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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 494/2016
M/S GEO MILLER & CO PVT LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. S.D. Singh, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Kamla
Prasad, Mr. Siddartha Singh,
Mr. Manan Saini, Mr. Meenu
Singh, Mr. Navneet, Advs.
versus
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Alka Dahar, Mr. Shiv
Verma, Mr. Ankit Bharadwaj
and Ms. Pankhudi Tripathi,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
%
JUDGMENT(ORAL)
27.07.2026
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 challenging the arbitral award
dated 30.11.2011.
2.
The dispute arises out of an EPC Tender concerning the
construction of a wastewater treatment plant at Panipat Market
Terminal awarded by the Respondent to the Petitioner vide Letter of
Intent dated 06.12.1996 for a total contract value of Rs.4,90,00,000/-.
3.
Under the terms of the Letter of Intent dated 06.12.1996, the
1 “the Act”, hereinafter
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stipulated period for completion was nine months. However, dispute
erupted as the work was not completed within the initial time line.
4.
Consequently, the Respondent withheld 10% of the total contract
value by invoking contractual provisions governing liquidated damages
for delay.
5.
Aggrieved by the deduction, the Petitioner invoked arbitration,
challenging the 10% penalty and preferring additional monetary claims
towards overheads and prolonged site, stay attributable to alleged
delays by the Respondents.
Adjudicating Issue Nos. 5 & 6
6.
Pertaining to whether the Respondent had unlawfully withheld
10% of the contract value, the learned Sole Arbitrator ruled in favour
of the Respondent. The learned Arbitrator concluded that:(i)
The Petitioner was responsible for the delay in project
execution.
(ii)
Time was the essence of the contract.
(iii)
The Petitioner failed to adhere to the prescribed procedure
for seeking an extension of time under Clause 4.3.6.0.
7.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Arbitrator has placed reliance
on the stipulated execution period of nine months and the repeated
notices issued by the Respondent highlighting the delay in execution of
the works.
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8.
Furthermore, referring to Clause 4.3.5.0, 4.3.6.0 & 4.3.6.0, the
Arbitrator held that the Petitioner failed to submit any document
proving compliance with the mandatory contractual procedure for
seeking time extension.
9.
The learned Arbitrator negated the Petitioner’s plea regarding
adverse weather, observing that the rainfall was not the permissible
ground for an extension under the contract and, in any event, the rainfall
occurred on 07.11.1997 well after the scheduled completion date. The
Arbitrator rejected the Petitioner’s objection that only Respondent itself
could grant time extensions on levy price reductions, holding that
Engineers India Ltd, acting as Respondent’s power of Attorney Holder
was fully competent to act on its behalf.
10.
Consequently, the learned Sole Arbitrator held that the
Respondent was lawfully entitled under Clause 4.4.0.0 to reduce the
contract price by 10% of the total contract price.
11.
Mr. S.D. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
submits that the Arbitrator erred in attributing delay to the Petitioner
and upholding the 10% deduction.
12.
It is contended that the Arbitrator failed to properly appreciate
correspondence which established that the delay was attributable to the
Respondent.
13.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner further contends that
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time could no longer be treated as the essence of the contract once the
Respondent was permitted to continue the work beyond the stipulated
completion date, irrespective of whether the contractual owner had
formally decided the issue of extension of time or levy of liquidated
damages.
14.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on
Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority and Anr.2 to
contend that Respondent could not justify an automatic deduction of the
maximum 10% merely upon proof of delay and the amount recoverable
had to constitute reasonable compensation for a breach attributable to
the petitioner.
15.
Further, reliance was placed on J.G. Engineers Private Limited
v. Union Of India and Anr.3 to contend that Respondent could not
unilaterally decide that the contractor was responsible for the delay and
then impose liquidated damages.
16.
Lastly, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner contended that
the learned Sole Arbitrator failed to evaluate whether the stipulated
deduction constituted reasonable compensation under Section 74 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872.
17.
On these grounds, the Petitioner prays for setting aside the
impugned order.
18.
Upon reviewing the material on record, the controversy narrows
down to two principal issues:2
2015 (4) SCC 136
3 2011 (5) SCC 758
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(i)
Whether the Respondent was justified in withholding 10%
of the Contract value as liquidated damages for delayed
compensation.
(ii)
Whether the Petitioner was entitled to additional
compensation for extended stay at the project side.
19.
There is no challenge pertaining to the clause of the contract
which permits 10% liquidated damages. The case of the Petitioner is
that since delay is attributable to Respondent, he cannot deduct 10%
liquidated damages as per contract. In essence, the Petitioner invites this
Court to reexamine factual questions regarding causation of delay and
whether extension letters operated as unconditional waivers.
20.
Adjudicating the submission as to who really caused the delay,
would require a fresh appraisal of evidence and contractual
correspondence, and exercise power well beyond the limited
supervisory scope under Section 34 of the Act.
21.
However, according to this Court, after analysing the evidentiary
record, the learned Arbitrator led the plausible finding that the
Respondent delayed the project by 270 days.
22.
