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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 20.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 03.02.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 03.02.2026
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FAO(OS)(COMM) 10/2026 & CM APPL. 3484/2026
M/S L AND D JV
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Sarthak Sawhney, Adv.
versus
CONTAINER CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. R. K. Joshi, Mr. Ojusya
Joshi and Mrs. Shabnam Joshi,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1.
The present Appeal, preferred by the Appellant, assails the
correctness of judgment and order dated 05.08.2025 [hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’] passed by the learned Single
Judge in O.M.P.(COMM) 440/2024, whereby the petition filed by the
Appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 [hereinafter referred to as the ‘1996 Act’] challenging the
arbitral award dated 04.07.2024, passed by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, came to be dismissed.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
13:05:58
2.
The issue which arises for consideration in the present Appeal
is whether, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court ought to interfere
with the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the
Appellant’s petition under Section 34, particularly when the arbitral
award rests on a finding that the Appellant is barred from raising any
claim on account of the No Claim Certificate and allied declarations
executed by it.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
3.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present
Appeal, it would be apposite to briefly advert to the material facts
giving rise thereto.
4.
The Respondent awarded a works contract to the Appellant
pursuant to a tender issued during the year 2013 for execution of
earthwork and allied civil works relating to development of land at a
Container Freight Station at Vallarpadam, Cochin, Kerala. The
contract was an item-rate contract governed by the General Conditions
of Contract and the Special Conditions of Contract, and the scope of
work was defined by the Bill of Quantities [hereinafter referred to as
‘BOQ’] forming part of the tender documents. Under the contractual
arrangement, the BOQ specifying items of work and approximate
quantities was prepared by the Respondent, and the Appellant was
required to execute the works in accordance therewith, under the
supervision of the Respondent.
5.
The scheduled date of commencement of work was 02.03.2014
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and the stipulated date of completion was 01.01.2015. The work,
however, came to be completed on 26.06.2017, whereafter completion
was certified and the works were put to use by the Respondent.
During the course of execution of the contract, disputes arose between
the parties in relation to the execution of the works, payments made
therefor, and responsibility for alleged defects and rectification.
6.
The Appellant asserted that, during execution, it was required to
carry out certain additional and rectification works beyond the original
scope of the BOQ, allegedly on account of site conditions and
directions issued by the Respondent. It was also alleged that payments
of running account bills were delayed, that certain deductions were
wrongfully made, and that amounts towards earnest money deposit
were liable to be refunded. According to the Appellant, the additional
works were executed under compulsion and without commensurate
payment.
7.
The Respondent, on the other hand, disputed the aforesaid
assertions and contended that the works executed by the Appellant
were governed by the contractual terms, that no extra or variation
works were duly established in accordance with the contract, and that
any rectification carried out was within the Appellant’s contractual
obligations. The Respondent further denied liability towards
additional payments and interest.
8.
In view of the disputes, the Appellant invoked the arbitration
clause contained in the contract and referred the disputes to
arbitration. Before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, the Appellant filed
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its Statement of Claims, inter alia, seeking amounts towards alleged
extra and variation works, recovery of deductions made from running
account bills, refund of earnest money deposit, and interest on alleged
delayed payments. The Respondent contested the claims by filing its
Statement of Defence.
9.
Upon consideration of the pleadings and material placed on
record, the learned Arbitral Tribunal framed issues and examined the
claims raised by the Appellant. As regards the claim relating to extra
and variation works, the learned Tribunal found that the Appellant had
failed to specifically plead or establish the particulars of such alleged
extra work and that no material sufficient was produced to
demonstrate execution of work beyond the contractual scope as
defined in the BOQ. The learned Tribunal accordingly held that the
Appellant had not been able to substantiate its entitlement to
additional payment on this account.
10.
With respect to the claim for interest on delayed payment of
running account bills, the learned Arbitral Tribunal examined the
dates on which the bills were raised and the dates on which payments
were released, and held that all payments in respect of Running
Account Bills had been made by September 2016. The Tribunal
further held that the claim for interest, having been raised for the first
time in the Statement of Claims filed in the year 2021, was barred by
limitation. The judgments relied upon by the Appellant in support of
its claim for interest was distinguished on facts.
11.
