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2026:JHHC:13992
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Arbitration Application No. 3 of 2026
M/s. Hindustan Dorr-Oliver Limited, a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 2013 having its Registered Office at 404-405, 4th Floor,
Sabari Sammriddhi, Behind Maitri Park ST Bus Stand, Sion-Trombay
Road, Chembur, Mumbai - 400071, through its authorised representative
and Head Commercial - Mr Sri Kumar Malani, aged about 51 years, son
of Govind Das Malani, resident of 2-4-51, Malani Building, M G Road,
Secunderabad, Secunderabad, P.O. - Secunderabad, P.S. Ramgopalpet,
District Hyderabad, State - Telangana,
…
…
…
Applicant
Versus
M/s. Uranium Corporation of India Limited, a Government Company
incorporated under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 having its
Registered Office at Jaduguda, P.O.- Jaduguda Mines, District-East
Singhbhum, State - Jharkhand, PIN - 832102
…
…
… Respondent
--------CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
--------For the Applicant:
Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate
Mr. Manish Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Pratyush, Advocate
For the Respondent:
Mr. Sudarshan Shrivastava, Advocate
--------05 /Dated: 08.05.2026
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
This is an application seeking appointment of an Arbitrator by
invoking the provisions of Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (the said Act).
3.
According to the applicant, disputes have arisen between the parties
to and in connection with the contract agreement dated 20th March 2009
(Annexure-2 to this application).
4.
Clause 7 of the agreement reads as follows:“Both parties shall make best endeavour to settle amicably
among themselves any dispute that may arise on any matter
arising out of or in connection with this contract. In the
unlikely case that the parties are not able to come to a
mutual settlement either of them shall seek arbitration. Then
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2026:JHHC:13992
it is expressly and agreed between the parties that any such
dispute or difference arising out of or in connection with the
Contract shall be referred to arbitration and the arbitration
proceedings shall be governed by the relevant clause of the
Agreement.”
5.
In addition to Clause -7, reference can also be made to Clause 46 of
the NIT, which is accepted to be a part of the agreement.
6.
Clause 46 reads as follows:“46.0 DISPUTES AND ARBITRATION
46.1
Disputes
If at any time any questions, dispute or difference
(hereinafter referred to as a "Dispute") shall arise between
the Purchaser and the Contractor, either party shall, as soon
as reasonably practicable, give to the other notice in writing
of the existence of such Dispute specifying its nature and the
point of issue. The parties shall attempt, within a period of
sixty (60) days after receipt by one party of a notice from the
other party of the existence of the Dispute, to settle such
Dispute amicably in the first instance by mutual discussions
between the parties.
46.2
Arbitration
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Contract, all
questions, disputes or differences whatsoever which is not
amicably settled as per clause no 46.1 above, between the
parties to the Contract, arising out of or relating to the
construction, meaning and operation or interpretation of
provision of the Contract or matters related thereto whether
during the currency of the Contract or its failure or after the
completion of the Contract, shall be referred to the
adjudication of Sole arbitrator to be nominated and
appointed by the Chairman and Managing Director of the
Purchaser. It will be no objection to any such appointment
even if the Arbitrator so appointed is an employee of the
Purchaser.”
7.
The applicant, vide notice dated 04.09.2025, invoked the arbitration
clause and sought the resolution of disputes through arbitration. The
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2026:JHHC:13992
respondent, by its response dated 1st November 2025, disagreed with the
applicant herein.
8.
The contents of the response dated 1st November 2025 (Annexure-
25 at page 298) are transcribed below for the convenience of reference:“With reference to your letter / notice dated 04-10-2025 on
behalf of your client, it is bring to your kind notice that since
the claim mentioned therein is related to an agreement
executed dated 20-03-2009, which according to UCIL is now
a stale agreement as such we shall not treat your
letter/notice regarding as valid.”
9.
From the above, at least prima facie, the existence of the arbitration
agreement was never disputed by the Respondent. The scope of
proceedings under Section 11(6) of the said Act is quite limited, and the
same is confined to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement.
