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IN THE HIGH COURTOF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 12.01.2026
Date of decision:09.02.2026
Uploaded on: 10.02.2026
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W.P.(C) 11251/2015 & CM APP. 29330/2015
M/S CSAT SYSTEM (P) LTD
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Saurabh Shandilya , Adv.
versus
APPELLANT AUTHORITY UNDER THE PAYMENT OF
GRATUITY ACT, 1972 AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through:
Mr. Kailash Sharma and Ms.
Pushpanjali Tripathi, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1.
The present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 /227 of the
Constitution of India, inter-alia, seeking quashing and setting aside of the
Order dated 10.12.2014 (hereinafter ‘Impugned order I’) passed by the
Controlling Authority (hereinafter ‘CA’) appointed by the Government of
NCT of Delhi, New Delhi, and the Order dated 21.10.2015 passed by the
learned Appellate Authority (hereinafter ‘Impugned order II’) under the
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter ‘the Act’) holding that the
Respondent No. 3/Claimant is entitled and management is liable to pay
Rs.1,55,769/- (One lakh fifty-five thousand seven hundred and sixty-nine
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only) being the amount of gratuity along with interest at 10% P.A. from the
date of resignation i.e. 01.03.2013 till the date of actual payment of the said
amount.
BRIEF FACTS:
2.
The Petitioner company is a body corporate, incorporated under the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at B61/3, Jagat Puri, Delhi-110051 and its Head Office at C-116, SECTOR 10,
NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh. The Petitioner is, inter-alia, engaged in the
manufacture of Automatic Data Processing machines and units, as well as in
the development of Information Technology software.
3.
Respondent No. 3/Claimant was employed with the Petitioner
company since 1994 in the capacity of System Executive. The last drawn
wages being Rs.15,000/-(Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) per month, along
with other benefits paid from time to time by the Management.
4.
After working for around 20 years, Respondent No. 3/Claimant
resigned from the services of the Petitioner/Company with effect from
01.03.2013. Subsequent to his resignation, certain communications took
place between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 3 /Claimant concerning the
terms and conditions of service and completion of post-resignation
formalities.
5.
Respondent No. 3, by way of the aforesaid communications/letters,
requested the Company to release the gratuity amount along with some dues
to which he was entitled. However, the Company denied all such claims,
including the claim for gratuity, in their entirety, contending that the
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Respondent had neither served the requisite notice period nor complied with
the other conditions of resignation and, therefore, was not entitled to gratuity
or to any other payment whatsoever. In pursuance to which, Respondent No.
3 /Claimant filed an Application under Sec. 7(4) of the Act before the CA,
Delhi, wherein he claimed a sum of Rs.1,64,423/- towards gratuity, along
with other alleged dues such as salary and conveyance allowance. In the said
application, it was averred that Respondent No. 3 had been employed with
the Petitioner since 1994 and had resigned from service on 01.03.2013.
6.
In response thereto, the Petitioner herein, filed a preliminary objection
to the said application, specifically challenging the jurisdiction of the CA.
Thereafter, evidence(s) were led by the Management as well as on behalf of
the claimant. The CA on the basis of the pleadings and evidence(s) led by
the parties framed the following issue for consideration:
“1. Whether the matter is under jurisdiction of this Court ?
2. Whether claimant Shri Shiv Narayan Pandey is entitled
for payment of Gratuity under the payment of Gratuity
Act. 1972 and if yes, to-what relief, is he entitled and
what direction(s) are necessary in this respect?”
7.
Consequently, the CA vide ‘Impugned order I’ held that it was the
competent authority in the present case and therefore it would accordingly
have jurisdiction. The order reads as under:
“First of all the question of the jurisdiction has to be
decided. The management in this case denied the
jurisdiction of this court. I have carefully examined the
contents of the document Ext).P.W.1/2 which is the reply of
the management duly admitted by the witness of the
management in cross examination. The contents of this
document reflects that the Registered office of the
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management is located at: B-61/3, Jagat Puri, Delhi.
his fact has not been denied by the management. The same
Delhi address is also printed on the letter Heads which are
placed on record. Therefore, this court is competent to
decide the present dispute.”
