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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 16.01.2026
+
ARB.P. 1253/2025 & I.A. 20190/2025
M/S KALRA RADIOS
....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Braj Bhushan Lal Karn, Adv.
versus
S. BALJEET SINGH
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Mayan Prasad, Mr. Rituraj
Biswas, Mr. Murari Kumar Singh, Mr. Aayush
Garg, Ms. Kanak Kumari, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
:
JASMEET SINGH, J (ORAL)
1.
The judgment is de-reserved.
2.
This is a petition filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) seeking appointment of an
Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties.
3.
The brief facts of the case are that Mr. Dharam Pal Kalra was allotted
property measuring 600 square yards in plot No. 207, Block-C, Naraina
Industrial Area, Phase-I, Delhi vide perpetual lease deed dated
15.07.1967 registered as document No.13017 in additional book No.1
volume 86 on pages 102 to 107 dated 29.10.1967.
4.
Mr. Dharam Pal Kalra sold 75 square yards on the ground floor,
backside portion size 45‟x15‟ and first floor shed known as Room No.
A over ground floor portion of the said property by the registered
Agreement to Sell dated 09.06.2003 which was duly registered and
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ARB.P. 1253/2025
signed between the parties.
5.
The said Agreement to Sell was on the basis of clause 7 of the
perpetual lease deed which permitted the lessee to sub-lease the
property.
6.
Mr. Dharam Pal Kalra expired on 11.03.2017 and the petitioner being
his son got survivorship member certificate from the Sub Divisional
Magistrate.
7.
The said Agreement to Sell contained an arbitration clause being
Clause No. 16, which reads as under:
“16. That the First Party has given photo copies of all
related documents about ownership of the property. Also,
if; any dispute arises between the parties, the same shall be
got decided by a mutually appointed Arbitrator”
8.
Since there were disputes between the parties, the petitioner invoked
Arbitration vide legal notice dated 14.08.2024 and thereafter has filed
the present petition.
9.
The reason stated for the termination of the Agreement is that the
respondent was in possession of the said property and was using the
same in the capacity of a licensee but now the respondent is trying to
dispose of the said property without any legal authority. Hence, the
petitioner in the capacity of the principal lessor has terminated the
license Agreement and is seeking possession.
10. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent, states that there exists
no valid or binding arbitration agreement between the parties. It is
contended that the arbitration clause cannot be inferred from Clause
No. 16, which merely contemplates arbitration in the event of disputes,
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inasmuch as Clause No. 15 simultaneously confers discretion upon the
parties to seek enforcement of the Agreement before a Court of law.
Clause No. 15 reads as under:
“15. That if the First Party infringes the terms and
conditions of this Agreement, the Second Party shall he
entitled to get implementation of this Agreement through the
Court of Law and the First Party shall co-operate in all
requirements wherever required or where his presence is
required.”
11. Accordingly, the coexistence of these two clauses creates an inherent
inconsistency, thereby negating any unequivocal intention of the parties
to submit disputes exclusively to arbitration. Consequently, it is urged
that in the absence of a clear and mandatory arbitration agreement, the
present reference is not maintainable. He relies on BGM & M-RPLJMCT (JV) v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471. He
further places reliance on Tata Capital Housing Finance Ltd. v. Shri
Chand Construction and Apartment (P) Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del
5091.
12. The scope of inquiry by the referral court under Section 11 of the 1996
Act is very limited. The Court is only required to look into prima facie
existence of the Arbitration Agreement.
13. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bihar State Mineral Development
Corpn. v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 418 laid down the
essential ingredients as envisaged under Section 7 of the 1996 Act
which read as under:
“13. The essential elements of an arbitration agreement are
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as follows:
(1) There must be a present or a future difference in
connection with some contemplated affair.
(2) There must be the intention of the parties to settle such
difference by a private tribunal.
(3) The parties must agree in writing to be bound by the
decision of such tribunal.
(4) The parties must be ad idem.”
14. In the present case, the Arbitration Clause is contained in the
Agreement to sell and a perusal of Clause No. 16 shows that the said
clause fulfils the ingredients enumerated under Section 7 of the 1996
Act. Thus, the said clause constitutes a valid Arbitration Agreement
between the parties.
15. In my considered opinion, reliance on BGM & M-RPL-JMCT (JV)
(Supra) to state that in the light of discrepancy, the Arbitration
Agreement is not binding, is misplaced. It is a well settled law that if
the Arbitration Agreement is contained in a single undisputed
document, the referral court need not conduct a mini trial, rather only a
prima facie proof is required to establish the existence of the
Arbitration Agreement on the touchstone of Section 7 of the 1996 Act.
Even if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, regarding
the alleged discrepancy between Clause No. 15, which permits
enforcement before the Civil Court, and Clause No. 16, which refers
disputes to arbitration, is considered, the referral court is only required
to examine whether the ingredients of Section 7 of the 1996 Act are
satisfied. In such a scenario, the referral court cannot conduct an in-
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depth examination of the material on record. The relevant paragraphs
read as under:
“16. What can be deduced from the above decision is that
the Referral Court before appointing an arbitral tribunal
will have to be prima facie satisfied that an arbitration
agreement as contemplated in Section 7 of the 1996 Act
exists. For this limited purpose it can scrutinize the
documents relied upon by the parties in proof of its
existence. Though the burden of proving the existence of
arbitration agreement lies on the party seeking to rely on
such agreement, only prima facie proof of its existence must
be adduced before the Referral Court because the Referral
Court is not the appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial
by allowing the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to
its existence.
