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( 2026:HHC:30092 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No.614 of 2025
Reserved on : 29.06.2026
Decided on: 21.07.2026
Uploaded on :21.07.2026
M/s Hotel Himland & Anr.
…Petitioners
Versus
National Insurance Company & Anr.
…Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
_______________________________________________________________
For the petitioners
For the respondents
:
:
Mr. Balwant Kukreja and Ms.
Drishti Sirswal, Advocates.
Mr. Ashwani Sharma, Senior
Advocate, with Ms. Mamta,
Advocate, for respondent No.1.
None for respondent No.2.
Virender Singh, Judge
Petitioners have filed the present petition, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, against the order
dated 26.08.2025, passed by the Court of learned Senior
Civil Judge, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. (hereinafter
referred to as the learned trial Court), in Civil Suit Reg.
No.900853 of 2014, titled as M/s Hotel Himland (West) &
another versus National Insurance Company Limited and
another.
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
2.
For the sake of convenience, the parties to the
present lis, are, hereinafter referred to, in the same
manner, as were, referred to, by the learned trial Court.
3.
petition
Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present
before
this
Court,
as
borne
out
from
the
documents, annexed with the petition, may be summed up,
as under:3.1.
The plaintiff-M/s Hotel Himland (West) and
another
have
filed
suit
for
permanent
prohibitory
injunction, against the defendants with a prayer to restrain
them from parking car/cars/any vehicles or creating any
hindrance, in front of Hotel Himland (West), which was
constructed
over
the
land,
comprised
in
Khasra
Nos.2163/1600, 2165/1601 (old Khasra No.1600 and new
Khasra
No.2163),
Khata-Khatauni
No.214/301,
new
Khata-Khatauni No.204/294, situated at Up Mohal Bemloi,
Station Ward, Chhota Shimla, Tehsil and District Shimla,
H.P.
3.2.
The said suit has been filed, on the ground that
plaintiff No.2, is landlord of old Khasra Nos.1597, 1598,
1600 and 1601, new Khasra Nos.2159, 2161, 2163 and
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2165 along with the building constructed, over it and open
space, in front of the Hotel.
3.3
It is the further case of the plaintiffs that Ved
Prakash Akre, father of plaintiff No.2, along with his wife
Braham Kumari Akre, Usha Ahluwalia plaintiff No.2, Uma
Soni, (her sister and Umesh Akre/her brother) had
purchased the land and raised building on the part of the
land, comprising Khasra Nos.1597 to 1619.
death of
After the
Ved Prakash Akre, a dispute has arisen with
regard to the shares, in the said property and Uma Soni
had filed Civil Suit No.87 of 1994, before the High Court,
which was compromised later on.
3.4.
According to the plaintiffs, another compromise
had taken place between the parties on 17.01.2007 and as
per Memorandum of partition, Khasra Nos.1597, 1598,
1599, 1600, 1601, new Khasra Nos.2159, 2161, 2163,
2165, have fallen in the share of plaintiff No.2 and
thereafter, plaintiff No.2, leased out some portion of her
built up structure, alongwith open area, in front of the
Hotel Himland, bearing Khasra No.2163/1600. It has also
been agreed upon between the parties to the Memorandum
of family partition that “the parties to the deed shall not
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raise any construction/obstruction, on the passages and
stairs, as marked, in the plans attached and road (twelve
feet width), as the same has been kept common for all the
parties.
3.5.
It is the further case of the plaintiffs that Smt.
Uma Soni had leased out some portion of her share to the
defendant-National Insurance Company Limited, in which,
they are running their Divisional Office.
3.6.
Asserting the fact that the defendant has no
legal right or locus-standi to obstruct the passage or to
park car/cars/any other vehicles, upon the land, bearing
old Khasra Nos.1598, 1600 and 1601, new Khasra
Nos.2159, 2163 and 2165, owned by plaintiff No.2 and in
possession of plaintiff No.1, being lessee.
3.7.
Despite request made by the plaintiff, the
defendants are stated to be still adamant to park their
vehicles, for which, they have no legal right to do so.
3.8.
