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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 06th FEBRUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+
ARB.P. 1466/2025 & I.A. 26066/2025
M/S DYNAMIC PROJECTS
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. A. K. Tewari, Mr. Rahul Burman
and Ms. Yosha Dutt, Advs
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Vinay Yadav, CGSC with
Advocates Ms Kamna Behrani, Mr.
Ansh Kalra and Mr. Neeraj Paulose
with Mr. A. K. Pandey, Director, and
Mr. M. K. Goyal, Joint Director, and
Mr. R. Kayasth, TLC, DGMAP
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Petitioner seeking
appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes which have
arisen between the parties under a Contract dated 22.05.2009.
2.
The facts, as narrated in the petition, are that the Respondent No.1
invited bids for the work of “Detailed Engineering and Project Management
Consultant for construction of residential accommodation at Karwar
(Navy)”. The Petitioner participated in the tender. The bid of the Petitioner
was accepted and the Contract was awarded to the Petitioner.
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3.
It is the case of the Petitioner that the work stood completed on
15.01.2018. The Petitioner, thereafter, on 21.11.2023 submitted its running
account bill amounting to Rs.20,08,818.00/- to Respondent No.3 for StageIV under the Contract. Further on 08.01.2025, the Petitioner submitted its
bill amounting to of Rs. 2,42,34,215.00/- to Respondent No.3 for Stage-V
(Final stage) under the Contract. It is stated that since the bills submitted by
the Petitioner for Stage-IV and Stage-V were not cleared, disputes arose
between the parties.
4.
It is stated that the Petitioner, thereafter, issued a notice under Article
17 of Contract requesting the Engineer-in-Chief, Integrated HQ of MOD
(Army), Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi (who is the designated
authority to appoint a Sole Arbitrator) to appoint an independent and
impartial Arbitrator. Since no response was received, the Petitioner
approached this Court by filing the present Petition seeking appointment of
an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes.
5.
Notice was issued in the Petition on 15.09.2025.
6.
It is stated by the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the
Petitioner failed to perform its duties under the Contract. According to the
Respondents, the arbitration clause, which is Article 17 of the Contract,
could be invoked only after the completion of defect liability period of two
years. He states that a similar arbitration clause was the subject matter of
challenge before this Court in another petition under Section 11 being ARB
P. No. 1342/2022 and the Order passed by the learned Single Judge of this
Court appointing an Arbitrator in that petition was the subject matter in an
Special Leave to Appeal (C) 17079/2024, wherein the Apex Court set aside
the Order of the learned Single Judge appointing an Arbitrator.
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7.
Heard learned Counsel appearing for the Parties and perused the
material on record.
8.
The main question which arises for consideration before this Court is
as to whether the invocation of arbitration by the Petitioner was invalid
and/or premature. It is necessary to reproduce Article 17 of the Contract,
which is the arbitration clause under the Contract. The same reads as under:“ARTICLE 17
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
All disputes, between the parties to the contract
(other than those for which the decision of the DGMAP
or any other person is by the contract expressed to be
final and binding) shall, after written notice by either
party to the Contract to the other of item, be referred
to the sole arbitration of serving officer having degree
in Engineering or equivalent or having passed Final /
Direct Final Examination of Sub Division II of
Institution of Surveyors (India) recognized by the Govt
of India to be appointed by the Engineer-in-Chief, Ein-C's Branch, Kashmir House, New Delhi-11 or
Director General of Works if specifically delegated in
writing by Engineer-in-Chief, Army Headquarters,
New Delhi whose decision shall be final, conclusive
and binding. The Arbitration shall be governed by
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Unless both parties agree in writing, such
reference shall not take place until after the
completion or alleged completion of the Works or
termination or determination of the Contract under
conditions of this contract.
Provided that in the event of abandonment of the
works or cancellation of the Contract under conditions
of this contract, such reference shall not take place
until alternative arrangements have been finalized by
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the OWNER to get the works completed by or through
any other consultant or consultants or Agency or
agencies.
