Book and recognised engineering
practices for quantifying the claim and that the whole exercise of
quantification undertaken was arbitrary, unsupported by the record and
based on surmises and conjectures.
69.
To my mind, no arbitrariness or perversity can be made out on a
reading of the award as suggested by the Petitioner. In my reading, at
every stage, the Tribunal was cautious in determining the final amount
payable as is evident from the fact that it did not accept the computation
of the Respondent as it is. It found that the Respondent had worked out
the delay costs by carrying forward the deployment of manpower and
machinery beyond March 2005 for the entire prolonged period. The
Tribunal found that such an approach did not reflect the manner in
which the project had actually progressed, particularly when the
deployment of resources kept changing from one stage to another.
70.
Further, the Tribunal did not treat the project as one
homogeneous unit. Since each section had a different commencement
date, completion schedule and period of extension for Section-I, the
period of delay and extension in each section were examined separately.
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The delay attributable to each component then worked out on the basis
of the extensions granted or recommended by the Engineer.
71.
Even thereafter, the Tribunal excluded the period falling outside
the reference and, keeping in view the nature of work that could be
executed during the rainy season, deducted 80% of that period. The
figures of 686, 462, 390 and 1151 days did not emerge from broad
estimates but from the detailed exercise undertaken by the Tribunal
itself.
72.
The same degree of scrutiny by the Tribunal is evident while
assessing the monetary claim. The Tribunal first declined the claim
towards loss of profit in view of the definition of “Cost”. It then
assessed the machinery component with reference to Clause 70.3(xi) of
COPA. The MoRTH Standard Data Book was relied upon only for
working out the overhead component after recording that the Contract
itself did not provide a workable basis in that regard.
73.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to point out
any provision in the Contract which explicitly prohibited such an
approach.
74.
Further, the Tribunal has not awarded the amount so worked out
in its entirety. It also made deductions of 10% towards unutilised spares
and 20% on account of mitigation. These deductions formed part of the
Tribunal’s overall assessment based on the material before it and cannot
be characterised as arbitrary. As recognised in McDermott
International Inc. (supra) and M/s Cobra Instalaciones Y Servicios,
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S.A. & Shyam Indus Power Solution Pvt. Ltd. (JV). v. Haryana Vidyut
Prasaran Nigam Ltd.(Hvpnl)44, assessment of damages may
necessarily involve a measure of reasonable estimation where exact
computation is not feasible.
75.
A similar approach has recently been adopted by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Airports Authority of India v. URC
Construction (P) Ltd45. Repelling the contention that overhead charges
could not be awarded in the absence of salary registers, vouchers or
other minute proof of expenditure, the Court held that once the delay is
attributable to the employer, the use of recognised standard formulae or
industry benchmarks for quantification does not render the award
arbitrary. It was observed that in construction contracts, it is not always
possible to establish every component of prolongation costs by direct
evidence and a reasonable method of quantification based on accepted
standards falls within the domain of the Arbitrator. The relevant
observations are as follows:
Claim No. 4: Compensation for Overheads:
129. The Petitioner has challenged the award of Rs.
89,18,765/- towards Overhead expenses, on the ground that the
Respondent failed to lead specific evidence, such as salary registers,
vouchers, or books of account, to prove that it incurred actual
expenditure during the extended period. The Petitioner relies on the
principle that damages must be proved and contends that the
Arbitrator's reliance on the CPWD Circular dated 14.12.2007 acts
as a substitute for evidence, which is impermissible.
130. To adjudicate this challenge, it is necessary to appreciate the
commercial nature of construction contracts.
131. Overheads refer to the indirect costs incurred by a
contractor which cannot be directly allocated to a specific physical
item of work, but are necessary for the sustenance of the business
and the project. These include Head Office administrative costs
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and Site Office expenses like staff salaries, rent, electricity,
stationary, etc.
132. It is a judicially recognized fact that when a Project is
delayed due to the fault of the Employer, the Contractor is forced
to keep its resources and establishment deployed for a period
longer than anticipated. This inevitably results in the consumption
of overheads without corresponding revenue generation from the
project. As observed by the Supreme Court in McDermott
International Inc. (supra), in the absence of direct proof of every
minute expenditure, the use of standard formulae is a permissible
method to compute these damages.
133. In the present case, the Arbitrator was faced with the task
of quantifying the loss after having already established
the factum of delay attributable to the Petitioner. Instead of
applying a complex international formula, the Arbitrator adopted
the CPWD Circular, which specifically quantifies overheads
at 7.5%.