On the aforesaid reasoning, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
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rejected the claims raised by the Appellant and passed the arbitral
award dated 04.07.2024. Aggrieved by the same, the Appellant filed a
petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, being O.M.P.(COMM)
440/2024, before this Court, contending that the award suffered from
perversity, patent illegality, and was contrary to law.
12.
The learned Single Judge, upon hearing the parties and perusing
the arbitral record, dismissed the petition vide the Impugned Order.
The learned Single Judge held that the findings returned by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal were based on appreciation of evidence, that
the Tribunal was the master of the evidence, and that no ground
warranting interference under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was made
out.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
13.
Contentions of the Appellant:
13.1 Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant, while drawing
attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the learned
Arbitrator under Issue Nos.2 and 3 of the Award, submitted that the
Tribunal had, in fact, returned findings indicating that the Appellant
was entitled to recover amounts quantified at Rs. 32,32,618.82/- and
Rs. 45,45,605/-. It was contended that after recording such findings,
the learned Arbitrator erred in ultimately dismissing the Appellant’s
claim petition in its entirety, thereby rendering the Award internally
inconsistent and unsustainable in law.
13.2 It was further submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the
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learned Arbitral Tribunal, while adjudicating certain issues arising out
of the disputes between the parties, had recorded findings which,
according to the Appellant, indicated that the difficulties encountered
during execution of the works were not attributable to any lapse or
deficiency on its part. It was contended that the material placed before
the Tribunal, including technical assessments and contemporaneous
correspondence exchanged between the parties, demonstrated that the
issues at site arose due to conditions beyond the Appellant’s control
and not on account of faulty execution. Proceeding on this basis, it
was urged that once the Tribunal had returned findings which
exonerated the Appellant from responsibility for the difficulties faced
at site, the rejection of the claim for reimbursement of alleged
additional or rectification works was unsustainable.
13.3 It was further argued that the continued utilization of the site by
the Respondent even after remedial measures were undertaken
indicated that rectification efforts had in fact been carried out and had
achieved their intended purpose, thereby lending support to the
Appellant’s claim that work beyond the original contractual scope had
been executed. According to the Appellant, the failure of the learned
Arbitrator to grant relief despite such findings rendered the Award
inconsistent and liable to interference.
13.4 Learned counsel also relied upon correspondence exchanged
between the parties, including letters dated 20.05.2016, 24.06.2016,
19.10.2016 and 11.12.2017, which, according to the Appellant, had
been duly proved during the arbitral proceedings. It was urged that the
failure of the learned Arbitrator to adequately consider the said
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NARAYAN
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correspondence
rendered
the
findings
under
Claim
No.1
unsustainable.
13.5 Assailing the rejection of Claim No. 5 relating to interest on
delayed payment of Running Account Bills, learned counsel for the
Appellant submitted that the learned Arbitrator erred in holding the
said claim to be barred by limitation. It was contended that the period
of limitation ought to have been computed from the date of payment
of the final bill, which was admittedly paid on 19.05.2020, after a
substantial delay following completion of the work.
13.6 It was contended that payments made under the Running
Account Bills were adjustable against the final bill and, therefore,
delay in settlement of the final bill constituted a fresh and independent
cause of action. It was urged that even if payments under the RA Bills
had been made by September 2016, the obligation to make payment of
the final bill arose only upon completion of the work and, therefore,
the claim for interest could not have been held to be time-barred.
13.7 Learned counsel for the Appellant also tried to submit that the
learned Single Judge erred in declaring that the Appellant’s claim for
delayed payments was incorrect and in failing to appreciate the
contractual stipulations governing the timeline for release of
payments.
14.
Contentions of the Respondent:
14.1 Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondent supported the
Impugned Order and submitted that the present Appeal is devoid of
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NARAYAN
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merit and liable to be dismissed both on grounds of maintainability
and on merits, and that no case for interference under Section 37 of
the 1996 Act is made out.
14.2 At the outset, an objection was raised with respect to the
maintainability of the Appeal on the ground of limitation and
procedural defect. It was submitted that the Appellant had re-filed the
Appeal after a delay of 75 days without filing a certified copy of the
Impugned Order. It was further submitted that even in the application
seeking condonation of delay, the Appellant had not averred that it
had applied for a certified copy of the Impugned Order, which is a
mandatory procedural requirement.
