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WP No. 36026 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 36026 OF 2025 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
M/S KUSUMA BHANDARY CONSTRUCTIONS PVT LIMITED
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
MR. SURESH BHANDARY
OFF. AT 2ND FLOOR, HOTEL LAKSHMI MAHAL,
OPP. MISCHIEF MALL, OPP. K S RAO ROAD,
MANGALORE – 575 001
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SACHIN B. S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
MADHURI S
Location:
High Court
of Karnataka
DR. KSHAMA HEGDE
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS
D/O SRI SUDHEER KUMAR P. HEGDE,
R/AT OM SRI NIVAS, AJJARKADU,
JODUKATTE, UDUPI – 576 101
REPRESENTED BY HER
POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER / FATHER
SRI. SUDHEER KUMAR P. HEGDE
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. JAYAKUMAR S. PATIL, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SHIVARAM R. BHAT, ADVOCATE)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR ANY OTHER
APPROPRIATE WRIT OR ORDER QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER
DATED 07.02.2025 IN I.A.NO. III AND IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
25.10.2025 IN I.A.NO.V PASSED IN A.P.14 OF 2024 ON THE FILE OF IT
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT/ COMMERCIAL COURT, UDUPI, AS PER
ANNEXURE-A AND B AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE I.A.NO.III AND
I.A.NO.V AS PRAYED FOR IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AS
PER ANNEXURE- G AND H.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
This petition arises out of the proceedings in E.P.No.14/2024
pending before the II Addl.District Court (commercial court) at
Udupi.
2. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present petition
are as under:
The petitioner who is the respondent in the said petition filed
by the respondent herein filed an application I.A.No.3 under Order
7 Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the main petition on the ground of
want / lack of jurisdiction of the commercial court at Udupi. The
said application having been opposed by the respondent herein,
the commercial court passed the impugned order dated 07.02.2025
rejecting the said application I.A.No.3 filed by the petitioner.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an application I.A.No.5 under Order
47 Rule 1 r/w Section 114 CPC seeking review of the aforesaid
order dated 07.02.2025 passed on I.A.No.3. By the subsequent
impugned
order
dated
25.10.2025,
the
commercial
court
proceeded to reject I.A.No.5 filed by the petitioner, thereby
confirming its earlier order dated 07.02.2025. Aggrieved by the
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impugned orders dated 07.02.2025 and 25.10.2025, rejecting
I.A.Nos. 3 and 5, petitioner is before this Court by way of the
present petition.
3.
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Senior counsel for the respondent and perused the material on
record.
4. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel
for the petitioner invited my attention to the order sheet maintained
by the arbitral tribunal in A.C.No.7/2019 in order to point out that
both the petitioner and respondent had agreed that the seat of
arbitration (proceedings) would be at Mangalore, as a result of
which, the petition in A.P.No.14/2024 was not maintainable before
the commercial court at Udupi and the petitioner had also assailed
the arbitral award by filing the petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, ( for short ‘the said Act of
1996’)
which
commercial
was
court
pending
at
in
A.P.No.21/2024
Mangalore,
the
instant
before
the
petition
in
A.P.No.14/2024 filed by the respondent before the commercial
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court at Udupi, was liable to be returned for lack / want of
jurisdiction and the same was liable to be re-presented before the
commercial court at Mangalore to be tried and disposed of along
with A.P.No.21/2024 filed by the petitioner. It is submitted that the
commercial court committed an error in not correctly considering or
appreciating these aspects of the matter and as such, the
impugned orders deserve to be set aside and the application
I.A.No.3 filed by the petitioner deserves to be allowed. In support of
his submissions, he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of M/s.INOX Renewables Ltd., vs. Jayesh
Electricals Ltd., - (2023) 3 SCC 733.
5. Per contra, learned Senior counsel for the respondent
would support the impugned orders and contend that merely
because the venue of arbitration was at Mangalore where the
learned sole arbitrator was stationed, having regard to the
undisputed fact that the seat of arbitration was agreed between the
parties to be at Manipal / Udupi in terms of clause-30 of the Joint
Development Agreement (JDA) dated 24.11.2008 executed
between the parties and the seat of arbitration had not been
agreed to be at Mangalore by either party. He would also invited
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my attention to clause – 31 of the JDA in order to point out that as
agreed between the parties, it was the civil courts at Udupi that had
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all disputes arising or
touching out of the JDA dated 24.11.2008, which was executed at
Udupi, the commercial court has correctly rejected the applications
filed by the petitioner by passing the impugned order, which does
not warrant interference by this Court in the present petition, which
is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, he placed
reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of BGS
SGS SOMA JV vs. NHPC Limited – (2020)4 SCC 234 and BBR
(India) Pvt. Ltd., vs. S.P.Singla Construction Private Limtied (2023) 1 SCC 693.
6.
I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
7. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the
petitioner approached this Court in C.M.P.No.255/2018 under
Section 11 of the said Act of 1996 seeking appointment of a
Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute between the parties in
relation to Joint Development Agreement dated 24.11.2008
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entered into between them. By final order dated 11.04.2019, this
Court allowed the said petition and appointed a sole arbitrator who
was based at Bangalore to adjudicate upon the dispute between
the parties as hereunder:“
Sri.Cyril
Prasad
Pais,
learned
counsel
for
for petitioner. Sri.K.A.Ariga, learned counsel for respondent.
2.
The petition is admitted for hearing and the
same is heard finally.
3.
By means of this petition under Section 11(5) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred as ‘the Act’, for short), the petitioner inter alia seeks
appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute
between the parties.
4.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties
and perused the records.
5.
Admittedly, the parties have entered into an
Joint Development Agreement dated 24.11.2008 and
Clause-30 of the aforesaid agreement contains an arbitration
clause. In that regard, the petitioner has sent the notice to
the respondent on 03.01.2017 invoking the arbitration
clause. In the aforesaid factual background, petitioner has
approached this Court seeking appointment of an arbitrator.
6.
When the matter is taken up today, learned
counsel for the parties jointly submit that the parties are from
Mangaluru and Mr. Moosa Kunhi Nayarmoole, retired District
and Sessions Judge be appointed as a sole arbitrator to
adjudicate the dispute between the parties.
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7.
In view of the aforesaid submission and in the
facts of the case, I deem it appropriate to appoint
Mr.Moosa Kunhi Nayarmoole, retired District and Sessions
Judge, who is based in Mangaluru, as the sole arbitrator to
adjudicate the dispute between the parties.
8.
A copy of this order be dispatched to the
Mr.Moosa Kunhi Nayarmoole, retired District and Sessions
Judge, for necessary action in that regard.
Accordingly, the petition is disposed of.”
8.
As can be seen from the aforesaid order, the sole
arbitrator, who was appointed was based in Mangalore, thereby
indicating that it was only the venue of arbitration that was agreed
upon by both parties to be at Mangalore, which by itself did not
mean that there was change or relocation of the seat or arbitration
which was not at Mangalore but at Manipal / Udupi as can be seen
from clause No.30 of the JDA dated 24.11.2008 on the basis of
which, this Court referred the dispute to arbitration at the instance
of the petitioner.
9. In pursuance of the said order passed by this Court in
C.M.P.No.255/2018 dated 11.04.2019, the petitioner filed his claim
petition before the sole arbitrator, to which, the respondent filed the
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statement of objections and contested the arbitration proceedings
and also put forth a counter claim against the petitioner, who filed a
rejoinder and opposed the counter claim, pursuant to which, the
tribunal proceeded to pass an arbitral award dated 24.08.2024
partly allowing the claim petition of the petitioner and disallowing
the counter claim of the respondent.
10.
Aggrieved by the arbitral award insofar as it relates to
partial rejection of its claim, the petitioner has approached the
commercial court at Mangalore in A.P.No.21/2024 under Section
34 of the said Act of 1996, which is pending adjudication. So also,
aggrieved by the arbitral award insofar as it relates to allowing the
claim of the petitioner and rejection of her counter claim, the
respondent filed the instant petition in A.P.No.14/2024 before the
commercial court at Udupi. As stated supra, aggrieved by the
impugned orders, passed by the commercial court at Udupi,
petitioner is before this Court by way of the present petition.
11. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be
necessary to extract clauses 30 and 31 of the JDA dated
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24.11.2008 entered into between the petitioner and respondent as
hereunder:30.
In case of any dispute between the parties to
this agreement regarding the interpretation of the terms and
conditions
of
this
agreement
or its
enforcement
or
compliance or non-compliance and anything arising out of
this agreement or in relation thereto or on account of any
thing done pursuant thereto and any matter whatsoever
touching this agreement between the parties to this deed or
their legal representatives etc.,
It shall be referred to an settled by arbitration as per
the Provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1966
and the decision of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding
on both the parties. The Owner and the PROMOTER agree
that Mr.Paul Mascarenhas Architect Mangalore and Mr.
Nagesh Hegde Udupi shall be the Arbitrators to decide all
such disputes and the venue of Arbitration proceedings shall
be at Manipal City Only.
31.
That all disputes touching or arising out of this
agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
civil courts of Udupi.
12. As can be seen from the aforesaid clause No.30 of the
JDA entered into between the parties, the seat of arbitration has
been agreed and fixed at Manipal / Udupi only and not at
Mangalore; so also, at clause – 31, both petitioner and respondent
have jointly agreed that all disputes touching or arising out of the
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JDA shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts at
Udupi and not anywhere else including Mangalore; it is a matter of
record that the instant petition in A.P.No.14/2024 is pending before
the commercial court at Udupi, which is nothing but a civil court for
the purpose of clause No.31 of the JDA having exclusive
jurisdiction over the dispute; it follows therefrom that the seat of
arbitration being agreed by both parties to be at Manipal / Udupi
and not at Mangalore coupled with the fact that the commercial
court at Udupi has territorial jurisdiction over Manipal and Udupi,
which are undisputedly adjacent to each other in addition to the
fact that both parties had agreed that all disputes shall be subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts / commercial courts at
Udupi, I am of the view that the commercial court was fully justified
in coming to the correct conclusion that it had jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the petition by passing the impugned order, which
is correct, proper and in accordance with law.
13. In the case of BGS SGS SOMA’s case supra, the Apex
Court held as under:The juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings
22. The Arbitration Act, 1940 did not refer to the
“juridical seat” of the arbitral proceedings at all. Under the
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scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 14 stated as
follows:
“14. Award to be signed and filed.—(1) When the
arbitrators or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it
and shall give notice in writing to the parties of the making
and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges
payable in respect of the arbitration and award.
(2) The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of
any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming
under such party or if so directed by the Court and upon
payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the
arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing
the award, cause the award or a signed copy of it, together
with any depositions and documents which may have been
taken and proved before them, to be filed in Court, and the
Court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of
the award.
(3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case
under clause (b) of Section 13, the Court, after giving notice
to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion
thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form
part of, the award.”
23. When the award was signed and filed in court, a
judgment in terms of the award had then to be made as
follows:
“17. Judgment in terms of award.— Where the Court
sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters
referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the
award, the Court shall, after the time for making an
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application to set aside the award has expired, or such
application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to
pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal
shall lie from such a decree except on the ground that it is in
excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award.”
24. It was in this setting that “court” was defined by
Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as follows:
“2. Definitions.— In this Act, unless there is anything
repugnant in the subject or the context—
(c) “Court” means a civil court having jurisdiction to decide
the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if
the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not
except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under
Section 21 include a Small Cause Court;”
25. Section 31, which dealt with the court in which an
award may be filed then stated as follows:
“31. Jurisdiction.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this
Act, an award may be filed in any Court having jurisdiction in
the matter to which the reference relates.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided
in this Act, all questions regarding the validity, effect or
existence of an award or an arbitration agreement between
the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under them
shall be decided by the Court in which the award under the
agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court.
(3) All applications regarding the conduct of arbitration
proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings
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shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or may
be, filed, and to no other Court.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act
or in any other law for the time being in force where in any
reference any application under this Act has been made in a
Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have
jurisdiction
over
the
arbitration
proceedings
and
all
subsequent applications arising out of that reference and the
arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no
other Court.”
26. It will be noticed that in this statutory setting, the
“place” in which the award is made is not referred to at all.
Given this fact, the “court” was defined as any civil court
having jurisdiction to decide questions forming the subjectmatter of the reference to arbitration if the same had been the
subject-matter of a suit.
27.
The
UNCITRAL
Model
Law
on
International
Commercial Arbitration (as adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law on 21-6-1985)
(hereinafter referred to as “the UNCITRAL Model Law”) was
then adopted by this country. The UNCITRAL Model Law
introduced the concept of “place” or “seat” of the arbitral
proceedings as follows:
“1. Scope of application.—(1)
*
*
*
(2) The provisions of this Law, except Articles 8, 9, 35
and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory
of this State.
2. Definitions and rules of interpretation
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(c) “court” means a body or organ of the judicial
system of a State;
6. Court or other authority for certain functions of
arbitration assistance and supervision.—The functions
referred to in Articles 11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3) and 34(2)
shall be performed by … [Each State enacting this model law
specifies the court, courts or, where referred to therein, other
authority competent to perform these functions.]
20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are free to
agree on the place of arbitration. Failing such agreement, the
place of arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case,
including the convenience of the parties.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of
this article, the Arbitral Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses,
experts or the parties, or for inspection of goods, other
property or documents.
31. Form and contents of award.—(1)-(2
(3) The award shall state its date and the place of
arbitration as determined in accordance with Article 20(1).
The award shall be deemed to have been made at that
place.”
28. The Arbitration Act, 1996 repealed the Arbitration
Act, 1940. As is stated in its Preamble, the Arbitration Act,
1996 adopted provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law, as they
had made a significant contribution to the establishment of a
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unified legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement of
disputes arising in international commercial relations.
29. The Arbitration Act, 1996 refers to “the place” of
arbitration and defines “court”, and indicates which courts
have jurisdiction in relation to arbitral proceedings in several
sections in Part I. Section 2(1)(e) and Section 2(2) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 are as follows:
“2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires—
(e) “Court” means—
(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international
commercial arbitration, the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in
exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter
of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a
suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to
such principal civil court, or any Court of Small Causes;
(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration,
the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming
the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the
subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court
having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts
subordinate to that High Court;
(2) Scope.—This part shall apply where the place of
arbitration is in India:
Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary,
the provisions of Sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section
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(1) and sub-section (3) of Section 37 shall also apply to
international commercial arbitration, even if the place of
arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to
be made in such place is enforceable and recognised under
the provisions of Part II of this Act.
30. Sections 20, 31(4) and 42 of the Arbitration Act,
1996 read as follows:
“20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are free to
agree on the place of arbitration.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section
(1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case,
including the convenience of the parties.
(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2),
the Arbitral Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses,
experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods
or other property.
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.—(1)-(3)
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place
of arbitration as determined in accordance with Section 20
and the award shall be deemed to have been made at that
place.
42.
Jurisdiction.—
Notwithstanding
anything
contained elsewhere in this Part or any other law for the time
being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement
any application under this Part has been made in any Court,
that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral
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proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of
that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in
that Court and in no other Court.”
31. It will thus be seen that the new provisions
contained in Sections 20 and 31(4) of the Arbitration Act,
1996 are a replication of Articles 20 and 31(3) of the UNCITRAL
Model Law, in which pride of place is given to the juridical
seat of the arbitral proceedings. However, the definition of
“court” in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996
continues the definition contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940,
but replaces any and every civil court by only the principal
civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the
High Court in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction. Section
42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 also substantially follows the
drill of Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
32. It can thus be seen that given the new concept of
“juridical seat” of
the
arbitral proceedings,
and
the
importance given by the Arbitration Act, 1996 to this “seat”,
the arbitral award is now not only to state its date, but also
the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with
Section 20. However, the definition of “court” contained in
Section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, continued as
such in the Arbitration Act, 1996, though narrowed to mean
only principal civil court and the High Court in exercise of
their original ordinary civil jurisdiction. Thus, the concept of
juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings and its relationship
to the jurisdiction of courts which are then to look into
matters relating to the arbitral proceedings — including
challenges to arbitral awards — was unclear, and had to be
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developed in accordance with international practice on a
case by case basis by this Court.
33. Some of the early decisions of this Court did not
properly distinguish between “seat” and “venue” of an arbitral
proceeding. The five-Judge Bench in Balco [Balco v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] dealt with this problem as follows :
(SCC pp. 597-99, 605-607, paras 75-76, 95-96, 98-99)
“75. We are also unable to accept the submission of
the learned counsel for the appellants that the Arbitration
Act, 1996 does not make seat of the arbitration as the centre
of gravity of the arbitration. On the contrary, it is accepted by
most of the experts that in most of the national laws,
arbitrations
are
anchored
to
the
seat/place/situs
of
arbitration. Redfern in Para 3.54 concludes that ‘the seat of
the arbitration is thus intended to be its centre of gravity.’ [
Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern and Hunter (Eds.), Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford
University Press, Oxford/New York 2009)] This, however,
does not mean that all the proceedings of the arbitration
have to take place at the seat of the arbitration. The
arbitrators at times hold meetings at more convenient
locations. This is necessary as arbitrators often come from
different countries. It may, therefore, on occasions be
convenient to hold some of the meetings in a location which
may be convenient to all. Such a situation was examined by
the Court of Appeal in England in Naviera Amazonica
Peruana SA v. Compania International de Seguros del Peru
[Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania International
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de Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)]
wherein at p. 121 it is observed as follows:
‘The preceding discussion has been on the basis that
there is only one “place” of arbitration. This will be the place
chosen by or on behalf of the parties; and it will be
designated in the arbitration agreement or the terms of
reference or the minutes of proceedings or in some other
way as the place or “seat” of the arbitration. This does not
mean, however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its
meetings or hearings at the place of arbitration. International
commercial arbitration often involves people of many
different nationalities, from many different countries. In these
circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an Arbitral
Tribunal to hold meetings—or even hearings —in a place
other than the designated place of arbitration, either for its
own convenience or for the convenience of the parties or
their witnesses…. It may be more convenient for an Arbitral
Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a hearing in
another country — for instance, for the purpose of taking
evidence…. In such circumstances each move of the Arbitral
Tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat of arbitration
changes. The seat of arbitration remains the place initially
agreed by or on behalf of the parties.’
These observations were subsequently followed in
Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corpn. [Union of India
v. McDonnell Douglas Corpn., (1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep 48]
76. It must be pointed out that the law of the seat or place
where the arbitration is held, is normally the law to govern
that arbitration. The territorial link between the place of
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arbitration and the law governing that arbitration is well
established in the international instruments, namely, the New
York Convention of 1958 and the Uncitral Model Law of
1985. It is true that the terms “seat” and “place” are often
used
interchangeably.
In
Redfern
and
Hunter
on
International Arbitration [ Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern and
Hunter
(Eds.),
Redfern
and
Hunter
on
International
Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford/New
York 2009)] (Para 3.51), the seat theory is defined thus:‘The
concept that an arbitration is governed by the law of the
place in which it is held, which is the “seat” (or “forum” or
locus arbitri) of the arbitration, is well established in both the
theory and practice of international arbitration. In fact, the
Geneva Protocol, 1923 states:
‘2. The arbitral procedure, including the constitution of
the Arbitral Tribunal, shall be governed by the will of the
parties and by the law of the country in whose territory the
arbitration takes place.’
The New York Convention maintains the reference to
‘the law of the country where the arbitration took place’
[Article V(1)(d)] and, synonymously to ‘the law of the country
where the award is made’ [Articles V(1)(a) and (e)]. The
aforesaid observations clearly show that the New York
Convention continues the clear territorial link between the
place of arbitration and the law governing that arbitration.
The author further points out that this territorial link is again
maintained in the Model Law which provides in Article 1(2)
that:
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‘1. (2) the provision of this Law, except Articles 8, 9,
35 and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the
territory of the State.’
Just as the Arbitration Act, 1996 maintains the territorial link
between the place of arbitration and its law of arbitration, the
law in Switzerland and England also maintain a clear link
between the seat of arbitration and the lex arbitri. The Swiss
Law states:
‘176(I). (1) The provision of this chapter shall apply to
any arbitration if the seat of the Arbitral Tribunal is in
Switzerland and if, at the time when the arbitration
agreement was concluded, at least one of the parties had
neither its domicile nor its habitual residence in Switzerland.’
[See the Swiss Private International Law Act, 1987, Ch. 12,
Article 176 (I)(1).]
95. The learned counsel for the appellants have
submitted that Section 2(1)(e), Section 20 and Section 28
read with Section 45 and Section 48(1)(e) make it clear that
Part I is not limited only to arbitrations which take place in
India. These provisions indicate that the Arbitration Act, 1996
is subject-matter centric and not exclusively seat-centric.
Therefore, “seat” is not the “centre of gravity” so far as the
Arbitration Act, 1996 is concerned. We are of the considered
opinion that the aforesaid provisions have to be interpreted
by keeping the principle of territoriality at the forefront. We
have earlier observed that Section 2(2) does not make Part I
applicable to arbitrations seated or held outside India. In
view of the expression used in Section 2(2), the maxim
expressum facit cessare tacitum, would not permit by
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interpretation to hold that Part I would also apply to
arbitrations held outside the territory of India. The expression
“this Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India”
necessarily excludes application of Part I to arbitration
seated or held outside India. It appears to us that neither of
the provisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellants would make any section of Part I applicable to
arbitration seated outside India. It will be apposite now to
consider each of the aforesaid provisions in turn.
96. Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as
under:
‘2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires.—
(e) “Court” means the Principal civil court of Original
Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in
exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subjectmatter of the arbitration if the same had been the subjectmatter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a
grade inferior to such Principal civil court, or any Court of
Small Causes.’
We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of the
arbitration” cannot be confused with “subject-matter of the
suit”. The term “subject-matter” in Section 2(1)(e) is confined
to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process
of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts
having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings.
Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court
of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the
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provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in
view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to
party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as
projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in
fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature
has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court
which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is
located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This
was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may
provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be
neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the
arbitration takes place would be required to exercise
supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if
the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties
are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place
as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata)
and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order
Under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal
against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to
the courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory
jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal.
This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to
be performed under the contract were to be performed either
at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place
in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts would have
jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subjectmatter of the suit is situated and the courts within the
jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is
located.
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***
98. We now come to Section 20, which is as under:
‘20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are free to agree
on the place of arbitration.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), the
place of arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case,
including the convenience of the parties.
(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the
Arbitral Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses,
experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, good
or other property.’