134. This Court finds that the approach of the Arbitrator is
neither arbitrary nor perverse as the CPWD Manual and Circulars
are standard reference documents, in government infrastructure
contracts. Adopting a percentage fixed by the CPWD as
a reasonable estimate of overheads, is a plausible method of
quantification.
135. As held in A.T. Brij Paul Singh v. State of Gujarat, (1984)
4 SCC 59, it is not always possible for a contractor to produce
minute proof of every rupee lost due to the prolongation of the
contract. In such cases, a broad evaluation based on industry
norms, is legally sustainable.
136. The award of 7.5% towards overheads is not an
exaggerated figure that would shock the conscience of the Court.
It is a conservative estimate of the administrative costs required to
maintain a construction setup for an additional 477 days.
137. The Petitioner's argument that there was no evidence is,
therefore, misconceived. The evidence was the prolongation of the
contract itself and the industry standard evident from the CPWD
Circular establishing the norm for such costs. The Arbitrator
applied the law of damages by using a reasonable yardstick for
quantification. This falls squarely within the domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, as the master of facts.
138. Consequently, this Court finds no patent illegality in the
Arbitrator's order to award overhead charges based on the CPWD
Circular.”
76.
The reliance placed on Batliboi (supra) is also misplaced. That
decision does not lay down that a reasonable method of quantification
can never be adopted. Rather, it cautions against quantification resting
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on mere assumptions, unsupported formulae, or double recovery. In the
present case, the Tribunal, on the basis of the material placed before it,
came to the conclusion that the Respondent had incurred additional
expenditure on account of the prolongation of the Contract. The
subsequent exercise of quantification was supported by reasons at each
stage, and therefore, the methodology was not applied in a vacuum, as
cautioned in Batliboi (supra).
77.
The use of the MoRTH Standard Data Book for quantifying the
claim for compensation of additional overhead expenses due to
prolongation of the Contract Period has also received judicial
recognition. In National Highways Authority of India v. IJM-Gayatri
Joint Venture46, this Court upheld the Tribunal’s adoption of the
MoRTH Data Book after it had rejected the claimant’s own
computation. A similar view was taken in National Highways
Authority of India v. DIC - NCC (JV)47, and Public Works Department
(NH Wing) v. GVR Infra Projects Ltd.48, where this Court recognised
the MoRTH Standard Data Book as an accepted basis for assessment of
costs arising from prolongation attributable to the employer. The
percentage ultimately adopted also cannot be said to be so unreasonable
as to shock the conscience of this Court. The final amount awarded
under this claim was also not some figure in air but was determined on
a reasoned basis at each stage after taking into account the material on
record.
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78.
For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no infirmity in the Tribunal’s
determination of Claim No. 1. The findings returned are a reasonable
and plausible view emerging from the material on record and the
Tribunal’s interpretation of the Contract. I do not find the impugned
Award to suffer from any perversity, patent illegality or any error going
to the root of the matter so as to warrant interference under Section 34.
I have also perused all the authorities relied upon by the Petitioner and
find that they are of no assistance to the Petitioner in support of its
claim. Accordingly, the challenge to Claim No. 1 is rejected.
CLAIM 3 AND CLAIM 4
79.
Moving to the challenge to Claim No. 3, the Tribunal examined
Sub-Clause 70.8 of the Contract and held that reimbursement was
available only in respect of such additional statutory burden which was
not already covered by the other Clauses related to price adjustment.
On that basis, it excluded the Education Cess relatable to excise duty
on goods as it already stood reflected in the WPI-based price adjustment
but allowed reimbursement of Service Tax and the corresponding
Education Cess on services such as insurance, and other services, as
these were found to fall outside the price adjustment clauses.
80.
I find no ground to interfere with the aforesaid view. The
Tribunal has interpreted the terms of the contract and returned a finding
as to what was, and what was not, covered by the price adjustment
clauses. Whether that distinction was correctly drawn is essentially a
matter of interpretation of the Contract and material on record. At the
cost of repetition, so long as the view taken is a plausible one, this Court
cannot substitute its own interpretation in challenge under Section 34.
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81.
The view taken also finds support from the decision of the
Supreme Court in NHAI v. ITD Cementation India Ltd.49, where it was
held that a contractor is entitled to reimbursement when a subsequent
legislative change imposes an additional burden not already covered in
the initial prices provided in the Contract.