3.The resignation of the claimant is not denied and
the management has not shown any other reason provided
by the law by which the claimant is not entitled to the
Gratuity. In view of the above, I hold that applicant is
entitled to the Gratuity for a period of 18 years for a sum of
Rs.1,55,769/- (1500x15x18/26) being the amount of
gratuity along with interest @10% P.A. from the date
resignation i.e. 01.03.2013 till the date of actual payment.
The remaining claims of the applicants are rejected as the
same are not under jurisdiction of this authority “
8.
Being aggrieved by the Impugned Order I, the Petitioner herein
preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority appointed by the
Government of NCT of Delhi, New Delhi. However, the Appellate
Authority, vide Impugned Order II, dismissed the said appeal and remanded
the matter to the CA with a direction to release the gratuity amount
deposited by the Petitioner herein in favour of Respondent No. 3/Claimant,
in terms of Impugned Order I.
9.
The present Writ Petition is filed by the Petitioner assailing the
aforesaid Impugned orders passed by the Appellate Authority as also by the
CA praying that the said orders be set aside. The Petitioner further prays for
an ad interim order restraining the execution of the said orders and for a
direction that the matter should be directed to be taken up and considered
afresh by the appropriate Government, namely, the Central Government,
which alone has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the same under the provisions
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of the Act.
ISSUES INVOLVED:
The sole question before this Court at present is:
● Whether the Controlling Authority & the Appellate Authority
appointed by the Government of NCT of Delhi, New Delhi were
competent authority to adjudicate the dispute even when Petitioner
is a company having branches in more than one state?
SUBMISSIONS OF PARTIES:
10.
As for the submissions of the parties, ld. Counsel for the Petitioner
urged that the Petitioner/Company, being an establishment, has its
branches/offices in different states including branches at Mumbai, Dehradun
& Jamshedpur.
11.
Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has raised the plea that the sole
question involved in the present Writ is whether the ‘CA’ and the Appellate
Authority who have passed the Impugned Order(s), were the competent
authorities in the present case or not. In support of his arguments, the
Petitioner has placed reliance on Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, stating that,
from these provisions it is evident that the appropriate Government is the
Central Government in present case; consequently, the ‘CA’ ought to be an
authority appointed by the Central Government and not by the State
Government. Whereas, in the present case the Impugned Order was passed
by the ‘CA’ appointed by the State Government. Therefore, it is submitted
that the Impugned Order(s) suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction which
can be rectified at the stage of Writ Petition only. Hence, it is prayed that the
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Impugned Order(s) be set aside.
12.
Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner further contends that since the issue
raised in the present Writ goes to the root of the matter and relates to
inherent lack of the jurisdiction of the State Government to decide the matter
therefore, the said plea could be raised at any stage as it relates to inherent
lack of jurisdiction. In support of the said contention counsel has relied upon
the decisions of this Court in Balsara Hygiene Products .Ltd. Vs. Appellate
Authority (under the Payment of Gratuity Act), 2001 SCC online Del 898
in which it was held that objections relating to inherent lack of jurisdiction
go to the root of the matter and can be raised at any stage, even for the first
time in writ proceedings, as such defects cannot be cured by consent or
waiver.
13.
Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has also relied on various judgments
rendered by different High Courts elucidating the scope and meaning of the
term “Appropriate Government” with reference to the competent authority
and the appellate authority, inter alia, as lndo American Electricals Ltd.
and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others (2005 SCC OnLine Cal
341), Management of CMC Hospital, Vellore Vs. Joint Commissioner of
Labour, Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, Chennai and
Others (2003 SCC OnLine Mad 628) and Jawala Stone Crusher Vs.
Swaran Singh and Others (2007 SCC OnLine HP 155).
14.