A plain reading of Section 20 leaves no room for doubt that
where the place of arbitration is in India, the parties are free
to agree to any “place” or “seat” within India, be it Delhi,
Mumbai, etc. In the absence of the parties' agreement
thereto, Section 20(2) authorises the tribunal to determine
the place/seat of such arbitration. Section 20(3) enables the
tribunal to meet at any place for conducting hearings at a
place of convenience in matters such as consultations
among its members for hearing witnesses, experts or the
parties.
99. The fixation of the most convenient “venue” is
taken care of by Section 20(3). Section 20, has to be read in
the context of Section 2(2), which places a threshold
limitation on the applicability of Part I, where the place of
arbitration is in India. Therefore, Section 20 would also not
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support the submission of the extra-territorial applicability of
Part I, as canvassed by the learned counsel for the
appellants,
so
far as
purely
domestic
arbitration
is
concerned.”
34. The Court in Balco [Balco v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] then went on to refer to several English judgments
and specifically italicised several parts of the judgment in
Shashoua v. Sharma [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC
957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] as follows :
(Balco case [Balco v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , SCC p.
614, para 110)
“110. Examining the fact situation in the case, the
Court observed as follows:
‘The basis for the court's grant of an anti-suit injunction of the
kind sought depended upon the seat of the arbitration. An
agreement as to the seat of an arbitration brought in the law
of that country as the curial law and was analogous to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause. Not only was there agreement
to the curial law of the seat, but also to the courts of the seat
having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration, so that,
by agreeing to the seat, the parties agreed that any
challenge to an interim or final award was to be made only in
the courts of the place designated as the seat of the
arbitration.
Although, “venue” was not synonymous with “seat”, in
an arbitration clause which provided for arbitration to be
conducted in accordance with the Rules of the ICC in Paris
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(a supranational body of rules), a provision that “the venue of
arbitration shall be London, United Kingdom” did amount to
the designation of a juridical seat.…’
In para 54, it is further observed as follows:
‘There was a little debate about the possibility of the
issues relating to the alleged submission by the claimants to
the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi being heard by that
court, because it was best fitted to determine such issues
under the Indian Law. Whilst I found this idea attractive
initially, we are persuaded that it would be wrong in principle
to allow this and that it would create undue practical
problems in any event. On the basis of what I have already
decided, England is the seat of the arbitration and since this
carries with it something akin to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause, as a matter of principle the foreign court should not
decide matters which are for this Court to decide in the
context of an anti-suit injunction.’
In making the aforesaid observations in Shashoua case, the
Court relied on the judgments of the Court of Appeal in C v.
D.”
35. Finally, the conclusion drawn in para 116 of Balco
was as follows :
“116. The legal position that emerges from a
conspectus of all the decisions, seems to be, that the choice
of another country as the seat of arbitration inevitably
imports an acceptance that the law of that country relating to
the conduct and supervision of arbitrations will apply to the
proceedings.
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36. Also, in para 123, the Court in BALCO held as
follows : (BALCO case [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] ,
SCC p. 621)
“123. Thus, it is clear that the regulation of conduct of
arbitration and challenge to an award would have to be
done by the courts of the country in which the arbitration is
being conducted. Such a court is then the supervisory court
possessed of the power to annul the award. This is in
keeping with the scheme of the international instruments,
such as the Geneva Convention and the New York
Convention as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law. It also
recognises the territorial principle which gives effect to the
sovereign right of a country to regulate, through its national
courts, an adjudicatory duty being performed in its own
country. By way of a comparative example, we may
reiterate the observations made by the Court of Appeal,
England in C v. D [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA
Civ 1282 (CA)] wherein it is observed that : (Bus LR p. 851,
para 17)
‘17. It follows from this that a choice of seat for the
arbitration must be a choice of forum for remedies seeking
to attack the award.’
In the aforesaid case, the Court of Appeal had
approved the observations made in A v. B [A v. B, (2007) 1
All ER (Comm) 591 : (2007) 1 Lloyd's Rep 237] wherein it is
observed that:
‘… an agreement as to the seat of an arbitration is
analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for
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a remedy … as to the validity of an existing interim or final
award is agreed to be made only in the courts of the place
designated as the seat of arbitration.’”
37. The Court in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] then concluded in para 194 as follows : (SCC p.
647)
“194. In view of the above discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the Arbitration Act, 1996 has
accepted the territoriality principle which has been adopted
in the UNCITRAL Model Law. Section 2(2) makes a
declaration that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall
apply to all arbitrations which take place within India. We
are of the considered opinion that Part I of the Arbitration
Act, 1996 would have no application to international
commercial arbitration held outside India. Therefore, such
awards would only be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Indian courts when the same are sought to be enforced in
India in accordance with the provisions contained in Part II
of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In our opinion, the provisions
contained in the Arbitration Act, 1996 make it crystal clear
that there can be no overlapping or intermingling of the
provisions contained in Part I with the provisions contained
in Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996.”
38. A reading of paras 75, 76, 96, 110, 116, 123 and 194 of
BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,
(2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] would show
that where parties have selected the seat of arbitration in
their agreement, such selection would then amount to an
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exclusive jurisdiction clause, as the parties have now
indicated that the courts at the “seat” would alone have
jurisdiction to entertain challenges against the arbitral award
which have been made at the seat. The example given in
para 96 buttresses this proposition, and is supported by the
previous
and
subsequent
paragraphs
pointed
out
hereinabove. The BALCO judgment, when read as a whole,
applies the concept of “seat” as laid down by the English
judgments (and which is in Section 20 of the Arbitration Act,
1996), by harmoniously construing Section 20 with Section
2(1)(e), so as to broaden the definition of “court”, and bring
within its ken courts of the “seat” of the arbitration
39. However, this proposition is contradicted when
para 96 of BALCO speaks of the concurrent jurisdiction of
courts within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises
wholly or in part, and Courts within the jurisdiction of which
the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration, is located.
40. Para 96 of BALCO case is in several parts. First
and foremost, Section 2(1)(e), which is the definition of
“court” under the Arbitration Act, 1996 was referred to, and
was construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20
of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which give recognition to party
autonomy
in
choosing
the
seat
of
the
arbitration
proceedings. Secondly, the Court went on to state in two
places in the said paragraph that jurisdiction is given to two
sets of courts, namely, those courts which would have
jurisdiction where the cause of action is located; and those
courts where the arbitration takes place. However, when it
came to providing a neutral place as the “seat” of arbitration
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proceedings, the example given by the five-Judge Bench
made it clear that appeals under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 against interim orders passed under
Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would lie only to the
courts of the seat — which is Delhi in that example — which
are the courts having supervisory control, or jurisdiction,
over the arbitration proceedings. The example then goes on
to state that this would be irrespective of the fact that the
obligations to be performed under the contract, that is the
cause of action, may arise in part either at Mumbai or
Kolkata. The fact that the arbitration is to take place in Delhi
is of importance. However, the next sentence in the said
paragraph reiterates the concurrent jurisdiction of both
courts.
41. This Court has held that judgments of Courts are
not to be construed as statutes, neither are they to be read
as Euclid's theorems. All observations made must be read
in the context in which they appear. This was felicitously put
in Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, where this
Court stated : (SCC pp. 362-63, para 10)
“10. There is one other significant sentence in
Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. with which we
must express our agreement, it was said : (SCC p. 377,
para 27)
‘27. … With utmost respect, these observations of
the learned Judge are not to be read as Euclid's theorems,
nor as provisions of a statute. These observations must be
read in the context in which they appear.’
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We consider it proper to say, as we have already
said in other cases, that judgments of courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and
provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges
to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is
meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret
statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret
words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as
statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton
‘…The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by
treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they
were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of
interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from
the great weight to be given to the language actually used
by that most distinguished Judge.…’
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [Home
Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2
WLR 1140 (HL)] Lord Reid said : (AC p. 1027)
‘…Lord Atkin's speech M'Alister (or Donoghue) v.
Stevenson … is not to be treated as if it was a statutory
definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.’
Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham
(No. 2) [Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2), (1971) 1
WLR 1062] observed : (WLR p. 1069)
‘… One must not, of course, construe even a
reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act
of Parliament.’
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And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [British
Railways Board v. Herrington, 1972 AC 877 : (1972) 2 WLR
537 (HL)] Lord Morris said : (AC p. 902)
‘There is always peril in treating the words of a
speech or a judgment as though they were words in a
legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a
particular case.’”
42. More recently, this Court in Union of India v.
Amrit Lal] held as follows : (SCC p. 83, para 15)
“15. Cases involving challenges to orders of
detention before and after execution of the order stand on
different footings. Courts should not place reliance on
decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation
fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be
read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute
and that too taken out of their context. These observations
must be read in the context in which they appear to have
been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed
as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a
statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into
lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain
and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their
words are not to be interpreted as statutes.”
43. In any case, a judgment must be read as a
whole, so that conflicting parts may be harmonised to reveal
the true ratio of the judgment. However, if this is not
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possible, and it is found that the internal conflicts within the
judgment cannot be resolved, then the first endeavour that
must be made is to see whether a ratio decidendi can be
culled out without the conflicting portion. If not, then, as held
by Lord Denning in Harper v. National Coal Board the
binding nature of the precedent on the point on which there
is a conflict in a judgment, comes under a cloud. [ In
Harper, 1974 QB 614 : (1974) 2 WLR 775 : (1974) 2 All ER
441 (CA), the decision in Central Asbestos Co. Ltd. v.
Dodd, 1973 AC 518 : (1972) 3 WLR 333 : (1972) 2 All ER
1135 (HL), a House of Lords judgment, had to be applied. It
was found that two learned Law Lords decided the question
of law in favour of Dodd, 1973 AC 518 : (1972) 3 WLR 333 :
(1972) 2 All ER 1135 (HL), whereas two learned Law Lords
decided the question of law against Dodd, 1973 AC 518 :
(1972) 3 WLR 333 : (1972) 2 All ER 1135 (HL), stating that
his claim was barred. As Lord Denning stated, the fifth Law
Lord, Lord Pearson, was the odd man out, in that he agreed
with the two learned Law Lords that the law did not support
Dodd case, 1973 AC 518 : (1972) 3 WLR 333 : (1972) 2 All
ER 1135 (HL), but agreed with the minority judges that
Dodd, 1973 AC 518 : (1972) 3 WLR 333 : (1972) 2 All ER
1135 (HL) claim was not barred. This being the case, Lord
Denning spoke of the precedential value of Dodd case,
1973 AC 518 : (1972) 3 WLR 333 : (1972) 2 All ER 1135
(HL) as follows:
“How then do we stand on the law? We have listened
to a most helpful discussion by Mr McCullough on the
doctrine of precedent. One thing is clear. We can only
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accept a line of reasoning which supports the actual
decision of the House of Lords. By no possibility can we
accept any reasoning which would show the decision itself
to be wrong. The second proposition is that if we can
discover the reasoning on which the majority based their
decision, then we should accept that as binding upon us.
The third proposition is that, if we can discover the
reasoning on which the minority base their decision, we
should reject it. It must be wrong because it led them to the
wrong result. The fourth proposition is that, if we cannot
discover the reasoning on which the majority based their
decision, we are not bound by it. We are free to adopt any
reasoning which appears to us to be correct, so long as it
supports the actual decision of the House .In support of
those propositions, I would refer to the speech of Lord
Dunedin in Great Western Railway Co. v. Owners of S.S.
Mostyn, 1928 AC 57, pp. 73-74 (HL), and of Lord
MacDermott in Walsh v. Curry, 1955 NI 112 (CA), pp. 124125 and of Viscount Simonds in Midland Silicones Ltd. v.
Scruttons Ltd., 1962 AC 446, pp. 468-469 : (1962) 2 WLR
186 (HL)Applying the propositions to Central Asbestos Co.
Ltd. v. Dodd, 1973 AC 518 : (1972) 3 WLR 333 : (1972) 2
All ER 1135 (HL), the position stands thus : (1) the actual
decision of the House in favour of Dodd must be accepted
as correct, We cannot accept any line of reasoning which
would show it to be wrong. We cannot therefore accept the
reasoning of a minority of two — Lord Simon of Glaisdale
and Lord Salmon — on the law. It must be wrong because it
led them to the wrong result. (2) We ought to accept the
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reasoning of the three in the majority if we can discover it.
But it is not discoverable. The three were divided. Lord Reid
and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest took one view of the law.
Lord Pearson took another. We cannot say that Lord Reid
and Lard Morris of Borth-y-Gest were correct : because we
know that their reasoning on the law was in conflict with the
reasoning of the other three. We cannot say that Lord
Pearson was correct : because we know that the reasoning
which he accepted on the law led the other two (Lord Simon
of Glaisdale and Lord Salmon) to a wrong conclusion. So
we cannot say that any of the three in the majority was
correct. (3) The result is that there is no discernible ratio
among the majority of the House of Lords. In these
circumstances I think we are at liberty to adopt the
reasoning which appears to us to be correct.” (Harper case,
1974 QB 614, pp. 621-22)(emphasis in original)]
44. If paras 75, 76, 96, 110, 116, 123 and 194 of
BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,
(2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] are to be read
together, what becomes clear is that Section 2(1)(e) has to
be construed keeping in view Section 20 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996, which gives recognition to party autonomy — the
Arbitration Act, 1996 having accepted the territoriality
principle in Section 2(2), following the UNCITRAL Model Law.
The narrow construction of Section 2(1)(e) was expressly
rejected by the five-Judge Bench in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] . This being so, what has then to
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be seen is what is the effect Section 20 would have on
Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
45. It was not until this Court's judgment in Indus
Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile Distribution (P)
Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 :
(2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] that the provisions of Section 20
were properly analysed in the light of the 246th Report of
the Law Commission of India titled, “Amendments to the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996” (August, 2014)
(hereinafter referred to as “the Law Commission Report,
2014”), under which Sections 20(1) and (2) would refer to
the “seat” of the arbitration, and Section 20(3) would refer
only to the “venue” of the arbitration. Given the fact that
when parties, either by agreement or, in default of there
being an agreement, where the Arbitral Tribunal determines
a particular place as the seat of the arbitration under
Section 31(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, it becomes clear
that the parties having chosen the seat, or the Arbitral
Tribunal having determined the seat, have also chosen the
courts at the seat for the purpose of interim orders and
challenges to the award.
46. This Court in Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd.
[Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations
(P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , after
referring to Sections 2(1)(e) and 20 of the Arbitration Act,
1996, and various judgments distinguishing between the
“seat” of an arbitral proceeding and “venue” of such
proceeding, referred to the Law Commission Report, 2014
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and the recommendations made therein as follows : (SCC
pp. 692-93, paras 17-20)
“17. In amendments to be made to the Act, the Law
Commission recommended the following:
‘Amendment of Section 20
12. In Section 20, delete the word “place” and add
the words “seat and venue” before the words “of
arbitration”.
(i) In sub-section (1), after the words “agree on the” delete
the word “place” and add words “seat and venue”.
(ii) In sub-section (3), after the words “meet at any” delete
the word “place” and add word “venue”. [Note.—The
departure from the existing phrase “place” of arbitration is
proposed to make the wording of the Act consistent with the
international usage of the concept of a “seat” of arbitration,
to denote the legal home of the arbitration. The amendment
further legislatively distinguishes between the “[legal] seat”
from a “[mere] venue” of arbitration.]
Amendment of Section 31
17. In Section 31
(i) In sub-section (4), after the words “its date and
the” delete the word “place” and add the word “seat”.’
18. The amended Act, does not, however, contain
the aforesaid amendments, presumably because the BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] judgment in no
uncertain terms has referred to “place” as “juridical seat” for
the purpose of Section 2(2) of the Act. It further made it
clear that Sections 20(1) and 20(2) where the word “place”
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is used, refers to “juridical seat”, whereas in Section 20(3),
the word “place” is equivalent to “venue”. This being the
settled law, it was found unnecessary to expressly
incorporate what the Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court has already done by way of construction of the Act.
19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions
shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to
an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present
case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and
Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively
vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the law of arbitration,
unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits
filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a
neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration
clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense
have jurisdiction — that is, no part of the cause of action
may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any
of the provisions of Sections 16 to 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has
been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact
that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with
exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral
proceedings arising out of the agreement between the
parties.
20. It is well settled that where more than one court
has jurisdiction, it is open for the parties to exclude all other
courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see
Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Swastik
Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32 :
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(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 157] This was followed in a recent
judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal v.
Chhattisgarh Investment Ltd. [B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg
Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment Ltd., (2015) 12 SCC
225 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 427] . Having regard to the above,
it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical
seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the
impugned judgment [Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Indus
Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3744 :
(2016) 158 DRJ 391] is set aside. The injunction confirmed
by the impugned judgment will continue for a period of four
weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, so
that the respondents may take necessary steps under
Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals are disposed of
accordingly.”
This judgment has recently been followed in Brahmani River
Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. [Brahmani River
Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 462 :
2019 SCC OnLine SC 929 at para 15]
47. In fact, the Law Commission Report, 2014 also
recommended an amendment in the definition of “court”
under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, so that in
the case of international commercial arbitrations held in
India, the High Court alone should be the “court” for the
purposes of the Arbitration Act, 1996, even where such a
High Court does not exercise ordinary original jurisdiction.
The recommendation made by the Law Commission, which
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was followed, leading to an amendment of the Arbitration
Act, 1996, is as follows:
“26. It is recommended that in case of international
commercial arbitrations, where there is a significant foreign
element to the transaction and at least one of the parties is
foreign, the relevant “court” which is competent to entertain
proceedings arising out of the arbitration agreement, should
be the High Court, even where such a High Court does not
exercise ordinary civil jurisdiction. It is expected that this
would ensure that international commercial arbitrations,
involving foreign parties, will be heard expeditiously and by
commercial oriented Judges at the High Court level. …”
Amendment of Section 2
1. In Section 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as the principal Act)—
***
(ii) In sub-section (1), clause (e), after the words “court
means”— add sub-section (i) beginning with the words “in
the
case
of
an
arbitration
other than
international
commercial arbitration”, before the words “the Principal civil
court of Original Jurisdiction”
In sub-section (1), clause (e) replace sub-clause (ii) by
following:
‘1. (e)(ii) in the case of an international commercial
arbitration, the High Court exercising jurisdiction over the
Principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and
includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original
civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions
forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had
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been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any
court of a grade inferior to such High Court, or in cases
involving grant of interim measures in respect of arbitrations
outside India, the High Court exercising jurisdiction over the
court having jurisdiction to grant such measures as per the
laws of India, and includes the High Court in exercise of its
ordinary original civil jurisdiction.’
[Note.—This is to solve the problem of conflict of jurisdiction
that would arise in cases where interim measures are
sought in India in cases of arbitrations seated outside India.
This
also
ensures
that
in
international
commercial
arbitrations, jurisdiction is exercised by the High Court, even
if such High Court does not exercise ordinary original civil
jurisdiction.]”
48. The aforesaid amendment carried out in the
definition of “Court” is also a step showing the right
direction,
namely,
that
in
international
commercial
arbitrations held in India, the High Court alone is to exercise
jurisdiction over such proceedings, even where no part of
the cause of action may have arisen within the jurisdiction
of such High Court, such High Court not having ordinary
original jurisdiction. In such cases, the “place” where the
award is delivered alone is looked at, and the High Court
given jurisdiction to supervise the arbitration proceedings,
on the footing of its jurisdiction to hear appeals from
decrees of courts subordinate to it, which is only on the
basis of territorial jurisdiction which in turn relates to the
“place” where the award is made. In the light of this
important change in the law, Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the
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Arbitration Act, 1996 must also be construed in the manner
indicated by this judgment.
49.
Take
the
consequence
of
the
opposite
conclusion, in the light of the facts of a given example, as
follows. New Delhi is specifically designated to be the seat
of the arbitration in the arbitration clause between the
parties. Part of the cause of action, however, arises in
several places, including where the contract is partially to
be performed, let us say, in a remote part of Uttarakhand. If
concurrent jurisdiction were to be the order of the day,
despite the seat having been located and specifically
chosen by the parties, party autonomy would suffer, which
BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,
(2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] specifically
states cannot be the case. Thus, if an application is made to
a District Court in a remote corner of the Uttarakhand hills,
which then becomes the court for the purposes of Section
42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 where even Section 34
applications have then to be made, the result would be
contrary to the stated intention of the parties — as even
though the parties have contemplated that a neutral place
be chosen as the seat so that the courts of that place alone
would have jurisdiction, yet, any one of five other courts in
which a part of the cause of action arises, including courts
in remote corners of the country, would also be clothed with
jurisdiction. This obviously cannot be the case. If, therefore,
the conflicting portion of the judgment of BALCO [BALCO v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC
552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] in para 96 is kept aside for a
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moment, the very fact that parties have chosen a place to
be the seat would necessarily carry with it the decision of
both parties that the courts at the seat would exclusively
have jurisdiction over the entire arbitral process.
50. In fact, subsequent Division Benches of this
Court have understood the law to be that once the seat of
arbitration is chosen, it amounts to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause, insofar as the courts at that seat are concerned. In
Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH [Enercon (India) Ltd.
v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59]
, this Court approved the dictum in Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
Rep 376] as follows : (Enercon case [Enercon (India) Ltd. v.
Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] ,
SCC p. 55, para 126)
“126. Examining the fact situation in the case, the Court in
Shashoua case [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957
(Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] observed as
follows:
‘The basis for the court's grant of an anti-suit injunction of
the kind sought depended upon the seat of the arbitration.
An agreement as to the seat of an arbitration brought in the
law of that country as the curial law and was analogous to
an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Not only was there
agreement to the curial law of the seat, but also to the
courts of the seat having supervisory jurisdiction over the
arbitration, so that, by agreeing to the seat, the parties
agreed that any challenge to an interim or final award was
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to be made only in the courts of the place designated as the
seat of the arbitration.
Although, “venue” was not synonymous with “seat”, in an
arbitration clause which provided for arbitration to be
conducted in accordance with the Rules of the ICC in Paris
(a supranational body of rules), a provision that “the venue
of arbitration shall be London, United Kingdom” did amount
to the designation of a juridical seat.…’
In para 54, it is further observed as follows:
‘There was a little debate about the possibility of the issues
relating to the alleged submission by the claimants to the
jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi being heard by that
Court, because it was best fitted to determine such issues
under the Indian law. Whilst I found this idea attractive
initially, we are persuaded that it would be wrong in
principle to allow this and that it would create undue
practical problems in any event. On the basis of what I have
already decided, England is the seat of the arbitration and
since this carries with it something akin to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause, as a matter of principle the foreign court
should not decide matters which are for this Court to decide
in the context of an anti-suit injunction.’”
