Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : 13.03.2026
+
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
M/S. BPTP LIMITED
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Manish Sharma, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Jigyasa Sharma, Mr. Kaushik
Poddar, Advs.
versus
VIJYANT AGARWAL AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Soibal Gupta, Mr. Himanshu
Swami, Mr. Surendra Singh, Ms.
Sutanuka Chatterjee, Mr. Yash
Tiwari, Mr. Sadab Salmani, Mr.
Suresh Kumar, Advs.
Major Kanika Sharma, (Army)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J. (ORAL)
CM APPL. 15455/2026 (Exemption)
1.
Exemption is allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2.
The application stands disposed of.
FAO (COMM) 257/2025 CM APPL. 15454/2026
3.
This appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, against the Judgement, dated 03.05.2025 passed by
the Learned District Judge, Commercial-03 Patiala House Courts, New
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
Delhi in OMP (Comm) No.78/2022 titled as Vijyant Agarwal & Ors. Vs.
M/S. BPTP Ltd deciding a petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, by the respondents, whereby the Learned
District Judge has set aside the award of the Learned Arbitrator by stating in
paragraphs 10 onwards as under:
“10.
After hearing the arguments of the parties and perusing the
records, and appropriatedly guided by judgment (supra), in the
considered opinion, the Ld. Arbitrator has erred in passing the
impugned award and further modifying/ replacing the words "actual
amount paid" with the words "club maintenance charges" in the Clause
4 of the Settlement Deed dated 30.05.2016. The Ld. Arbitrator has
erred by not interpreting the terms of the Settlement Deed but
interpreting the alleged intent or expectation of the respondent from the
Settlement Deed. The Ld. Arbitrator was solitarily mandated to resolve
the dispute arising from the Settlement Deed as per the arbitration
clause and not rewrite the Settlement Deed. It needs to be mention that
the Ld. Arbitrator ought not to have considered the reasoning of the
respondent that the clause 4 was defective clause which resulted in
absurdity of the Settlement Deed. The Ld. Arbitrator erred in
examining the commercial wisdom of the respondent and rewrote the
Settlement Deed on the basis of the commercial difficulties faced by
respondent in performing its obligations. In consonance with The
Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case "Union Of India, Ministry Of
Railways, Railway Board.& Anr” (supra), if the terms of the Settlement
Deed do not clearly express the intentions of the parties, it is open for
the parties to seek recourse to various tools of interpretation. This
would include interpreting the Settlement Deed in a manner that would
make commercial sense as it is assumed that men of commerce would
have intended it so. However, it is not open for the Ld. Arbitrator to rework a bargain that was struck between the parties on the ground that
it is commercially difficult for one party to perform the same.
11.
It is further to be noted that the respondent was well aware of
the presence of the clause 4 since the inception of the Settlement Deed
yet they elected to raise this issue after the expiry of the mentioned
period in the clause 4 and at the time of invoking the arbitration. The
respondent was a voluntary and prudent signatory to the Settlement
Deed and was not coerced to sign the same, therefore the respondent is
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
obligated to abide by the terms of the Settlement Deed. In case the
respondent was aggrieved by the illegality of the clause 4 in the
Settlement Deed, the respondent should have followed the proper
procedure and offering the petitioners an amendment to the Settlement
Deed as mutual agreed within a reasonable time after the inception of
the Settlement Deed. These aforementioned facts establishes that the
pleas of the respondent is an afterthought but not a legal ground to
challenge the terms of the Settlement Deed. The impugned arbitral
award deserves to be set-aside on this account.
12.
Further, upon hearing the Ld. Counsels for both the sides and
perusing the documents, it appears that in the present case, in terms of
the provisions of Settlement Deed, the respondent had an option for
appointment of Arbitrator at their discretion. In terms of the said Deed,
the respondent had nominated the Ld. Sole Arbitrator and unilaterally
appointed the Ld. Sole Arbitrator without the consent of the petitioner.
Section 12 (5) of the Act says as follows:
12. Ground for Challenge. (1) ............... .
(2) .......... .. .. ..
(3) ............ . .. .
(4) .......... .. .. ..
(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any
person whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the
subject-matter of the dispute, falls under any of the categories
specified in the seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be
appointed as an arbitrator:
Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen
between them, waive the applicability of this subsection by an
express agreement in writing.
13.