In contradistinction, ld. counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents made an attempt to sustain the finding(s) which have been
arrived at by the authorities below by urging that the Petitioner has not
raised any issue regarding jurisdiction whatsoever, neither in the pleading(s)
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nor in evidence(s), but however one such issue of jurisdiction was framed by
the ‘CA’ which was decided vide Order dated 10.12.2014 in favour of the
workman i.e., the Respondent No. 3 herein.
15.
Ld. counsel for the Respondent has further submitted that, in fact, an
Appeal was filed by the Petitioner itself before the Appellate Authority
seeking setting aside of Impugned Order I and, therefore, the Petitioner
could not be allowed to raise such plea at the stage of arguments in the Writ,
particularly where the principles of waiver and estoppel are also applicable
to the facts and circumstances of the present case. He further goes on to
submit that the Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the State
Government without raising any plea of want of jurisdiction at the earliest
stage and, therefore, the said plea raised at the time of arguments of the
appeal was rightly rejected by the Appellate Authority. In support of the said
contention counsel relied upon dicta of the Supreme Court in Jeewanlal Ltd.
and Others v. Appellate Authority Under The Payment Of Gratuity Act &
Others, (1984) 4 SCC 356, to contend that reference made to the Central
Government or State Government is immaterial and has contended that, in
view of the said judgment, the ‘CA’ has rightly adjudicated the
issue/dispute. Ld. counsel for the Respondent has further submitted that the
‘CA’ possessed the requisite jurisdiction to decide the issue/dispute.
Consequently, it is urged that nothing survives for consideration in the
present Writ Petition, and the same is liable to be dismissed.
16.
Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the
Respondent used to work at the Delhi office/branch, and that the NOIDA
office/branch merely dealt with official communications, with no technical
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or substantial functions of the Company ever being performed there.
Consequently, it was contended that the application for gratuity was rightly
filed before the Controlling Authority at Delhi.
17.
Learned counsel for the Respondent draws support from Sections 20
and 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to contend that the question of
jurisdiction in the present case pertains only to territorial competence. It is
submitted that in terms of Sec. 20 CPC, the proceedings could be instituted
at a place where the defendant resides or carries on business, or where the
cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. It is further contended, with
reference to Sec. 21 CPC, that any objection as to territorial or pecuniary
jurisdiction is required to be raised at the earliest opportunity and, having
not been so raised by the Respondent, stands waived, there being no
consequent failure of justice shown.
18.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner opposed the said submission and
contended that Respondent No. 3 used to work at both locations, namely
Delhi and NOIDA, as per the requirements of the Company. It was further
submitted that, had Respondent No. 3 been working exclusively at the Delhi
office and not at NOIDA, he would not have addressed his resignation to the
NOIDA office.
DISCUSSION:
19.
Having considered the rival submissions, it is apparent that the
dispute lies in a narrow compass. The principal grievance of the Petitioner is
not with respect to the entitlement of the Respondent to gratuity per se, but
with regard to the very competence of the authorities who entertained and
decided the claim.
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20.
The sole objection raised by the Petitioner throughout the proceedings
has been that neither the Controlling Authority nor the Appellate Authority
accorded even minimal consideration to the issue of competent jurisdiction.
Additionally, the impugned orders reflect a complete feigned ignorance of
this vital aspect. The absence of any discussion or finding on jurisdiction
renders the orders unsustainable in law.
21.
The Petitioner on the basis of the documents placed on record has
contended that the Petitioner/Company has branches in more than one State
viz Delhi and Uttar Pradesh and therefore, so far as the Petitioner is
concerned, in terms of definition of Sec. 2(a)(1)(b) of the Act, the
appropriate Government would be the Central Government. Thus, it is
amply proved on the basis of the documents placed on record that the
Petitioner/Company has branches in more than one State and, therefore, the
appropriate Government in the case of the Petitioner for the purpose of
applicability of Payment of Gratuity Act would be the Central Government.
22.