51. The Court in Enercon [Enercon (India) Ltd. v.
Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59]
then concluded : (SCC p. 60, para 138)
“138. Once the seat of arbitration has been fixed in India, it
would be in the nature of exclusive jurisdiction to exercise
the supervisory powers over the arbitration.”
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52. In Reliance Industries Ltd. [Reliance Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Civ) 737] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 627, 630-31, paras
45, 55-56)
“45. In our opinion, it is too late in the day to contend that the
seat of arbitration is not analogous to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause. This view of ours will find support from
numerous judgments of this Court. Once the parties had
consciously agreed that the juridical seat of the arbitration
would be London and that the arbitration agreement will be
governed by the laws of England, it was no longer open to
them to contend that the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration
Act would also be applicable to the arbitration agreement.
This Court in Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India
[Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC
161 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 257] has clearly held as follows :
(SCC p. 178, para 33)
‘33. In the present case also, the parties had agreed that
notwithstanding Article 33.1, the arbitration agreement
contained in Article 34 shall be governed by laws of England.
This necessarily implies that the parties had agreed to
exclude the provisions of Part I of the Act. As a corollary to
the above conclusion, we hold that the Delhi High Court did
not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by the
respondents under Section 9 of the Act and the mere fact
that the appellant had earlier filed similar petitions was not
sufficient to clothe that High Court with the jurisdiction to
entertain the petition filed by the respondents.’
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55. The effect of choice of seat of arbitration was
considered by the Court of Appeal in C v. D [C v. D, 2008
Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] . This judgment
has been specifically approved by this Court in Balco
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] and reiterated in
Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon Gmbh [Enercon (India) Ltd.
v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59]
. In C v. D [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ
1282 (CA)] , the Court of Appeal has observed : (C case [C
v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] , Bus
LR p. 851, para 16)
‘Primary conclusion
16. I shall deal with Mr Hirst's arguments in due course but,
in my judgment, they fail to grapple with the central point at
issue which is whether or not, by choosing London as the
seat of the arbitration, the parties must be taken to have
agreed that proceedings on the award should be only those
permitted by English law. In my view they must be taken to
have so agreed for the reasons given by the Judge. The
whole purpose of the balance achieved by the Bermuda form
(English arbitration but applying New York law to issues
arising under the policy) is that judicial remedies in respect of
the award should be those permitted by English law and only
those so permitted. Mr Hirst could not say (and did not say)
that English judicial remedies for lack of jurisdiction on
procedural irregularities under Sections 67 and 68 of the
1996 Act were not permitted; he was reduced to saying that
New York judicial remedies were also permitted. That,
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however, would be a recipe for litigation and (what is worse)
confusion which cannot have been intended by the parties.
No doubt New York Law has its own judicial remedies for
want of jurisdiction and serious irregularity but it could
scarcely be supposed that a party aggrieved by one part of
an award could proceed in one jurisdiction and a party
aggrieved by another part of an award could proceed in
another jurisdiction. Similarly, in the case of a single
complaint about an award, it could not be supposed that the
aggrieved party could complain in one jurisdiction and the
satisfied party be entitled to ask the other jurisdiction to
declare its satisfaction with the award. There would be a
serious risk of parties rushing to get the first judgment or of
conflicting
decisions
which
the
parties
cannot
have
contemplated.’
56. The aforesaid observations in C v. D [C v. D, 2008 Bus
LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] were subsequently
followed by the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench
Division, Commercial Court (England) in Sulamérica Cia
Nacional
de
Seguros
SA
v.
Enesa
Engelharia
SA
[Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa
Engelharia SA, (2013) 1 WLR 102 : 2012 EWCA Civ 638 :
2012 WL 14764 (CA)] . In laying down the same proposition,
the High Court noticed that the issue in that case depended
upon the weight to be given to the provision in Condition 12
of the insurance policy that “the seat of the arbitration shall
be London, England”. It was observed that this necessarily
carried with it the English Court's supervisory jurisdiction
over the arbitration process. It was observed that:
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‘this follows from the express terms of the Arbitration Act,
1996 and, in particular, the provisions of Section 2 which
provide that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 applies where
the seat of the arbitration is in England and Wales or
Northern Ireland. This immediately establishes a strong
connection between the arbitration agreement itself and the
law of England. It is for this reason that recent authorities
have laid stress upon the locations of the seat of the
arbitration as an important factor in determining the proper
law of the arbitration agreement.’”
53. In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017)
7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , after clearing the air
on the meaning of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1996,
the Court in para 19 (which has already been set out
hereinabove) made it clear that the moment a seat is
designated by agreement between the parties, it is akin to
an exclusive jurisdiction clause, which would then vest the
courts at the “seat” with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes
of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the
agreement between the parties.
54. Despite the aforesaid judgments of this Court,
discordant notes have been struck by some of the High
Courts. In Antrix Corpn. Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas
Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] , a
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, after setting out
para 96 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] ,
then
followed
the
reasoning
of
judgments
[Nivaran
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Solutions v. Aura Thia Spa Services (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC
OnLine Bom 5062 : (2016) 5 Mah LJ 234] , [Konkola Copper
Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine
Bom 777 : (2013) 5 Bom CR 29, Ed. : This is the decision of
the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court which had
reversed the decision of the Single Judge in Konkola
Copper Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC
OnLine Bom 476 : (2013) 4 Bom CR 619. The decision of
the Single Judge in Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewarts &
Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 476 : (2013) 4
Bom CR 619, in fact stands affirmed herein by the Supreme
Court.] of the Bombay High Court, in stating that the ratio
decidendi of the 5-Judge Bench in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] is that courts would have
concurrent jurisdiction, notwithstanding the designation of
the seat of arbitration by agreement between the parties.
The Delhi High Court stated : (Antrix Corpn. Ltd. case
[Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC
OnLine Del 9338] , SCC OnLine Del para 52)
“52. Having held that the statement in para 96 of BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] would apply to the
present case as well, this Court has to examine its legal
consequence in light of the law declared in BALCO [BALCO v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552
: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] . It is important to note that in the
said paragraph (extracted above), the Supreme Court has
noted that Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act confers
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jurisdiction to two courts over the arbitral process — the
courts having subject-matter jurisdiction and the courts of the
seat. This is evident both from the substantive holding of the
paragraph as well as the example given by the Court. The
Court notes that : (SCC p. 606)
“96. … the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to
two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where
the cause of action is located and the courts where the
arbitration takes place.”
This is further reinforced by the example that the Court gave
later in the same paragraph. In the example where the
parties are from Mumbai and Kolkata and the obligations
under the contract are to be performed at either Mumbai or
Kolkata, and the parties have designated Delhi as the seat of
the arbitration, in such a situation, both courts would have
jurisdiction i.e. within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of
the suit is situated (either Mumbai or Kolkata) and the court
within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e.
arbitration is located (which is Delhi). Moreover, the fact that
the court interpreted the term “subject-matter of the suit” in
the paragraph, also gives credence to the interpretation that
the court recognised that Section 2(1)(e) gives jurisdiction to
both the cause of action courts, and the court at the seat of
the arbitration. If the Court were of the opinion that only the
courts at the seat would have jurisdiction under Section
2(1)(e) and no other court, then it would be wholly
unnecessary for the court to interpret the term “subjectmatter of the suit”, since that court would anyway not have
jurisdiction. In sum therefore, para 96 of BALCO [BALCO v.
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Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552
: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] gives jurisdiction to both courts at
the seat and the courts within whose jurisdiction the cause of
action arises, if the dispute were the subject-matter of a suit.
This is what the Bombay High Court in Konkola Copper
Mines [Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India
Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 777 : (2013) 5 Bom CR 29, Ed.
: This is the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court which had reversed the decision of the Single
Judge in Konkola Copper Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of
India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 476 : (2013) 4 Bom CR
619. The decision of the Single Judge in Konkola Copper
Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine
Bom 476 : (2013) 4 Bom CR 619, in fact stands affirmed
herein by the Supreme Court.] also interpreted BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] as holding:
‘The Supreme Court held that the provisions of
Section 2(1)(e) are purely jurisdictional in nature and can
have no relevance to the question whether any part of the
cause of action has taken place outside India. The
observations which have been extracted above, clearly
establish that the Court where the arbitration takes place
would be required to exercise supervisory control over the
arbitral process. The Supreme Court has held that
Parliament has given jurisdiction to two courts — the Court
which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is
located and the Court where the arbitration takes place.
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This is evident from the example which is contained in the
above quoted extract from the decision.’”
55. Having so stated, the Division Bench then went
on to give a restricted meaning to Indus Mobile Distribution
(P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind
Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC
(Civ) 760] in para 56 as follows : (Antrix Corpn. Ltd. case
[Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC
OnLine Del 9338] , SCC OnLine Del)
“56. In Datawind [Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Indus
Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3744 :
(2016) 158 DRJ 391] , as the facts and the question framed
by the Court in the second paragraph of its decision suggest,
the Court was faced with a situation where the parties had
designated both the seat and specified an exclusive forum
selection clause. Therefore, its findings have to be
interpreted in that light. In fact, were this Court to find
otherwise, and interpret Datawind [Datawind Innovations (P)
Ltd. v. Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine
Del 3744 : (2016) 158 DRJ 391] as holding that the
designation of seat alone would amount to an exclusive
forum selection clause in domestic arbitrations, then this
would run contrary to the five-Judge decision in BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , which as noticed
above, gave jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e) to two courts
— one of which was the court of the seat, thereby clearly
implying that the designation of a seat would not amount to
an exclusive forum selection clause.”
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56. The Court then went on to state : (Antrix Corpn.
Ltd. case [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd.,
2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] , SCC OnLine Del paras 5859)
“58. The Court is of the opinion that in this case, only if the
parties had designated the seat as New Delhi and also
provided an exclusive forum selection clause in favour of
the courts at New Delhi, could it be said that this Court
would have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications filed
under the Arbitration Act. Indeed, it is open to parties to an
arbitration to designate a particular forum as the exclusive
forum to which all applications under the Act would lie. This
would merely be an exercise of the right of the parties to
choose one among multiple competent forums as the
exclusive forum. This is a clearly permissible exercise of the
right of party autonomy as held by the Supreme Court in
Swastik Gases (P) Ltd.v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [Swastik
Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9 SCC 32 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 157] . Conversely, merely choosing a
seat, cannot amount to exercising such a right of exclusive
forum selection.
59. This court is of opinion that, holding otherwise
would in effect render Section 42 of the Arbitration Act
ineffective and useless. Section 42 of the Act presupposes
that there is more than one competent forum to hear
applications under the Arbitration Act, and hence to ensure
efficacy of dispute resolution, this provision enacts that the
court, which is first seized of any such application under the
Act, would be the only court possessing jurisdiction to hear
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all subsequent applications. If seat were equivalent to an
exclusive forum selection clause in Part-I arbitrations, then
every time parties would designate a seat, that would in
effect mean that Section 42 would have no application.
Thus, only those few situations where parties do not
actually designate any seat (and thus no exclusive
competence is conferred on one forum) would Section 42
have any role. In fact, often, when parties do not agree
upon a seat in the arbitration agreement, for convenience,
the Arbitral Tribunal designates a particular seat of the
arbitration, or the agreement vests the discretion in the
tribunal to decide the seat (and not just the “venue”). In all
those circumstances then as well, the decision of the
tribunal to agree upon a “seat” would amount to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause and Section 42 would have no
application. This would dilute Section 42 and would
accordingly,
be
contrary
to
Parliamentary
intent.
Undoubtedly, in the present case, the parties have only
chosen the seat as New Delhi and have not specified an
exclusive forum selection clause. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the courts in Delhi have exclusive competence to
entertain applications under the Arbitration Act in the
present dispute. The jurisdiction of the courts where the
cause of action arises, which in this case, is the Bangalore
City civil court, cannot be said to have been excluded
therefore. Accordingly, question (ii) is also answered in
favour of Antrix.”
57. The view of the Delhi High Court in Antrix Corpn.
Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018
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SCC OnLine Del 9338] , which followed judgments [Nivaran
Solutions v. Aura Thia Spa Services (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC
OnLine Bom 5062 : (2016) 5 Mah LJ 234] , [Konkola Copper
Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine
Bom 777 : (2013) 5 Bom CR 29] of the Bombay High Court,
does not commend itself to us. First and foremost, it is
incorrect to state that the example given by the Court in
para 96 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810]
reinforces the concurrent jurisdiction aspect of the said
paragraph. As has been pointed out by us, the conclusion
that the Delhi as well as the Mumbai or Kolkata courts
would have jurisdiction in the example given in the said
paragraph is wholly incorrect, given the sentence, “This
would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be
performed under the contract were to be performed either at
Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in
Delhi”. The sentence which follows this is out of sync with
this sentence, and the other paragraphs of the judgment.
Thus, BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810]
does not “unmistakably” hold that two courts have
concurrent jurisdiction i.e. the seat court and the court
within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises. What is
missed by these High Court judgments is the subsequent
paragraphs in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] ,
which clearly and unmistakably state that the choosing of a
“seat” amounts to the choosing of the exclusive jurisdiction
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of the courts at which the “seat” is located. What is also
missed are the judgments of this Court in Enercon (India)
Ltd. [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC
1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] and Reliance Industries Ltd.
[Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC
603 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 737]
58. Equally, the ratio of the judgment in Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v.
Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3
SCC (Civ) 760] , is contained in paras 19 and 20. Two
separate and distinct reasons are given in Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v.
Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3
SCC (Civ) 760] for arriving at the conclusion that the courts
at Mumbai alone would have jurisdiction. The first reason,
which is independent of the second, is that as the seat of
the arbitration was designated as Mumbai, it would carry
with it the fact that courts at Mumbai alone would have
jurisdiction over the arbitration process. The second reason
given was that in any case, following the Hakam Singh
[Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286]
principle, where more than one court can be said to have
jurisdiction, the agreement itself designated the Mumbai
courts as having exclusive jurisdiction. It is thus wholly
incorrect to state that Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd.
[Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations
(P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] has a
limited ratio decidendi contained in para 20 alone, and that
para 19, if read by itself, would run contrary to the 5-Judge
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Bench decision in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] .
59. Equally incorrect is the finding in Antrix Corpn.
Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018
SCC OnLine Del 9338] that Section 42 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996 would be rendered ineffective and useless.
Section 42 is meant to avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of
courts by placing the supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral
proceedings in connection with the arbitration in one court
exclusively. This is why the section begins with a non
obstante clause, and then goes on to state “…where with
respect to an arbitration agreement any application under
this part has been made in a court…” It is obvious that the
application made under this part to a court must be a court
which has jurisdiction to decide such application. The
subsequent holdings of this court, that where a seat is
designated in an agreement, the courts of the seat alone
have jurisdiction, would require that all applications under
Part I be made only in the court where the seat is located,
and that court alone then has jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of
the arbitral agreement. So read, Section 42 is not rendered
ineffective or useless. Also, where it is found on the facts of
a particular case that either no “seat” is designated by
agreement, or the so-called “seat” is only a convenient
“venue”, then there may be several courts where a part of
the cause of action arises that may have jurisdiction. Again,
an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996
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may be preferred before a court in which part of the cause
of action arises in a case where parties have not agreed on
the “seat” of arbitration, and before such “seat” may have
been determined, on the facts of a particular case, by the
Arbitral Tribunal under Section 20(2) of the Arbitration Act,
1996. In both these situations, the earliest application
having been made to a court in which a part of the cause of
action arises would then be the exclusive court under
Section 42, which would have control over the arbitral
proceedings. For all these reasons, the law stated by the
Bombay and Delhi High Courts in this regard is incorrect
and is overruled.
Tests for determination of “seat”
60. The judgments of the English courts have
examined the concept of the “juridical seat” of the arbitral
proceedings, and have laid down several important tests in
order to determine whether the “seat” of the arbitral
proceedings has, in fact, been indicated in the agreement
between the parties. The judgment of Cooke, J., in
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm)
: (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] , states:
“34. London arbitration is a well-known phenomenon which
is often chosen by foreign nationals with a different law, such
as the law of New York, governing the substantive rights of
the parties. This is because of the legislative framework and
supervisory powers of the courts here which many parties
are keen to adopt. When therefore there is an express
designation of the arbitration venue as London and no
designation of any alternative place as the seat, combined
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with a supranational body of rules governing the arbitration
and no other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable
conclusion is, to my mind, that London is the juridical seat
and English Law the curial law. In my judgment it is clear that
either London has been designated by the parties to the
arbitration agreement as the seat of the arbitration, or,
having regard to the parties' agreement and all the relevant
circumstances, it is the seat to be determined in accordance
with the final fall back provision of Section 3 of the Arbitration
Act.”
61. It will thus be seen that wherever there is an
express designation of a “venue”, and no designation of any
alternative
place
as
the
“seat”,
combined
with
a
supranational body of rules governing the arbitration, and
no
other
significant
contrary
indicia,
the
inexorable
conclusion is that the stated venue is actually the juridical
seat of the arbitral proceeding.
62. In Enercon GmbH v. Enercon (India) Ltd.
[Enercon GmbH v. Enercon (India) Ltd., 2012 EWHC 689
(Comm) : (2012) 1 Lloyd's Rep 519] , the arbitration clause
between the parties read as follows:
“18.3. All proceedings in such arbitration shall be
conducted in English. The venue of the arbitration
proceedings shall be London. The arbitrators may (but shall
not be obliged to) award costs and reasonable expenses
(including reasonable fees of counsel) to the party(ies) that
substantially prevail on merit. The provisions of the Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply.”
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63. The Court in Enercon GmbH [Enercon GmbH v.
Enercon (India) Ltd., 2012 EWHC 689 (Comm) : (2012) 1
Lloyd's Rep 519] began its discussion on the “seat” of the
arbitration by referring to Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma,
2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] ,
and then referring to “The Conflict of Laws”, Dicey, Morris &
Collins, 14th Edn. as follows:
“58. Moreover, as Cooke, J. noted, this conclusion is
consistent with the views expressed in The Conflict of Laws,
Dicey, Morris & Collins, 14th Edition at ¶16-035 where the
authors state that the seat “is in most cases sufficiently
indicated by the country chosen as the place of the
arbitration. For such a choice of place not to be given effect
as a choice of seat, there will need to be clear evidence that
the parties … agreed to choose another seat for the
arbitration and that such a choice will be effective to endow
the courts of that country with jurisdiction to supervise and
support the arbitration”.
59. Apart from the last sentence in Clause 18.3 (i.e.
“The provisions of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 shall apply”), it seems to me that the conclusion
that London is the “seat” of any arbitration there-under is
beyond any possible doubt. Thus, the main issue is whether
this last sentence is to be regarded as “significant contrary
indicia” (using the language of Cooke, J.) so as to place the
“seat” of the arbitration in India. A similar issue was
considered by Saville, J. in Union of India v. McDonnell
Douglas [Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corpn.,
(1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep 48] which, of course, pre-dates the
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English 1996 Act. The arbitration agreement in that case
provided as follows:“In the event of a dispute arising out of
or in connection with this agreement…the same shall be
referred to an Arbitration Tribunal…The arbitration shall be
conducted in accordance with the procedure provided in the
Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 or any enactment or
modification thereof. The arbitration shall be conducted in
the
English
language…The
seat
of
the
arbitration
proceedings shall be London, United Kingdom.” Saville, J.
expressed the view that the arguments on both sides were
“finely balanced” but in effect concluded that the reference
to the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 did not have the effect of
changing the “seat” of the arbitration designated by the
parties. Rather, the phrase referring to the 1940 Act was to
be reconciled with the rest of the clause by reading it as
referring to the internal conduct of the arbitration as
opposed to the external supervision of the arbitration by the
courts.”
64. The Court in Enercon GmbH [Enercon GmbH v.
Enercon (India) Ltd., 2012 EWHC 689 (Comm) : (2012) 1
Lloyd's Rep 519] then held that although the word “venue”
is not synonymous with “seat”, on the facts of that case,
London — though described as the “venue” — was really
the “seat” of the arbitration. This was for the reason that
London was a neutral place in which neither party worked
for gain, and in which no part of the cause of action arose. It
was thus understood to be a neutral place in which the
proceedings could be “anchored”. Secondly, the Court
stressed on the expression “arbitration proceedings” in
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Clause 18.3, which the Court held to be an expression
which included not just one or more individual hearings, but
the arbitral proceedings as a whole, culminating in the
making of an award. The Court held:
“63. Second, the language in Clause 18.3 refers to
the “arbitration proceedings”. That is an expression which
includes not just one or more individual or particular
hearings but the arbitration proceedings as a whole
including the making of an award. In other words the parties
were anchoring the whole arbitration process in London
right up to and including the making of an award. The place
designated for the making of an award is a designation of
seat. Moreover the language in Clause 18.3 does not refer
to the venue of all hearings “taking place” in London.
Clause 18.3 instead provides that the venue of the
arbitration proceedings “shall be” London. This again
suggests the parties intended to anchor the arbitration
proceedings to and in London rather than simply physically
locating the arbitration hearings in London. Indeed in a case
where evidence might need to be taken or perhaps more
likely inspected in India it would make no commercial sense
to construe the provision as mandating all hearings to take
place in a physical place as opposed to anchoring the
arbitral process to and in a designated place. All
agreements including an arbitration agreement should be
construed to accord with business common sense. In my
view, there is no business common sense to construe the
arbitration agreement (as contended for by EIL) in a manner
which would simply deprive the arbitrators of an important
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discretion that they possess to hear evidence in a
convenient geographical location.
64. Third, Joseph QC submitted that the last sentence of
Clause 18.3 can be reconciled with the choice of London as
the seat. First, he submitted that it can be read as referring
simply to Part II of the Indian 1996 Act i.e. the enforcement
provisions. Edey QC's response was that if that is all the last
sentence meant, then it would be superfluous. However, I do
not consider that any such superfluity carries much, if any,
weight. Alternatively, Joseph QC submitted that it can be
read as referring only to those provisions of the Indian 1996
Act which were not inconsistent with the English 1996 Act.”
65. The Court in Enercon GmbH [Enercon GmbH v.
Enercon (India) Ltd., 2012 EWHC 689 (Comm) : (2012) 1
Lloyd's Rep 519] then held that the reference to the Indian
Arbitration Act, 1996 would not make London the “venue”
and India the “seat” of the arbitral process for several
reasons, including the fact that in earlier agreements
between the same parties, the seat of arbitral proceedings
was India, which was changed by this agreement to London
— the explanation for this change being to render an award
enforceable in India under the provisions of the Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York, 1958).