At this juncture, it would be appropriate to extract relevant
portion of judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Perkins
Eastman Architects DPC & .Anr Vs. HSCC (India) Ltd., Arbitration
Application No. 32 of 2019, decided on 26.11.2019:-”
“16. However, the point that has been urged, relying upon the
decision of this Court in Walter Bau AG and TRF3 Limited
requires consideration. In the present case Clause 24 empowers
the Chairman and Managing Director of the respondent to make
the appointment of a sole arbitrator and said clause also
stipulates that no person other than a person appointed by such
Chairman and Managing Director of the respondent would act as
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
an arbitrator. In TRF Limited4, a Bench of three Judges of this
Court, was called upon to consider whether the appointment of
an arbitrator made by the Managing Director of the respondent
therein was a valid one and whether at that stage an application
moved under Section 11(6) of the Act could be entertained by the
Court. The relevant Clause, namely, Clause 33 which provided
for resolution of disputes in that case was under:
“33. Resolution of dispute/arbitration
(a) In case any disagreement or dispute arises between the buyer
and the seller under or in connection with the PO, both shall
make every effort to resolve it amicably by direct informal
negotiation. (b) If, even after 30 days from the commencement of
such informal negotiation, seller and the buyer have not been
able to resolve the dispute amicably, either party may require
that the dispute be referred for resolution to the formal
mechanism of arbitration. (c) All disputes which cannot be settled
by mutual negotiation shall be referred to and determined by
arbitration as per the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as
amended. (d) Unless otherwise provided, any dispute or
difference between the parties in connection with this agreement
shall be referred to sole arbitration of the Managing Director of
buyer or his nominee. Venue of arbitration shall be Delhi, and the
arbitration shall be conducted in English language. (e) The
award of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both, buyer
and seller.”
14. In TRF Limited, the Agreement was entered into before the
provisions of the Amending Act (Act No.3 of 2016) came into
force. It was submitted by the appellant that by virtue of the
provisions of the Amending Act and insertion of the Fifth and
Seventh Schedules in the Act, the Managing Director of the
respondent would be a person having direct interest in the
dispute and as such could not act as an arbitrator. The extension
of the submission was that a person who himself was disqualified
and disentitled could also not nominate any other person to act as
an arbitrator. The submission countered by the respondent
therein was as under :
“7.1. The submission to the effect that since the
Managing Director of the respondent has become
ineligible to act as an arbitrator subsequent to the
amendment in the Act, he could also not have
nominated any other person as arbitrator is
absolutely unsustainable, for the Fifth and the
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
Seventh Schedules fundamentally guide in
determining whether circumstances exist which give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the independence and
impartiality of the arbitrator. To elaborate, if any
person whose relationship with the parties or the
counsel or the subject-matter of dispute falls under
any of the categories specified in the Seventh
Schedule, he is ineligible to be appointed as an
arbitrator but not otherwise.
18. The issue was discussed and decided by this Court as under:
“50. First, we shall deal with clause (d). There is no
quarrel that by virtue of Section 12(5) of the Act, if
any person who falls under any of the categories
specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to
be appointed as the arbitrator. There is no doubt and
cannot be, for the language employed in the Seventh
Schedule, the Managing Director of the Corporation
has become ineligible by operation of law. It is the
stand of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
that once the Managing Director becomes ineligible,
he also becomes ineligible to nominate. Refuting the
said stand, it is canvassed by the learned Senior
Counsel for the respondent that the ineligibility
cannot extend to a nominee if he is not from the
Corporation and more so when there is apposite and
requisite disclosure. We think it appropriate to make
it clear that in the case at hand we are neither
concerned with the disclosure nor objectivity nor
impartiality nor any such other circumstance. We are
singularly concerned with the issue, whether the
Managing Director, after becoming ineligible by
operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an
arbitrator. At the cost of repetition, we may state that
when there are two parties, one may nominate an
arbitrator and the other may appoint another. That is
altogether a different situation. If there is a clause
requiring the parties to nominate their respective
arbitrator, their authority to nominate cannot be
questioned. What really in that circumstance can be
called in question is the procedural compliance and
the eligibility of their arbitrator depending upon the
norms provided under the Act and the Schedules
appended thereto. But, here is a case where the
Managing Director is the “named sole arbitrator”
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
and he has also been conferred with the power to
nominate one who can be the arbitrator in his place.