10.
However, Mr Sudarshan Shrivastava, the learned counsel for the
respondent, submitted that the applicant's claim, apart from being false and
frivolous, is highly belated. He submitted that the applicant left the work
incomplete and has belatedly sought to invoke the arbitration clause.
11.
Apart from the above objection, Mr Shrivastava referred to the
statements made and objections raised in paragraphs 12 to 20 of the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent.
12.
The contents of these paragraphs are transcribed below for the
convenience of reference: “12. That thereafter, a Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process vide CP No.596/1&BP/NCLT/MAH/2017 was filed
before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai
Bench,
Mumbai
under
Insolvency
and
Bankruptcy
(Applications and Adjudicating Authority), Rules 2016. NCLT
has pronounced its order dated 21/04/2017 that till the
completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process or
until the Bench approves the resolution plan under subsection (1) of section 31 or passes an order for liquidation of
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2026:JHHC:13992
corporate debtor under section 33 as the case may be. Sri
Amit Gupta informed UCIL through an email dated 09/04/18
that the company is under liquidation process, hence to
release the amount, which was withhold by UCIL
13.
That NCLT Bench has also appointed Sri Amit Gupta
as Interim Resolution Professional (Liquidator) to carry out
the functions as mentioned under Insolvency & Bankruptcy
Code. As per the provisions of the Code and NCLAT order
dated 25/06/2018, the Liquidator has been assigned the
powers of the Board of Directors, key managerial persons of
HDOL.
14.
an
That UCIL has communicated to the Liquidator through
email
dated
03/09/2020
that
the encashment
of
Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) is rightly encashed by
UCIL, as it was failure of HDOL to demonstrate the
performance test and extra expenditure incurred cannot be
adjusted from the encashed PBG amount, as there is no
provision in the contract. Further, UCIL will go ahead with
completing the pending work as per the scope of the work at
the risk and cost of HDOL and the contract will be closed
subsequently as agreed by HDOL.
15.
That Sri Amit Gupta communicated through a letter
dated 21/02/2023 that under section 35(f) of IBC, 2016 and
regulation 33 of Liquidation process the company was sold as
a "going concern in liquidation" vide E-auction held on
29/07/2022 to M/s. Pan India Tubes Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad.
The company is now under process of resuming normal
operation under the management of the new owner.
16.
That M/s. Pan India Tubes Pvt. Ltd., Hyderabad has
communicated to UCIL that they are acquired HDOL through
e-auction. Hence, requested to release the amount withheld.
The then Chief Manager (Legal) has communicated to M/s.
Pan India Pvt. Ltd., through a letter dated 27/03/2023 that the
communication sent to Sri Amit Gupta dated 03/09/2020 still
stick by UCIL, as this was not payable.
17.
That now Hon'ble NCLT Mumbai Bench has disposed
the matter 10/10/2023, which was pending and passed an
order, is as follows:
"The Liquidation Process is declared to have come to
an end and Corporate Debtor is taken out of rigours of
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2026:JHHC:13992
Liquidation process upon having been sold as a going
concern. Consequently, the moratorium under section
33(5) shall cease to be in forced".
18.
That thereafter, an Arbitration Notice issued by
HDOLdated 04/10/2025 by invoking Clause 46.2 of General
Conditions under Section V of Volume I of the Package No.
UCTL 2: Annexure - A of the Contract Agreement dated
20.03.2009stating inter alia that to resolve the disputes Mr.
Jyotirmay Bhattacharya, Former Chief Justice of High Court
of Calcutta be appointed as a sole Arbitrator under section 21
read with Section 12(5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
19.
That it is to say and submit that it was duly
communicated to the applicant that as the claims put forth by
the applicant is a stale and time barred claim and moreover,
that there is no existence of M/s HDOL, as the said company
purchased through e-auction by M/s. Pan India Pvt. Ltd.