14.3 In this regard, reliance was placed on Order XLI Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to contend that every appeal must be
accompanied by a copy of the judgment appealed against and that
such copy necessarily implies a certified copy. Reliance was further
placed on the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish
Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava1; and Shakuntala Devi Jain v.
Kuntal Kumari2 to submit that an appeal filed without a certified copy
of the impugned judgment is incomplete and not to be adjudicated.
14.4 On merits, it was submitted that while adjudicating Issue No.7,
the learned Arbitral Tribunal had categorically held that the Appellant,
after having signed the No Claim Certificate, Full and Final
Settlement Certificate and, in particular, the No Demand Certificate
dated 20.05.2020, stood precluded from claiming any amount in
1960) SCC OnLine SC 149
(1968) SCC OnLine SC 139
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relation to the contract works. It was submitted that this finding
constituted an independent and complete bar to the claims raised by
the Appellant.
14.5 It was further submitted that once the learned Arbitral Tribunal
had arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, any observations made while
dealing with other issues, including Issue Nos.2 and 3, could not be
relied upon to seek relief. According to the Respondent, the operative
conclusion of the Award is one of dismissal of the claims and the
Appellant cannot selectively rely upon intermediate findings while
ignoring the determinative conclusion.
14.6 With respect to Claim No.5 relating to interest on delayed
payment of Running Account Bills, it was submitted that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal had rightly held the claim to be barred by limitation.
It was contended that the claim for interest on delayed payments was
admittedly raised for the first time in the Statement of Claims filed in
the year 2021.
14.7 It was submitted that payments in respect of RA Bills No.1 to 9
had been made between 24.10.2014 and 27.09.2016 and that the
limitation must be computed from the dates on which the amounts
became due and payable. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this
Court in KP Rana v. DDA3 to contend that limitation in respect of
such claims begins to run from the date when payment becomes due.
14.8 Reliance was also placed on Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8372
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NARAYAN
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v. UB Engineering Limited4 and Essar Procurement Services Ltd. v.
Paramount Constructions5 to submit that where a claim has not been
raised in the final bill, the claimant cannot subsequently contend that
limitation would commence from the date of settlement of the final
bill and that the cause of action with respect to each Running Account
Bill is distinct.
14.9 Lastly, it was submitted that the present Appeal essentially
seeks re-appreciation of facts and evidence, which is impermissible in
proceedings under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. It was urged that both
the learned Arbitral Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have
returned concurrent findings of fact and that no ground warranting
interference is made out.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:
15.
This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
16.
At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited scope of
interference by this Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction under
Section 37 of the 1996 Act. It is well settled that an appeal under
Section 37 is not in the nature of a regular first appeal and does not
permit re-appreciation of evidence or re-examination of factual
findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal. Interference is warranted
only where the order passed under Section 34, or the award itself, is
shown to suffer from perversity, patent illegality apparent on the face
2020 SCC OnLine Mad 170
2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9697
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of the record, or is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian
law. If the view taken by the learned Arbitrator is a plausible one, the
Court exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 or 37 cannot substitute
its own view merely because another interpretation may also be
possible.
17.
In the present case, learned counsel for the Appellant placed
considerable emphasis on the findings recorded by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal under Issue Nos. 2 and 3 of the Award. It was
submitted that while adjudicating the said issues, the learned
Arbitrator recorded findings which, according to the Appellant,
recognized its entitlement to recover amounts quantified at
Rs.32,32,618.82/- and Rs.45,45,605/-. On that basis, it was argued
that the ultimate dismissal of the claim petition was contradictory and
unsustainable.
18.
This submission, though attractive at first blush, does not
withstand closer scrutiny of the Award read as a whole. First of all, it
is evident from the record that the Appellant had substantially pressed
its challenge in relation to Issue Nos.1 and 5, a position which has also
been noticed by the learned Single Judge in the Impugned Order.
More importantly, while adjudicating Issue No.7, the learned Arbitral
Tribunal returned a categorical and unequivocal finding that the
Appellant, after having executed the No Claim Certificate, Full and
Final Settlement Certificate and, in particular, the No Demand
Certificate dated 20.05.2020, stood precluded from raising any further
monetary claims in relation to the contract works.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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19.
The finding returned under Issue No.7 is not merely incidental
but goes to the root of the maintainability of the claims themselves.