Thus, there is subtle distinction. In this regard, our
attention has been drawn to a two-Judge Bench
decision in State of Orissa v. Commr. of Land
Records & Settlement7. In the said case, the question
arose, can the Board of Revenue revise the order
passed by its delegate. Dwelling upon the said
proposition, the Court held : (SCC p. 173, para 25)
“25. We have to note that the Commissioner
when he exercises power of the Board delegated
to him under Section 33 of the Settlement Act,
1958, the order passed by him is to be treated as
an order of the Board of Revenue and not as that
of the Commissioner in his capacity as
Commissioner. This position is clear from two
rulings of this Court to which we shall presently
refer. The first of the said rulings is the one
decided by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab. In that case, it
was held by the majority that where the State
Government had, under Section 41(1) of the East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, delegated its
appellate powers vested in it under Section 21(4)
to an “officer”, an order passed by such an
officer was an order passed by the State
Government itself and “not an order passed by
any officer under this Act” within Section 42 and
was not revisable by the State Government. It
was pointed out that for the purpose of exercise
of powers of revision by the State under Section
42 of that Act, the order sought to be revised
must be an order passed by an officer in his own
right and not as a delegate of the State. The State
Government was, therefore, not entitled under
Section 42 to call for the records of the case
which was disposed of by an officer acting as its
delegate.” (emphasis in original)
51. Be it noted in the said case, reference was made to Behari
Kunj Sahkari Awas Samiti v. State of U.P., which followed the
decision in Roop Chand v. State of Punjab8. It is seemly to note
here that the said principle has been followed in Indore Vikas
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
Pradhikaran.
52. Mr Sundaram has strongly relied on Pratapchand Nopaji . In
the said case, the three-Judge Bench applied the maxim “qui facit
per alium facit per se”. We may profitably reproduce the passage
: (SCC p. 214, para 9)
“9. … The principle which would apply, if the
objects are struck by Section 23 of the Contract
Act, is embodied in the maxim:“qui facit per
alium facit per se” (what one does through
another is done by oneself). To put it in another
form, that which cannot be done directly may not
be done indirectly by engaging another outside
the prohibited area to do the illegal act within
the prohibited area. It is immaterial whether, for
the doing of such an illegal act, the agent
employed is given the wider powers or authority
of the “pucca adatia”, or, as the High Court had
held, he is clothed with the powers of an
ordinary commission agent only.’
53. The aforesaid authorities have been commended to us to
establish the proposition that if the nomination of an arbitrator
by an ineligible arbitrator is allowed, it would tantamount to
carrying on the proceeding of arbitration by himself. According
to the learned counsel for the appellant, ineligibility strikes at the
root of his power to arbitrate or get it arbitrated upon by a
nominee.
54. In such a context, the fulcrum of the controversy would be,
can an ineligible arbitrator, like the Managing Director,
nominate an arbitrator, who may be otherwise eligible and a
respectable person. As stated earlier, we are neither concerned
with the objectivity nor the individual respectability. We are only
concerned with the authority or the power of the Managing
Director. By our analysis, we are obligated to arrive at the
conclusion that once the arbitrator has become ineligible by
operation of law, he cannot nominate another as an arbitrator.
The arbitrator becomes ineligible as per prescription contained
in Section 12(5) of the Act. It is inconceivable in law that person
who is statutorily ineligible can nominate a person. Needless to
say, once the infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound
to collapse. One cannot have a building without the plinth. Or to
put it differently, once the identity of the Managing Director as
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
the sole arbitrator is lost, the power to nominate someone else as
an arbitrator is obliterated. Therefore, the view expressed by the
High Court is not sustainable and we say so.”
19……………….
20. We thus have two categories of cases. The first, similar to the
one dealt with in TRF Ltd. where the Managing Director himself
is named as an arbitrator with an additional power to appoint
any other person as an arbitrator. In the second category, the
Managing Director is not to act as an arbitrator himself but is
empowered or authorised to appoint any other person of his
choice or discretion as an arbitrator. If, in the first category of
cases, the Managing Director was found incompetent, it was
because of the interest that he would be said to be having in the
outcome or result of the dispute. The element of invalidity would
thus be directly relatable to and arise from the interest that he
would be having in such outcome or decision. If that be the test,
similar invalidity would always arise and spring even in the
second category of cases. If the interest that he has in the
outcome of the dispute, is taken to be the basis for the possibility
of bias, it will always be present irrespective of whether the
matter stands under the first or second category of cases. We are
conscious that if such deduction is drawn from the decision of this
Court in TRF Ltd., all cases having clauses similar to that with
which we are presently concerned, a party to the agreement
would be disentitled to make any appointment of an arbitrator on
its own and it would always be available to argue that a party or
an official or an authority having interest in the dispute would be
disentitled to make appointment of an arbitrator.