82.
Further, in regard to Claim No. 4, on examining the BOQ, the
drawings and the Technical Specifications, the Tribunal found that
“filler type expansion joints” formed part of the BOQ only for crash
barriers. Insofar as retaining walls, separators and drains were
concerned, no such provision was found. The claim was, therefore,
rejected in respect of crash barriers but allowed for the remaining
structures at the rate already approved by the Engineer’s
Representative.
83.
The challenge to this finding is nothing but an invitation to re-
appreciate the evidences. Once the Tribunal, upon examining the BOQ,
the drawings and the Technical Specifications, has found that the item
was neither provided for nor priced under the Contract, this Court
cannot re-examine those documents to arrive at a different conclusion.
No perversity or patent illegality in that finding has been demonstrated.
84.
Having dealt with the merits of Claims Nos. 3 and 4, I now turn
to the principal objection pressed by the Petitioner.
(2015) 14 SCC 21
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85.
The common thread running through the Petitioner’s challenge
to Claims Nos. 3 and 4 is not directed against the findings rendered
under Claims Nos. 3 and 4, but with the form of the relief granted.
According to the Petitioner, by leaving the quantification to the
Engineer instead of determining the amount itself, the Tribunal
rendered a merely declaratory award, which, according to the
Petitioner, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
86.
Recently, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Harbel Singh50, had considered the permissibility of a
declaratory award. Upholding such an award, the Court observed as
follows:
“27. The arbitrator while adjudicating the issue regarding Goods
and Service Tax on the awarded claims has held as under:
“23.3. So far as the arbitration agreement is concerned,
there is no limitation with regard to power for making any
declaratory award. Section 7 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 also covers disputes in respect of a
defined legal relationship. Section 28(1) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act mandates the arbitrator to decide the
dispute submitted to Arbitration in accordance with the
substantive law for the time being in force in India. Hence,
I do not find any prohibition in law or bar regarding
arbitrability for making declaratory awards by the
arbitrators. In fact, it is a practice in most jurisdictions to
make declaratory awards, including on interpretation of
contracts, by the Arbitral Tribunals.
23.4. In this case, the declaratory award is based on the
plea that in case the claimant has to pay GST on award
amount, the said amount of GST should be reimbursed by
the respondent. I find no reason if the claimant incurs
liability of GST on awarded sum and lawfully and
properly pays the same to the government, then the same
should be reimbursed by the respondent. This shall be an
additional tax burden and is covered under Clause 38 of
the GCC forming part of the contract.
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23.5. In view of above, I make a declaratory award that the
claimant shall submit details within 30 days of receipt of
award amount, the GST amount actually paid to the
government on the awarded sum which shall be reimbursed
by the respondent within 30 days of submission of details of
such payment by the claimant failing which a simple
interest @ 10 per cent will be payable by the respondent to
the claimant till actual date of payment.”
..
30.
This Court is of the opinion that the sole arbitrator has dealt
with and has considered all the material that was placed before him.
There is no prescribed format under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, in which an arbitral award must be made. After
going through the award this Court could not find any observation
made by the arbitrator which was devoid of merit or was made
without considering the submissions made by the petitioner or the
respondent/claimant or was outside the purview of the agreement
entered into between the parties.”
87.
The principle was explained further by another Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Union of India v. Reliance Industries Ltd. & Anr51,
while considering the executability of a declaratory award which was
also reiterated by the Division Bench in Union of India vs Reliance
Industries52. The Coordinate Bench took a view that there is no
prohibition against such an award, however, it must finally determine
the rights of the parties and leave no adjudicatory exercise to be
undertaken thereafter. The relevant observations are as follows:
“58. The proposition is, however, easier stated
than applied. While I also subscribe to the view that
there is no proscription against enforcement of a
declaratory award - no such proscription being
contained in the 1996 Act either - the enforcement
would, clearly, require the declaration to
be practically enforceable. This principle would
have to be applied keeping in mind the fact that the
executing Court merely executes; it does not
pronounce or adjudicate. The executing Court can,
therefore, execute only if the award - or decree - is
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executable, and not otherwise. Mere declarations,
which cannot be reduced to hard cash cannot,
therefore, be executed in terms of money. If, however,
the declarations are sufficiently explicit as to require
a mere application of the principles declared to
accepted facts and figures and application of mere
arithmetic to arrive at the liability, then the award
would probably be executable; but not otherwise.