On the basis of the above facts, the following
prayer has been made in the suit:
“(a) A decree for permanent perpetual
prohibitory
injunction
restraining
the
Officers, Employees, Agents, representatives
etc. etc. of the defendant-Company from
parking any vehicles or creating any
hindrance in front of Hotel Himland (West)
Tehsil and District Shimla, H.P. on the land
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comprising Khasra No.2163/1600, (Old
Khasra Nos.1600 and new Khasra No.2163,
Khata Khatauni No.214/301, new Khata
Khatauni No.204/294, situated at Up Muhal
Bamloe, Station Ward Chhota Shimla, Tehsil
and District Shimla, may kindly be passed
in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant.”
4.
When,
contested,
by
put
the
to
notice,
defendant,
the
by
suit
filing
has
the
been
written
statement, in which, the preliminary objections have been
taken qua the maintainability of the suit; suit is bad for
non-joinder of necessary party; plaintiffs have no locusstandi to file the present suit; suit is not valued for the
purpose of court fee and jurisdiction.
position,
qua
the
ownership,
While, the factual
litigation
and
family
settlement has been denied for want of knowledge, in para7, it has been denied that the defendant-company used to
park their vehicles in front of Hotel Himland (West) over old
Khasra No.1600, new Khasra No.2163.
Para-7 of the
written statement, is reproduced, as under:“7. That the contents of para-7 of the suit
are wrong hence denied. It is specifically
denied that Defendant Company is using
to park their vehicles in front of the Hotel
Himland (West) over the Khasra No.1600,
New 2163. It is pertinent to mention here
that on dated 4.11.2012 fresh lease deed
was executed between Mrs. Uma Soni
D/o Ved Prakash and Defendant
Company for a further period up to 13th
July, 2021 with terms and conditions. As
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per the terms and condition of the lease
deed “ The Lessee shall be entitled during
the continuance of the lease to use the
occupy exclusively and free of any extra
or additional rent or charges sufficient
space or accommodation for 3 No.
sufficient space or accommodation for 2
No. parking cars and 2 No. two wheelers
within the compound of area of the
building in the said premises known as
Himland Hotel (west).
It is further
clarified that Defendant is only parking
their vehicle in the space provided as per
the temrs and conditions of the lease
deed, it is clarified that defendant only
parked their vehicle in front of their office
and never parked vehicle towards
plaintiff hotel as per the terms and
condition of lease deed with Smt. Usha
Soni owner of rented premises.”
5.
On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made to dismiss the suit.
6.
In the said suit, the plaintiffs moved an
application, under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, read with
Section 151 of CPC, to pass the judgment in their favour,
on the basis of the admission, as contained, in the written
statement and as such, a prayer has been made to decree
the suit, as prayed for.
7.
The said application has been filed, by the
plaintiffs, on the ground, that along with the suit, they
have filed the application, under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2
CPC. In the said application, the learned trial Court has
passed
an
ad-interim
injunction,
vide
order
dated
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19.06.2015, which was challenged by the defendant, before
the learned District Judge, Shimla, District Shimla and the
order was affirmed by the learned Additional District
Judge, Shimla, on 02.04.2016. Thereafter, the judgment
was assailed, before the High Court, by way of CMPMO
No.329 of 2016, which was allowed on 01.11.2016 and
order passed by the learned trial Court dated 19.06.2015,
as affirmed on 02.04.2016, were set-aside, keeping in view
the defence, taken by the defendant.
8.
On the basis of observations, so made, by this
Court, while, deciding CMPMO No.329 of 2016, it has been
prayed that the plaintiffs are entitled for the judgment and
decree in their favour, under the provisions of Order 12,
Rule 6 of CPC.
9.
The said application has been contested, by the
defendant, by taking preliminary objections, that the
application is not maintainable. The factual position has
not been disputed. However, in reply to para-4, it has been
asserted that the defendant-company is not using the front
portion of Hotel Himland (west) situated over Khasra
No.1600, new Khasra No.2163 to park their vehicles.
According to them, a fresh lease deed was executed on
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04.11.2012, between defendant company and Uma Soni for
further period up to 13.07.2021.
In the lease deed
following conditions have been inserted:
“The Lessee shall be entitled during the
continuance of the lease to use the occupy
exclusively and free of any extra or
additional rent or charges sufficient space
or accommodation for 3 No. sufficient
space or accommodation for 2 No. parking
cars and 2 No. two wheelers within the
compound of area of the building in the
said premises known as Himland Hotel
(west).”
10.
The defendant has further pleaded that they are
parking their vehicles, on the space provided, as per the
terms and conditions of the lease deed and they have never
parked their vehicles towards the plaintiff hotel. Another
objection has been taken that the plaintiffs have failed to
identified the disputed property, upon which, they are
claiming injunction.