Further M/s. Pan India Pvt. Ltd., was not a signatory while
entering into a contract and is not a party to the contract.
20.
That it is stated and submitted that in the above
circumstances M/s. HDOL cannot request to the Hon'ble High
Court for appointment of Arbitrator, as it is not in existence
and M/s. Pan India Pvt. Ltd., also cannot request the court for
appointment of Arbitrator, as it was not a signatory to the
contract. Hence, theappointment of an arbitrator, which is
unwarranted and this Hon'ble court may not pass any order
appointing any arbitrator to arbitrate the alleged dispute
mentioned in this petition.”
13.
Based on the above, Mr Shrivastava submitted that the applicant
herein was involved in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. He
submitted that, in terms of the orders of the NCLT, the applicant has been
virtually taken over by M/S Pan India Pvt. Limited. He therefore submitted
that it is not open to the present applicant to seek appointment of an
Arbitrator. Further, he has submitted that even M/s Pan India Pvt. Ltd.
cannot seek appointment of an Arbitrator because, admittedly, the said
company was not a signatory to the agreement/work order.
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14.
Upon considering the above submissions made on behalf of the
respondent, I am satisfied that such submissions cannot be accepted at
this stage. As noted earlier, the limited scope of proceedings under Section
11(6) of the said Act is to examine the existence of an Arbitration clause. In
the present case, given clause 7 of the agreement, the existence of the
arbitration clause, at least prima facie, cannot be doubted. The applicant
and the respondents are the parties to such an agreement.
15.
The issues of the claim being belated or not being maintainable at
the behest of the present applicant are matters that can always be
investigated and decided by the Arbitral Tribunal once the same is
constituted. The mere fact that an Arbitrator is appointed does not mean
that all such defences, including the defence concerning the very
competence of the Arbitrator to adjudicate such disputes, are waived or
settled. All such defences can certainly be raised before the Arbitrator,
even though this Court allows this application and refers the parties to
arbitration.
16.
In
the
Interplay
Between
Arbitration
Agreements
under
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In RE,
(2024) 6 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the following: “163. We are of the opinion that the above premise of the Court in
Vidya Drolia is erroneous because the omission of Section 11(6-A)
has not been notified and, therefore, the said provision continues to
remain in full force. Since Section 11(6-A) continues to remain in
force, pending the notification of the Central Government, it is
incumbent upon this Court to give true effect to the legislative
intent.
164.
The
Amendment
Act
has
laid
down
different
parameters for judicial review under Section 8 and Section 11.
Where Section 8 requires the Referral Court to look into the
prima facie existence of a valid arbitration agreement, Section
11 confines the Court's jurisdiction to the examination of the
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existence of an arbitration agreement. Although the object and
purpose behind both Sections 8 and 11 is to compel parties to
abide by their contractual understanding, the scope of power of the
Referral Courts under the said provisions is intended to be different.
The same is also evident from the fact that Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act allows an appeal from the order of an Arbitral
Tribunal refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8,
but not from Section 11. Thus, the 2015 Amendment Act has
legislatively overruled the dictum of Patel Engg where it was held
that Section 8 and Section 11 are complementary in nature.
Accordingly, the two provisions cannot be read as laying down a
similar standard.
165.
The legislature confined the scope of reference under
Section 11(6-A) to the examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. The use of the term "examination" in itself
connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a prima facie
determination, Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained
code, the requirement of "existence" of an arbitration
agreement draws effect from Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.
In Duro Felguera, this Court held that the Referral Courts only need
to consider one aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration
agreement whether the underlying contract contains an arbitration
agreement which provides for arbitration pertaining to the disputes
which have arisen between the parties to the agreement.
Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A)
should be confined to the existence of an arbitration
agreement on the basis of Section 7. Similarly, the validity of
an arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7, should be
restricted to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement be in writing. This interpretation
also gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by
leaving the issue of substantive existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement to be decided by Arbitral Tribunal under
Section 16. We accordingly clarify the position of law laid down in
Vidya Drolia in the context of Section 8 and Section 11 of the
Arbitration Act.