The impugned Award expressly considers the delay attributable
to the Petitioner in mobilising resources at the project site, as well as
the delays relating to the issuance and availability of Approved for
Construction drawings.
23.
It further records the Petitioner’s failure to expedite the execution
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of the works and to deploy adequate manpower, machinery, and other
resources, despite repeated notices, reminders, by respondents.
24.
The learned Arbitral Tribunal has thus examined the relevant
correspondence,
and
the
conduct
of
the
parties,
and
the
contemporaneous project records before determining responsibility for
the delay.
25.
The relevant findings from the arbitral award in this regard are
reproduced as below:
“I have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the
matter and the arguments of both sides. A perusal of the facts of the
matter substantiated by the plethora of communication exchanged
between the parties show that the Claimant was slow and negligent
in fulfilling his obligations as specified under the contract. The slow
pace of work can be ascertained from the fact that the Claimant
deputed his authorized representative only on 2nd Feb 1997 after a
delay of 2 months. Letter dated 17th January 1997 sent by EIL,
Power of Attorney holders of the Respondent also show the delay on
part of the Claimant. Provision of Clause 4.4.0.0 of the Contract
provides that if there has been any delay in the final completion of
the work at any job site or specific works in respect of which a
separate progress schedule has been established, beyond the date
for the final completion of the work or works aforesaid at job site as
stipulated in the progress scheduled, the owner shall (without
prejudice to any other right of owner in this behalf) be entitled to
reduction in price % (one half percent of the total contract value for
each week of delay or part thereof limited to a max. of 10% (ten
percent) of the total contract value.
Further provisions of Cl. 4.3.5.0 provides for procedure for
obtaining extension of time which was not complied with by the
Claimant.
Contract Clause 4.3.5.0 provides as follows:
“Within 7 (seven) days of the occurrence of any act, event or
omission which, in the opinion of the Contractor, is likely to
lead to delay in the commencement or completion of any
particular work(s) or operation(s) or the entire work at any
job site(s) and as such it would entitle the Contractor for an
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extension of the time specified in this behalf in the Progress
Schedule (s), the contractor shall inform the site engineer
and the engineer-in-charge in writing of the occurrence of
the act, event or omission and the date of commencement of
such occurrence. Thereafter, if even upon the cessation of
such act or event of the fulfillment of the omission, the
contractor is of opinion that an extension of the time
specified in the Progress Schedule relative to any particular
operation(s) or item(s) of work of the entire work at any job
site is necessary, the contractor shall within 7 (seven) days
after the cessation or fulfillment as aforesaid make a written
request to the Engineer-in-charge for extension of the
relative time specified in the progress schedule, and the
Engineer-in-charge may at may time prior to completion of
the work extend the relative time of completion in the
progress schedule for such period(s) as he considers
necessary, if he is of the opinion that such act/event/omission
constitutes a ground for extension of time in terms of the
Contract and that such act/event/omission has in fact
resulted in insurmountable delay to the contractor. The
opinion/decision of the Engineer-in-charge in this behalf
and as to the extension necessary shall, subject to the
provisions of Clause 4.3.6.0 hereof be final and binding upon
the contractor.”
The Claimants have argued that Owner doesn't include
representative or agents and that only IOCL as an owner
was empowered to terminate the agreement however IOCL
did not choose to terminate the contract. The Claimant has
further argued that till date there is no complaint about the
quality of the work executed by the Claimant and the same is
being fully used by the Respondent. The Claimants have
further stated that the Respondent does not have any right to
withhold the amount by permitting the Claimant to execute
the work and without terminating the contract and
suspending the work and that there was De-facto extension
of the contract which is evidenced by the communication
between the parties evidently showing that the contract has
been extended mutually between the parties.
The Counsel for the Claimant has also stated that if there is
extension clause in the contract, time cannot be said to be
the essence. The Claimant has relied on Section 55 of the
Contract Act and states in the present case, the conduct of
the parties clearly shows that the Respondent never treated
time as an essence and permitted the claimant to continue
the execution of the work. The Counsel has relayed on
Arosan Enterprises Ltd V. UOI & Ano. (1999) 9 SCC 449
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(para 14) and states that when the contract itself provides
for extension of time, the same i.e. time cannot be termed to
be essence of contract. The counsel also argues that due to
the delay caused in the completion of the project no damages
or loss was caused to the Respondents.
I have also considered the arguments of counsel for the
Respondent that the payment for the execution of work has
already been made to the satisfaction of the Claimant and
subsequent to which it has issued the 'NOC' on 03.11.99
without any undue pressure. The Respondent states the
present claim of the Claimant is therefore, liable to be
dismissed on this ground alone. The counsel has further
argued that the time was the essence of the contract and the
entire work was to be completed Arbitral within 9 months
from the date of fax of intent. This Arbitral tribunal attention
has also been drawn to Clause 2.3.1.0 of GCC wherein the
Claimant had to submit all the drawings within 15 days from
the date of acceptance of the Tender or 15 days before the
proposed date of commencement of the relative work,
whichever shall be earlier. Clause 4.3.7.0 of the Contract
has also been mentioned which defines the circumstances
under which the contractor is eligible for extension of time
for completion of work and for such extension rain is not
covered including Clause 4.3.5.0 which provides if any
extension had to be obtained for any hindrances then the
contractor had right to apply for time extension under this
provision failing which it is assumed that all the works would
be executed as per the contract which in this case the
Claimant did not do. It is also pointed out by the Respondent
that scheduled date of completion of work was September 5,
1997 whereas the date of rain is November 7, 1997.