11.
The learned trial Court, after hearing learned
counsel appearing for the parties dismissed the said
application, vide order dated 26.08.2025. The said order
has been assailed, by way of the present petition, mainly
relying upon the admission, made by the defendant, as well
as, the order passed by this Court in CMPMO No.329 of
2016.
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
12.
The order under challenge has been assailed, on
the ground that when, the case of the plaintiffs has been
admitted, by the defendant, then, as per the mandate of
Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, the suit ought to have been
decreed, as nothing is to be left for adjudication, by the
learned trial Court.
13.
The order has also been assailed, on the ground
that the admission made by the defendant has not been
taken into consideration, while, dismissing the application
under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC.
14.
The prayer, as made, in the petition has been
opposed
by
Mr.
Ashwani
Sharma,
Senior
Advocate,
assisted by Ms. Mamta Advocate, for respondent No.1,
while arguing that the learned trial Court has rightly
appreciated the stand, as taken, in the reply and despite
framing the issues, way back on 20.12.2019, the plaintiffs
could not adduce the evidence, despite availing eight
effective opportunities.
15.
On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has
been made to dismiss the petition.
16.
The plaintiffs, are before this Court, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The power under
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in
nature, as the same is not akin to the appellate powers.
17.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “K. Valarmathi &
Ors. Versus Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606” has elaborately
discussed the scope of interference, under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. Relevant para 9 of the judgment,
is reproduced, as under:
“Essence of the power under Article 227 being
supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original
jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor
can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy
under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. For example,
existence of appellate remedy under Section 96 of the
Code operates as a near total bar to exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.”
18.
Even otherwise, in a recent decision in “Nandi
Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus
B. Gurappa Naidu & Ors., 2026 INSC 434”, the scope of
interference has again be explained by Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is
reproduced, as under:“35. In short, the principles laid down in the above
matters is as follows:
a)
The power of superintendence under Article 227 is
not to be exercised unless there has been an (a)
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in
Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an
unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in
Courts or tribunals.
b)
It is also well settled that the High Court while
acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an
appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is
not apparent on the face of the record.
c)
The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction
does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate,
reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. Supervisory
jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a
legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be
supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own
decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior
court or tribunal.”
19.
Being guided, by the above decision, this Court
would proceed further, to determine, whether the findings,
so recorded, by the learned trial Court, require any
interference, by this Court, that too, while exercising
jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
20.
As per the order, which has been challenged,
before this Court, by way of the present petition, the issues
were framed on 20.12.2019 and thereafter, the plaintiffs
have taken the fact that eight opportunities, if seen in the
light of the decision of this Court, which was rendered on
01.11.2016 in CMPMO No.329 of 2016, this Court is of the
view that the application, filed under Order 12, Rule 6, is
nothing, but, to delay the proceedings.
21.
If the facts and circumstances of the present
case are seen, in the light of decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in case titled as Pushpa and others
versus Dayawati and others, reported in (2026) INSC
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
603, then, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere
with the findings, recorded by the learned trial Court.
Relevant paragraphs-33 to 35, of the judgment, are
reproduced, as under:“33. A plain reading of Order XII Rule 6 of the
CPCindicates that the provision confers a
discretionary power upon the Court to pronounce
judgment on the basis of admission made either in
pleadings or otherwise however the exercise of
such power is conditioned upon the existence of a
clear admission of fact. The object of the provision
is to enable a party to obtain speedy relief where
there is no substantial dispute requiring trial. At the
same time, the provision cannot be invoked in a
manner so as to deprive a party of adjudication
where the controversy involves disputed questions
of fact requiring evidence.
34. The term “admission” has been defined under
Sections 17and 18of the Evidence Act, 1872, an
admission is a statement which suggests any
inference as to a fact in issue or relevant fact and is
made by a party to the proceeding or by a person
authorised by such party however every statement
made by a party cannot automatically result in a
decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. Thus,
the admission must be categorical, unambiguous,
unconditional and unequivocal.