It is observed that the application under Sec. 7(4) of the Act filed by
Respondent No. 3 was presented before the CA appointed by the State
Government and not before the authority appointed by the Central
Government. This position is undisputed on the facts of the present case and
stands corroborated by the documents placed on record. Furthermore, the
plea advanced on behalf of Respondent No. 3, is that even assuming, that the
appropriate Government in the present case is the Central Government, as
no objection to the jurisdiction of the said authority was raised at the earliest
stage hence, it cannot be agitated by Petitioner now. It is further contended
that the Petitioner, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the CA and the
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Appellate Authority by participating in the proceedings and by preferring an
appeal, has waived any objection to such jurisdiction. Consequently, it was
urged that both the CA and the Appellate Authority rightly exercised
jurisdiction in the matter.
23.
Before adverting to the rival submissions urged on behalf of the
parties, it is apposite to first notice the documentary evidence that came to
be exhibited in the course of the evidence led by the Company. The
company has placed on record the copy of ‘Certificate of Incorporation’ and
a copy of the ‘VAT and Service Tax Registrations’.
24.
Upon perusal of the Certificate of Incorporation, it is evident that the
Company is registered in Delhi, as reflected by the endorsement and
signature of the Registrar of Companies, Delhi & Haryana, which also
corroborates the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner. Petitioner
has also placed a copy of the VAT and Service Tax Registrations from
NOIDA, U.P. which mentions the place of business as B-61/3, Jagat Puri,
Delhi-110051and Proprietor/Director/Partner, Name/Address as:
1. Anil Shukla-C-116, SECTOR 10, NOIDA, U.P.
2. Sunil Shukla-B-61/3, Jagat Puri, Delhi-110051.
25.
Now coming to Impugned Order I i.e. the order passed by the CA.
One of the issues before the CA was whether it had the jurisdiction to
adjudicate the dispute. What reflects from the Impugned order I is that apart
from going into the merits of the dispute, the authority had considered the
issues of jurisdiction and the only reasoning furnished by the CA for
assuming its jurisdiction is that the company has its registered office in
Delhi and, therefore, the CA at Delhi was competent to adjudicate the
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dispute. Such reasoning is ex facie flawed, as the location of the registered
office by itself cannot confer jurisdiction in the absence of a finding
regarding the appropriate Government and the place where the claimant was
actually employed, taking into consideration the provision of the Act.
26.
Consequently, the matter was carried in appeal before the Appellate
Authority. In the said appeal, the Petitioner had specifically raised an
objection with regard to the competent jurisdiction, contending that since the
Petitioner-Company has branches in more than one State, namely Delhi and
Uttar Pradesh, the appropriate Government, in terms of Section 2(a)(1)(b) of
the Act, would be the Central Government. It was thus urged that the
proceedings before the Controlling Authority appointed by the State
Government were without jurisdiction. However, the Appellate Authority
failed to consider the aforesaid jurisdictional objection and did not render
any discussion or reasons thereon. The appeal came to be dismissed merely
on the premise that the management witness had admitted the liability
towards gratuity. The order passed by the Appellate Authority is, therefore,
wholly cryptic and non-speaking, inasmuch as the foundational issue of
jurisdiction, which goes to the root of the matter, remained completely
unaddressed.
27.
In view of the above, the contention of the Respondent No. 3 that the
Petitioner has raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the present
Writ is misconceived and untenable, as the said issue was specifically raised
and argued before the Appellate Authority itself.
28.
It is further evident from perusal of the orders passed by the CA that
the issue of the appropriate Government or the competence of the CA never
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arose for consideration. Likewise, the question as to whether the claimant
was working at Delhi or at NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh was neither properly
raised nor adjudicated in the impugned orders.
29.
Now coming to the question of jurisdiction. There are few types of
jurisdiction including territorial jurisdiction and competence jurisdiction.
The dispute in the present case falls within a narrow compass. The question
before the Court is whether, for the purposes of Sec. 2(a) of the Act, the
appropriate Government in relation to the Petitioner/Company is the Central
Government or the State Government.
30.
