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2024:MLHC:1158-DB
Serial No.01
Weekly List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Arb.A.No.3/2024
Date of CAV
: 18.11.2024
Date of pronouncement : 16.12.2024
M/s N.J. Devani Builders (P) Ltd.
..... Appellant
Vs.
1. Union of India represented by the Chief Engineer, Shillong Zone
Spread Eagle Falls, Shillong-793001.
2. The Garrison Engineer (I) (P), Teliamura, Lichubagan Salbagan Post,
Agartala, 799012.
..... Respondents
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice I.P. Mukerji, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
For the Respondents
: Mr. K. Khan, AAG with
Mr. S.K. Hassan, Adv
Ms. M. Rahman, Adv
: Mr. R. Debnath, CGC with
Ms. B. Khongiong, Adv
F
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
No
Note: For proper public information and transparency, any media
reporting this judgment is directed to mention the
2024:MLHC:1158-DB
composition of the bench by name of judges, while reporting
this judgment/order.
JUDGMENT
(Delivered by the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice)
This dispute arises out of a works contract dated 29 th July, 2000
between the Central government represented by the Chief Engineer Shillong
Zone, Spread Eagle Falls (the respondent) and M/s N.J. Devani Builders (P)
Ltd. (the appellant) valued at Rs.8,24,29,936.83/-. It contained an arbitration
clause.
The contract was for construction of residential accommodations
by the appellant for army personnel at Teliamura. The execution of the work
was to commence on 9th October, 2000 and was to be done in two phases
(Phase-I and Phase-II) which were to be completed by 8 th January, 2002 and
8th April, 2003, respectively.
No substantial work was ever commenced. There was a continuing
dispute between the parties with regard to the soil conditions and drawings.
It was never resolved.
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By a notice dated 19th February, 2001, the appellant accused the
respondents of abandoning the contract. On 8th March, 2001, the appellant
rescinded the contract.
The matter went to arbitration.
On 3rd April, 2002, Major General (Retd) C T Chari was appointed
as the sole arbitrator by the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati High Court. The
learned arbitrator entered upon the reference on 2nd July, 2002, and invited
the parties to file their claims and counter claims as would appear from the
recital part of the award.
In the statement of claim, the appellant made eight claims which
are as follows:
“Claim No.1: Rs.35,37,346:00. Whether the Claimant is entitled to
any balance payment for work done and materials at site.
Claim No.2: Rs.9,30,386:00. Whether the Claimant is entitled to
any payment for infrastructure established.
Claim No.3: Rs.3,00,000:00 Whether the Claimant is entitled to
any payment for infrastructure in the form of labour camps,
shuttering materials and miscellaneous items.
Claim No.4: Rs.4,00,000:00 Whether the Claimant is entitled to
any payment for loss suffered on account of movement of
transport, labour, staff and personnel to and from site.
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Claim No.5: Rs.6,00,000:00 Whether the Claimant is entitled to
any payment for loss suffered on account of idle labour, T&P,
personnel, labour and other establishment at site.
Claim No.6.: Rs.60,00,000:00 Whether the Claimant is entitled to
any payment for loss suffered on account of overhead charges, idle
T&P, personnel, labour and other establishment at head office and
profit.
Claim No.7: Whether the Claimant is entitled to any payment by
way of interest.
Claim No.8: Rs.1,00,000:00 Whether the Claimant is entitled to
cost of reference.”
As a counter blast, the respondents made a counter claim
comprising of eight heads of claim as follows:
“CLAIM NO.1: EXTRA AMOUNT INCURRED IN
COMPLETING THE BALANCE WORK THROUGH OTHER
AGENCY AT THE RISK AND COST OF THE DEFAULTING
CONTRACTOR FOR Rs.99,24,828.25/-.
CLAIM NO.2.: DAMAGES ON ACCOUNT OF DELAY IN
UTILISATION OF ACCN FOR Rs.10 LAKHS
CLAIM NO.3: EXTRA AMOUNT SPENT ON ACCOUNT OF
ESTABLISHMENT OF GE (I) PROJECT OFFICE AND A
PORTION OF CHIEF ENGINEERS OFFICE FOR DELAY AT
ELEVEN MONTHS AND SEVENTEEN DAYS FOR
Rs.13,05,406/-.