66. In Shagang South-Asia (Hong Kong) Trading Co.
Ltd. v. Daewoo Logistics [Shagang South-Asia (Hong Kong)
Trading Co. Ltd. v. Daewoo Logistics, 2015 EWHC 194] ,
the Queen's Bench Division (Commercial Courts) dealt with
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a “Fixture Note” in which the respondent agreed to charter a
vessel to Shangang, China. The Fixture Note provided:
“23.ARBITRATION TO BE HELD IN HONGKONG. ENGLISH LAW TO BE
APPLIED.”
67. After referring to Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
Rep 376] and Enercon GmbH [Enercon GmbH v. Enercon
(India) Ltd., 2012 EWHC 689 (Comm) : (2012) 1 Lloyd's
Rep 519] , the Court in Shagang South-Asia (Hong Kong)
Trading Co. Ltd. [Shagang South-Asia (Hong Kong) Trading
Co. Ltd. v. Daewoo Logistics, 2015 EWHC 194] held:
“38. In my judgment the approach adopted in
Shashoua v. Sharma [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC
957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] and in other
cases is appropriate in this case also. An agreement that
the arbitration is “to be held in Hong Kong” would ordinarily
carry with it an implied choice of Hong Kong as the seat of
the arbitration and of the application of Hong Kong law as
the curial law. Clear words or “significant contrary indicia”
are necessary to establish that some other seat or curial
law has been agreed.”
68. In Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v.
Nigeria [Process and Industrial Developments Ltd. v.
Nigeria, 2019 EWHC 2241 (Comm)] the Court was
concerned with a dispute that arose out of a gas supply and
processing agreement. The arbitration clause in that case
read as follows:
“6. … The parties agree that if any difference or
dispute arises between them concerning the interpretation
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or performance of this agreement and if they fail to settle
such difference or dispute amicably, then a party may serve
on the other a notice of arbitration under the rules of the
Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act (Cap A18 LFN
2004) which, except as otherwise provided herein, shall
apply to any dispute between such parties under this
agreement. Within thirty (30) days of the notice of arbitration
being issued by the initiating party, the parties shall each
appoint an arbitrator and the arbitrators thus appointed by
the parties shall within fifteen (15) days from the date the
last arbitrator was appointed, appoint a third arbitrator to
complete the tribunal. …
The arbitration award shall be final and binding upon
the parties. The award shall be delivered within two months
after the appointment of the third arbitrator or within such
extended period as may be agreed by the parties. The
costs of the arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties.
Each party shall, however, bear its own lawyers' fees.
The venue of the arbitration shall be London, England or
otherwise as agreed by the parties. The arbitration
proceedings and record shall be in the English language.…”
69.
The
Court
in
Process
and
Industrial
Developments Ltd. [Process and Industrial Developments
Ltd. v. Nigeria, 2019 EWHC 2241 (Comm)] then held that
the gas supply agreement provided for the seat of the
arbitration to be in London, inter alia, for the following
reasons:
“85. … (1) It is significant that Clause 20 refers to the
venue “of the arbitration” as being London. The arbitration
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would continue up to and including the final award. Clause
20 does not refer to London as being the venue for some or
all of the hearings. It does not use the language used in
Section 16(2) ACA of where the tribunal may “meet” or may
“hear witnesses, experts or the parties”. I consider that the
provision represented an anchoring of the entire arbitration
to London rather than providing that the hearings should
take place there.
(2) Clause 20 provides that the venue of the
arbitration “shall be” London “or otherwise as agreed
between the parties”. If the reference to venue was simply
to where the hearings should take place, this would be an
inconvenient provision and one which the parties are
unlikely to have intended. It would mean that hearings had
to take place in London, however inconvenient that might
be for a particular hearing, unless the parties agreed
otherwise. The question of where hearings should be
conveniently held is, however, one which the arbitrators
ordinarily have the power to decide, as indeed is envisaged
in Section 16(2) ACA. That is likely to be a much more
convenient arrangement. Clearly if the parties were in
agreement as to where a particular hearing were to take
place, that would be likely to be very influential on the
Arbitral Tribunal. But if for whatever reason they were not in
agreement, and it is not unknown for parties to arbitration to
become at loggerheads about very many matters, then it is
convenient for the arbitrators to be able to decide. If that
arrangement was to be displaced it would, in my judgment,
have to be spelled out clearly. Accordingly, the reference to
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the “venue” as being London or otherwise as agreed
between the parties, is better read as providing that the seat
of the arbitration is to be England, unless the parties agree
to change it. This would still allow the arbitrators to decide
where particular hearings should take place, while providing
for an anchor to England for supervisory purposes, unless
changed.”
70. Coming to the judgments of our Courts, this
Court in Dozco (India) (P) Ltd. v. Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd.
[Dozco (India) (P) Ltd. v. Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd., (2011)
6 SCC 179 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 276] , was concerned with
the following arbitration clause contained in the agreement
between the parties : (SCC p. 182, para 4)
“22. Governing Laws — 22.1.—This agreement shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of
The Republic of Korea.
23. Arbitration — 23.1.—All disputes arising in connection
with this agreement shall be finally settled by arbitration in
Seoul, Korea (or such other place as the parties may agree
in writing), pursuant to the rules of agreement then in force
of the International Chamber of Commerce.”
71. The Court then held : [Dozco (India) (P) Ltd. case
[Dozco (India) (P) Ltd. v. Doosan Infracore Co. Ltd., (2011)
6 SCC 179 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 276] , SCC pp. 187-89,
paras 18-20]
“18. In my opinion, there is essential difference
between the clauses referred to in Citation Infowares Ltd. v.
Equinox Corpn. [Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corpn.,
(2009) 7 SCC 220] as also in Indtel Technical Services (P)
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Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins Rail Ltd. [Indtel Technical Services (P)
Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins Rail Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 308] on one
hand and Article 23.1 in the present case, on the other. Shri
Gurukrishna Kumar rightly pointed out that the advantage of
the bracketed portion cannot be taken, particularly, in view
of the decision in Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v.
Compania International de Seguros del Peru [Naviera
Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania International de
Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)] wherein it
was held:
‘All contracts which provide for arbitration and contain a
foreign element may involve three potentially relevant
systems of law : (1) the law governing the substantive
contract; (2) the law governing the agreement to arbitrate
and the performance of that agreement; (3) the law
governing the conduct of the arbitration. In the majority of
the cases all three will be the same, but (1) will often be
different from (2) and (3) and occasionally, but rarely, (2)
may also differ from (3).’
That is exactly the case here. The language of Article 23.1
clearly suggests that all the three laws are the laws of The
Republic of Korea with the seat of arbitration in Seoul,
Korea and the arbitration to be conducted in accordance
with the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
19. In respect of the bracketed portion in Article 23.1,
however, it is to be seen that it was observed in Naviera
case [Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania
International de Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1 Lloyd's Rep 116
(CA)] :
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‘… It seems clear that the submissions advanced below
confused the legal “seat”, etc. of an arbitration with the
geographically convenient place or places for holding
hearings. This distinction is nowadays a common feature of
international arbitrations and is helpfully explained in
Redfern and Hunter [Ed. : Redfern and Hunter on
International Arbitration.] in the following passage under the
heading “The Place of Arbitration”:
“The preceding discussion has been on the basis that there
is only one “place” of arbitration. This will be the place
chosen by or on behalf of the parties; and it will be
designated in the arbitration agreement or the terms of
reference or the minutes of proceedings or in some other
way as the place or “seat” of the arbitration. This does not
mean, however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its
meetings
or
hearings
at
the
place
of
arbitration.
International commercial arbitration often involves people of
many different nationalities, from many different countries.
In these circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an
Arbitral Tribunal to hold meetings — or even hearings — in
a place other than the designated place of arbitration, either
for its own convenience or for the convenience of the
parties or their witnesses….
It may be more convenient for an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in
one country to conduct a hearing in another country — for
instance, for the purpose of taking evidence…. In such
circumstances, each move of the Arbitral Tribunal does not
of itself mean that the seat of the arbitration changes. The
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seat of the arbitration remains the place initially agreed by
or on behalf of the parties.”
These aspects need to be borne in mind when one comes
to the Judge's construction of this policy.’
It would be clear from this that the bracketed portion in the
article was not for deciding upon the seat of the arbitration,
but for the convenience of the parties in case they find to
hold the arbitration proceedings somewhere else than
Seoul, Korea. The part which has been quoted above from
Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania International
de Seguros del Peru [Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v.
Compania International de Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1
Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)] supports this inference.
20. In that view, my inferences are that:
(i) The clear language of Articles 22 and 23 of the
distributorship agreement between the parties in this case
spells out a clear agreement between the parties excluding
Part I of the Act.
(ii) The law laid down in Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading
SA [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, (2002) 4 SCC
105] and Indtel Technical Services (P) Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins
Rail Ltd. [Indtel Technical Services (P) Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins
Rail Ltd., (2008) 10 SCC 308] , as also in Citation Infowares
Ltd. v. Equinox Corpn. [Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox
Corpn., (2009) 7 SCC 220] is not applicable to the present
case.
(iii) Since the interpretation of Article 23.1 suggests that the
law governing the arbitration will be Korean Law and the
seat of arbitration will be Seoul in Korea, there will be no
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question of applicability of Section 11(6) of the Act and the
appointment of arbitrator in terms of that provision.”
72. In Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India
[Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC
161 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 257] , this Court was concerned
with an arbitration agreement between the parties as
follows : (SCC p. 164, para 3)
“34.12. Venue and law of arbitration agreement.—The
venue of sole expert, conciliation or arbitration proceedings
pursuant to this article, unless the parties otherwise agree,
shall be Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and shall be conducted in
the English language. Insofar as practicable, the parties
shall continue to implement the terms of this contract
notwithstanding the initiation of arbitral proceedings and any
pending claim or dispute. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 33.1, the arbitration agreement contained in this
Article 34 shall be governed by the laws of England.”
73. Referring to Sections 3 and 53 of the English
Arbitration Act, 1996, the Court in Videocon Industries Ltd.
[Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] held : (Videocon Industries Ltd.
case [Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6
SCC 161 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 257] , SCC pp. 169-70,
paras 20-21)
“20. We shall first consider the question whether Kuala
Lumpur was the designated seat or juridical seat of
arbitration and the same had been shifted to London. In
terms of Article 34.12 of the PSC entered into by 5 parties,
the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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However, due to outbreak of epidemic SARS, the Arbitral
Tribunal decided to hold its sittings first at Amsterdam and
then at London and the parties did not object to this. In the
proceedings held on 14-10-2003 and 15-10-2003 at
London, the Arbitral Tribunal recorded the consent of the
parties for shifting the juridical seat of arbitration to London.
Whether this amounted to shifting of the physical or juridical
seat of arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London? The
decision of this would depend on a holistic consideration of
the relevant clauses of the PSC.
21. Though, it may appear repetitive, we deem it necessary
to mention that as per the terms of agreement, the seat of
arbitration was Kuala Lumpur. If the parties wanted to
amend Article 34.12, they could have done so only by a
written instrument which was required to be signed by all of
them. Admittedly, neither was there any agreement
between the parties to the PSC to shift the juridical seat of
arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London nor was any
written instrument signed by them for amending Article
34.12. Therefore, the mere fact that the parties to the
particular arbitration had agreed for shifting of the seat of
arbitration to London cannot be interpreted as anything
except physical change of the venue of arbitration from
Kuala Lumpur to London.”
74. In Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon (India) Ltd. v.
Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] ,
this Court was concerned with an arbitration clause which
stated that the venue shall be in London. The Court held, on
the facts of that case, that since the substantive law of the
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contract, the curial law of the proceedings, and the law
governing the arbitration agreement were all India, the seat
would be India — London only being the venue for holding
meetings. The Court then held, following the Naviera
Amazonica Peruana SA v. Compania International de
Seguros del Peru [Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v.
Compania International de Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1
Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)] case, that the lex fori of the arbitral
proceedings, namely, the place in which arbitration is to be
held, must be considered to be the seat of the arbitral
proceedings, other things being equal, as follows : [Enercon
(India) Ltd. case [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH,
(2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , SCC p. 45, para
100]
“100. On the facts of the case, it was observed in Naviera
Amazonica case [Naviera Amazonica Peruana SA v.
Compania International de Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1
Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)] that since there was no contest on
Law 1 and Law 2, the entire issue turned on Law 3, “the law
governing the conduct of the arbitration”. This is usually
referred to as the curial or procedural law, or the lex fori.
Thereafter, the Court approvingly quoted the following
observation from Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws
(11th Edn.):‘English Law does not recognise the concept of
a delocalised arbitration or of arbitral procedures floating in
the
transnational
firmament,
unconnected
with
any
municipal system of law.’ It is further held that ‘accordingly
every arbitration must have a “seat” or “locus arbitri” or
“forum” which subjects its procedural rules to the municipal
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law which is there in force.’ The Court thereafter culls out
the following principle:
‘Where the parties have failed to choose the law governing
the arbitration proceedings, those proceedings must be
considered, at any rate prima facie, as being governed by
the law of the country in which the arbitration is held, on the
ground that it is the country most closely connected with the
proceedings.’
The aforesaid classic statement of the conflict of law rules
as quoted in Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws (11th
Edn.), Vol. 1, was approved by the House of Lords in
James Miller & Partners Ltd. v. Whitworth Street Estates
(Manchester) Ltd. [James Miller & Partners Ltd. v.
Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd., 1970 AC 583 :
(1970) 2 WLR 728 (HL)] and Mustill, J. in Black Clawson
International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg
A.G. [Black Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke
Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G., (1981) 2 Lloyd's Rep 446] ,
Lloyd's Rep at p. 453, a little later characterised the same
proposition as “the law of the place where the reference is
conducted, the lex fori”. The position of law in India is the
same.”
75. The Court in Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon (India)
Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Civ) 59] then examined Braes of Doune Wind Farm
(Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Business Services Ltd.
[Braes of Doune Wind Farm (Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred
McAlpine Business Services Ltd., 2008 Bus LR D 137
(QBD) : 2008 EWHC 426 (TCC)] in some detail, and
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concluded in para 118 as follows : [Enercon (India) Ltd.
case [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC
1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , SCC p. 51]
“118. In Braes of Doune [Braes of Doune Wind Farm
(Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Business Services Ltd.,
2008 Bus LR D 137 (QBD) : 2008 EWHC 426 (TCC)] ,
detailed examination was undertaken by the Court to
discern the intention of the parties as to whether the place
mentioned refers to venue or the seat of the arbitration. The
factual situation in the present case is not as difficult or
complex as the parties herein have only designated London
as a venue. Therefore, if one has to apply the reasoning
and logic of Akenhead, J., the conclusion would be
irresistible that the parties have designated India as the
seat. This is even more so as the parties have not agreed
that the courts in London will have exclusive jurisdiction to
resolve any dispute arising out of or in connection with the
contract, which was specifically provided in Clause 1.4.1 of
the EPC contract examined by Akenhead, J. in Braes of
Doune [Braes of Doune Wind Farm (Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred
McAlpine Business Services Ltd., 2008 Bus LR D 137
(QBD) : 2008 EWHC 426 (TCC)] . In the present case,
except
for
London
being
chosen
as
a
convenient
place/venue for holding the meetings of the arbitration,
there
is
no
other factor
connecting
the
arbitration
proceedings to London.”
76. The Court in Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon (India)
Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Civ) 59] then made a reference to C v. D [C v. D, 2008 Bus
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LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] , where the Court,
following C v. D [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA
Civ 1282 (CA)] , held : [Enercon (India) Ltd. case [Enercon
(India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3
SCC (Civ) 59] , SCC pp. 53-54, para 122)
“122. Longmore, J. of the Court of Appeal observed : (C v.
D case [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282
(CA)] , Bus LR p. 851, paras 16-17)
‘16. I shall deal with Mr Hirst's arguments in due course but,
in my judgment, they fail to grapple with the central point at
issue which is whether or not, by choosing London as the
seat of the arbitration, the parties must be taken to have
agreed that proceedings on the award should be only those
permitted by English law. In my view they must be taken to
have so agreed for the reasons given by the Judge. The
whole purpose of the balance achieved by the Bermuda
Form (English arbitration but applying New York law to
issues arising under the policy) is that judicial remedies in
respect of the award should be those permitted by English
law and only those so permitted. Mr Hirst could not say (and
did not say) that English judicial remedies for lack of
jurisdiction on procedural irregularities under Sections 67
and 68 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996 were not
permitted; he was reduced to saying that New York judicial
remedies were also [Ed. : The word “also” has been
emphasised in original.] permitted. That, however, would be
a recipe for litigation and (what is worse) confusion which
cannot have been intended by the parties. No doubt New
York law has its own judicial remedies for want of
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jurisdiction and serious irregularity but it could scarcely be
supposed that a party aggrieved by one part of an award
could proceed in one jurisdiction and a party aggrieved by
another part of an award could proceed in another
jurisdiction. Similarly, in the case of a single complaint about
an award, it could not be supposed that the aggrieved party
could complain in one jurisdiction and the satisfied party be
entitled to ask the other jurisdiction to declare its satisfaction
with the award. There would be a serious risk of parties
rushing to get the first judgment or of conflicting decisions
which the parties cannot have contemplated.
17. It follows from this that a choice of seat for the
arbitration must be a choice of forum for remedies seeking
to attack the award.’
On the facts of the case, the Court held that the seat of the
arbitration was in England and accordingly entertained the
challenge to the award.”
77. Reference in Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon
(India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3
SCC (Civ) 59] was made to Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
Rep 376] in paras 124 to 128, and then to various other
judgments, including BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] , as follows : [Enercon (India) Ltd. case [Enercon
(India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3
SCC (Civ) 59] , SCC p. 58, para 134)
“134. It is accepted by most of the experts in the law relating
to international arbitration that in almost all the national
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laws, arbitrations are anchored to the seat/place/situs of
arbitration. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration
(5th Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2009),
in Para 3.54 concludes that “the seat of the arbitration is
thus intended to be its centre of gravity”. In BALCO [BALCO v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC
552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , it is further noticed that this
does not mean that all proceedings of the arbitration are to
be held at the seat of arbitration. The arbitrators are at
liberty to hold meetings at a place which is of convenience
to all concerned. This may become necessary as arbitrators
often come from different countries. Therefore, it may be
convenient to hold all or some of the meetings of the
arbitration in a location other than where the seat of
arbitration is located. In BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] , the relevant passage from Redfern and Hunter
has been quoted which is as under : (SCC p. 598, para 75)
‘75. … “The preceding discussion has been on the basis
that there is only one “place” of arbitration. This will be the
place chosen by or on behalf of the parties; and it will be
designated in the arbitration agreement or the terms of
reference or the minutes of proceedings or in some other
way as the place or “seat” of the arbitration. This does not
mean, however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its
meetings
or
hearings
at
the
place
of
arbitration.
International commercial arbitration often involves people of
many different nationalities, from many different countries.
In these circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an
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Arbitral Tribunal to hold meetings—or even hearings—in a
place other than the designated place of arbitration, either
for its own convenience or for the convenience of the
parties or their witnesses…. It may be more convenient for
an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a
hearing in another country — for instance, for the purpose
of taking evidence…. In such circumstances each move of
the Arbitral Tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat of
arbitration changes. The seat of arbitration remains the
place initially agreed by or on behalf of the parties.”
(Naviera
case
[Naviera
Amazonica
Peruana
SA
v.
Compania International de Seguros del Peru, (1988) 1
Lloyd's Rep 116 (CA)] , Lloyd's Rep at p. 121.)’
These observations have also been noticed in Union of
India v. McDonnell Douglas Corpn. [Union of India v.
McDonnell Douglas Corpn., (1993) 2 Lloyd's Rep 48] ”
78. The Court finally concluded : [Enercon (India)
Ltd. case [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5
SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , SCC pp. 58-59, para 135]
“135. In the present case, even though the venue of
arbitration proceedings has been fixed in London, it cannot
be presumed that the parties have intended the seat to be
also in London. In an international commercial arbitration,
venue can often be different from the seat of arbitration. In
such circumstances, the hearing of the arbitration will be
conducted at the venue fixed by the parties, but this would
not bring about a change in the seat of the arbitration. This
is precisely the ratio in Braes of Doune [Braes of Doune
Wind Farm (Scotland) Ltd. v. Alfred McAlpine Business
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Services Ltd., 2008 Bus LR D 137 (QBD) : 2008 EWHC 426
(TCC)] . Therefore, in the present case, the seat would
remain in India.”
79. In Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. v. Gupta
Coal India Ltd. [Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. v. Gupta
Coal India Ltd., (2015) 9 SCC 172 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ)
341] , the Court dealt with an arbitration clause between the
parties which read as follows : (SCC p. 193, para 36)
“36. … ‘5. If any dispute or difference should arise under
this charter, general average/arbitration in London to apply,
one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto, the third
by the two so chosen, and their decision or that of any two
of them, shall be final and binding, and this agreement may,
for enforcing the same, be made a rule of court. Said three
parties to be commercial men who are the members of the
London Arbitrators Association. This contract is to be
governed and construed according to the English law. For
disputes where total amount claimed by either party does
not exceed US $50,000 the arbitration should be conducted
in accordance with small claims procedure of the London
Maritime Arbitration Association.’”
80. After referring, in extenso, to a large number of
English decisions and the decisions of this Court, the Court
in Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. [Harmony Innovation
Shipping Ltd. v. Gupta Coal India Ltd., (2015) 9 SCC 172 :
(2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 341] concluded : (SCC p. 199, para 48)
“48. In the present case, the agreement stipulates that the
contract is to be governed and construed according to the
English law. This occurs in the arbitration clause. Mr
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Viswanathan, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that
this part has to be interpreted as a part of “curial law” and
not as a “proper law” or “substantive law”. It is his
submission that it cannot be equated with the seat of
arbitration. As we perceive, it forms as a part of the
arbitration clause. There is ample indication through various
phrases like “arbitration in London to apply”, arbitrators are
to be the members of the “London Arbitration Association”
and the contract “to be governed and construed according
to the English law”. It is worth noting that there is no other
stipulation relating to the applicability of any law to the
agreement. There is no other clause anywhere in the
contract. That apart, it is also postulated that if the dispute
is for an amount less than US $50,000 then, the arbitration
should be conducted in accordance with small claims
procedure of the London Maritime Arbitration Association.
When the aforesaid stipulations are read and appreciated in
the contextual perspective, “the presumed intention” of the
parties is clear as crystal that the juridical seat of arbitration
would be London.”
81.
Most
recently,
in
Brahmani
River
Pellets
[Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd.,
(2020) 5 SCC 462 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 929 at para 15] ,
this Court in a domestic arbitration considered Clause 18 —
which was the arbitration agreement between the parties —
and which stated that arbitration shall be under Indian
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the venue of
arbitration shall be Bhubaneswar. After citing several
judgments of this Court and then referring to Indus Mobile
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Distribution [Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind
Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ)
760] , the Court held : (Brahmani River Pellets case
[Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd.,
(2020) 5 SCC 462 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 929 at para 15] ,
SCC pp. 472-73, paras 18-19)
“18. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court
at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction
to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all
other courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed
that the “venue” of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar.