Sec. 2(a) of the Act defines the expression “appropriate Government”
as:
"2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
(a) "appropriate government" means,—
(i) in relation to an establishment —
(a) belonging to, or under the control of, the
Central Government,
(b) having branches in more than one State,
(c) of a factory belonging to, or under the control
of, the Central Government,
(d) of a major port, mine, oilfield or railway
company, the Central Government,
(ii) in any other case, the State Government;"
31.
Sec. 2 (a) of the Act delineates the authority competent to act as the
‘appropriate Government’ for the purposes of the Act. It vests such authority
in the Central Government in cases where the establishment or factory
belongs to or is under its control, where an establishment has branches in
more than one State, or where the undertaking relates to specified sectors
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such as major ports, mines, oilfields, or railway companies. In all remaining
cases, where none of these conditions are attracted, the State Government is
designated as the appropriate Government to exercise jurisdiction under the
Act.
32.
Since in the present case there are two offices one being in Delhi and
the other in NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh which is also evident from the
application for gratuity filed by the respondent/claimant before the CA
which mentions both the addresses of the company, i.e., Delhi as well as
NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh. Additionally, the minutes of the meeting of the
Board of Directors of the company held on 8th January, 2014 also record
both addresses viz C-116, SECTOR 10, NOIDA and B-61/3, Jagat Puri,
Delhi-110051. Therefore, the CA in the present case would be authority
appointed by Central government.
33.
It is pertinent to note here that the resignation letter of the claimant
was addressed to the NOIDA office of the company and not to the Delhi
office. This fact assumes significance, particularly in light of the claimant’s
own contention that he worked exclusively in Delhi and not at NOIDA, and
that Delhi was the appropriate Government competent to adjudicate his
claim. If such a contention were true, the resignation letter ought to have
been addressed to the Delhi office. Not only was the resignation letter sent
to the NOIDA office, but even the subsequent Legal Notices issued by the
claimant were addressed to the NOIDA office alone.
34.
The CA as well as the Appellate Authority, in the present case vide
Impugned Orders, have held that the application for payment of gratuity
filed by the Respondent was maintainable before the CA appointed by the
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State Government, on the ground that the State Government is the
appropriate Government for the purposes of the Act.
35.
The fundamental error permeating both the impugned orders is the
assumption that merely because the claimant worked or claimed to have
worked in Delhi, the Controlling Authority appointed by the State
Government and the Appellate Authority derived jurisdiction to adjudicate
the dispute
36.
Thus, as is evident from the various documents placed on record such
as
resignation
letter
of
the
claimant,
legal
notices
sent
by
Respondent/claimant and the minutes of the meeting of the Board of
Directors of the company, that the company was having office at both places
viz NOIDA, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi, therefore, Sec. 2(a) of the Act applies
squarely hence, the competent government should be the Central
government.
37.
View of this court get supported from the Judgment of High Court of
Bombay in Rhone Poulene (India) Ltd.; Versus Anjali Devrukhar and
others, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 355, wherein Chandrachud J., has rightly
observed as under:
“8. Neither the expression ‘establishment’ nor for that
matter ‘branch’ is defined by the Act. These expressions
must, therefore, bear the meaning which is attributed to
them in common parlance. A branch is essentially a limb of
an organization or an arm of the organization through
which the organization carries on business. The branch is
as it were a tributary which is controlled by the trunk. The
connotation of the word ‘branch’, is liable to vary
depending upon the context and the nature of legislation in
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which it is used. In Polestar Electronic (Pvt) Ltd. v.
Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, (1978) 1 SCC 636, the
Supreme Court held that in relation to Sales Tax legislation
branches are not distinct and independent from the assessee
but are merely establishments of the assessee (Para 22 page
668). In Agencia Commercial International Limited v.