CLAIM NO.4 DEPREGIATION OF GE’S OFFICE T & P FOR
DELAYED PERIOD OF 11 MONTHS AND 17 DAYS FOR
Rs.46,900/-.
CLAIM NO.5: INFLATED COST OF FUTURE PROJECTS FOR
Rs.43,57,709/-.
CLAIM NO.6: COST OF PREPARATION OF FINAL BILL FOR
Rs.50,000/-.
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CLAIM No.7: COST OF REFERENCE FOR Rs.2,00,000/-.
CLAIM NO.8: SIMPLE INTEREST @ 18% PER ANNUM ON
ALL ABOVE CLAIMS FROM THE DATE OF
CANCELLATION TO THE DATE OF PHYSICAL PAYMENT.”
On 30th November, 2003, the learned arbitrator made and published
his award.
The following award was made claim wise as follows:
“Claim No.1
Claim No.2
Claim No.3
Claim No.4
Claim No.5
Claim No.6
-
Rs.22,74,391.05/Rs.2,32,600/Nil
Nil
Rs.2,50,000/Rs.2,50,000/-
Claim No.7
-
from the date of accrual of the cause
of action till the date of the award i.e.
8th March, 2003 (8th March, 2001)
to 30th November, 2003 till the date
of payment if not made within 90
days from the date of the award,
12% per annum. If made within 90
days, 9% per annum.
Claim No.8
-
Rs.1,00,000/-”
The records say that both the parties challenged this award before
the learned Commercial Court, East Khasi Hills, Shillong, under Section 34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act of 1996). By a judgment
and order dated 3rd September 2004, the learned judge set aside the award.
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Only two reasons were assigned to set it aside. It was without reasons.
Secondly, the counter claims of the respondents had not been considered.
The award was described as being in conflict with the public policy of India.
Liberty was given to the parties to have the claims and counter claims
adjudicated through fresh arbitration.
From this judgment and order, the contractor appeals before us.
Mr. K. Khan, learned AAG appearing for the appellant cited two
cases to justify the reasoning process of the learned arbitrator. First he relied
upon Tikka Brijinder Singh Bedi v. Metso Minerals (New Delhi) Pvt. Ltd.
reported in 2010 SCC OnLine Del 29. In this case, a learned single Judge of
the Delhi High Court laid down the following proposition of law:
“17. ..... I must note that, the Arbitrator was not a legal man, but a
technical man, being an architect. One cannot expect such a non
legal person to write and give a judgment like a Civil Court. .....”
14. ..... It is settled law that reasons do not have to be detailed like
the judgment of court of law and nor is there any fixed format for
an Award. Once reasons are given at different places in the Award
and the reasons are such which have a necessary nexus to the
conclusions arrived at, the requirement of the Award being a
reasoned Award stands complied with. When I refer to the
conclusions in the last four pages of the Award, from paragraphs 1
to 10, along with the factual narration and findings given in the
earlier pages, it is quite clear that there are sufficient reasons as
required in law. If such a detailed Award giving factual findings,
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reasons and conclusions exists then I cannot appreciate the
argument that the Award is not a reasoned award. .....”
Thereafter, he cited a three-judge bench judgment of the Supreme
Court in Dyna Technologies Private Limited v. Crompton Greaves Limited
reported in (2019) 20 SCC 1. Paragraphs 34 and 35 are inserted below:
“34. The mandate under Section 31(3) of the arbitration Act is to
have reasoning which is intelligible and adequate and, which can in
appropriate cases be even implied by the courts from a fair reading
of the award and documents referred to thereunder, if the need be.
The aforesaid provision does not require an elaborate judgment to
be passed by the arbitrators having regard to the speedy resolution
of dispute.
35. When we consider the requirement of a reasoned order, three
characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They are:
proper, intelligible and adequate. If the reasonings in the order are
improper, they reveal a flaw in the decision-making process. ......
the court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 has to
adjudicate the validity of such an award based on the degree of
particularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature of
issues falling for consideration. .....”
Mr. Khan emphasised that the reasons given by the learned
arbitrator were available across the award and that they were short,
intelligible and proper.
Now, the learned arbitrator in our case is a retired army officer not
a person trained in law. He does not possess the qualification, experience and
finesse of a judge, versatile lawyer or a jurist. Therefore, some latitude is to
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be given to him while adjudicating his award. What needs to be appreciated
from the reasons given in support of the award is whether he understood the
facts and law correctly, adjudicated the facts and applied the law reasonably
or if the understanding of the law was capable of more than one
interpretation or application, whether the application of the law by the
learned arbitrator was acceptable or the view expressed plausible, in case
more than one view was maintainable.