Provided always that commencement or
continuance of any arbitration proceeding hereunder
or otherwise shall not in any manner militate against
the Owner's right of recovery from the consultant as
provided in conditions of this contract.
If the Arbitrator so appointed resigns his
appointment or vacates his office or is unable or
unwilling to act due to any reason whatsoever, the
authority appointing him may appoint a new Arbitrator
to act in his place.
The Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration,
exparte, if either party, inspite of notice from the
Arbitrator, fails to take part in the proceedings.
The Arbitrator shall give his reasoned award in
writing on all matters referred to him and shall
indicate his findings, along with sums awarded,
separately on each individual item of dispute.
The venue of arbitration shall be such place or
places as may be fixed by the Arbitrator in his
discretion.
The language of the arbitration proceedings and
that of all documents any communications between the
parties shall be "English".
The award of the Arbitrator shall be final and
binding on both the parties to the contract.
Notwithstanding the fact that the stations of
work are anywhere in India, only the courts at
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Delhi/New Delhi shall have the jurisdiction to
adjudicate and settle any disputes between OWNER
and the consultant. No other court outside Delhi/New
Delhi shall have any jurisdiction on any matter
requiring reference to Civil Court.”
9.
This Court has also gone through the Order dated 04.03.2024 passed
by the learned Single Judge of this Court in ARB.P. No.1342/2022, which
has been relied on by the Respondents. A perusal of the said Order brought
out notable factual dissimilarities from those involved in the present petition.
Parts of the Order depicting such disparities are extracted as under:“13. The reliance placed by the respondent on the
proviso of Clause 60 of GCC to contend that since the
contract has been cancelled by the respondent, there
can be no reference to the arbitration till alternative
agreements have been made by the Government to get
the works completed by or through any other also
without any merit. The Kerala High Court in Ivrcl
(supra), has held that such conditions in an arbitration
clause are treated only as an enabling provision which
enables the department to raise their claims in respect
of the loss caused as a result of rearrangement and
they cannot be treated as a fetter on the right of the
petitioner to seek remedies on account of alleged
breach of contract. Relevant extract of the said
judgement is as under:
“….Provided that in the event of abandonment of the
Works or cancellation of the Contract under
Condition Nos. 52, 53 or 54 hereof, such reference
shall not take place until alternative arrangements
have been finalized by the Government to get the
Works completed by or through any other
Contractor or Contractors or Agency or Agencies….
xxx
xxx
xxx
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28. There seems to be considerable force in the
above submission. It is true that going by Condition
No. 70 of the General Conditions that
rearrangement of work seems to be a condition for
seeking a reference to arbitration. But as rightly
pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, it is only an enabling provision which
enables the department to raise their claims in
respect of the loss caused as a result of
rearrangement. That cannot be treated as a fetter
on the right of the petitioner to seek remedies on
breach of contract. It could not be said that cause
of action for the petitioner arises only on
rearrangement of the work by the department. One
need not labour much on this aspect. In the
decision reported in Delta Foundations and
Constructions v. Kerala State Construction
Corporation (2003 KHC 107) wherein an identical
question was considered, it was held that going by
Article 55 of the Limitation Act, the time begins to
run from the date on which the contract is broken
and not when the rearrangement is made…
xxx
xxx
xxx
32. Coming to the present claims, while the
petitioner would complaint of illegal termination,
the department would put the blame on the
petitioner. The definite stand of the department is
that as per Condition No. 70, only after
rearrangement of work, any one of the parties get a
right to seek arbitration.
33. As already noticed, the above contention cannot
be countenanced. At the risk of repetition, one may
notice the period of limitation. As far as the
petitioner is concerned, the time commences to run
from the date of breach of contract. It also does not
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stand to reason to hold that cause of action will
commence only on a particular act being done by
the respondent. As already noticed, the said clause
is intended for the benefit of the department and
cannot be taken as a ground to postpone the
remedies i.e., to seek reference by the contractor on
breach of contract. If one is to accept the contention
of the respondent, in case the department decides
not to make rearrangement for the work, or delays
the same deliberately either the claim of the
contractor would become barred or it would never
arise.