Considering
the
agreement
of
the
parties
having
Bhubaneswar as the venue of arbitration, the intention of the
parties is to exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik
[Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 9
SCC 32 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 157] , non-use of words like
“exclusive jurisdiction”, “only”, “exclusive”, “alone” is not
decisive and does not make any material difference.
19. When the parties have agreed to the have the “venue” of
arbitration at Bhubaneshwar, the Madras High Court erred
[Kamchi Industries Ltd. v. Brahmin River Pellets Ltd., 2018
SCC OnLine Mad 13127] in assuming the jurisdiction under
Section 11(6) of the Act. Since only the Orissa High Court
will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under
Section 11(6) of the Act, the impugned order [Kamchi
Industries Ltd. v. Brahmin River Pellets Ltd., 2018 SCC
OnLine Mad 13127] is liable to be set aside.”
82. On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it
may be concluded that whenever there is the designation of
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a place of arbitration in an arbitration clause as being the
“venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the expression
“arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the “venue”
is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, as the
aforesaid expression does not include just one or more
individual
or
particular
hearing,
but
the
arbitration
proceedings as a whole, including the making of an award at
that place. This language has to be contrasted with language
such as “tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts or
the parties” where only hearings are to take place in the
“venue”, which may lead to the conclusion, other things
being equal, that the venue so stated is not the “seat” of
arbitral proceedings, but only a convenient place of meeting.
Further, the fact that the arbitral proceedings “shall be held”
at a particular venue would also indicate that the parties
intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a particular place,
signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the arbitral
proceedings. This, coupled with there being no other
significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is merely a
“venue” and not the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, would
then conclusively show that such a clause designates a
“seat” of the arbitral proceedings. In an international context,
if a supranational body of rules is to govern the arbitration,
this would further be an indicia that “the venue”, so stated,
would be the seat of the arbitral proceedings. In a national
context, this would be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996
as applying to the “stated venue”, which then becomes the
“seat” for the purposes of arbitration.
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Correctness of the judgment inHardy Exploration
and Production (India) Ltd. [Union of India v. Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 :
(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790]
83.Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957
(Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] was expressly
referred to in paras 108 and 109 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , and followed in paragraph 110 as
extracted above. BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] then summed up the legal position as follows :
(BALCO case [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , SCC p.
618, paras 116-17)
“116. The legal position that emerges from a conspectus of
all the decisions, seems to be, that the choice of another
country as the seat of arbitration inevitably imports an
acceptance that the law of that country relating to the
conduct and supervision of arbitrations will apply to the
proceedings.
117. It would, therefore, follow that if the arbitration
agreement is found or held to provide for a seat/place of
arbitration outside India, then the provision that the
Arbitration
Act,
would
govern
the
arbitration
proceedings, would not make Part I of the Arbitration Act,
1996 applicable or enable the Indian courts to exercise
supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration or the award. It
would only mean that the parties have contractually imported
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from the Arbitration Act, 1996, those provisions which are
concerned with the internal conduct of their arbitration and
which are not inconsistent with the mandatory provisions of
the English procedural law/curial law. This necessarily
follows from the fact that Part I applies only to arbitrations
having their seat/place in India.”
84. In Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma [Roger
Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017) 14 SCC 722 : (2018) 2
SCC (Civ) 116] , a Division Bench of this Court, after
referring to a number of judgments, referred to the English
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] judgment as follows : (Roger
Shashoua case [Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017)
14 SCC 722 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 116] , SCC p. 751, para
46)
“46. As stated earlier, in Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma,
2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376]
Cooke, J., in the course of analysis, held that “London
arbitration” is a well-known phenomenon which is often
chosen by foreign nationals with a different law, such as the
law of New York, governing the substantive rights of the
parties and it is because of the legislative framework and
supervisory powers of the courts here which many parties
are keen to adopt. The learned Judge has further held that
when there is an express designation of the arbitration venue
as London and no designation of any alternative place as the
seat, combined with a supranational body of rules governing
the arbitration and no other significant contrary indicia, the
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inexorable conclusion is that London is the juridical seat and
English law the curial law.”
85. The Division Bench then turned down an
argument that BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810]
had not expressly approved the Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
Rep 376] principle, as follows : (Roger Shashoua case
[Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017) 14 SCC 722 :
(2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 116] , SCC pp. 754-55, para 54)
“54. We had earlier extracted extensively from the said
judgment, as we find, the Court after adverting to various
aspects, has categorically held that the High Court [Enercon
(India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1495]
had not followed Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009
EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376]
principle. The various decisions referred to in Enercon (India)
Ltd. [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1
: (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , the analysis made and the
propositions deduced leads to an indubitable conclusion that
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] principle has been accepted
by Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon
GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] It is also to
be noted that in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] , the Constitution Bench has not merely
reproduced few paragraphs from Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
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Rep 376] but has also referred to other decisions on which
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] has placed reliance upon. As
we notice, there is analysis of earlier judgments, though it
does not specifically state that “propositions laid down in
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] are accepted”. On a clear
reading, the ratio of the decision in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , in the ultimate eventuate, reflects
that the Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957
(Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] principle has been
accepted and the two-Judge Bench in Enercon (India) Ltd.
[Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , after succinctly analysing it, has
stated that the said principles have been accepted by the
Constitution Bench. Therefore, we are unable to accept the
submission of Mr Chidambaram that the finding recorded in
Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH,
(2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] that Shashoua
[Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2
Lloyd's Law Rep 376] principle has been accepted in BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] should be declared as
per incuriam.”
86. The Court then set out the arbitration clause and
the governing law on the facts of the case as follows : (Roger
Shashoua case [Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017)
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14 SCC 722 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 116] , SCC p. 759, paras
69-70)
“69. Though we have opined that Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
Rep 376] principle has been accepted in BALCO [BALCO v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552
: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] and Enercon (India) Ltd. [Enercon
(India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3
SCC (Civ) 59] , yet we think it apt to refer to the clauses in
the agreement and scrutinise whether there is any scope to
hold that the courts in India could have entertained the
petition. Clause 14 of the shareholders' agreement (SHA)
refers to arbitration. The said Clause reads thus:
‘14. ARBITRATION
14.1. … Each party shall nominate one arbitrator and in the
event of any difference between the two arbitrators, a third
arbitrator/umpire
shall
be
appointed.
The
arbitration
proceedings shall be in accordance with the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce, Paris.
14.2. Proceedings in such arbitrations shall be conducted in
the English language.
14.3. The arbitration award shall be substantiated in writing
and shall be final and binding on the parties.
14.4. The venue of the arbitration shall be London, United
Kingdom.’
70. Clause 17.6 deals with governing law, which reads as
follows:
‘17.6. GOVERNING LAW
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This agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of India.’”
87. The Court then went on to state : (Roger
Shashoua case [Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017)
14 SCC 722 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 116] , SCC pp. 760 & 762,
paras 72 & 76)
“72. It is worthy to note that the arbitration agreement is not
silent as to what law and procedure is to be followed. On the
contrary, Clause 14.1 lays down that the arbitration
proceedings shall be in accordance with the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the ICC. In Enercon (India)
Ltd. [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1
: (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , the two-Judge Bench referring to
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] accepted the view of Cooke,
J. that the phrase “venue of arbitration shall be in London,
UK” was accompanied by the provision in the arbitration
clause or arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the
Rules of ICC in Paris. The two-Judge Bench accepted the
Rules of ICC, Paris which is supernational body of Rules as
has been noted by Cooke, J. and that is how it has accepted
that the parties have not simply provided for the location of
hearings to be in London. To elaborate, the distinction
between the venue and the seat remains. But when a court
finds there is prescription for venue and something else, it
has to be adjudged on the facts of each case to determine
the juridical seat. As in the instant case, the agreement in
question has been interpreted and it has been held that
London is not mentioned as the mere location but the courts
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in London will have the jurisdiction, another interpretative
perception as projected by the learned Senior Counsel is
unacceptable.
***
76. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we allow the appeals
and set aside the judgment [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon
GmbH, 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1495] of the High Court of
Delhi that has held that courts in India have jurisdiction, and
has also determined that Gautam Budh Nagar has no
jurisdiction and the petition under Section 34 has to be filed
before the Delhi High Court. Once the courts in India have
no jurisdiction, the aforesaid conclusions are to be nullified
and we so do. In the facts and circumstances of the case,
there shall be no order as to costs.”
88. The stage is now set for consideration of the
recent judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc. [Union of India v.
Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC
472 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] The precise question that had
been referred to the three-Judge Bench in Hardy Exploration
& Production (India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy Exploration
& Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 790] was as to whether the ratio of Sumitomo Heavy
Industries Ltd. v. ONGC [Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v.
ONGC, (1998) 1 SCC 305] — a judgment delivered under
the Arbitration Act, 1940 — would have any impact on the
“juridical seat” doctrine in arbitration law, as developed in
England and by our courts. The three-Judge Bench
answered the reference as follows : (Hardy Exploration &
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Production (India) Inc. case [Union of India v. Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 :
(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] , SCC pp. 492-93, paras 24-25)
“24. In view of the aforesaid development of law, there
is no confusion with regard to what the seat of arbitration and
venue of arbitration mean. There is no shadow of doubt that
the arbitration clause has to be read in a holistic manner so
as to determine the jurisdiction of the Court. That apart, if
there is mention of venue and something else is appended
thereto, depending on the nature of the prescription, the
Court can come to a conclusion that there is implied
exclusion of Part I of the Act. The principle laid down in
Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC [Sumitomo Heavy
Industries Ltd. v. ONGC, (1998) 1 SCC 305] has been
referred to in Reliance Industries Ltd. (2) [Union of India v.
Reliance Industries Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 213 : (2016) 1 SCC
(Civ) 102] and distinguished. In any case, it has no
applicability to a controversy under the Act. The said
controversy has to be governed by the BALCO [BALCO v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552
: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] principle or by the agreement or by
the principle of implied exclusion as has been held in Bhatia
International [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, (2002)
4 SCC 105] .
25. Thus, we answer the reference accordingly.”
89. Having answered the reference, the Court then
went on to consider the arbitration clause in the facts of that
case, which was set out in para 27 as follows : (Hardy
Exploration & Production case [Union of India v. Hardy
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Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 :
(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] , SCC p. 493)
“27. Article 33 deals with “Sole expert, conciliation and
arbitrator”. Articles 33.9 and 33.12 read thus:
‘33.9.
Arbitration
proceedings
shall be conducted
in
accordance with theUNICITRALModel Law on International
Commercial Arbitration of 1985 except that in the event of
any conflict between the rules and the provisions of this
Article 33, the provisions of this Article 33 shall govern.
***
33.12. The venue of conciliation or arbitration proceedings
pursuant to this Article unless the parties otherwise agree,
shall be Kuala Lumpur and shall be conducted in English
language. Insofar as practicable the parties shall continue to
implement the terms of this contract notwithstanding the
initiation of arbitration proceedings and any pending claim or
dispute.’”
90. The Court then went on to see for itself Articles 20
and 31 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and then went on to state
that under the UNCITRAL Model Law, either the juridical seat
of the arbitral proceedings is indicated in the agreement
between the parties, or if it is not, must be determined by the
Arbitral Tribunal. Holding that the arbitration clause, on the
facts of that case, referred to the “venue” as Kuala Lumpur,
the Court went on to hold that there was no determination of
any “juridical seat” by agreement, and would therefore have
to be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal. As there was no
such determination by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Court then
concluded : (Hardy Exploration & Production case [Union of
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India v. Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019)
13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] , SCC p. 496, paras
34-36)
“34. … The said test clearly means that the expression of
determination signifies an expressive opinion.
35. In the instant case, there has been no adjudication and
expression of an opinion. Thus, the word “place” cannot be
used as seat. To elaborate, a venue can become a seat if
something else is added to it as a concomitant. But a place
unlike seat, at least as is seen in the contract, can become a
seat if one of the conditions precedent is satisfied. It does
not ipso facto assume the status of seat. Thus understood,
Kuala Lumpur is not the seat or place of arbitration and the
interchangeable use will not apply in stricto sensu.
36. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the irresistible
conclusion is that the courts in India have jurisdiction and,
therefore, the order passed [Union of India v. Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc., 2016 SCC OnLine Del
4098 : (2016) 232 DLT 384] by the Delhi High Court is set
aside. Resultantly, the appeal stands allowed and the High
Court is requested to deal with the application preferred
under Section 34 of the Act as expeditiously as possible.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
91. The three-Judge Bench in Hardy Exploration &
Production (India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy Exploration &
Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 790] failed to apply the Shashoua [Shashoua v.
Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law
Rep 376] principle to the arbitration clause in question. Had
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the Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957
(Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] principle been
applied, the answer would have been that Kuala Lumpur,
which was stated to be the “venue” of arbitration
proceedings, being governed by the UNCITRAL Model Law,
would be governed by a supranational set of rules, and there
being no other contrary indicator, it would be clear that Kuala
Lumpur would therefore be the juridical “seat” of the
arbitration.
92. As we have seen hereinabove, the judgment of
Cooke, J. in Shashoua v. Sharma [Shashoua v. Sharma,
2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] ,
was expressly approved by the five-Judge Bench in BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , as was stated by the
Supreme Court of India in Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh
Sharma [Roger Shashoua v. Mukesh Sharma, (2017) 14
SCC 722 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 116] . By failing to apply the
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] principle to the arbitration
clause in question, the three-Judge Bench in Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 :
(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] has not followed the law as to
determination of a “juridical seat”, laid down by a five-Judge
Bench of this Court in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] . The result in Hardy Exploration & Production
(India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy Exploration & Production
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(India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] is
that a foreign award that would be delivered in Kuala
Lumpur, would now be liable to be challenged in the courts
at Kuala Lumpur, and also be challenged in the courts in
India, under Section 34 of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
This is exactly the situation that this Court encountered when
it decided the case of Venture Global Engg. v. Satyam
Computer Services Ltd. [Venture Global Engg. v. Satyam
Computer Services Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 190] The five-Judge
Bench in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810]
expressly overruled Venture Global Engg. [Venture Global
Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 190]
as follows : (BALCO case [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] , SCC pp. 630-31, 634, paras 143 & 154)
“143. … With these observations, the matter was remanded
back to the trial court to dispose of the suit on merits. The
submissions made by K.K. Venugopal, as noticed in para 42,
epitomise the kind of chaos which would be created by two
court
systems,
in
two
different
countries,
exercising
concurrent jurisdiction over the same dispute. There would
be a clear risk of conflicting decisions. This would add to the
problems relating to enforcement of such decisions. Such a
situation would undermine the policy underlying the New
York Convention or the UNCITRAL Model Law. Therefore, we
are of the opinion that the appropriate manner to interpret
the aforesaid provision is that “alternative two” will become
available only if “alternative one” is not available.
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154. At this stage, we may notice that in spite of the
aforesaid international understanding of the second limb of
Article V(1)(e), this Court has proceeded on a number of
occasions to annul an award on the basis that parties had
chosen Indian law to govern the substance of their dispute.
The
aforesaid
view
has
been
expressed
in
Bhatia
International [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, (2002)
4 SCC 105] and Venture Global Engg. [Venture Global
Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 190]
In our opinion, accepting such an interpretation would be to
ignore the spirit underlying the New York Convention which
embodies a consensus evolved to encourage consensual
resolution of complicated, intricate and in many cases very
sensitive international commercial disputes. Therefore, the
interpretation which hinders such a process ought not to be
accepted. This also seems to be the view of the national
courts in different jurisdictions across the world. For the
reasons stated above, we are also unable to agree with the
conclusions recorded by this Court in Venture Global Engg.
[Venture Global Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.,
(2008) 4 SCC 190] that the foreign award could be annulled
on the exclusive grounds that the Indian law governed the
substance of the dispute. Such an opinion is not borne out
by the huge body of judicial precedents in different
jurisdictions of the world.”
93. The five-Judge Bench then went on to state :
(BALCO case [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , SCC p.
647, para 195)
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“195. With utmost respect, we are unable to agree with the
conclusions recorded in the judgments of this Court in Bhatia
International [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading SA, (2002)
4 SCC 105] and Venture Global Engg. [Venture Global
Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 190]
In our opinion, the provision contained in Section 2(2) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 is not in conflict with any of the
provisions either in Part I or in Part II of the Arbitration Act,
1996.
In
a
foreign-seated
international
commercial
arbitration, no application for interim relief would be
maintainable under Section 9 or any other provision, as
applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is limited to
all arbitrations which take place in India. Similarly, no suit for
interim injunction simpliciter would be maintainable in India,
on the basis of an international commercial arbitration with a
seat outside India.”
94. The decision in Hardy Exploration & Production
(India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy Exploration & Production
(India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790] is
therefore contrary to the five-Judge Bench in BALCO [BALCO
v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC
552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , in that it failed to apply the
Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] principle to the arbitration
clause in question. The Hardy Exploration & Production
(India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy Exploration & Production
(India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790]
decision would lead to the result that a foreign award would
not only be subject to challenge in the country in which it
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was made, but also subject to challenge under Section 34 of
Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which would lead to the
chaos spoken of in para 143 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , with the concomitant risk of
conflicting decisions, as held in Venture Global Engg.
[Venture Global Engg. v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd.,
(2008) 4 SCC 190] [overruled in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] ], which would add to problems
relating to enforcement, and undermine the policy underlying
the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law. We,
therefore, declare that the judgment in Hardy Exploration &
Production (India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy Exploration &
Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 790] , being contrary to the five-Judge Bench in BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , cannot be considered
to be good law.
95. Coming to the impugned judgment in the present
appeals, it is clear that the reasoning followed stems from
the subject-matter test that flows from the definition of “court”
in Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act. According to the impugned
judgment [NHPC Ltd. v. Jaiparkash Associates Ltd., 2018
SCC OnLine P&H 1304 : (2019) 193 AIC 839] , since the
agreement was executed at Faridabad, part of the cause of
action would arise at Faridabad, clothing Faridabad courts
with jurisdiction for the purposes of filing a Section 34
petition. The second part of the reasoning is that Faridabad
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is the place where the request for reference to arbitration
was received, as a result of which part of the cause of action
arose in Faridabad, which ousts the jurisdiction of courts of
New Delhi, in which no part of the cause of action arose.
96. We have extracted the arbitration agreement in
the present case (as contained in Clause 67.3 of the
agreement between the parties) in para 3 of this judgment.
As per the arbitration agreement, in case a dispute was to
arise with a foreign contractor, Clause 67.3(ii) would apply.
Under this sub-clause, a dispute which would amount to an
“international commercial arbitration” within the meaning of
Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, would have to be
finally settled in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1996
read with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and in case of any
conflict, the Arbitration Act, 1996 is to prevail (as an award
made under Part I is considered a domestic award under
Section 2(7) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 notwithstanding the
fact that it is an award made in an international commercial
arbitration). Applying the Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma,
2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376]
principle delineated above, it is clear that if the dispute was
with a foreign contractor under Clause 67.3 of the
agreement, the fact that arbitration proceedings shall be held
at New Delhi/Faridabad, India in sub-clause (vi) of Clause
67.3, would amount to the designation of either of these
places as the “seat” of arbitration, as a supranational body of
law is to be applied, namely, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
in conjunction with the Arbitration Act, 1996. As such
arbitration would be an international commercial arbitration
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which would be decided in India, the Arbitration Act, 1996 is
to apply as well. There being no other contra indication in
such a situation, either New Delhi or Faridabad, India is the
designated “seat” under the agreement, and it is thereafter
for the parties to choose as to in which of the two places the
arbitration is finally to be held.
97. Given the fact that if there were a dispute between
NHPC Ltd. and a foreign contractor, Clause 67.3(vi) would
have to be read as a clause designating the “seat” of
arbitration, the same must follow even when sub-clause (vi)
is to be read with sub-clause (i) of Clause 67.3, where the
dispute between NHPC Ltd. would be with an Indian
contractor. The arbitration clause in the present case states
that
“Arbitration
proceedings
shall
be
held
at
New
Delhi/Faridabad, India…”, thereby signifying that all the
hearings, including the making of the award, are to take
place at one of the stated places. Negatively speaking, the
clause does not state that the venue is so that some, or all,
of the hearings take place at the venue; neither does it use
language such as “the Tribunal may meet”, or “may hear
witnesses, experts or parties”. The expression “shall be held”
also indicates that the so-called “venue” is really the “seat” of
the arbitral proceedings. The dispute is to be settled in
accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1996 which, therefore,
applies a national body of rules to the arbitration that is to be
held either at New Delhi or Faridabad, given the fact that the
present arbitration would be Indian and not international. It is
clear, therefore, that even in such a scenario, New
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Delhi/Faridabad, India has been designated as the “seat” of
the arbitration proceedings.
98. However, the fact that in all the three appeals
before us the proceedings were finally held at New Delhi,
and the awards were signed in New Delhi, and not at
Faridabad, would lead to the conclusion that both parties
have chosen New Delhi as the “seat” of arbitration under
Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This being the
case, both parties have, therefore, chosen that the courts at
New Delhi alone would have exclusive jurisdiction over the
arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the fact that a part of the
cause of action may have arisen at Faridabad would not be
relevant once the “seat” has been chosen, which would then
amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause so far as courts of
the “seat” are concerned.
99. Consequently, the impugned judgment [NHPC
Ltd. v. Jaiparkash Associates Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine P&H
1304 : (2019) 193 AIC 839] is set aside, and the Section 34
petition is ordered to be presented in the courts in New
Delhi, as was held by the learned Single Judge of the
Special Commercial Court at Gurugram. The appeals are
allowed in the aforesaid terms.”
14. In Inox Renewables case supra, the Apex Court held
as under:“ 10. Having heard the learned counsel for both the
parties, it is first necessary to set out what the learned
arbitrator has held in the award with respect to the
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venue/place of the arbitration. In para 12.3, the learned
arbitrator holds thus:
“12.3. There is no controversy as to the constitution of
the Tribunal between the parties and the parties have agreed
to get their dispute resolved by a sole arbitrator. As per
arbitration agreement, the venue of the arbitration was to be
Jaipur.
However,
the
parties
have
mutually
agreed,
irrespective of a specific clause as to the [venue, that the
place] of the arbitration would be at Ahmedabad and not at
Jaipur. The proceedings, thus, have been conducted at
Ahmedabad on constitution of the Tribunal by the learned
Nominee Judge of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat.”
11. What is clear, therefore, as per this paragraph is
that by mutual agreement, parties have specifically shifted
the venue/place of arbitration from Jaipur to Ahmedabad.