The learned arbitrator came to the finding that the respondents
were in breach of the contract, after having been apprised of the law relating
to breach of contract. Further, that the appellant had rightly rescinded the
contract after upholding the allegation of the appellant that the respondents
had abandoned the contract and were in breach of it. It is true that a trained
lawyer, judge or jurist would have given more details of the breach and of
the grounds why he held rescission of the contract by the appellant was
justified.
The law is very clear on the subject that even short intelligible
reasons showing proper application of mind to the issue involved would
suffice to uphold an award.
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Therefore, we hold that there was no dearth of proper reasons
advanced by the learned arbitrator to hold that the respondents were in
breach of the contract and that it was rightly rescinded by the appellant.
Now, let us examine whether the learned arbitrator had advanced
reasons in support of the award. At internal page 4 and 5 of the award, the
learned arbitrator had discussed the dispute which the respondents raised
with regard to the plans and drawings submitted by the appellant. He
observed that the respondents never suspended the work formally under
Condition 9(c) of IAFW 2249 because of insufficiency of those documents
but through its officers unofficially stopped the appellant from performing
the work. He upheld the notice dated 19th February, 2001 issued by the
appellant stating that the respondents had abandoned the contract and
thereafter the appellant “rescinded the contract by its letter dated 8 th March,
2001”. Having held that the respondents were in breach of the contract and
upholding the appellant’s decision to treat the contract as abandoned by the
respondents, the learned arbitrator upheld the rescission of the contract by
the appellant and proceeded to deal with their claims.
Now, let us examine whether the specific claims were properly
adjudicated upon by reasons by the learned arbitrator.
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With regard to claim No.1, the learned arbitrator has valued the
work done at Rs.45,69,663.94/-, valued the material at site at
Rs.21,28,432.46/-, totalling to Rs.66,98,096.40/-. The other sub-claims for
earth filling, removal of waste and disposal of earth were disallowed. For the
sub-claim of jhama filling Rs.2,86,273.41/- was allowed. Hence, out of a
total claim of Rs.35,37,346/-, Rs.22,74,391.05/- was allowed. The learned
arbitrator while partly allowing the claim has tried to compute the value of
the work and materials, taken into account the payments received by the
contractor and also disallowed some sub-claims with the reason “not
adequately justified”.
We find that the reasons given are succinct but very acceptable and
most adequate.
Claim No.2 for Rs.9,30,386/- was for infrastructure setup by the
appellant. The learned arbitrator, inter alia, held that this claim was
exaggerated, no sanction of the “GE” was obtained to setup the infrastructure
and allowed 25 per cent of the claim amounting to Rs.2,32,600/-.
This part of the award in our opinion cannot be sustained. The
arbitrator under Section 28(2) of the Act of 1996 as applicable at that point
of time was to decide the dispute “in accordance with the terms of the
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contract”. When the contract was awarded to the appellant, it was expressly
provided therein or to be implied from the terms that the appellant would
have to setup its infrastructure to execute the contract. The value of the
contract included the cost incurred in setting up the infrastructure. In claim
No.1, which necessarily took into account the infrastructure expenses, the
appellant claimed and has been partially awarded the balance claim for the
work done. An award for the amount expended on account of infrastructure
could not have been separately claimed or awarded. There was no
justification for an award for this claim.
So this is an error of law apparent on the face of the award,
rendering that part of the award patently illegal. This part of the claim was
rightly set aside by the learned judge.
Claims No.3 and 4 were not awarded.
Claim No.5 for Rs.6,00,000/- was on account of loss suffered for
deployment of idle labour, “T&P” personnel, labour and other establishment
at site.
Claim No.6 for Rs.60 lakhs claimed similar damages on account of
overhead charges, idle T&P, personnel, labour and other establishment at
head office and profit. For each of these claims, the learned arbitrator ruled
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that there was no evidence to justify the claims but nevertheless he awarded
Rs.2,50,000/- for each of the heads of claims stating that it was “lumpsum”
to “meet the ends of justice”.