17. However, where professed arbitration agreement is
found in an undisputed document, no trial or inquiry is
required as to its existence. In such a situation, the Court
would have to simply peruse the same to satisfy itself
whether it, prima facie, fulfills the essential ingredients of
an arbitration agreement as contemplated under Section 7
of the 1996 Act. But where the professed arbitration
agreement is not contained in any one document and is to
be inferred from two or more documents, such as exchange
of letters or communications, parties may raise various
pleas and place various documents to prove or disprove its
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existence. In such a scenario, if from the documents placed,
existence of an arbitration agreement, as defined in Section
7, is prima facie made out, Referral Court, instead of
undertaking a deeper probe or inquiry, should refer the
matter to the arbitral tribunal. More so, because opinion of
the Referral Court as to existence of an arbitration
agreement is neither binding on the arbitral tribunal nor the
Court dealing with the arbitral award.
18. In the instant case, the appellant is relying on just one
clause in the contract which, according to the appellant,
constitutes an arbitration agreement whereas according to
the respondent, though the clause is not disputed, the same
does not constitute an arbitration agreement. In such
circumstances, the Court while exercising power under
Section 11 would not have to hold a mini-trial or an enquiry
into its existence rather a plain reading of the clause would
indicate whether it is, or it is not, an arbitration agreement,
prima facie, satisfying the necessary ingredients of it, as
required by Section 7 of the 1996 Act. In our view, such a
limited exercise would not transgress the limit set out by
sub-section (6-A)7 of Section 11 of the 1996 Act as
introduced by 2015 Amendment because the object of such
an exercise (i.e., of examination) is to weed out frivolous
claims for appointment of an arbitrator/reference to an
arbitral tribunal.”
(emphasis supplied)
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16. Further the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v.
Sokrati Technologies (P) Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 192, held that even
frivolity is also an aspect which should be decided by the Arbitrator.
The relevant paragraph reads as under:
“19. The scope of inquiry under Section 11 of the 1996 Act
is limited to ascertaining the prima facie existence of an
arbitration agreement. In the present case, the High Court
exceeded this limited scope by undertaking a detailed
examination of the factual matrix. The High Court
erroneously proceeded to assess the auditor's report in
detail and dismissed [Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati
Technologies (P) Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3530] the
arbitration application. In our view, such an approach does
not give effect to the legislative intent behind the 2015
Amendment to the 1996 Act which limited the judicial
scrutiny at the stage of Section 11 solely to the prima facie
determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
1754 : 2024 INSC 532] , frivolity in litigation too is an
aspect which the referral court should not decide at the
stage of Section 11 as the arbitrator is equally, if not more,
competent to adjudicate the same.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. The reliance in Tata Capital Housing Finance Ltd. (supra) is also
distinguishable on facts. The factual matrix of the said judgement was
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such that the arbitration clause would be given a go-by at the option on
Tata Capital Housing Finance Ltd., petitioner in the said dispute, in
case of any change in legal status of the petitioner in light of
notification under SARFESI Act. The same option was not available to
the respondent. The Court, inclined with the view that whilst the
arbitration clause may categorise the disputes to be referred to the
Arbitration, the categorisation of claims are not allowed. Moreover, the
court held that the clause negates the essential ingredient of the
Arbitration clause as enumerated in Section 7 of the 1996 Act, i.e.
mutual promise to submit the disputes between the parties. In the
present case there is no such categorisation of claims. The mutuality
element is also evident from “any dispute arises between the parties,
the same shall be got decided by a mutually appointed Arbitrator”.
18. Thus, in the present case, it would be apposite to conclude that Clause
No. 16 of the said Agreement shows the existence of the mutual
Arbitration Agreement between the parties. Further, the issues raised
by the petitioner would require detailed analysis as well as evidence
which lies within the exclusive domain of the Arbitrator.
19. For the said reasons, the petition is allowed and the following
directions are issued:i)
Since, the subject matter is about Rs. 50 lakhs Mr. Pritish
Sabharwal (Advocate) (Mob. No. 7678296077) is appointed as a
Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties.
ii)
The arbitration will be held under the aegis and rules of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre, Delhi High Court, Sher Shah
Road, New Delhi (hereinafter, referred to as the „DIAC‟).
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iii) The remuneration of the learned Arbitrator shall be in terms of
DIAC (Administrative Cost and Arbitrators‟ Fees) Rules, 2018.
iv) The learned Arbitrator is requested to furnish a declaration in
terms of Section 12 of the Act prior to entering into the reference.
v)
It is made clear that all the rights and contentions of the parties,
including as to the arbitrability of any of the claim, any other
preliminary objection, as well as claims/counter-claims and merits
of the dispute of either of the parties, are left open for adjudication
by the learned arbitrator.
vi) The parties shall approach the learned Arbitrator within two weeks
from today.
20.
In case the arbitrator comes to a finding that the claim is frivolous,
appropriate costs will be imposed on the petitioner in terms of Goqii
Technologies (P) Ltd. (supra), which has held as under:
“21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the limited
jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11 must not
be misused by parties in order to force other parties to the
arbitration agreement to participate in a time consuming
and costly arbitration process. This is possible in instances,
including but not limited to, where the claimant canvasses
the adjudication of non-existent and mala fide claims
through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial
interference of the referral courts with the interests of the
parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct
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that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party
which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the
other party to the arbitration…”
21.
The application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act, as and when filed
by the petitioner, shall be treated as a preliminary issue.
22.
The present petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
JASMEET SINGH, J
JANUARY 16, 2026/AS
(corrected and released on 22.01.2026)
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