This being so, is it not possible to accede to the argument
made by the learned counsel for the respondent that this
could only have been done by written agreement and that
the arbitrator's finding would really have reference to a
convenient venue and not the seat of arbitration.
12. In BGS SGS [BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd.,
(2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] , this Court,
after an exhaustive review of the entire case law, concluded
thus : (SCC pp. 268, 281, 284, 301-02 & 309, paras 32, 4849, 53, 82 & 98)
“32. It can thus be seen that given the new concept of
“juridical seat” of the arbitral proceedings, and the
importance given by the Arbitration Act, 1996 to this “seat”,
the arbitral award is now not only to state its date, but also
the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with
Section 20. However, the definition of “court” contained in
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Section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, continued as
such in the Arbitration Act, 1996, though narrowed to mean
only Principal Civil Court and the High Court in exercise of
their original ordinary civil jurisdiction. Thus, the concept of
juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings and its relationship
to the jurisdiction of courts which are then to look into
matters relating to the arbitral proceedings — including
challenges to arbitral awards — was unclear, and had to be
developed in accordance with international practice on a
case-by-case basis by this Court.
48. The aforesaid amendment carried out in the
definition of “Court” is also a step showing the right direction,
namely, that in international commercial arbitrations held in
India, the High Court alone is to exercise jurisdiction over
such proceedings, even where no part of the cause of action
may have arisen within the jurisdiction of such High Court,
such High Court not having ordinary original jurisdiction. In
such cases, the “place” where the award is delivered alone is
looked at, and the High Court given jurisdiction to supervise
the arbitration proceedings, on the footing of its jurisdiction to
hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to it, which
is only on the basis of territorial jurisdiction which in turn
relates to the “place” where the award is made. In the light of
this important change in the law, Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 must also be construed in the manner
indicated by this judgment.
49. Take the consequence of the opposite conclusion,
in the light of the facts of a given example, as follows. New
Delhi is specifically designated to be the seat of the
arbitration in the arbitration clause between the parties. Part
of the cause of action, however, arises in several places,
including where the contract is partially to be performed, let
us say, in a remote part of Uttarakhand. If concurrent
jurisdiction were to be the order of the day, despite the seat
having been located and specifically chosen by the parties,
party autonomy would suffer, which BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] specifically states cannot be the
case. Thus, if an application is made to a District Court in a
remote corner of the Uttarakhand hills, which then becomes
the court for the purposes of Section 42 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996 where even Section 34 applications have then to
be made, the result would be contrary to the stated intention
of the parties — as even though the parties have
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contemplated that a neutral place be chosen as the seat so
that the courts of that place alone would have jurisdiction,
yet, any one of five other courts in which a part of the cause
of action arises, including courts in remote corners of the
country, would also be clothed with jurisdiction. This
obviously cannot be the case. If, therefore, the conflicting
portion of the judgment of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] in para 96 is kept aside for a moment, the very
fact that parties have chosen a place to be the seat would
necessarily carry with it the decision of both parties that the
courts at the seat would exclusively have jurisdiction over the
entire arbitral process.
53. In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017)
7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , after clearing the air
on the meaning of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1996,
the Court in para 19 (which has already been set out
hereinabove) made it clear that the moment a seat is
designated by agreement between the parties, it is akin to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause, which would then vest the
courts at the “seat” with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of
regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement
between the parties.
82. On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it
may be concluded that whenever there is the designation of
a place of arbitration in an arbitration clause as being the
“venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the expression
“arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the “venue”
is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, as the
aforesaid expression does not include just one or more
individual or particular hearing, but the arbitration
proceedings as a whole, including the making of an award at
that place. This language has to be contrasted with language
such as ‘tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts or
the parties’ where only hearings are to take place in the
“venue”, which may lead to the conclusion, other things
being equal, that the venue so stated is not the “seat” of
arbitral proceedings, but only a convenient place of meeting.
Further, the fact that the arbitral proceedings “shall be held”
at a particular venue would also indicate that the parties
intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a particular place,
signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the arbitral
proceedings. This, coupled with there being no other
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significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is merely a
“venue” and not the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, would
then conclusively show that such a clause designates a
“seat” of the arbitral proceedings. In an International context,
if a supranational body of rules is to govern the arbitration,
this would further be an indicia that “the venue”, so stated,
would be the seat of the arbitral proceedings. In a national
context, this would be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996
as applying to the “stated venue”, which then becomes the
“seat” for the purposes of arbitration.
98. However, the fact that in all the three appeals
before us the proceedings were finally held at New Delhi,
and the awards were signed in New Delhi, and not at
Faridabad, would lead to the conclusion that both parties
have chosen New Delhi as the “seat” of arbitration under
Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This being the
case, both parties have, therefore, chosen that the courts at
New Delhi alone would have exclusive jurisdiction over the
arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the fact that a part of the
cause of action may have arisen at Faridabad would not be
relevant once the “seat” has been chosen, which would then
amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause so far as Courts of
the “seat” are concerned.”
13. This case would show that the moment the seat is
chosen as Ahmedabad, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause, thereby vesting the courts at Ahmedabad with
exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the arbitration. However,
the learned counsel for the respondent referred to and relied
upon paras 49 and 71 of the aforesaid judgment. Para 49
only dealt with the aspect of concurrent jurisdiction as dealt
with in BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] [“BALCO”] which does
not arise on the facts of the present case. Para 71 is equally
irrelevant, in that, it is clear that the parties have, by mutual
agreement, entered into an agreement to substitute the
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venue at Jaipur with Ahmedabad as the place/seat of
arbitration under Section 20(1) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
14. The learned counsel for the respondent relied
heavily upon Videocon [Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2011) 6 SCC 161 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 257] for the
proposition that any change in seat could only be by a
written agreement signed by the parties. A close look at the
judgment in Videocon [Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2011) 6 SCC 161 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 257] would
show that it contained Clause 34.12 which dealt with “venue
and law of arbitration agreement” and Clause 35.2 which
dealt with “amendment”, as follows : (SCC p. 164, para 3)
“3.
…
34.12.
Venue
and
Law
of
Arbitration
Agreement.—The venue of sole expert, conciliation or
arbitration proceedings pursuant to this Article, unless the
parties otherwise agree, shall be Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
and shall be conducted in the English language. Insofar as
practicable, the parties shall continue to implement the terms
of this contract notwithstanding the initiation of arbitral
proceedings
and
any
pending
claim
or
dispute.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 33.1, the arbitration
agreement contained in this Article 34 shall be governed by
the laws of England.
35.2. Amendment.—This contract shall not be amended,
modified, varied or supplemented in any respect except by
an instrument in writing signed by all the parties, which shall
state the date upon which the amendment or modification
shall become effective.”
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15. Given the above, this Court concluded : (Videocon
case [Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6
SCC 161 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 257] , SCC pp. 169-70, paras
20-21)
“20. We shall first consider the question whether
Kuala Lumpur was the designated seat or juridical seat of
arbitration and the same had been shifted to London. In
terms of Clause 34.12 of the PSC entered into by 5 parties,
the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
However, due to outbreak of epidemic SARS, the Arbitral
Tribunal decided to hold its sittings first at Amsterdam and
then at London and the parties did not object to this. In the
proceedings held on 14-10-2003 and 15-10-2003 at London,
the Arbitral Tribunal recorded the consent of the parties for
shifting the juridical seat of arbitration to London. Whether
this amounted to shifting of the physical or juridical seat of
arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London? The decision of
this would depend on a holistic consideration of the relevant
clauses of the PSC.
21. Though, it may appear repetitive, we deem it
necessary to mention that as per the terms of agreement,
the seat of arbitration was Kuala Lumpur. If the parties
wanted to amend Article 34.12, they could have done so only
by a written instrument which was required to be signed by
all of them. Admittedly, neither there was any agreement
between the parties to the PSC to shift the juridical seat of
arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to London nor was any written
instrument signed by them for amending Article 34.12.
Therefore, the mere fact that the parties to the particular
arbitration had agreed for shifting of the seat of arbitration to
London cannot be interpreted as anything except physical
change of the venue of arbitration from Kuala Lumpur to
London.”
16. The aforesaid judgment would have no application
to the facts of the present case as there is nothing akin to
Clause 35.2, which is the amendment clause which was
applied to the facts in Videocon case [Videocon Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 161 : (2011) 3 SCC
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(Civ) 257] . This being the case, the parties may mutually
arrive at a seat of arbitration and may change the seat of
arbitration by mutual agreement which is recorded by the
arbitrator in his award to which no challenge is made by
either party.
17. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
respondent on Indus Mobile [Indus Mobile Distribution (P)
Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 :
(2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , and in particular, on paras 18 and
19 thereof, would also support the appellant's case,
inasmuch as the “venue” being shifted from Jaipur to
Ahmedabad is really a shifting of the venue/place of
arbitration with reference to Section 20(1), and not with
reference to Section 20(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, as it has been made clear that Jaipur does not
continue to be the seat of arbitration and Ahmedabad is now
the seat designated by the parties, and not a venue to hold
meetings. The learned arbitrator has recorded that by mutual
agreement, Jaipur as a “venue” has gone and has been
replaced by Ahmedabad. As Clause 8.5 of the purchase
order must be read as a whole, it is not possible to accept
the submission of Shri Malkan that the jurisdiction of courts
in Rajasthan is independent of the venue being at Jaipur.
The two clauses must be read together as the courts in
Rajasthan have been vested with jurisdiction only because
the seat of arbitration was to be at Jaipur. Once the seat of
arbitration is replaced by mutual agreement to be at
Ahmedabad, the courts at Rajasthan are no longer vested
with jurisdiction as exclusive jurisdiction is now vested in the
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courts at Ahmedabad, given the change in the seat of
arbitration.
18. For all these reasons, it is clear that the impugned
judgment [Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.,
2019 SCC OnLine Guj 5671] cannot stand and is set aside.
The parties are now referred to the courts at Ahmedabad for
the resolution of the Section 34 petition.
19. Vide order dated 12-12-2019 [Inox Renewables
Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2036] ,
this Court stayed the execution proceedings in Execution
Petition No. 117 of 2019 on the condition that the appellant
shall deposit an amount of Rs 40,00,000 in this Court, which
has been so deposited. This deposit will now be transferred
to the appropriate forum at Ahmedabad by which the Section
34 petition will be decided. The execution proceedings shall
remain stayed till the disposal of the Section 34 petition
unless the appropriate forum at Ahmedabad varies this
interim order.
20. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
21. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of
accordingly.”
15. In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court took note of
the facts and circumstances obtaining in the said case and
recorded a finding that by mutual agreement, both parties had
expressly and mutually agreed that the seat of arbitration would be
changed/shifted from Jaipur to Ahmedabad and having done so,
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the seat or arbitration was held to be Ahmedabad and the appeal
was disposed of accordingly; in the instant case, in the absence of
any material to conclusively establish that both parties had agreed
that both parties had mutually agreed to shift / change the seat of
arbitration from Udupi / Manipal to Mangalore, merely because the
sole arbitrator who was based out of Mangalore and accordingly,
conducted the arbitration proceedings at Mangalore, it cannot be
said that the seat of arbitration was at Mangalore, which was only
the venue for conducting arbitration proceedings and the seat of
arbitration and jurisdiction of the civil court to file the instant petition
before the commercial court at Udupi / Manipal and not at
Mangalore and consequently, the commercial court came to the
correct conclusion by rejecting the application filed by the
petitioner.
16.
In BBR (India)’s case supra, the Apex Court
considered its earlier judgments in Inox Renewables and BGS
SGS cases supra, and held as under:“ 12. However, this order has been set aside by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana vide order dated 14-102019 [S.P. Singla Constructions (P) Ltd. v. BBR (India) (P)
Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 4287] , with the finding that the
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courts of Delhi do not have the jurisdiction to entertain the
objections under Section 34 of the Act. To this effect, the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana has recorded that the
agreement between the parties was silent as to “the seat” of
the arbitration proceedings, and the second arbitrator Mr
Justice (Retd.) T.S. Doabia, vide his first order dated 30-62015, had not determined Delhi to be the “seat of
arbitration”. Relying on the decision of this Court in State of
W.B. v. Associated Contractors [State of W.B. v. Associated
Contractors, (2015) 1 SCC 32 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 1] , the
High Court held that the courts at Panchkula had jurisdiction
to deal with the case. The review application filed by the
appellant was dismissed vide order dated 8-11-2019 [S.P.
Singla Constructions (P) Ltd. v. BBR (India) (P) Ltd., 2019
SCC OnLine P&H 6265] .
13. These orders, passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana, have been assailed before us by the appellant
in these appeals. By order dated 9-1-2020 [BBR (India) (P)
Ltd. v. S.P. Singhla Constructions (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 1391] , notice was issued in the present appeals.
14. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, which defines the term
“court”; Section 20 on the “place of arbitration”; as well as
Section 42 read thus:
“2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
(e) “Court” means—
(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international
commercial arbitration, the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in
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exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having
jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subjectmatter of the arbitration if the same had been the subjectmatter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a
grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of
Small Causes;
20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are free to agree
on the place of arbitration.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), the
place of arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case,
including the convenience of the parties.
(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the
Arbitral Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses,
experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods
or other property.
***
42. Jurisdiction.— Notwithstanding anything contained
elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being
in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any
application under this Part has been made in a Court, that
Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of
that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in
that Court and in no other Court.”
15. Interpretation of the term “court”, as defined in
clause (e) to sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act, had
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come up for consideration before a Constitutional Bench of
five Judges in BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc. [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,
(2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , (for short
“BALCO case”) which decision had examined the distinction
between “jurisdictional seat” and “venue” in the context of
international arbitration, to hold that the expression “seat of
arbitration” is the centre of gravity in arbitration. However,
this does not mean that all arbitration proceedings must take
place at “the seat”. The arbitrators at times hold meetings at
more convenient locations. Regarding the expression “court”,
it was observed that Section 2(2) of the Act does not make
Part I applicable to arbitrations seated outside India. The
expressions used in Section 2(2) [ See para 20 below. By
Act 3 of 2016 proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act has been
inserted with retrospective effect from 23-10-2015, and the
provision as substituted/amended by Act 33 of 2019 for
clause (a), now reads—“(2) Scope.—This Part shall apply
where the place of arbitration is in India:Provided that subject
to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of Sections 9,
27 and clause (b) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of
Section 37 shall also apply to international commercial
arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India,
and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is
enforceable and recognised under the provisions of Part II of
this Act.”] of the Act do not permit an interpretation to hold
that Part I would also apply to arbitrations held outside the
territory of India.
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16. Noticing the above interpretation, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd.
[BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 :
(2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] has observed that the expression
“subject to arbitration” used in clause (e) to sub-section (1) of
Section 2 of the Act cannot be confused with the “subjectmatter of the suit”. The term “subject-matter of the suit” in the
said provision is confined to Part I. The purpose of the
clause is to identify the courts having supervisory control
over the judicial proceedings. Hence, the clause refers to a
court which would be essentially a court of “the seat” of the
arbitration process. Accordingly, clause (e) to sub-section (1)
of Section 2 has to be construed keeping in view the
provisions of Section 20 of the Act, which are, in fact,
determinative and relevant when we decide the question of
“the seat of an arbitration”. This interpretation recognises the
principle of “party autonomy”, which is the edifice of
arbitration. In other words, the term “court” as defined in
clause (e) to sub-section (1) of Section 2, which refers to the
“subject-matter of arbitration”, is not necessarily used as
finally determinative of the court's territorial jurisdiction to
entertain proceedings under the Act.
17. In BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC
Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] , this Court
observed that any other construction of the provisions would
render Section 20 of the Act nugatory. In view of the Court,
the legislature had given jurisdiction to two courts : the court
which should have jurisdiction where the cause of action is
located; and the court where the arbitration takes place. This
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is necessary as, on some occasions, the agreement may
provide the “seat of arbitration” that would be neutral to both
the parties. The courts where the arbitration takes place
would be required to exercise supervisory control over the
arbitral process. The “seat of arbitration” need not be the
place where any cause of action has arisen, in the sense
that the “seat of arbitration” may be different from the place
where obligations are/had to be performed under the
contract. In such circumstances, both the courts should have
jurisdiction viz. the courts within whose jurisdiction “the
subject-matter of the suit” is situated and the courts within
whose jurisdiction the dispute resolution forum, that is, where
the Arbitral Tribunal is located.
18. Turning to Section 20 of the Act, sub-section (1) in
clear terms states that the parties can agree on the place of
arbitration. The word “free” has been used to emphasise the
autonomy and flexibility that the parties enjoy to agree on a
place of arbitration which is unrestricted and need not be
confined to the place where the “subject-matter of the suit” is
situated. Sub-section (1) to Section 20 gives primacy to the
agreement of the parties by which they are entitled to fix and
specify “the seat of arbitration”, which then, by operation of
law, determines the jurisdictional court that will, in the said
case, exercise territorial jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) comes
into the picture only when the parties have not agreed on the
place of arbitration as “the seat”. [ Section 20(2) also applies
when “the seat” as mentioned in the agreement is only a
convenient venue.] In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 20
the Arbitral Tribunal determines the place of arbitration. The
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Arbitral Tribunal, while doing so, can take into regard the
circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the
parties. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act enables the
Arbitral Tribunal, unless the parties have agreed to the
contrary, to meet at any place to conduct hearing at a place
of convenience in matters, such as consultation among its
members, for the recording of witnesses, experts or hearing
parties, inspection of documents, goods, or property.
19. Relying upon the Constitutional Bench decision in
BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,
(2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , in BGS SGS
Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234
: (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] , it has been held that sub-section
(3) of Section 20 refers to “venue” whereas the “place”
mentioned in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) refers to
the “jurisdictional seat”. To explain the difference, in BALCO
[BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012)
9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , a case relating to
international arbitration, reference was made to several
judgments, albeit the judgment in Shashoua v. Sharma
[Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm)] was
extensively quoted to observe that an agreement as to the
“seat of arbitration” draws in the law of that country as the
curial law and is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause. [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282
(CA)] The parties that have agreed to “the seat” must
challenge an interim or final award only in the courts of the
place designated as the “seat of arbitration”. In other words,
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the choice of the “seat of arbitration” must be the choice of a
forum/court for remedies seeking to attack the award.
20. The aforesaid principles relating to international
arbitration have been applied to domestic arbitrations. In this
regard, we may refer to para 38 of BGS SGS Soma [BGS
SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2
SCC (Civ) 606] , which reads as under : (SCC p. 274)
“38. A reading of paras 75, 76, 96, 110, 116, 123 and
194 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810]
would show that where parties have selected the seat of
arbitration in their agreement, such selection would then
amount to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, as the parties
have now indicated that the courts at the “seat” would alone
have jurisdiction to entertain challenges against the arbitral
award which have been made at the seat. The example
given in para 96 buttresses this proposition, and is supported
by the previous and subsequent paragraphs pointed out
hereinabove. The BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 810] judgment, when read as a whole, applies the
concept of “seat” as laid down by the English judgments (and
which is in Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1996), by
harmoniously construing Section 20 with Section 2(1)(e), so
as to broaden the definition of “court”, and bring within its
ken courts of the “seat” of the arbitration [ Section 3 of the
English Arbitration Act, 1996 defines “seat” as follows:“3.
The seat of the arbitration.—In this Part “the seat of the
arbitration” means the juridical seat of the arbitration
designated—(a) by the parties to the arbitration agreement,
or (b) by any arbitral or other institution or person vested by
the parties with powers in that regard, or (c) by the Arbitral
Tribunal if so authorised by the parties, or determined, in the
absence of any such designation, having regard to the
parties' agreement and all the relevant circumstances.”It will
be noticed that this section closely approximates with
Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1996. The meaning
of “Court” is laid down in Section 105 of the English
Arbitration Act, 1996 whereby the Lord Chancellor may, by
order, make provision allocating and specifying proceedings
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under the Act which may go to the High Court or to County
Courts.] .”
21. The Court in BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma
JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ)
606] , then proceeded to examine the contention whether
para 96 of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] ,
which speaks of concurrent jurisdiction of the courts, that is,
the jurisdiction of courts where the cause of action has
arisen wholly or partly, and the courts within the jurisdiction
in which the dispute resolution forum — arbitration is
located, to observe and elucidate the legal position : (BGS
SGS Soma case [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020)
4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] , SCC pp. 274-75,
para 40)
“40. Para 96 of BALCO case [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] is in several parts. First and
foremost, Section 2(1)(e), which is the definition of “court”
under the Arbitration Act, 1996 was referred to, and was
construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996, which give recognition to party
autonomy in choosing the seat of the arbitration
proceedings. Secondly, the Court went on to state in two
places in the said paragraph that jurisdiction is given to two
sets of courts, namely, those courts which would have
jurisdiction where the cause of action is located; and those
courts where the arbitration takes place. However, when it
came to providing a neutral place as the “seat” of arbitration
proceedings, the example given by the five-Judge Bench
made it clear that appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act, 1996 against interim orders passed under Section 17 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996 would lie only to the courts of the
seat — which is Delhi in that example — which are the
courts having supervisory control, or jurisdiction, over the
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arbitration proceedings. The example then goes on to state
that this would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations
to be performed under the contract, that is, the cause of
action, may arise in part either at Mumbai or Kolkata. The
fact that the arbitration is to take place in Delhi is of
importance. However, the next sentence in the said
paragraph reiterates the concurrent jurisdiction of both
courts.”
22.BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC
Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606]
extensively refers to the judgment of this Court in Indus
Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd.
[Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations
(P) Ltd., (2017) 7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , which
decision refers to the legislative history of Section 2(1)(e)
and Section 20 of the Act and the recommendations of the
246th
Law
Commission
Report,
2014.
These
recommendations, it is observed, were not implemented in
consonance with the decision in BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] , which, in no uncertain terms,
refers to the “place” as the “jurisdictional seat” for the
purpose of clause (e) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the
Act. This judgment was subsequently followed in Brahmani
River Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd. [Brahmani River
Pellets Ltd. v. Kamachi Industries Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 462 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 326]
23. It may, however, be noted that clause (e) to subsection (1) of Section 2 was amended by inserting subclause (ii) [ “2. (1)(e)(ii) in the case of international
commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its
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ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide
the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if
the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other
cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from
decrees of courts subordinate to that High Court;”] with the
specific objective to solve the problem of conflict of
jurisdiction that would arise in cases where interim measures
are sought in India in cases of arbitration seated outside
India. In the context of domestic arbitrations it must be held
that once the “seat of arbitration” has been fixed, then the
courts at the said location alone will have exclusive
jurisdiction to exercise the supervisory powers over the
arbitration. The courts at other locations would not have
jurisdiction, including the courts where cause of action has
arisen. As observed above and held in BGS SGS Soma
[BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 :
(2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] , and Indus Mobile [ In Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017)
7 SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760, the Court after clearing
the air on the meaning of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act,
1996 made it clear that the moment a seat is designated by
agreement between the parties, it is akin to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause, which would then vest the courts at the
“seat” with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating
arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between
the parties.] , the moment the parties by agreement
designate “the seat”, it becomes akin to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause. It would then vest the courts at “the seat”
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with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate arbitration proceedings
arising out of the agreement between the parties.