Regrettably, this is no reason at all. The decision is flawed. When
according to the finding of the learned arbitrator there was no evidence to
justify the claims, he ought to have rejected them. He made a random award
relying on his conception of a just award. Here he misdirected himself by
failing to properly appreciate the consequences of lack of evidence. The
reason given is against law and constitutes a patent error of law apparent on
the face of the award. He had no jurisdiction to do charity. Hence, the award
of Rs.5 lakh against claims No.5 and 6 was rightly set aside by the learned
judge.
Claim No.7 and 8 relate to grant of interest and cost. We do not
find any reason to interfere with those claims as they are in accordance with
law.
Now, we have to deal with the argument that the award is vitiated
by the arbitrator’s failing to consider the counter claims.
Mr. R. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
cited several authorities to argue that non consideration of the counter claim
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vitiated the award. Reference may be made to Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited v. Go Airlines (India) Limited reported in (2019) 10
SCC 250. The highest Court relied upon its earlier decision in State of Goa
v. Praveen Enterprises reported in (2012) 12 SCC 581. The following
paragraphs from the judgment in Praveen were highlighted in paragraph 23
of the judgment. Paragraphs 27 and 29 are reproduced below:
“27. Similarly, Section 23 read with Section 2(9) makes it clear that
a respondent is entitled to raise a counterclaim “unless the parties
have otherwise agreed” and also add to or amend the counterclaim,
“unless otherwise agreed”. In short, unless the arbitration
agreement requires the arbitrator to decide only the specifically
referred disputes, the respondent can file counterclaims and amend
or add to the same, except where the arbitration agreement restricts
the arbitration to only those disputes which are specifically referred
to arbitration, both the claimant and the respondent are entitled to
make any claims or counterclaims and further entitled to add to or
amend such claims and counterclaims provided they are arbitrable
and within limitation.
29. Where the arbitration agreement requires the disputes to be
formulated and referred to arbitration by an appointing authority,
and the appointing authority fails to do so, the Chief Justice or his
designate will direct the appointing authority to formulate the
disputes for reference as required by the arbitration agreement. The
assumption by the courts below that a reference of specific disputes
to the arbitrator by the Chief Justice or his designate is necessary
while making appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the
Act, is without any basis. Equally baseless is the assumption that
where one party filed an application under Section 11 and gets an
arbitrator appointed the arbitrator can decide only the disputes
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raised by the applicant under Section 11 of the act and not the
counterclaims of the respondent.”
In this case, the counter claim of the appellant had been rejected at
the threshold by the learned arbitrator on the ground that he had no
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled:
“24. The questions whether the issue regarding CENVAT invoices
was outside the terms of agreement or whether CENVAT invoices
relates to the agreement dated 1-1-2007 and 1-4-2009 and whether
it is arbitrable and whether it falls beyond the scope of reference to
arbitration and such other related questions, are to be determined
only during the enquiry. It may be that after enquiry, the arbitrator
might reject the counterclaim for CENVAT invoices as not
arbitrable and the counterclaim beyond the scope of reference to
arbitration. But to reject the counterclaim at the threshold on the
ground that the arbitrator has no jurisdiction would not be proper.
The High Court, in our view, has rightly set aside the order of the
learned arbitrator dated 18-4-2011.”
Learned counsel also cited (1994) 4 SCC 665. In this case, the
counter claim which had not been considered by the learned arbitrator was
remitted back for consideration.
Learned counsel for the respondents very strongly relied on certain
recitals and statements in the body of the award to establish that the learned
arbitrator had ignored the counter claims.
He showed us the recital at page 2 of the award which is as
follows:
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“And whereas, I, Maj Gen (Retd) CT Chari was appointed as Sole
Arbitrator in the above matter by the Shillong Bench of the Gauhati
High Court by its order No.FAO No.1(T)18(SH)2001 dated 03 Apr
02, to adjudicate on the Claimants list of eight claims as included
in the petition filed on 28 Aug 01.”
Then he relied on the following statement made in the award:
“In the light of the foregoing, I, Maj Gen (Retd) CT Chari, do
hereby make and publish this award, limiting myself to the eight
claims as petitioned by the Claimant to the Engineer-in-Chief and
subsequently to the Honourable Court, for the reasons enunciated
earlier, as follows: ....”
Mr. K. Khan, learned AAG appearing for the appellant brought to
our notice another recital at page 2 of the award to the following effect:
“And whereas, I entered upon the reference on 02 Jul 02 and
started the proceedings inviting both parties to submit their claims
and counter claims, the limitation in the scope of the arbitration
notwithstanding, on the assumption that the appointment order with
a list of claims may be issued subsequently by the Engineer-inChief, Army HQ.”