34. There is nothing in Condition No. 70 which is
relied on by the department to show that they were
bound to take steps for rearrangement of the work
within a stipulated period. It is difficult to
understand how the period of limitation against the
petitioner could be postponed by an act depending
on the whims and fancies of the department which is
essential to assess the damage or loss sustained by
the department as a consequence of the
rearrangement of the work. 35. It is significant to
notice that the entire claim made by the contractor
and the claim that is expected to be raised by the
department consequent on the act of the petitioner
are distinct and different. May be that when the
claim is referred to the Arbitration Tribunal, the
department may not be able to prefer a counter
claim. Apart from the fact that such a contingency
has already been referred to, it does not stand to
reason also. Therefore, the department can have no
grievance.”
14. Further, the petitioner‟s contention is that it had
already terminated the contract on 14.09.2021 and
thereafter the cancellation of the contract by the
respondent is a farce and an attempt to build up a
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defence. Further, it is pointed out that the period of the
contract had also come to end before reference was
sought. In this context, the Jammu and Kashmir and
Ladakh High Court in Mohindra Bros (supra), has
held as under:
“Perusal of Condition 70, read as whole,
demonstrates its object that arbitration may not be
permissible during the period of Contract unless
there was agreement between the parties for
reference to arbitration or in the event of
abandonment of Works or cancellation thereof, until
alternate arrangements were finalized by the
Government to get the Work completed by or
through any other Contractor or Agency. The
completion of Contract referred to in the Condition
means the period initially fixed for completion of
Contract, of course, including the extended period
thereto. After the expiry of the period of Contract or
extension allowed therefor, the agreement of the
parties and the Proviso appended to Condition 70
thereof may not have any application, in that, after
the expiry of period of Contract or extended period
thereof, resort to arbitration is permissible for
referring the matter to arbitration. Abandonment,
cancellation or completion of work by any other
Contractor or Agency would also not operate as
impediment for appointment of Arbitrator when the
period of Contract had otherwise expired.”
15. The above observations in Ivrcl (supra) and
Mohindra Bros (supra), are squarely applicable in the
present case. Also, the respondent cannot be permitted
to frustrate the arbitration agreement by failing to
make the alternative arrangements for inordinately
long period. Almost two years have expired since the
date of cancellation of the contract and the alternative
arrangements are apparently not yet in place. In this
context, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sai
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Enterprises (supra), has held as under:
“2. The parties had admittedly entered into a
contract clause 37 whereof contains an arbitration
agreement. Clause 37 entitles the respondents to
appoint a serving officer which is not permissible
under the amended Act. The proviso states that in
the event of abandonment of the supplies or
cancellation of the contract under condition Nos. 26,
27 or 28 thereof, the reference shall not take place
until alternative arrangements have been finalized
by the government to get the supplies completed by
or through any other contractor or contractors or
agency or agencies.
3. The respondents contend that the petitioner
abandoned the work on 17.11.2016.
4. I will presume that to be so. I will also presume
that the respondents have not as yet made the
alternative arrangements as contemplated in the
proviso to clause 37 of the agreement. The
respondents cannot frustrate an arbitration
agreement by failing to make the alternative
arrangements. It is now ten months since the alleged
abandonment of the work.
5. Faced with this, it is contended that the
cancellation was on 03.08.2017. The respondents
can always make alternative arrangements. That
would not affect the appointment of the arbitrator. In
any event, to leave no scope for grievance, the
arbitrator shall not enter upon the reference for a
period of four weeks hereafter.”
10.
The abovementioned Order demonstrates that the facts in ARB P. No.
1342/2022 and the facts in the present case are distinguishable.
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11.