24. The Court in BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma
JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ)
606] has also dealt with the situation where the parties have
not agreed on or have not fixed the jurisdictional “seat of
arbitration”, and has laid down the following test to determine
the “seat of arbitration” which would determine the location
of the court that would exercise supervisory jurisdiction. The
test is simple and reads : (SCC p. 289, para 61)
“61. It will thus be seen that wherever there is an express
designation of a “venue”, and no designation of any
alternative place as the “seat”, combined with a
supranational body of rules governing the arbitration, and no
other significant contrary indicia, the inexorable conclusion is
that the stated venue is actually the juridical seat of the
arbitral proceeding.”
For formulating the test reference was made to several
Indian and foreign judgments to emphasise that where the
parties had failed to choose the “jurisdictional seat” [BGS
SGS Soma JV v. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Civ) 606 case also examines and explains case law where
the courts have held that so called “seat” mentioned in the
agreement is convenient “venue” an aspect with which we
are not concerned in the present case.] which would be
governing the arbitral proceedings, the proceedings must be
considered at any rate prima facie as being governed and
subject to jurisdiction of the court where the arbitration is
being held, on the ground that the said court is most likely to
be connected with the proceedings. [ See the principle culled
out by Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws (11th Edn.,
Sweet and Maxwell, 1987).]
25. Accordingly, in BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma
JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ)
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606] , the law as applicable, where the parties by agreement
have not fixed the jurisdictional “seat”, is crystallised as
under : (SCC pp. 301-02, para 82)
“82. On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it
may be concluded that whenever there is the designation of
a place of arbitration in an arbitration clause as being the
“venue” of the arbitration proceedings, the expression
“arbitration proceedings” would make it clear that the “venue”
is really the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, as the
aforesaid expression does not include just one or more
individual or particular hearing, but the arbitration
proceedings as a whole, including the making of an award at
that place. This language has to be contrasted with language
such as “tribunals are to meet or have witnesses, experts or
the parties” where only hearings are to take place in the
“venue”, which may lead to the conclusion, other things
being equal, that the venue so stated is not the “seat” of
arbitral proceedings, but only a convenient place of meeting.
Further, the fact that the arbitral proceedings “shall be held”
at a particular venue would also indicate that the parties
intended to anchor arbitral proceedings to a particular place,
signifying thereby, that that place is the seat of the arbitral
proceedings. This, coupled with there being no other
significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is merely a
“venue” and not the “seat” of the arbitral proceedings, would
then conclusively show that such a clause designates a
“seat” of the arbitral proceedings. In an international context,
if a supranational body of rules is to govern the arbitration,
this would further be an indicia that “the venue”, so stated,
would be the seat of the arbitral proceedings. In a national
context, this would be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996
as applying to the “stated venue”, which then becomes the
“seat” for the purposes of arbitration.”
26. BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC
Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] also refers
to decision of this Court in Union of India v. Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc. [Union of India v. Hardy
Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019) 13 SCC 472 :
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(2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790 — In this case the parties had not
chosen the seat of arbitration and the Arbitral Tribunal had
also not determined the seat of arbitration. Therefore it was
held that the choice of Kuala Lumpur as the venue of
arbitration did not imply that Kuala Lumpur had become the
seat of arbitration.] , which had held that the choice of the
venue of arbitration did not imply that it had become the
“seat of arbitration” and that the venue could not by itself
assume the status of “the seat”; instead a venue could
become “the seat” only if “something else is added to it as a
concomitant”. According to BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS
Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Civ) 606] , the reasoning given in Hardy Exploration [Union
of India v. Hardy Exploration & Production (India) Inc., (2019)
13 SCC 472 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 790 — In this case the
parties had not chosen the seat of arbitration and the Arbitral
Tribunal had also not determined the seat of arbitration.
Therefore it was held that the choice of Kuala Lumpur as the
venue of arbitration did not imply that Kuala Lumpur had
become the seat of arbitration.] is per incuriam as it
contradicts the ratio and law laid down in BALCO [BALCO v.
Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552
: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] . Hence, BGS SGS Soma [BGS
SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2
SCC (Civ) 606] holds that it would be correct to hold that
while exercising jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section
20 of the Act, an arbitrator is not to pass a detailed or a
considered decision. The place where the Arbitral Tribunal
holds the arbitration proceedings would, by default, be the
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venue
of
arbitration and
consequently the
“seat
of
arbitration”.
27. When we turn to the facts of the present case, if
the
arbitration
proceedings
were
held
throughout
in
Panchkula, there would have been no difficulty in holding
that Delhi is not the jurisdictional “seat”. But that was not to
be, as on recusal of Mr Justice (Retd.) N.C. Jain and post
the appointment of Mr Justice (Retd.) T.S. Doabia arbitration
proceedings were held at Delhi. In the context of the present
case and noticing the first order passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal on 5-8-2014 stipulating that the place of the
proceedings would be Panchkula in Haryana and in the
absence of other significant indica on application of Section
20(2) of the Act, the city of Panchkula in Haryana would be
the jurisdictional “seat” of arbitration. As “the seat” was fixed
vide the order dated 5-8-2014, the courts in Delhi would not
have jurisdiction.
28. The appellant, however, contends that on the
appointment of the new arbitrator, namely, Mr Justice (Retd.)
T.S. Doabia, and thereupon the venue being fixed at Delhi,
the jurisdictional “seat of arbitration” had changed from
Panchkula in Haryana to Delhi.
29. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision
of this Court in Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals
Ltd. [Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd., (2023)
3 SCC 733 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 448] in which the “seat of
arbitration” fixed by the parties was Jaipur, but the courts at
Ahmedabad had entertained the challenge to the award. The
appellant submits that the courts at Ahmedabad had
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exercised jurisdiction, which was upheld on the ground that
the arbitration proceedings were conducted in Ahmedabad.
Thus the “seat of arbitration” changed and had got relocated
from Jaipur to Ahmedabad. This, in the context of the
decision in Inox Renewables [Inox Renewables Ltd. v.
Jayesh Electricals Ltd., (2023) 3 SCC 733 : 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 448] , is undoubtedly correct, but the aforesaid
decision cannot be read as a precept in cases governed by
sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act. Inox Renewables
[Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd., (2023) 3
SCC 733 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 448] was a case governed
under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, that is, where
parties by the agreement had fixed the jurisdictional “seat” at
Jaipur, Rajasthan, but thereafter, by mutual consent, had
decided to change the venue of proceedings to Ahmedabad
prior to the commencement of the arbitration. This evidently
resulted in the decision of this Court accepting that the
jurisdictional “seat of arbitration” was Ahmedabad. This
decision would apply in case the parties, by consent, agree
mutually that the “seat of arbitration” would be located at a
particular place. The said exercise would be in terms of subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Act, which endorses and
emphasises on party autonomy and choice that determines
the “seat of arbitration”. It would not apply when the arbitrator
fixes “the seat” in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of
the Act. Once the arbitrator fixes “the seat” in terms of subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the arbitrator cannot
change “the seat” of the arbitration, except when and if the
parties mutually agree and state that the “seat of arbitration”
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should be changed to another location, which is not so in the
present case.
30. There are good reasons why we feel that
subsequent hearings or proceedings at a different location
other than the place fixed by the arbitrator as the “seat of
arbitration” should not be regarded and treated as a change
or relocation of jurisdictional “seat”. This would, in our
opinion, lead to uncertainty and confusion resulting in
avoidable esoteric and hermetic litigation as to the
jurisdictional “seat of arbitration”. “The seat” once fixed by
the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 20(2), should remain
static and fixed, whereas the “venue” of arbitration can
change and move from “the seat” to a new location. Venue is
not constant and stationary and can move and change in
terms of sub-section (3) to Section 20 of the Act. Change of
venue does not result in change or relocation of the “seat of
arbitration”.
31. It is highly desirable in commercial matters, in fact
in all cases, that there should be certainty as to the court that
should exercise jurisdiction. We do not think the law of
arbitration visualises repeated or constant shifting of the
“seat of arbitration”. In fact, sub-section (3) of Section 20
specifically states and draws a distinction between the venue
of arbitration and the “seat of arbitration” by stating that for
convenience and other reasons, the arbitration proceedings
may be held at a place different than the “seat of arbitration”,
which location is referred to as the venue of arbitration. If we
accept this contention of the appellant, we would, as
observed in C v. D [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA
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Civ 1282 (CA)] , create a recipe for litigation and (what is
worse) confusion which was not intended by the Act. The
place of jurisdiction or “the seat” must be certain and static
and not vague or changeable, as the parties should not be in
doubt as to the jurisdiction of the courts for availing of judicial
remedies. Further, there would be a risk of parties rushing to
the courts to get first hearing or conflicting decisions that the
law does not contemplate and is to be avoided.
32. A secondary contention to support the said plea
on the ground that the courts where arbitration proceedings
are being conducted should be given supervisory powers, on
in-depth consideration, must be rejected as feeble when we
juxtapose the unacceptable practicable consequences that
emerge. Exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by the courts
where the arbitration proceedings are being conducted is a
relevant
consideration,
but
not
a
conclusive
and
determinative factor when the venue is not “the seat”. “The
seat” determines the jurisdiction of the courts. There would
be situations where the venue of arbitration in terms of subsection (3) of Section 20 would be different from the place of
the jurisdictional “seat”, and it is equally possible majority or
most of the hearing may have taken place at a venue which
is different from the “seat of arbitration”. Further, on balance,
we find that the aspect of certainty as to the court's
jurisdiction must be given and accorded priority over the
contention that the supervisory courts located at the place
akin to the venue where the arbitration proceedings were
conducted or substantially conducted should be preferred.
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33. At this stage, we must also deal with the
appellant's argument that substantive proceedings were held
in Delhi and, therefore, it would be the “seat of arbitration”.
The proceedings before the first arbitration at Panchkula,
Haryana, were
restricted
to
filing
of pleadings
and
documents. On deeper consideration, this argument should
be rejected for the reasons recorded above, as it will lead to
confusion and uncertainty. The legal question raised in the
present case must be answered objectively and not
subjectively with reference to the facts of a particular case.
Otherwise, there would be a lack of clarity and consequent
mix-up about the courts that would exercise jurisdiction.
There could be cases where the arbitration proceedings are
held at different locations, but the “seat of arbitration”, as
agreed by the parties or as determined by the arbitrator, may
be different, and at that place — “the seat”, only a few
hearings or initial proceedings may have been held. This
would not matter and would not result in shifting of the
jurisdictional “seat”. Arbitrators can fix the place of residence,
place of work, or in case of recusal, arbitration proceedings
may be held at two different places, as in the present case.
34. For clarity and certainty, which is required when
the question of territorial jurisdiction arises, we would hold
that the place or the venue fixed for arbitration proceedings,
when sub-section (2) of Section 20 applies, will be the
jurisdictional “seat” and the courts having jurisdiction over
the jurisdictional “seat” would have exclusive jurisdiction.
This principle would have exception that would apply when
by mutual consent the parties agree that the jurisdictional
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“seat” should be changed, and such consent must be
express and clearly understood and agreed by the parties.
35. We have quoted Section 42 of the Act. Section 42
was also examined in BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV
v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606]
and the view expressed by the Delhi High Court in Antrix
Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd. [Antrix Corpn. Ltd.
v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338]
was overruled observing that the Section 42 is meant to
avoid conflicts of jurisdiction of courts by placing the
supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitration proceedings in
connection with the arbitration proceedings with one court
exclusively.
The
aforesaid
observation
supports
our
reasoning that once the jurisdictional “seat” of arbitration is
fixed in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act,
then, without the express mutual consent of the parties to the
arbitration, “the seat” cannot be changed. Therefore, the
appointment of a new arbitrator who holds the arbitration
proceedings at a different location would not change the
jurisdictional “seat” already fixed by the earlier or first
arbitrator. The place of arbitration in such an event should be
treated as a venue where arbitration proceedings are held.
36. We would now reproduce para 59 of the judgment
in BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd.,
(2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] , which
examines Section 42 of the Act and reads as under : (SCC
pp. 288-89)
“59. Equally incorrect is the finding in Antrix Corpn. [Antrix
Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine
Del 9338] that Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would
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be rendered ineffective and useless. Section 42 is meant to
avoid conflicts in jurisdiction of courts by placing the
supervisory jurisdiction over all arbitral proceedings in
connection with the arbitration in one court exclusively. This
is why the section begins with a non obstante clause, and
then goes on to state ‘… where with respect to an arbitration
agreement any application under this Part has been made in
a court…’. It is obvious that the application made under this
Part to a court must be a court which has jurisdiction to
decide such application. The subsequent holdings of this
court, that where a seat is designated in an agreement, the
courts of the seat alone have jurisdiction, would require that
all applications under Part I be made only in the court where
the seat is located, and that court alone then has jurisdiction
over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications
arising out of the arbitral agreement. So read, Section 42 is
not rendered ineffective or useless. Also, where it is found on
the facts of a particular case that either no “seat” is
designated by agreement, or the so-called “seat” is only a
convenient “venue”, then there may be several courts where
a part of the cause of action arises that may have
jurisdiction. Again, an application under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 may be preferred before a court in
which part of the cause of action arises in a case where
parties have not agreed on the “seat” of arbitration, and
before such “seat” may have been determined, on the facts
of a particular case, by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section
20(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. In both these situations,
the earliest application having been made to a court in which
a part of the cause of action arises would then be the
exclusive court under Section 42, which would have control
over the arbitral proceedings. For all these reasons, the law
stated by the Bombay [Nivaran Solutions v. Aura Thia Spa
Services (P) Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5062] , [Konkola
Copper Mines v. Stewarts & Lloyds of India Ltd., 2013 SCC
OnLine Bom 777] and Delhi [Antrix Corpn. Ltd. v. Devas
Multimedia (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9338] High
Courts in this regard is incorrect and is overruled.”
37. We have already referred to the first few
sentences of the aforementioned paragraph and explained
the reasoning in the context of the present case. The
paragraph in BGS SGS Soma [BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC
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Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 606] also
explains the non obstante effect as incorporated in Section
42 to hold that it is evident that the application made under
Part I must be to a court which has a jurisdiction to decide
such application. Where “the seat” is designated in the
agreement, the courts of “the seat” alone will have the
jurisdiction. Thus, all applications under Part I will be made in
the court where “the seat” is located as that court would
alone have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and
all subsequent proceedings arising out of the arbitration
proceedings. The quotation also clarifies that when either no
“seat” is designated by an agreement, or the so-called “seat”
is only a convenient venue, then there may be several courts
where a part of the cause of action arises that may have
jurisdiction. An application under Section 9 of the Act may be
preferred before the court in which a part of cause of action
arises in the case where parties had not agreed on the “seat
of arbitration”. This is possible in the absence of an
agreement fixing “the seat”, as an application under Section
9 may be filed before “the seat” is determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 20(2) of the Act. Consequently, in
such situations, the court where the earliest application has
been made, being the court in which a part or entire of the
cause of action arises, would then be the exclusive court
under Section 42 of the Act. Accordingly, such a court would
have control over the arbitration proceedings. [ We are not
examining and are not required to decide the question—
whether there is a difference between the expression “court”
and the “Chief Justice or his nominee” in the present case.]
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38. Section 42 is to no avail as it does not help the
case propounded by the appellant, as in the present case
the arbitrator had fixed the jurisdictional “seat” under Section
20(2) of the Act before any party had moved the court under
the Act, being a court where a part or whole of the cause of
action had arisen. The appellant had moved the Delhi High
Court under Section 34 of the Act after the Arbitral Tribunal
vide the order dated 5-8-2014 had fixed the jurisdictional
“seat” at Panchkula in Haryana. Consequently, the appellant
cannot, based on the fastest finger first principle, claim that
the courts in Delhi get exclusive jurisdiction in view of
Section 42 of the Act. The reason is simple that before the
application under Section 34 was filed, the jurisdictional
“seat” of arbitration had been determined and fixed under
sub-section (2) of Section 20 and thereby, the courts having
jurisdiction over Panchkula in Haryana, have exclusive
jurisdiction. The courts in Delhi would not get jurisdiction as
the jurisdictional “seat of arbitration” is Panchkula and not
Delhi.
39. In view of the aforesaid discussion and reasons,
we do not find any merit in the present appeals, and the
same are dismissed without any order as to costs.”
17.
Insofar as the contention urged by the learned counsel
for the petitioner that on 30.12.2019 which was the first date of
hearing of the arbitration proceedings before the sole arbitrator at
Mangalore, both sides agreed that the seat of arbitration shall be
Mangalore, as a result of which, the seat of arbitration was shifted
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from Manipal / Udupi to Mangalore for the purpose of jurisdiction
and filing of the present petition in A.P.No.14/2024 which ought to
have been filed at Mangalore and not before the commercial court
at Udupi, which did not have jurisdiction is concerned, the said
contention cannot be accepted for more than one reason; firstly,
respondent
specifically
asserts
and
contends
that
except
instructing his counsel to file vakalath and enter appearance on his
behalf on 30.12.2019, the respondent did not give any instructions
to his counsel to give consent or mutually agree for shifting of the
seat of arbitration from Manipal / Udupi to Mangalore; it is
contended by the respondent that he had instructed his learned
counsel that he did not have any objection for the venue of
arbitration proceedings to be at Mangalore where the sole
arbitrator was stationed / based and that at no point in time, did the
respondent instruct or give consent or mutually agree for shifting of
the seat of arbitration from Manipal / Udupi to Mangalore and all
that he agreed was for the venue of arbitration to be at Mangalore;
thirdly, the order sheet dated 30.12.2019 in the arbitral proceedings
in A.C.No.7/2019 does not record any consent by the respondent
for shifting of the seat of arbitration from Manipal / Udupi to
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Mangalore; lastly, the expression “seat of arbitration” contained in
the said order sheet dated 30.12.2019 is clearly a misnomer which
actually refers to “venue of arbitration” and not “seat of arbitration”,
especially in the absence of any other material on record to
establish express consent or mutual agreement between the
parties to shift the seat or arbitration from Manipal / Udupi to
Mangalore; at any rate, except the stray usage of the expression
“seat of arbitration”, the material on record does not satisfy or fulfill
the requirements of the parties mutually agreeing to or giving
consent to change the seat of arbitration from Manipal / Udupi to
Mangalore, albeit agreeing that the venue of arbitration would be at
Mangalore, since the arbitrator was based / stationed at Mangalore
and in the light of the principles enunciated by the Apex Court in
this regard and consequently, the said contention urged by the
petitioner cannot be accepted.
18.
A perusal of the impugned orders passed by the
commercial court rejecting I.A.Nos. 3 and 5 filed by the petitioner
will indicate that the commercial court has correctly and properly
considered and appreciated the entire material on record and has
arrived at the correct conclusion that it is the commercial court at
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Udupi that had jurisdiction who entertain and adjudicate upon the
petition filed by the respondent by holding as under::Order on IA-III; U/O 7 Rule 10 r/w Section 151 of CPC:
Respondent-1 moved this application seeking to
return the petition for want of jurisdiction.
2. Petitioner resist the application by filing statement
of objections.
3. Heard both side; perused records.
4. Following point arises for consideration; Whether
respondent-1 made out a case to return the petition as
prayed?
5. Answer to the above point is in negative for the
following;
REASONS
6.
At the outset; petition
is
filed questioning
correctness of Arbitral Award (in short ‘AA’) passed in
AC.No.7/19. 7. Respondent-1 marks its appearance and
filed the application at hand for the relief stated supra by
stating that; petition is filed under Section 34 of Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short ‘A&C’ Act) challenging
the AA dated 27.08.2024 passed by Sole Arbitrator
Sri.Moosa Kunhi, Retired District & Sessions Judge at
Mangaluru in AC.No.07 of 2019.
i) Petitioner offered schedule property to develop by
constructing a multi-storied apartment building; they entered
into a Joint Development Agreement (in short ‘JDA’) dated
24.11.2008. Construction of "Manipal Lake-view" was
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stopped midway due to fault of petitioner and in breach of
the terms of JDA.
ii) Dispute arose; respondent-1 invoked arbitration
clause of JDA and filed a petition before the Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka for appointment of arbitrator in
СМР.No.255 of 2018.
iii) As per arbitration clause in Clause No.30 of JDA
the venue of arbitration was mutually decided to be at Udupi.
But when CMP.No.255/18 came up for hearing both
petitioner and the respondent have mutually consented for
change of seat of arbitration to Mangaluru & for appointment
of Arbitrator Sri.Moosa Kunhi, Retired District & Sessions
Judge at Mangaluru.
iv) When, petitioner and respondent has mutually
consented for change in the seat of arbitration to Mangaluru
in CMP.No.255/18, the jurisdiction to file petition under
Section 34 of the AC Act can be only filed before the Hon’ble
High Court or the District Court having original civil
jurisdiction where the seat of arbitration lies and the same
has been upheld by the Apex Court in case of Inox
Renewables Ltd Vs Jayesh Electrical’s Ltd reported in 2023
(3) SCC 733.
v) Petitioner and the respondent have even subjected
to the jurisdiction of District Court at Mangaluru after having
filed petition under Section 29A for grant of extension of
time to arbitration proceedings in AA.No.28/23 on the file of
IV Additional District Judge at Mangaluru.
v) The seat of arbitration in AP.No.7/19 is different
from the venue decided by the parties in the arbitration
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clause No.30 of the JDA and seat of arbitration is at
Mangaluru.
vi) Petitioner cannot incautiously file petition before
this Court challenging the arbitral award when this Court
without any recourse lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
above case.
8. Petitioner objected the application by contending
that; application is false, frivolous and vexations and the
same is not maintainable in law or on merits.
a) It is denied that; deponent Mr.Suresh Bhandary is
the Director of Respondent Company and he has got locus
to file this application.
b) It is denied that; construction of the building was
stopped midway due to the fault of petitioner or breach in
terms of JDA.Respondent-1 without obtaining clearance
Certificate
from
Environmental
Authority
started
the
construction at Manipal and said Authority filed criminal
case, wherein respondent-1 was convicted.
c) It is false to say that; venue of arbitration was
mutually consented for change as seat of arbitration to
Mangaluru in CMP.No.255/18 before the Hon’ble High Court,
wherein the Hon’ble Court only appointed Sri.Moosa Kunnhi
as the sole arbitrator and nothing else has been decided or
agreed. Learned Arbitrator for his convenience has only
changed the venue and not the seat of Arbitration as laid
down in Clause 30 of JDA. The Order of the High Court is
self explanatory but respondent-1 is twisting the facts to suite
its illegal purpose.