He pleaded Section 2(9) of the Act of 1996 where it is stated that a
claim included a counter claim. He submitted that the learned arbitrator is
deemed to have considered the counter claim while considering the claims.
He, however, made a very substantial submission. He said that
Section 33(4) of the Act of 1996 gave right to a party to apply to the
arbitrator within 30 days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award to
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make an additional arbitral award in respect of “claims presented in the
arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award”. The respondents
did not avail of this remedy and has approached the court directly to set aside
the award much after the expiry of 30 days. Therefore, the respondents were
prevented by the rule of estoppel to urge this point.
Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the right given
under this provision did not envisage setting aside, review or modification of
the award by the learned arbitrator. He had no power to do so. If the counter
claim was considered by him under Section 34(4) of the Act of 1996, any
decision would have resulted in supersession of the impugned award and its
substitution by a new award. Therefore, the remedy under Section 34 was the
right remedy.
The scope of Section 31(4) has to be properly understood. I agree
with the view of Saraf, J of Allahabad High Court in National Highways
Authority of India v. Musafir reported in 2024 SCC Online All 3920 cited
by learned counsel for the respondents that under the above provision the
arbitrator has no power to review or modify his award. For example if in an
arbitral reference, the claimant presents ten claims. There is no counter
claim. Eight claims are considered by the arbitrator and an award is passed in
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favour of the claimant. Two are left out. They may have been allowed or
disallowed. Under Section 31(4), the two claims which have been left out
could be referred to the arbitrator. In that case, on their consideration either
the awarded amount would be increased if they were allowed or would
remain the same, if disallowed. But the moment the arbitrator is asked to
adjudicate upon a counter claim then there is a possibility of re-adjudication
of the claims in the light of the counter claim resulting in reversal,
affirmation or alteration of the award. This might have the effect of review of
the award or its modification. Therefore, asking the arbitrator to consider a
counter claim not considered by him was not within Section 31(4) of the Act.
The contention of the appellants in this regard is rejected.
The appellant approached the Court under Section 11 of the said
Act for reference of his claims to arbitration. The respondents do not appear
to have made any counter claim at that stage. Naturally, the order of Court
referring the matter to arbitration referred to eight claims, which the
arbitrator has recited in the body of the award. Thereupon, when he called
the parties to a meeting, the respondents indicated that they had a counter
claim. Thereupon, he directed filing of a statement of claim and counter
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claim, if any. We find nothing wrong with the learned arbitrator’s reference
to eight claims initially.
It is true that before pronouncing the award, the arbitrator remarked
that he had considered only the eight claims. There was no reference to the
counter claims. He has made a mistake, making this statement.
The award is more than 20 years old. If we have to set aside the
award on this ground and direct the parties to seek arbitration afresh to
consider the counter claims it would reach more injustice than justice.
The matter has to be looked into this way. The learned arbitrator
ruled that the respondents were in breach of the contract and that the
appellant had rightly treated their conduct as abandonment of the contract.
Thereafter, the appellant rescinded the contract. The learned arbitrator held
that rescission by the appellant was rightful. No breach of contract was
attributed to the appellant. This finding upheld by us expressly or impliedly
suggests that the appellant could maintain a claim against the respondents
but the respondents could not maintain one for risk purchase or otherwise. It
negates even consideration of any counter claim by the respondents.
Therefore, only the claims of the appellant were admissible and payable. We
are prepared to give latitude to the technical arbitrator when he made the
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statement that he only adjudged the eight claims. Consideration of the
counter claims would have been an idle formality. So would it be now, if we
order referral of the counter claim.
The reasons given by the learned arbitrator to support part of the
award which we have upheld are more than adequate and reasonable and
accepted by us. Therefore, the learned judge’s observation and finding in
relation to that part of the award which we have upheld that it is vitiated for
non-supply of reasons is completely erroneous, liable to be set aside and is
set aside.
This appeal is partly allowed. The award is partly set aside. The
award for claims 2, 5 and 6 is set aside. The rest of the award is upheld and
may be enforced. The impugned judgment and order is partly set aside. No
order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(I.P. Mukerji)
Chief Justice
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2024.12.16 19:07:35 IST
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