To summarize, the facts in ARB P. No. 1342/2022, reveal that since
the work was not completed, several notices were issued by the Respondent
complaining that the progress in work was extremely slow and, thereafter,
on 21.01.2022, the contract was terminated.
12.
Upon being directed by this Court, a copy of the Special Leave to
Appeal (C) 17079/2024 was handed over in Court, which contains the letter
of termination dated 21.01.2022 and is being reproduced as under:
“Dear Sir,
1. References:(a) This HQ latter No 84841/MAP/PH-II/PKG28/ Mumbai (Army)/957/E8 dt 30 Jul 2021.
(b) This HQ letter No 34841/MAP/PH-1I/PKG28/ Mumbai (Army)/980/E8 dt. 16 Nov 2021.
(c)This HQ letter No 84841/MAP/PH-II/PKG- 28/
Mumbai (Army)/1005/E8 dt 14 Jan 2022.
2. In spite of notices Issued to you under the references
mentioned at para 1 (a) and (b) in connection with the
work to be executed under the above mentioned
contract, you have failed to recommence the work
after, you abandoned it since Jun 2021.
3. Therefore, I Accepting Officer of the contract, on
behalf of the Government, acting under the powers
vested in me in terms of condition 48 of the General
Condition of Contracts and without prejudice to any
other right of remedy which shall have accrued or
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shall accrue hereinafter to the Government under the
terms of the above said contract, hereby cancel your
this contract on account of your default and the said
contract shall stand cancelled with Immediate effect.
4. Please note that the remaining works as defined in
the contract condition 1 (c) of the General Conditions
of Contracts will be completed by me through another
agency at your risk and cost.
5. You are accordingly requested to report to PM at his
office in person or through an accredited
representative on the date to be intimated by PM when
an Inventory of complete/incomplete items of work and
materials, if any, left by you at site will be made and
recorded jointly. In the event of your failure to keep
this appointment, Inventory will nevertheless be
prepared notwithstanding your absence and the same
shall be fully binding on you.
6. This is without prejudice.
Yours faithfully
(J S Ishar)
Maj Gen DG MAP”
13.
Unlike ARB P. No. 1342/2022, in the present case, the works stand
completed by the Petitioner. In fact, a Completion Certificate dated
17.02.2028 has also been issued to the Petitioner which reads as under:
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14.
On account of the facts being entirely different in ARB P. No.
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1342/2022, the Order passed by this Court in ARB P. No. 1342/2022 and its
subsequent overruling is wholly misplaced, as the work was terminated in
the said case whereas, in the present case, the work stands completed.
15.
Article 1 of the Contract provides definitions wherein Article 1.8
gives the definition of project which reads as under:
“1.8 "PROJECT" shall mean the Housing Complex/
Urban Development at location (s) for which
consultant is to provide SERVICES under this
CONTRACT”
16.
In any event, the interpretation of Article 17 of the Contract as to
whether the cause of action arises or not would be a subject matter for the
Arbitrator to decide.
17.
The Apex Court in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under
Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, has observed
as under:
“165. The legislature confined the scope of reference
under Section 11(6-A) to the examination of the
existence of an arbitration agreement. The use of the
term “examination” in itself connotes that the scope of
the power is limited to a prima facie determination.
Since the Arbitration Act is a self-contained code, the
requirement of “existence” of an arbitration
agreement draws effect from Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act. In Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera,
S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 :
(2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764] , this Court held that the
Referral Courts only need to consider one aspect to
determine the existence of an arbitration agreement —
whether the underlying contract contains an
arbitration agreement which provides for arbitration
pertaining to the disputes which have arisen between
the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the scope of
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examination under Section 11(6-A) should be
confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement
on the basis of Section 7. Similarly, the validity of an
arbitration agreement, in view of Section 7, should be
restricted to the requirement of formal validity such
as the requirement that the agreement be in writing.