35. This Court in several decisions has consistently
held that before passing a decree on admission, the
Court must be fully satisfied that the admission
relied upon leaves no room for controversy Page 12
and if the alleged admission requires interpretation,
inferential reasoning or examination of surrounding
circumstances, the matter ought to proceed to trial
and it is similarly well settled that where substantial
triable issues arise, the parties cannot be denied the
opportunity to lead evidence. Recently, this Court
in Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda(supra)
reiterated the principles under Order XII Rule 6 of
the CPC, the relevant paragraph reads as under:
“40. In Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd.
[Himani Alloys Ltd.v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011)
15 SCC 273 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376] it is
held that “Admissions” should be categorical
and intentional, as Order 12 Rule
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
6CPCallows discretion rather than obligation.
Admissions result in judgments without trial
which permanently deny any remedy to the
defendant, by way of an appeal on merits.
Therefore, unless the admission is clear,
unambiguous, and unconditional, the
discretion of the court is not exercised to
deny the valuable right of a defendant to
contest the claim. Hence, discretion should be
used only where there is a clear and
unequivocal admission. The relevant
paragraphs read thus: (SCC pp. 276-77, para
11) “11. It is true that a judgment can be
given on an “admission” contained in the
minutes of a meeting. But the admission
should be categorical. It should be a
conscious and deliberate act of the party
making it, showing an intention to be bound
by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling
provision, it is neither mandatory nor
peremptory but discretionary. The court, on
examination of the facts and circumstances,
has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping
in mind that a judgment on admission is a
judgment without trial which permanently
denies any remedy to the defendant, by way
of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the
admission is clear, unambiguous and
unconditional, the discretion of the Court
should not be exercised to deny the valuable
right of a defendant to contest the claim. In
short the discretion should be used Page 13
only when there is a clear “admission” which
can be acted upon. There is no such
admission in this case.”
22.
No doubt, this Court has disposed of CMPMO
No.329 of 2016, on the basis of admission, as made, in
para-7 of the written statement, but, the said findings,
were recorded, by this Court, while, deciding the CMPMO,
which
has
been
filed
by
the
defendant-Insurance
Company, against the order dated 02.04.2016, passed by
the learned Additional District Judge-II, Shimla, when, the
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
learned Appellate Court, has affirmed the findings of the
learned trial Court, in an application under Order 39,
Rules 1 and 2 of CPC.
23.
Moreover, mere admission is not sufficient to
grant relief, under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, if the said
admission requires interpretation.
24.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled as Balraj
Taneja and another versus Sunil Madan and another,
reported in 1999 (suppl) Civil Court Cases 1, has
elaborately discussed the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of
CPC, and held that in spite of admission of fact, made by a
party to the suit, the Court may still require the plaintiffs
to prove the fact, which has been admitted, by the
defendant.
Relevant paragraph-20 of the judgment, is
reproduced, as under:“20. In Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum &
Ors.AIR 1958 SC 886 = 1959 SCR 1111, it was held
that Order 12 Rule 6 has to be read along with Proviso to
Rule 5 of Order 8. That is to say, notwithstanding the
admission made by the defendant in his pleading, the
Court may still require the plaintiff to prove the facts
pleaded by him in the plaint.
Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made
by a party to the suit, the Court may still require the
plaintiff to prove the fact which has been admitted by
the defendant. This is also in consonance with the
provisions of Section 58 of the Evidence Act which
provides as under :
58. Facts admitted need not be proved - No fact need be
proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
their agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which,
before the hearing, they agree to admit by any writing
under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in
force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by
their pleadings:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the
facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such
admissions."
The Proviso to this Section specifically gives a
discretion to the Court to require the facts admitted to be
proved otherwise than by such admission. The Proviso
corresponds to the Proviso to Rule 5(1) Order 8 CPC.”
25.
If the facts and circumstances of the present
case, are seen in the light of the above observations, then,
the
learned
trial
Court
has
rightly
dismissed
the
application and the said findings cannot be interfered with
by this Court, that too, under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and it cannot be said that the learned
trial Court has unwarrantedly assumed the jurisdiction not
vested in it, or the order has been passed, in gross abuse of
the jurisdiction.
26.
At
the cost of repetition,
despite
availing
number of opportunities to lead evidence, the petitionersplaintiffs have not adduced the evidence, rather, opted to
move the application under Order 12, Rule 6 of CPC, which
has rightly been dismissed, by the learned trial Court.
27.
Hence, the present petition is devoid of merits,
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
( 2026:HHC:30092 )
28.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands
disposed of.
July 21, 2026
(subhash sharma)
(Virender Singh)
Judge
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