21. But, in our view that has to be the logical deduction from TRF
Ltd. Para 50 of the decision shows that this Court was concerned
with the issue, “whether the Managing Director, after becoming
ineligible by operation of law, is he still eligible to nominate an
arbitrator” The ineligibility referred to therein, was as a result of
operation of law, in that a person having an interest in the
dispute or in the outcome or decision thereof, must not only be
ineligible to act as an arbitrator but must also not be eligible to
appoint anyone else as an arbitrator and that such person cannot
and should not have any role in charting out any course to the
dispute resolution by having the power to appoint an arbitrator.
The next sentences in the paragraph, further show that cases
where both the parties could nominate respective arbitrators of
their choice were found to be completely a different situation. The
reason is clear that whatever advantage a party may derive by
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
nominating an arbitrator of its choice would get counterbalanced by equal power with the other party. But, in a case
where only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its
choice will always have an element of exclusivity in determining
or charting the course for dispute resolution. Naturally, the
person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the
dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator. That
has to be taken as the essence of the amendments brought in by
the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (3 of
2016) and recognised by the decision of this Court in TRF Ltd.
14.
Therefore, appropriately guided by the judgment supra it is
clear that appointment of Ld. Sole Arbitrator unilaterally by one of the
parties (respondent herein) would be ineligible by operation of law.
Further, the declaration of Ld. Arbitrator in terms of Section 12(1)(b)
of the Six Schedule of the Act as to his impartiality is not on record.
15.
In the present case, by virtue of Section 12 (5) of the Act, the
Ld. Arbitrator, who was unilaterally appointed, is ineligible to an
Arbitrator and the award passed by him, deserves to be set aside on
this account also. More particularly, as already observed, there is no
express waiver in writing as contemplated under the Proviso to Section
12 (5) of the Act.
In view of the foregoing discussions, taking all the above
points in consideration, this Court is of considered view that the
present award is liable to be set aside being against vitiated by patent
illegality and being in conflict with public policy of India.
17.
In view of foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed and
award dated 31.03.2022 is hereby set aside. No order as to costs.
18.
4.
File be consigned to record room.”
Suffice to state that the Learned District Judge has decided the issue
both on merits as well as under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
5.
We have been informed that the respondents have filed a petition
under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
appointment of an arbitrator and the same is coming up for a hearing before
the concerned Court on 19.03.2026.
6.
Having heard Mr. Manish Sharma, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellant, and Mr. Soibal Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, and taking note of the fact that the learned Arbitrator, while
rendering the award, had relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Perkins Eastman Architects DPC Anr. Vs. HSCC (India) Ltd.
(2020) 20 SCC 760, this Court queried the senior counsel whether the
appellant would prefer that the issue be decided afresh by a newly appointed
Arbitrator, Mr. Sharma submits that as the learned District Judge has also
adjudicated the issue on merits while exercising jurisdiction under Section
34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the findings returned
therein may not operate against the appellant even if a fresh Arbitrator is
appointed for adjudication of the disputes.
7.
In other words he submits that, the appellant has no objection if a new
Arbitrator is appointed for deciding the disputes de novo.
8.
Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that this Court may
clarify that the adjudication by the newly appointed Arbitrator shall be
undertaken independently and without being influenced by any observations
made either by the learned Arbitrator in the earlier proceedings or by the
learned District Judge while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
9.
At this stage, Mr. Gupta has also consented for the appointment of
Arbitrator.
10.
In view of the consent expressed by the learned counsel for the
parties, this Court appoints Mr. Gautam Narayan, Sr. Advocate (M. No.
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
9811411735) as the sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted under the aegis of the
Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) in accordance with its Rules.
It is clarified that the learned Arbitrator shall adjudicate the disputes de novo
and independently, without being influenced by any observations made by
the earlier Arbitrator or by the learned District Judge while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
11.
The disputes between the parties shall be adjudicated on the basis of
the claims and counterclaims, if any, that may be filed by the respective
parties.
12.
The learned Arbitrator shall furnish the requisite disclosure in terms
of Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before entering
upon the reference.
13.
In view of the aforesaid order, learned counsel for the parties submit
that the present appeal as well as Arbitration Petition No. 1282/2025 may be
disposed of.
14.
In light of the disposal of the appeal and the arbitration petition on the
above terms, on the request of learned counsel for the parties, the mediation
proceedings (if any) between the parties stand terminated.
15.
The date, i.e., 28.03.2026 in terms of Notification No. 64/G-4/Genl.-
I/DHC dated 27.02.2026 stands cancelled.
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
MARCH 13, 2026Tg/AM
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:28.03.2026 15:45
FAO (COMM) 257/2025
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review