This interpretation also gives true effect to the
doctrine of competence-competence by leaving the
issue of substantive existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement to be decided by Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 16. We accordingly clarify
the position of law laid down in Vidya Drolia [Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 :
(2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] in the context of Section 8
and Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
166. The burden of proving the existence of arbitration
agreement generally lies on the party seeking to rely
on such agreement. In jurisdictions such as India,
which accept the doctrine of competence-competence,
only prima facie proof of the existence of an
arbitration agreement must be adduced before the
Referral Court. The Referral Court is not the
appropriate forum to conduct a mini-trial by allowing
the parties to adduce the evidence in regard to the
existence or validity of an arbitration agreement. The
determination of the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement on the basis of evidence ought
to be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. This position of law
can also be gauged from the plain language of the
statute.
167. Section 11(6-A) uses the expression “examination
of the existence of an arbitration agreement”. The
purport of using the word “examination” connotes
that the legislature intends that the Referral Court
has to inspect or scrutinise the dealings between the
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parties for the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Moreover, the expression “examination” does not
connote or imply a laborious or contested inquiry. [
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.,
1997) 666.] On the other hand, Section 16 provides
that the Arbitral Tribunal can “rule” on its
jurisdiction, including the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A “ruling” connotes
adjudication of disputes after admitting evidence from
the parties. Therefore, it is evident that the Referral
Court is only required to examine the existence of
arbitration agreements, whereas the Arbitral Tribunal
ought to rule on its jurisdiction, including the issues
pertaining to the existence and validity of an
arbitration agreement. A similar view was adopted by
this Court in Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh
Optifibre Ltd. [Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh
Optifibre Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 234]”
(emphasis supplied)
18.
Similarly, the Apex Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish
Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754, has observed as under:
“122. Once an arbitration agreement exists between
parties, then the option of approaching the civil court
becomes unavailable to them. In such a scenario, if the
parties seek to raise a dispute, they necessarily have to
do so before the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral
tribunal, in turn, can only be constituted as per the
procedure agreed upon between the parties. However,
if there is a failure of the agreed upon procedure, then
the duty of appointing the arbitral tribunal falls upon
the referral court under Section 11 of the Act, 1996. If
the referral court, at this stage, goes beyond the scope
of enquiry as provided under the section and examines
the issue of “accord and satisfaction”, then it would
amount to usurpation of the power which the parties
had intended to be exercisable by the arbitral tribunal
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alone and not by the national courts. Such a scenario
would impeach arbitral autonomy and would not fit
well with the scheme of the Act, 1996.
*****
125. We are also of the view that ex-facie frivolity and
dishonesty in litigation is an aspect which the arbitral
tribunal is equally, if not more, capable to decide upon
the appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
parties. We say so because the arbitral tribunal has the
benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the referral court.
If the referral court is able to see the frivolity in the
litigation on the basis of bare minimum pleadings, then
it would be incorrect to doubt that the arbitral tribunal
would not be able to arrive at the same inference, most
likely in the first few hearings itself, with the benefit of
extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
19.
The issues as to whether the completion of work would include the
defect liability period or not would also be a matter to be decided by the
Arbitrator. It is well settled that the referral Court only sees as to whether
dispute exists between the parties or not. In view of the fact that work stands
completed, a Completion Certificate has been issued, disputes have arisen
between the parties regarding the payment of money and the Contract has
not been terminated, the present Petition deserves to be allowed.
20.
Accordingly, Mr. Ashim Vacher, Sr. Advocate
(Mob. No:
9811023217) is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the
disputes between the parties.
21.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) and would abide by its rules and
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regulations. The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees as per the
Schedule of Fees maintained by the DIAC.
22.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite disclosure
under Section 12(2) of the 1996 Act within two weeks of entering on
reference.
23.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned Arbitrator
on their merits, in accordance with law.
24.
Needless to state, nothing in this Order shall be construed as an
expression of this Court on the merits of the contentions advanced on behalf
of the parties.
25.
The Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, along with
pending application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
FEBRUARY 06, 2026
S. Zakir
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