166.
The burden of proving the existence of arbitration agreement
generally lies on the party seeking to rely on such agreement. In
jurisdictions such as India, which accept the doctrine of
competence-competence, only prima facie proof of the existence of
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an arbitration agreement must be adduced before the Referral
Court. The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum to
conduct a mini-trial by allowing the parties to adduce the
evidence in regard to the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement. The determination of the existence and validity of
an arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought to be
left to the Arbitral Tribunal. This position of law can also be
gauged from the plain language of the statute.
167.
Section 11(6-A) uses the expression "examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement". The purport of using the
word "examination" connotes that the legislature intends that the
Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the
parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement. Moreover,
the expression "examination" does not connote or imply a
laborious or contested inquiry. On the other hand, Section 16
provides
that
the
Arbitral
Tribunal
can
"rule"
on
its
jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A "ruling" connotes adjudication of
disputes after admitting evidence from the parties. Therefore,
it is evident that the Referral Court is only required to examine
the existence of arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral
Tribunal ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues
pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration
agreement. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Shin-Etsu
Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd.
168.
In Shin-Etsu, this Court was called upon to determine the
nature of adjudication contemplated by unamended Section 45 of
the Arbitration Act when the objection with regards to the arbitration
agreement being "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed" is raised before a judicial authority. Writing for the
majority, B.N. Srikrishna. J. held that Section 45 does not require
the judicial authority to give a final determination. The Court
observed that: (SCC p. 267, para 74)
"74. There are distinct advantages in veering to the view that
Section 45 does not require a final determinative finding by
the Court. First, under the Rules of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (as in force with effect
from 1-1-1998), as in the present case, invariably the Arbitral
Tribunal is vested with the power to rule upon its own
jurisdiction. Even if the Court takes the view that the arbitral
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2026:JHHC:13992
agreement is not vitiated or that it is not invalid, inoperative or
unenforceable, based upon purely a prima facie view, nothing
prevents the arbitrator from trying the issue fully and
rendering a final decision thereupon. If the arbitrator finds the
agreement valid, there is no problem as the arbitration will
proceed and the award will be made. However, if the
arbitrator finds the agreement invalid, inoperative or void, this
means that the party who wanted to proceed for arbitration
was given an opportunity of proceeding to arbitration, and the
arbitrator after fully trying the issue has found that there is no
scope for arbitration. Since the arbitrator's finding would not
be an enforceable award, there is no need to take recourse to
the judicial intercession available under Section 48(1)(a) of
the Act."
169. When the Referral Court renders a prima facie opinion,
neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the Court enforcing the
arbitral award will be bound by such a prima facie view. If a
prima facie view as to the existence of an arbitration
agreement is taken by the Referral Court, it still allows the
Arbitral Tribunal to examine the issue in depth. Such a legal
approach will help the Referral Court in weeding out prima
facie non-existent arbitration agreements. It will also protect
the jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunals to
decide on issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement.”
17.
From the above, it is clear that Section 11(6-A) of the said Act
continues to remain in force, and it is incumbent upon the Court to give true
effect to the legislative intent. Section 11(6-A) inter alia provides that the
High Court, while considering any application under Section 11(6), shall,
notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine itself
to the examination of the existence of an agreement.
18.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained that the use of the
term "examination" connotes that the scope of the power is limited to a
prima facie determination. The Referral Courts need only consider one
aspect to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement: whether the
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2026:JHHC:13992
underlying contract contains an arbitration clause that provides for the
arbitration of the disputes that have arisen between the parties to the
agreement.
19.
Therefore, the scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) should be
confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of
Section 7. Similarly, the validity of an arbitration agreement, under Section
7, should be limited to the formal requirements, such as the requirement
that the agreement be in writing. The court held that such an interpretation
also gives true effect to the doctrine of competence-competence by leaving
the issue of substantive existence and validity of an arbitration agreement
to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16.