Thus after hearing both the sides and after examination of
the plethora of communication exchanges between the
parties it is clear that the Respondent repeatedly
communicated to the Claimant regarding the delay of the
project. From the facts and circumstances of the matter, it is
clear that there has been a delay in executing the work and
it cannot be said that time was not the essence of the
contract. There is also no document to show that the
Claimant complied with the provisions of cl. 4.3.6.0 as was
required under the contract. The arguments of the Claimant
that only the owner could have taken the decision and the
Engineer Incharge was not competent to take the decision of
not allowing the extension of time does not hold water as
Engineers India Limited (EIL) are clearly the power of
attorney holders for Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL)
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and therefore, this argument of the Claimant also fails.
Hence I hold the Respondent are well within their legal
rights to price reduction as envisaged under the provisions
of cl. 4.4.0.0 of the contract up-to maximum of 10% of the
total contract value as there was a delay in completing the
work.”
26.
It is evident from the record that the view taken by the learned
Sole Arbitrator is entirely plausible. This Court in exercising its
constraint jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot interfere merely because
another view is possible, unless the findings are shown to be by no
evidence, ignored vital evidence and adopt an interpretation so
irrational as to be impermissible.
27.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associate Builders v. DDA4,
reiterated that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 does
not seek as a Court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate evidence.
Interference is limited strictly to cases where findings are perverse
based on no evidence or fundamentally irrational. Paragraph 33 reads
as under:
“33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying
the “public policy” test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a
court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected.
A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass
muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral
award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence which
does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would not be
held to be invalid on this score [ Very often an arbitrator is a lay
person not necessarily trained in law. Lord Mansfield, a famous
English Judge, once advised a high military officer in Jamaica who
needed to act as a Judge as follows:“General, you have a sound
head, and a good heart; take courage and you will do very well, in
your occupation, in a court of equity. My advice is, to make your
4 (2015) 3 SCC 49
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decrees as your head and your heart dictate, to hear both sides
patiently, to decide with firmness in the best manner you can; but be
careful not to assign your reasons, since your determination may be
substantially right, although your reasons may be very bad, or
essentially wrong”.It is very important to bear this in mind when
awards of lay arbitrators are challenged.] . Once it is found that the
arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the
last word on facts. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. v.
B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. [(2012) 1 SCC 594 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ)
342] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 601-02, para 21)
“21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an
Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the
evidence. An award can be challenged only under the
grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral
Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the
second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as
put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even
the minority view was that the second respondent was liable
as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not
liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by
the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against a
non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim against
another member. The finding of the majority is that the
appellant did the transaction in the name of the second
respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second
respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under
Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the
facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived
at.”
28.
The Apex Court had emphasized that plausible construction of
contractual terms by Arbitrator must be respected.
29.
It is also held time and again by Hon’ble Apex Court that Courts
cannot re-evaluate evidence under Section 34 simply to determine
whether an ultimate factual conclusion could have been reached unless
the award is based on no evidence or a vital evidence is ignored.
30.
Further, it is also borne out from the contract itself that the clause
permits a damage of 10%, which does not seem to this Court to be
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unreasonable or in access.
31.
The contention of learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
relying on J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) that the
disputed question as to which party caused the delay must be
adjudicated independently is not convincing. In the present case, that
requirement was satisfied because the Arbitrator himself examined the
correspondence and contractual provisions and recorded a finding that
the Claimant was responsible for the delay, therefore, J.G. Engineers
(supra) does not by itself invalidate the award.
32.
With regards to reliance placed on Kailash Nath (supra), in the
present case, the Arbitrator has expressly found that the contractor
committed breach by failing to complete the work by 05.09.1997 and did
not establish compliance with the contractual procedure for extension of
time and was repeatedly informed about the delay.
33.
Further, Clause 4.4.0.0 of the subject agreement does not provide
for forfeiture of a fixed deposit, but prescribes a graded price reduction of
0.5% for each week of delay, capped at 10%, thereby linking
compensation to the duration of the breach.. Thus, unlike Kailash Nath
(supra), the present case involves an adjudicated breach and a delay based
compensation clause.
34.
The remaining objections raised by the Petitioner are
consequential to the primary findings on responsibility for delay, once
the Arbitrator determine that the delay was attributable to the Petitioner,
thereby entitling Respondent to invoke Clause 4.4.0.0 is sustained
under reasonable and plausible view, the foundation of the challenge to
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the liquidated damages collapsed.
35.
In view of the above, the Petitioner’s objection to the impugned
arbitral award dated 30.11.2011 is devoid of merit and stands rejected.
36.
Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed along with all
pending applications with no orders as to costs.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
JULY 27, 2026/at/gunn
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