Custodian of the Branches of Banco National Ultramarino,
(1982) 2 SCC 482, the Supreme Court held that as a
general proposition a body corporate and its branches are
not distinct and separate entities from each other; branches
constitute mere components through which a corporate
entity expresses itself and that all transactions entered into
ostensibly with the branches are in legal reality
transactions with the corporate body. However the Court
noted that in the case of a Bank which operates through its
Branches, the Branches are regarded for many purposes as
separate and distinct entities from the head Office and from
each other.”
(emphasis applied)
38.
The word establishment which is also disputed in the present matter
was categorically dealt with in Rhone Poulene (supra), the relevant paras
reads as under:
“9. The provisions of section 2(a)(i) have fallen for
consideration before a Learned Single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court in Binny Limited v. Commissioner of
Labour, 1981 (1) LLJ 178. The Learned Single Judge noted
that in undertakings having branches in more than one
State, transfer of an employee from one State may take
place during the tenure of his service, if transfer is a
condition of his service. A dispute may arise as regards the
total number of completed years of service put in by the
employee for the purpose of gratuity. The appropriate
Controlling Authority appointed by the Central Government
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would be in a better position to deal with these cases
expeditiously than the authorities appointed by different
State Governments in different States. The Learned Judge
held that the expression “establishment” must be
understood, in its general sense and the petitioner before
the Court was held to be an establishment having its main
place of business in Tamil Nadu and a Branch in
Karnataka. Consequently, it was held that the Controlling
Authority appointed by the State Government had no
jurisdiction to entertain the application of the workmen in
that case. I am in respectful agreement with the judgment of
the Learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court.
…….…
Essentially the question which has to be answered is
whether the establishment has branches in more than one
State. The establishment in relation to those Branches must
necessarily mean the Company which controls and directs
the activities of the branches. Since the Company controls
and directs its branches which in turn are situated in more
than one State, clearly the appropriate Government can in
the present case only be the Central Government. The
Controlling Authority then relied upon the circumstance
that Charters of demand were submitted separately by
workers of the factory and by workers of the Depots. The
Controlling Authority noted that manufacturing activity was
carried out within the State of Maharashtra; that the
workmen had been appointed for the Mumbai Factory and
that they reside in Mumbai. The Controlling Authority, has
confused the issue of territorial jurisdiction with the issue of
which government is the appropriate Government. Insofar
as the decision of the Appellate Authority is concerned, the
reason which weighed with that authority was that the
petitioner had a factory in the State of Maharashtra which
did not either belong to, or was under the control of the
Central Government. Again for the reasons already
indicated earlier, this basis was erroneous. The fact that the
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factory is situated in the State of Maharashtra will not make
the State Government the appropriate Government where
the uncontroverted material on record showed the existence
of branches in more than one State.”
(emphasis applied)
39.
In this case as delineated above, it is established that the appropriate
Government under the present case would be the Central Government as the
Petitioner-company has branches in more than one State, and not the State
Government, therefore the argument of the respondent that since he used to
work at the Delhi office/branch, and that the NOIDA office/branch merely
dealt with official communications, with no technical or substantial
functions of the Company ever being performed, does not sustain in law.
The CA of the State Government has exercised its jurisdiction in the present
case on the basis of the application filed by the Respondent No. 3. On an
appropriate interpretation of the provisions of Sec. 2 of the Act it is
established that the said authority appointed by the State Government has no
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the matter. Therefore, the said authority
lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain and try this case and it is not a case of
either want of Pecuniary Jurisdiction or Territorial Jurisdiction, which could
be waived.
40.
Learned counsel for the Respondent had also raised a plea based on
Sections 20 and 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, the said
contention cannot be sustained in view of the fact that The Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972 is a special statute, which has an overriding effect over
the general law, namely the Code of Civil Procedure.
41.
Sec. 14 of the Act accords an overriding effect to the provisions of the
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Act by stipulating that the Act and the rules made thereunder shall have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other
enactment or instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the
said Act. The said provision thus gives primacy to The Payment of Gratuity
Act over all conflicting laws, contracts, awards, settlements, or service rules,
ensuring uniform and mandatory payment of gratuity in accordance with the
Act.
42.