20.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that though the burden of
proving the existence of the arbitration agreement generally lies on the
party seeking to rely on such agreement, in jurisdictions such as India,
which accept the doctrine of competence-competence, only prima facie
proof of the existence of an arbitration agreement must be adduced before
the Referral Court. The Referral Court is not the appropriate forum for a
mini-trial to determine the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.
The determination of the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement
on the basis of evidence ought to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal.
21.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court pointed out that Section 11(6-A) uses
the expression "examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement".
The purport of using the word "examination" connotes that the legislature
intends that the Referral Court has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings
between the parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Moreover, the expression "examination" does not connote or imply a
laborious or contested inquiry. On the other hand, Section 16 provides that
the Arbitral Tribunal can "rule" on its jurisdiction, including the existence
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and validity of an arbitration agreement. A "ruling" connotes the
adjudication of disputes after the admission of evidence from the parties.
Therefore, it is evident that the Referral Court is only required to examine
the existence of an arbitration agreement, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal
ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues pertaining to the
existence and validity of an arbitration agreement.
22.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further clarified that when the Referral
Court renders a prima facie opinion, neither the Arbitral Tribunal, nor the
Court enforcing the arbitral award will be bound by such a prima facie view.
If the Referral Court takes a prima facie view of the existence of an
arbitration agreement, it still allows the Arbitral Tribunal to examine the
issue in depth. Such a legal approach will help the Referral Court in
weeding out prima facie non-existent arbitration agreements. It will also
protect the jurisdictional competence of the Arbitral Tribunals to decide on
issues pertaining to the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement.
23.
Thus, considering the limited scope of these proceedings, I am
satisfied that this application should be allowed and that the parties must be
referred to arbitration. However, all contentions of the parties, including the
defences now raised by and on behalf of the respondent, are kept open
with liberty to the respondent to raise the same before the Arbitrator. The
mere appointment of an arbitrator should not be construed as either a
waiver of such objections or as an indication that this Court overruled such
objections.
24.
Accordingly, this application is disposed of by passing the following
orders: A.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Praveen Kumar, Former Judge of High
Court of Andhra Pradesh, residing at Plot No. 149B, MPs and
MLA Colony, Road No. 10C, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad 500033
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2026:JHHC:13992
[email-praveenchagari@yahoo.co.in] is hereby appointed as
the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes and
differences between the parties arising out of and in
connection with the agreement referred to above;
B.
All contentions and objections on behalf of the respondent,
including the contentions now raised in opposition to this
application, are left open for decision by the Arbitral Tribunal
so constituted;
C.
A copy of this order should be communicated to the learned
sole Arbitrator by the advocates for the applicants within
twenty days from today. The applicants shall provide the
parties' contact and communication particulars to the Arbitral
Tribunal, along with a copy of this order;
D.
The learned sole Arbitrator is requested to forward the
statutory statement of disclosure under Section 11(8) read
with Section 12(1) of the said Act to the parties within a
period of two weeks from the receipt of a copy of this order;
E.
The parties shall appear before the learned sole Arbitrator on
such date and at such place to obtain appropriate directions
with regard to the conduct of the arbitration, including fixing a
schedule for pleadings, examination of witnesses, if any,
schedule of hearings, etc.;
F.
At the above-referred meeting, the parties shall provide the
Arbitral Tribunal with a valid and functional email address
and the mobile numbers of the respective advocates of the
parties. Communications to such email addresses shall
constitute valid service of correspondence in connection with
the arbitration and;
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G.
The Arbitrator’s fees shall be in terms of the 4th Schedule of
the said Act. All arbitral costs and fees of the Arbitral Tribunal
shall be borne by the parties equally in the first instance, and
shall be subject to any final Award that may be passed by the
Tribunal in relation to the costs.
25.
Pending I.A.s, if any, stand disposed of. No costs.
26.
All concerned can act on an authenticated copy of this order.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)
May 08, 2026
A.F.R.
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