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d) The case of Inox Renewables 2023 (3) SCC 733 is
applicable only when there was mutual agreement between
the parties for the change of seat of arbitration as against the
admission of different seat in the Agreement. In this case,
only venue has been shifted from Manipal to Mangaluru for
convenience but seat remained unchanged as there was no
amendment to the JDA to this effect.
e) As per Circular dated 03.01.2024 in RJ.No.01/24 of
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka, it is stated that for the
extension of the period as contemplated under Section 29A
of the A&C Act, 1996, the jurisdiction of the District Court has
been taken away and the District Court cannot be construed
as the Court as mentioned in Section 2(1) (e) of the Act.
Therefore, though extension of time to arbitration proceeding
in AA 28/23 filed before the IV Additional District Judge,
Mangaluru cannot be accepted as acceptance of jurisdiction
of that Court under Section 42 of the said Act.
f) The JDA dated 24.11.2008 contains two clauses at
No.30 & 31, wherein clause No.30 prescribes the arbitration
clause and venue of arbitration at Manipal, Udupi and
whereas Clause No.31 prescribes that 'all disputes touching
or arising out of this agreement shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Courts of Udupi. The subject
matter of Agreement (immovable property) situated at
Shivally Village, Udupi Taluk & District. Admittedly, the
parties to JDA are not disputing the clause No.30 & 31 of
JDA nor those clauses were amended or there is an express
agreement between parties towards variation of the same,
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g) The respondent-1 in collusion with Government
Officials in order to grab the plaint property raised false
dispute over the JDA property situated at Manipal, Udupi & a
suit is filed before Udupi Court against Government Officials.
In addition, the respondent-1 has filed a false criminal case
against the petitioner in respect of the JDA property before
Udupi Court, which is pending for adjudication. These civil
and criminal cases related with the JDA property are pending
before the Udupi Court as per Clause 30 & 31 of JDA
Agreement.
h) The sole Arbitrator Sri.Moosa Kunhi was appointed
by the Hon.ble High Court of Karnataka in CMP.No.255/18
by order dated: 11-04-2019. Apart from appointing Sole
Arbitrator, the venue of Arbitrator's sitting has not been
decided by the Court.
i) Sole Arbitrator for convenience has shifted the
venue of arbitration tribunal from Manipal to Mangaluru, but it
is equally important to note that exclusive jurisdiction of
Udupi Courts or the seat of arbitration in resolving the
disputes arising out of the agreement has not been altered.
Therefore, for the purpose of disputes arising out of the
Arbitration Agreement, the Courts in Udupi District alone
have got the jurisdiction,
j) That pursuant to the passing of Award by the Sole
Arbitrator, petitioner has filed the present petition under
Section 34 of the Act in this Court. That as per Section
2(1)(e) of the Act, a petition under Section 34 shall be
submitted to the Court which is ceased of subject matter of
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dispute. Subject matter of dispute (immovable property)
situated at Shivally Village, Udupi Taluk.
k) Award passed by learned arbitrator is very much
silent about change of venue from Manipal to Mangaluru &
confirmation
of seat of arbitration at Mangaluru. When the Award is silent
on this fact, the Clauses 30 and 31 of the JDA gets priority
as them being not changed or altered. Therefore, petition is
maintainable.
9. It is worth to note that; in the case at hand
absolutely there is no dispute whatsoever with respect to
JDA and the terms and conditions enumerated therein. The
undisputed clause-30 & 31 reads thus;
“ 30. In case of any dispute between the parties to this
agreement regarding the interpretation of the terms and
conditions of this agreement or its enforcement or
compliance or non-compliance and anything arising out of
this agreement or in relation thereto or on account of
anything done pursuant thereto and any matter whatsoever
touching this agreement between the parties to this deed or
their legal representatives etc., it shall be referred to and
settled by arbitration as per the provisions of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1966 and the decision of the Arbitrator shall
be final and binding on both the parties. The owner and the
promoter agree that Mr.Paul Mascarenhs, Architect,
Mangalore & Mr.Nagesh Hegde, Udupi shall be the
Arbitrators to decide all such disputes and the venue of
arbitration proceedings shall be at Manipal City.
31. That all disputes touching or arising out of this
agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
Civil Courts of Udupi.”
10. For better understanding & appreciation let us see
what Section 20 of the A&C Act, 1996 says;
20. Place of arbitration.-(1) The parties are free to
agree on the place of arbitration.
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(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub- section
(1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the
arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of
the case, including the convenience of the parties.
(3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for
consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses,
experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods
or other property.
11. It is worth to note that; Section 20 (1) speaks of
party autonomy giving freedom to the parties to agree on
place of arbitration and choice given to the arbitral tribunal to
determine a convenient place as the place of arbitration
under of Section 20 (2).
12. On simple comparison of clause 30 & 31 and the
statutory provision Section 20 (1) supra one can say without
any hesitation that; here, parties agreed the place of
arbitration is Manipal, Udupi, as such Section 20 (2) and (3)
have no application to the facts at hand. And they also
agreed that; all disputes touching or arising out of
agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
civil courts of Udupi.
13. Indisputably, CMP.No.255 of 2018 was filed,
wherein at Para-6 it is stated that; When the matter taken up
today, learned counsel for the parties jointly submit that the
parties are from Mangaluru and Mr.Moosa Kunhi Nayarmole,
retired District & Sessions Judge be appointed as a sole
arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties.
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At Para-7 it is stated that; In view of the aforesaid
submission and in the facts of the case, I deem it
appropriate to appoint Mr.Moosa Kunhi Nayarmoole, retired
District and Sessions Judge, who is based in Mangaluru, as
the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the
parties.
14. On that basis arbitral proceedings AC.No.7/19
held at Mangaluru and AA was passed at Mangaluru, which
is impugned
herein.
15. Now the question that arises for consideration is; if
the place of arbitration is Manipal is fixed as per Section 20
(1) of A&C Act and the parties subjected to exclusive
territorial jurisdiction of Civil Courts of Udupi and arbitral
proceedings held at Mangaluru; AA was passed at
Managluru then which Court whether Court at Mangaluru or
Court at Udupi have the jurisdiction to entertain the
arbitration application under Section 34 of A&C Act.
16.
Answer
can
be
found
in
the
judicial
pronouncements which are discussed hereunder;
i)
In
Bharath
Aluminium
Company
V.
Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc, (2012) 9 SCC 552, the
constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court held that; for the
purpose of Section 2(2) of the A&C Act the ‘place’ referred to
as ‘juridical seat'. The word “place” used in Section 20(1) &
20(2) refers to “juridical seat”, whereas the word “place” used
in Section 20(3) is equivalent to “venue”. The “Court”
referred to in Section 2(1)(e) is to identify the
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Court having supervisory control over the arbitration
proceedings. Necessarily, it refers to the Court situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of the “seat” or “place” of
arbitration.
ii) In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. V. Datawind
Innovations (P) Ltd, (2017) 7 SCC 678, held that; the Court
situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the seat or place
of arbitration alone will entertain an application under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
iii) In Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. V. Kamachi
Industries Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 462, held that; the term ‘subject
matter’ in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act is to identify the ‘Court’
having supervisory control over arbitration proceedings and
that Section 20 read with Section 2(1)(e) will govern the field.
iv) In BGS SGS SOMA JV V. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4
SCC 234, held that; once the seat of arbitration is designated
or determined, the same operates as an exclusive
jurisdiction clause as a result of which only the Courts where
the seat is located would have jurisdiction over the
arbitration, to the exclusion of all other Courts, even Courts
where part of the cause of action may have arisen. It is also
held that; where it is found on the facts of a particular case
that either no ‘seat’ is designated by agreement, or has not
been so determined by the Arbitral Tribunal, or the so-called
‘seat’ is only a convenient ‘venue’, then there may be several
Courts where a part of the cause of action arises, that may
have jurisdiction over the arbitration,Wherever there is an
express designation of a “venue” and no designation of any
alternative place as the “seat”, and the same is combined
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with a supernational body of rules governing the arbitration,
and there are no other significant contrary indica, the
inexorable conclusion is that the stated venue is actually the
juridical seat of the arbitral proceeding, to the exclusion of all
other Courts, even Courts where part of the cause of action
may have arisen.
v) In BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd Vs SP Singla Constructions
Pvt. Ltd., 2023 (1) SCC 693, it is held that; the seat once
fixed by the arbitral tribunal under Section 20(2) should
remain static and fixed, whereas the venue of arbitration can
changed and move from the seat to a new location. Venue is
not constant and stationary and can move and change in
terms of sub Section (3) to Section 20 of the Act. Change of
venue does not result in change or re-location of the seat of
arbitration. Once the jurisdictional “seat” of arbitration is fixed
in terms of Section 20(2), then, without the express mutual
consent of the parties to the arbitration; the “seat” cannot be
changed. Such consent must be express and clearly
understood and agreed by the parties.
vi) In Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., V.
Mahakali Foods Private Ltd., (2023) 6 SCC 401, held that;
the place of arbitration for the parties, to entertain and
challenge to an arbitral award continues to be the place over
which the Court has been conferred with exclusive
jurisdiction, as agreed between the parties.
vii)
In
Shashidharan.K
V.
Manager,
Sundaram
Finance Ltd., 2018 (3) KHC 638, held that; the Court situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of the seat or place of
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arbitration alone will entertain an application under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
viii) In ARB.P.869/22 dated 12.10.22 (New Delhi),
Kush Raj Bhatia V. M/s DLF Power & Services Ltd., held
that; in agreement the arbitration clause indicates that; the
arbitration proceedings shall be held at an appropriate
location in New Delhi by a sole arbitrator. And the Civil
Courts at Gurugaon and High Court at Chandigrah alone
shall has jurisdiction. It is held that; it is quite evident that
there is a contraindication in the registered agreement that
while the venue of arbitration may be New Delhi, but the seat
of arbitration shall be Gurgaon and High Court at
Chandigarh. In the circumstances, it has to be held that New
Delhi Court has no jurisdiction and it is the Courts at
Gurgaon/High Court of Chandigarh which have exclusive
jurisdiction for entertaining the disputes arsing of the
registered lease agreement.
ix) In ARB.P.706/20, dated 09.11.22, (New Delhi),
Meenakshi Nehra Bhat & Anr. V. Wave Megacity Centre (P)
Ltd., held that; the arbitration clause New Delhi is referred to
in that clause only as the location for conducting arbitral
proceedings. However, from the jurisdictional perspective,
the parties have expressly agreed to territorial jurisdiction
vesting in the Courts at Gautam Budha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh
and the Allahabad High Court, as may be applicable,
depending upon the proceedings in question. It is held that,
New Delhi Court does not have territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the petition.
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17. Coming to the factual situation at hand; here, the
parties have agreed that the place of arbitration as well as
exclusive jurisdiction of Civil Courts is at Udupi. Thus,
absolutely there is no dispute that this Court is having
jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 34 of
the A&CAct.
18. Now, the question that arises is whether the
contention of respondent-1 that this Court has no jurisdiction
and only the Court
at
Mangaluru where
arbitration
proceedings were conducted is having jurisdiction to
entertain the application under Section 34
of A&C Act.
19.
The
respondent-1
mainly
relied
on
the
observations made in the CMP.No.255/18, wherein it is
observed that; learned counsel for parties jointly submit that
the parties are from Mangaluru and Mr.Moosa Kunhi be
appointed as sole arbitrator and on that basis Mr.Moosa
Kunhi, retired District Sessions Judge who is based in
Mangaluru as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute
between the parties. On the basis of these observations the
respondent-1 is argued that; this Court has no jurisdiction
to try the petition under Section 34 of A&C Act.
20. Above contention is not tenable because the
judicial pronouncements stated supra manifest that; the
designated place of arbitration and the exclusive territorial
jurisdiction of Civil Courts alone are having jurisdiction to try
the petition under Section 34 of A&C Act unless the parties
by express agreement have changed the place of arbitration.
In CMP.No.255/18 it is only stated that the parties are from
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Mangaluru and a sole arbitrator is based in Mangaluru and
nothing is stated and agreed by the parties that; the place of
arbitration is changed from Udupi to Mangaluru. In addition
to this the very cause title in CMP No.255/18 depict that
Smt.Kshama (R1 therein) and her GPA Holder are the
residents of Udupi and not Mangaluru.
21. Respondent-1 argued that; in the case of Inox
(supra) the place of arbitration was Jaipur but the arbitration
proceedings conducted at Ahmedabad and it is held that; the
Courts at Ahmedabad are having jurisdiction to try the
application under A&C Act. Said decision is not applicable to
the facts at hand because in the said case by mutual
agreement
the
parties
have
specifically
shifted
the
venue/place of arbitration from Jaipur to Ahmedabad and the
same is recorded by the arbitrator in his award to which no
challenge is made by either party. But in the case on hand
there is no such mutual agreement and arbitrator has not
recorded anything about change of seat of arbitration.
22. Respondent-1 argued that; in case of BGS (supra)
the place of arbitration was Faridabad but the proceedings
were held at New Delhi and the awards were signed at New
Delhi and thereby it is held that both the parties have chosen
New Delhi as the seat of arbitration under Section 20(1) of
Arbitration Act 1996 as such New Delhi Courts have
jurisdiction to entertain petition under Section 34 of A&C Act.
It is argued that; in the case on hand also entire proceedings
are conducted at Mangaluru and award is signed at
Mangaluru, as such both parties have chosen Mangaluru as
the seat of arbitration. Said decision is not applicable to the
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case on hand because in said case as per arbitration
agreement it was agreed that arbitration proceedings shall
be held at New Delhi/Faridabad and it is thereafter for the
parties to chose as to in which of the two places the
arbitration is finally to be held and the parties therein chose
New Delhi, as such it is held that Courts at Faridabad have
no jurisdiction and only the Courts at New Delhi are having
jurisdiction. But in the instant case only one venue of
arbitration is fixed and there is no express mutual agreement
between the parties to change the venue of arbitration and
only for convenient purpose the arbitral proceedings are
conducted Mangaluru.
23. Above discussion makes it crystal clear that the
fixed place of arbitration and exclusive territorial jurisdiction
of Civil Courts is at Udupi and only for the purpose of the
convenient the arbitral proceedings are conducted at
Mangaluru and at any stretch of imagination the Courts at
Mangaluru will not get any kind of jurisdiction to entertain the
petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. Hence, above
point is answered in negative and proceeds to pass the
following;
ORDER
IA.No.III under Order 7 Rule 10 r/w 151 of CPC filed
by the respondent-1 is rejected.
No order as to costs.”
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:Order on IA-V; U/O 47 Rule 1 r/w Sections 114 &
151 of CPC:
The applicant/respondent-1 moved this application
seeking review of the order dated 07.02.2025, wherein the
application for the return of plaint due to lack of territorial
jurisdiction was rejected. The review is sought in light of the
fact that the parties to the arbitration had already agreed to
designate Mangalauru as the seat of arbitration, as clearly
mentioned in the order sheet dated 30.12.2019 in
AC.No.07/2019.
2. Petitioner resist the application by filing statement
of objections.
3. Heard both side; Perused records.
4. Following point arises for consideration;
Whether first respondent made out a case to
review the order dated 07.02.2025 as prayed?
5. Answer to the above point is in the negative for
the following;
REASONS
6. At the outset; this petition is filed questioning the
correctness of the Arbitral Award (in short ‘AA’) passed in
AC.No.7/19.
7. The first respondent appeared and filed an
application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, seeking
return of the plaint for want of jurisdiction. The first
respondent stated that as Clause No.30 of the JDA, the
venue of arbitration was mutually decided to be at Udupi.
However, when CMP.No.255/18 came up for hearing, both
the petitioner and the respondent mutually consented to
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change the seat of arbitration to Mangaluru and for
appointment of an Arbitrator Sri.Moosa Kunhi, Retired
District & Sessions Judge at Mangaluru.
8.
The
petitioner objected
to the application,
contending that the sole Arbitrator had shifted the venue of
arbitration from Manipal to Mangaluru for convenience, but
this did not alter the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at
the seat of arbitration to resolve disputes arising out of the
agreement. Therefore, the Courts at Udupi alone have
jurisdiction to deal with disputes arising out of the Arbitration
Agreement.
9. After contest, said application was rejected vide
order dated 07.02.2025.
10. On 06.03.2025, the first respondent filed the
present application seeking the aforementioned relief,
alleging that the plaintiff made a false statement constituting
criminal contempt. The statement, made in relation to
judicial
proceedings,
allegedly
lacked
honesty
and
undermined the integrity of the proceedings.
a) The first respondent filed an application under
Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC, seeking return of plaint
on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction by
contending that the seat of arbitration was at Mangaluru
and the District Court at Mangaluru is had jurisdiction,
not the Court where the suit was filed.
b) The plaintiff has falsely contended that the seat of
the arbitration at Mangaluru was not decided, and the
District Court, Udupi, has jurisdiction to try the suit.
However, the plaintiff has suppressed the fact that the
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parties had agreed to decide the seat of arbitration at
Mangaluru, as clearly mentioned in the order sheet
dated 30.12.2019 in AC.No.7/2019.
c) This is an important matter that, despite due
diligence, could not be produced before the Court
earlier. The petitioner deliberately suppressed the
consent given before the Arbitral Tribunal for the seat of
arbitration to be at Mangaluru, which is reflected in the
order sheet of the arbitration proceedings. Due to the
document being mixed with other official records, the
respondent company was unable to produce the
certified copy of the order sheet at the time of hearing
for proper appreciation of the case.
d) The respondent company is not attempting to
challenge the earlier order, but rather seeks to bring on
record the material document from the Arbitration
Tribunal records and invoke the inherent powers of this
Court to review the order dated 07.02.2025, dismissing
IA. No. III.
11. Petitioner objected the application, contending
that Court had already considered all documents produced
by both the parties during the hearing and held that the
fixed place of arbitration and the exclusive territorial
jurisdiction of the civil courts is at Udupi and only for the
purpose of the convenient the arbitral proceedings are
conducted at Mangaluru and at any stretch of imagination
the Courts at Mangaluru will not get any kind of jurisdiction
to entertain the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act.
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i) The first respondent produced the order sheet of
the arbitral tribunal, contending that the alleged change
in the seat of arbitration by the parties was incorrect.
There was no mutual written consent or registered
rectification deed to effect such a change. The petitioner
alleged that the applicant’s actions were merely tactical,
aimed at dragging out the proceedings and harassing
the opponent for unlawful gain. Furthermore, the
applicant (R1) failed to comply the requirements under
Order 47 and Rules thereof and Section 114 of the
CPC. Hence, prayed to reject the application.
12. In light of the factual situation, the sole legal
question to be addressed is whether the first respondent
has satisfied the legal requirements under Order 47 of the
CPC to warrant the exercise of review power by this Court.
13. It is well settled that the scope of review has only
a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the distinctive limits
fixed by the language used in Order 47, Rule 1. It may allow
a review on three specified grounds. a) discovery of a new
and important matter or evidence, which after exercise of
due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or
could not be produced by him at the time when the order
was made; b) mistake or error apparent on the face of
record; or c) for any other sufficient reason.
14. In the present case, the applicant/first respondent
has
stated
in
paragraphs
&
of the
affidavit
accompanying the application that despite exercising due
diligence, the
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document could not be produced before the Court because
it was mixed up with other official documents.
15. The first respondent produced a true copy of the
order sheet in AC.No.7/2019 along with the application. The
said order sheet does not reveal the date on which it was
obtained; however, it is a true copy attested by the Notary
on 04.03.2025. If the entire order sheet or at least the last
page of the order sheet had been produced with the date of
obtaining mentioned, one could have ascertained the date
on which it was obtained. However, it appears that the
same has been deliberately withheld.
16. As per the said order sheet, on each hearing
date, it is specifically indicated that a copy of the
proceedings is to be furnished to both sides. This implies
that the parties would receive a copy of the proceedings on
each hearing date.
17. Here, it is not the case of first respondent that it
was unaware of the order. Instead it claimed that the
document was mixed with other official records. Moreover,
the learned counsel representing the first respondent signed
the order sheet on the relevant date of proceedings.
18. In the present case, the first respondent
appeared through learned counsel on 07.11.2024. The very
next date, on 20.11.2024 the first respondent filed an
interim application under Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC.
Subsequently, on 23.11.2024 the petitioner filed objection
statement to the said application. On 07.02.2025 the order
under review was passed. These facts manifest that the first
respondent failed to produce the document despite having
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multiple opportunities to do so, thereby indicating a lack of
due diligence. The first respondent was aware of the
document’s significance, yet still failed to produce it, which
suggests a lack of due diligence and potentially amounts to
an attempt to delay or prejudice the proceedings.
19. The first respondent, seeking a review of the
order, merely states that the document was mixed with
other official documents. This explanation is insufficient to
demonstrate
due
diligence,
particularly
when
the
respondent had multiple opportunities to produce the
document earlier.
20. The party seeking review must provide detailed
explanations and evidence to show that they exercised
reasonable diligence in producing the document earlier. No
evidence has been placed on record to demonstrate that
reasonable care was taken to produce the document earlier.
In fact, it appears that no such attempt was made at all.
21. In light of the above discussion, it is clear that a
mere statement that the document was mixed with other
official documents, without sufficient explanation and
evidence, is not enough to establish due diligence.
22.
Thus, the first respondent has
failed
to
demonstrate that, despite exercising due diligence, it could
not produced the document earlier. As such, the first
respondent is not entitled to an order of review. Hence,
above point is answered in negative & proceeds to pass the
following;
ORDER
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IA.No.V under Order 47 Rule 1 r/w 114 and 151 of
CPC filed by the respondent-1 is rejected.
No order as to costs.
19. Upon re-appreciation, reconsideration and re-evaluation
of the entire material on record, I am of the considered opinion that
the impugned orders passed by the commercial court does not
suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference by this
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India as held by the Apex Court in the cases of
Radhey Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath - (2015) 5 SCC 423, K.P.
Natarajan Vs. Muthalammal – AIR 2021 SC 3443 and Mohamed
Ali Vs. V. Jaya & others – (2022) 10 SCC 477.
20. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the petition and
the same is hereby dismissed.
Sd/(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR)
JUDGE
MDS/SRL
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