Russell, therefore, correctly expressed the principle
in the passage on which the petitioner itself relies:
“It is, however, sufficiently certain if the award
sets out the method of calculation of the amount due
to be paid, so that all that is required to determine
the actual amount is “mere arithmetic”. It is not
unusual, for example, for an award to set out the
basis on which interest is to be calculated, without
actually including a specific figure.”
59. What would be required, therefore, for a
purely declaratory award to be executed like a
money decree is, therefore, that the award must,
firstly, identify one of the parties to the dispute as
entitled to receive a quantifiable sum of money from
the other, and, secondly, to set out the principles on
the basis of which such quantification is to be done,
so that all that is required to be done by the
executing Court is application of pure arithmetic.”
(Emphasis supplied)
88.
It emerges from the aforesaid decisions that the validity of a
declaratory award does not depend upon whether the exact amount is
quantified in the award itself or not. The real test is whether the Tribunal
has finally adjudicated the rights and liabilities of the parties and laid
down the basis on which the liability is to be worked out, leaving no
adjudicatory function to be performed thereafter. If what remains is
only the verification of the relevant record and application of the
principles already declared, such an award cannot be faulted merely
because the final figure is to be worked out subsequently.
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89.
The impugned Award, in my view, falls squarely within the
above parameters. The Tribunal has finally determined the entitlement
of the Respondent under both claims and laid down the basis on which
the liability is to be worked out. Nothing has been left for the Engineer
to adjudicate. He is only required to verify the record and quantify the
amount payable in terms of the Award.
90.
In view of the above, no merit remains in the Petitioner’s
challenge to Claim Nos. 3 and 4. The Tribunal has finally determined
the Respondent’s entitlement. No patent illegality or perversity has
been shown in adopting such a course. The authorities relied upon in
regard to price escalation and others are also of no avail. Therefore,
there is no need of any interference with this part of the impugned
Award while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
91.
As far as challenge to interest is concerned, it is wholly
misconceived and devoid of merit. The Tribunal has not awarded any
pre-reference interest. Under Claim No. 1, interest has been awarded
only from the date of invocation of arbitration till the date of the Award.
92.
Reliance placed on Interstate Construction (supra), is also of no
avail. The said decision distinguishes between pre-reference interest
and pendente lite interest. While entitlement to pre-reference interest
must be based on substantive law, pendente lite interest is governed by
Section 31(7)(a) of the Act. Since the Tribunal has awarded interest
only for the pendente lite period, the said decision does not advance the
Petitioner’s case.
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93.
In any case, the substantive right of the Respondent for interest
lies under Clause 60.8 of the Contract. This Court in NHAI v.
Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.53 has held that 60.8 also applies to
the sums found to be due and payable. In the present case as well, the
Tribunal has also that interest is payable under Clause 60.8 from the
dates on which the respective payments became due. The mere absence
of elaborate reasoning on this aspect cannot warrant interference so
long as the basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion is discernible from the
Award. As held in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd (supra) and Dyna
Technology Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited54, a brief
reasoning, where the underlying basis is apparent, is sufficient and does
not invite interference under Section 34.
94.
In view of the aforesaid, I find no infirmity in the award of
interest. The Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate that the grant
of interest is contrary to any provision of the Contract or suffers from
any patent illegality or perversity warranting interference under Section
34 of the Act.
CONCLUSION
95.
For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in any of the grounds
raised by the Petitioner. The Petitioner has essentially sought a reappreciation of the terms of the Contract, the evidence and the
conclusions drawn by the Tribunal. That is not the scope of interference
under Section 34 of the Act. I find that the view taken by the Tribunal
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is a possible and plausible one and based on the material placed before
it.
96.
Insofar as Claim No. 1 is concerned, the Tribunal has returned a
reasoned finding on the attribution of delay, and the Respondent’s
entitlement in terms of the clauses of the contract. The methodology
also adopted for quantification cannot be said to be arbitrary or contrary
to the Contract, nor does it suffer from any patent illegality.
97.
In respect of Claim Nos. 3 and 4, the Tribunal has interpreted the
relevant provisions of the Contract and finally determined the
Respondent’s entitlement, leaving only the ministerial exercise of
verification and certification to the Engineer.
98.
The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
99.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
100. There shall be no order as to costs.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
AUGUST 18, 2026/gunn
Signed By:ANUBHAV
O.M.P. (COMM) 206/2016
TRIPATHI
13:00:55
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