Therefore, in the facts of the present case, it is the CA appointed by
the Central Government, who would have jurisdiction to entertain and
decide this matter and not the CA appointed by the State Government.
Consequently, it is also held that the CA before which the aforesaid
application under Sec.7(4) of the Act was filed and by whom it was
entertained in pursuance to which a case was instituted on that basis thereof,
was entirely lacking in jurisdiction and the CA was incompetent to try and
decide the same. The same applies for Appellate Authority also which
decided the appeal under Sec.7(7) of the act. Therefore, whatever Orders are
passed in the said proceedings or in the subsequent proceeding arising out of
it, namely in Claim Application and the Appeal were null and void as
consent of parties could not operate to confer jurisdiction on the said
authority, which was incompetent to try the aforesaid proceeding.
43.
As regards to the argument of Respondent that since the Petitioner has
not raised the plea of jurisdiction before the CA, therefore now he is
estopped from raising so at the stage of Writ, counsel for the Petitioner
vehemently opposed the same and in support of his contention he relied
upon the decisions of this Court in Balsara Hygiene Products. Ltd.(supra),
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relevant paras read as under:
“14. In Hira Lal case (vide supra), on which reliance was
placed by counsel appearing for both the parties, it was
held by the Supreme Court that it is well settled that the
objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does not stand
on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a
Court to try a case which goes to the very root of the
jurisdiction and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent
lack of jurisdiction. It was further held that, on the other
hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can
be waived and this principle has been given a statutory
recognition by enactments like S. 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In the said decision the Supreme Court also
referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Ledgard v.
Bull, [13 Ind. App. 134]. The decision of the Privy Council
in the said case is an authority for the proposition that
consent or waiver can cure defect of jurisdiction but cannot
cure inherent lack of jurisdiction.
16. Therefore, the legal principle which is established is
that if the plea raised goes to the root of the question and
concerns inherent lack of jurisdiction of the Court deciding
the matter, such plea could be allowed to be raised even at
a later stage, for it goes to very root of the matter. Such a
plea concerning inherent lack of jurisdiction of Court to
decide the matter could be raised before the High Court in a
writ jurisdiction, for the first time and such a plea is
required to be entertained to do justice amongst the parties.
On the other hand, if the plea raised concerns lack of
territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, the same could be
waived by a party by submitting to its jurisdiction and by
not raising at the earlier stage. Therefore, it is necessary to
apply the aforesaid settled principles of law to the facts of
the present case. In this case as delineated above, it is
established that the appropriate Government under the
present case is the Central Government as the petitionermanagement has branches in more than one State, and not
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the State Government. The controlling authority of the State
Government has exercised its jurisdiction in the present
case on the basis of the application filed by the respondent
No. 2. On an appropriate interpretation of the provisions of
S. 2 of the Act it is established that the said authority
appointed by the State Government has no jurisdiction to
entertain and decide the matter. Therefore, the said
authority lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain and try this
case and it is not a case of either want of pecuniary
jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction, which could be
waived. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, it is the
controlling authority appointed by the Central Government,
who would have jurisdiction to entertain and decide this
matter and not the State Government. Consequently, it is
also held that the controlling authority in which the
aforesaid application under S. 4 of the Act was filed and by
whom it was entertained and a case was instituted on the
basis thereof, was entirely lacking in jurisdiction and it was
incompetent to try and decide the same. Therefore, whatever
orders are passed in the said proceedings or in the
subsequent proceeding arising out of it, namely in the
appeal were null and void as consent of parties could not
operate to confer jurisdiction on the said authority, which
was incompetent to try the aforesaid proceeding”.
(emphasis applied)
44.
As is apparent from the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in
Seth Hiralal Patni vs. Sri Kali Nath, 1962 AIR 199, wherein it was held
that it is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a Court does
not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a Court
to try a case which goes to the very root of the jurisdiction and where it is
lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. It was further held that,
on the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a Court can be
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waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by
enactments like Sec. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
45.