The learned Tribunal, upon appreciation of the documentary material
and surrounding circumstances, concluded that the execution of the
aforesaid certificates constituted a binding accord between the parties,
thereby disentitling the Appellant from asserting any further claims
arising out of the contract. Such a finding, unless demonstrated to be
perverse or legally unsustainable, constitutes an independent and
determinative ground for rejection of the claims in their entirety.
20.
Once the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that the Appellant
was contractually precluded from raising any further monetary
demand in view of the No Claim and No Demand Certificates, any
observations made while adjudicating Issue Nos.2 and 3 could not
survive as independent basis for grant of relief. It is well settled that
an arbitral award must be read in a holistic manner, and isolated
findings cannot be torn out of context to assail the ultimate operative
conclusion. The operative part of the Award is one of dismissal of the
claims, and not the intermediate reasoning recorded while examining
individual issues.
21.
In view of the aforesaid position, the argument advanced by the
learned counsel for the Appellant on the basis of Issue Nos.2 and 3
lacks substance. Even assuming that certain observations under those
issues appeared to favour the Appellant, the conclusive finding
recorded under Issue No.7 operated as a complete bar to any recovery.
The learned Single Judge has taken note of this aspect and has rightly
held that no ground for interference under Section 34 was made out.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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22.
Learned counsel for the Appellant also sought to contend that
the learned Single Judge erred in affirming the rejection of the
Appellant’s claim relating to interest on delayed payment of Running
Account Bills. On this aspect, a perusal of the record reveals that the
Running Account Bill dated 16.07.2016 came to be paid on
27.09.2016. The learned Arbitrator has recorded a finding that the
claim seeking interest on alleged delayed payments was raised for the
first time only in the Statement of Claims filed in the year 2021.
23.
While adjudicating the claim under Issue No.5, the learned
Arbitrator examined the relevant dates of submission and payment of
the RA Bills and concluded that the claim for interest was barred by
limitation. The Tribunal reasoned that the cause of action, if any, arose
when the payments became due and were made, and that the
Appellant could not, after the lapse of several years, raise such a claim
for the first time in arbitration proceedings. The learned Single Judge
has affirmed the said finding, observing that it is based on
appreciation of the material on record.
24.
This Court finds no perversity or patent illegality in the
aforesaid conclusion. The determination of limitation, particularly in
the context of claims for interest on delayed payments, is essentially a
mixed question of fact and law and falls squarely within the domain of
the Arbitral Tribunal. Once the Tribunal has adopted a reasonable and
plausible view on the basis of the evidence before it, the same does
not warrant interference in appellate proceedings under Section 37 of
the 1996 Act.
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NARAYAN
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24A. In this context, it is also apposite to note that this Court in Late
Sh. Pramod Kumar Jain v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr.6,
has reiterated that for the purposes of limitation, the cause of action
arises when a claim is first asserted and remains unanswered or is not
acted upon within a reasonable time, and that subsequent reminders or
correspondence do not extend or postpone the commencement of
limitation. The Court further emphasized that once limitation begins to
run, it cannot be arrested by continued representations or silence of the
opposite party. The said principle squarely reinforces the view
adopted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal in the present case while
adjudicating the claim for interest on delayed payments.
25.
The submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellant, when
examined in entirety, essentially seek a re-appreciation of evidence
and reconsideration of factual findings returned by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. Such an exercise is clearly impermissible within the
limited scope of appellate scrutiny under Section 37, particularly
where both the Arbitral Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have
concurrently rejected the claims after due consideration.
26.
In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that
the Award does not suffer from perversity, patent illegality, or
violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The approach
adopted by the learned Arbitrator is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable,
and the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere with the
same.
2025:DHC:8212-DB
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27.
Hence, no interference is called for, keeping in view the limited
scope of interference against an arbitral award and the concurrent
findings recorded by the learned Arbitral Tribunal and affirmed by the
learned Single Judge.
CONCLUSION:
28.
In view of the foregoing discussion and findings, this Court
finds no infirmity in the Arbitral Award dated 04.07.2024 or in the
Impugned Order passed by the learned Single Judge. The Appellant
has failed to demonstrate any ground warranting interference by this
Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of the
1996 Act.
29.
The present Appeal, being devoid of merit, is accordingly
dismissed. The pending application also stands closed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
FEBRUARY 03, 2026
jai/pal
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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