In the said decision the Supreme Court also referred to the decision of
the Privy Council in Ledgard v. Bull, 1886 SCC OnLine PC 16 the decision
of the Privy Council in the said case is that, an authority, for the proposition
that consent or waiver, can cure defects of jurisdiction but cannot cure
inherent lack of jurisdiction. In the said case by consent of the parties, the
case was transferred to the Court of the District Judge for convenience of
trial and in that context it was laid down by the Privy Council that as the
Court in which the suit had been originally instituted was entirely lacking in
jurisdiction, in the sense that it was incompetent to try it, whatever happened
subsequently was null and void because consent of parties could not operate
to confer jurisdiction on a Court which was incompetent to try the suit. After
referring to the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court,
in the case of Seth Hiralal Patni (supra) went on to hold that the
competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction
and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction.
46.
In Chandrika Misir & Anr. V. Bhaiya Lal, (1973) 2 SCCC 474 and
also in the case of Rattan Lal Sharma V. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari
Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School, (1993) 4 SCC 10, Hon’ble
the Supreme Court has held that if the plea though not specifically raised
before the subordinate Tribunals or the administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, is raised before the High Court in the Writ proceedings for the first
time and the plea goes to the root of the question and is based on admitted
and uncontroverted facts and does not require any further investigation into
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a question of fact, the High Court is not only justified in entertaining the
plea but in the anxiety to do justice which is the paramount consideration of
the Court, it is only desirable that a litigant should not be shut out from
raising such plea which goes to the root of the lis involved.
47.
Therefore, the legal principle which is established is that if the plea
raised goes to the root of the question and concerns inherent lack of
jurisdiction of the Court deciding the matter, such a plea could be allowed to
be raised even at a later stage, for it goes to the very root of the matter. Such
a plea concerning inherent lack of jurisdiction of Court to decide the matter
could be raised before the High Court in a Writ jurisdiction, for the first time
and such a plea is required to be entertained to do justice amongst the
parties. Per contra, if the plea raised concerns lack of territorial or pecuniary
jurisdiction, the same could be waived by a party by submitting to its
jurisdiction and by not raising at the earlier stage. Therefore, it is necessary
to apply the aforesaid settled principles of law to the facts of the present
case.
48.
Although, this is the established position of law, however in the
present case, this issue does not arise. As admittedly, Petitioner herein raised
the issue of lack of territorial jurisdiction, before the CA and the issue of
competent jurisdiction before the Appellate Authority who have decided this
issue against the Petitioner. So, the contention of the Respondent that the
Petitioner has raised this issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the present
Writ is neither correct nor admissible.
CONCLUSION:
49.
In considered opinion of this court, the decisions rendered by the
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Supreme Court in the case of Hira Lal case (supra) and High Court of
Bombay in the case of Rhone Poulene (supra), squarely apply to the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
50.
For all these reasons, the Controlling Authority as well as the
Appellate Authority have manifestly erred in rejecting the preliminary
objection in regard to their jurisdiction. It may be noted that under Sec. 2(d)
of the Act, the Controlling Authority is defined as the authority appointed as
such by the appropriate Government. Under Sec. 7(4)(d) a dispute in regard
to gratuity lies within the jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority as defined
in Sec. 2(d). The appropriate Government in the present case being the
Central Government, the State authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain the
dispute.
51.
Having regard to the legal position crystallised by the precedents
discussed and the findings recorded herein, this Court is of the considered
view that the Petitioner has made out a fit case for interference.
Accordingly, and in consequence of the foregoing reasons, the Impugned
Order I and Impugned order II of the Controlling Authority, as also of the
Appellate Authority respectively are set aside and are hereby quashed. It is
further clarified that this Court has not examined or expressed any opinion
on the merits of the case.
52.
In terms of the aforesaid observations and directions, the Writ Petition
along with pending application, if any, stands disposed of. No order as to
costs.
SHAIL JAIN, J
FEBURARY 9, 2026/HP
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