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APHC010587112005
Bench Sr.No:-14
[3506]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
WRIT PETITION NO: 15156 of 2005
M. Prabhavathi, Visakhapatnam,
Vs.
Union Of India Another and Others
...Petitioner
...Respondent(s)
**********
Mrs.A V S LAXMI
Advocate for Petitioner:
Advocate(s) for Respondent(s): Mr.K.SRINIVAS RAO
CORAM : SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
DATE
: 25th June 2026
ORDER:
Present writ petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution
of India seeking following relief:
“to issue any writ order or direction, particularly one in
the
nature
proceedings
of
MANDAMUS,
commencing
from
declaring
all
the
No.A/Per/Appeal/
MPRR/2002, dt.23.12.2002, as confirmed by the
1st
Respondent under Proceedings C-16011/3/2003/
PE-1, dt.16.11.2004, as communicated by the 2nd
respondent
under
Order
No.QPER/DCell/Admn/
MPRR/15/0371, dt.07.01.2005, as arbitrary, illegal and
without jurisdiction and set aside the same and direct
payment of all the monetary benefits duly treating my
husband
as
retired
on
reaching
the
age
of
superannuation and pass such other order or orders as
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case.”
2.
(a)
Petitioner’s husband was working as Secretary,
Visakhapatnam Port Trust. He was served with charge memo
attributing various irregularities committed by misusing his official
position while selecting certain of the candidates for the posts of
clerks. The departmental enquiry ultimately ended in petitioner’s
husband being removed from service by proceedings dated
05.02.1999.
(b)
Challenging the same, W.P. No.4113 of 1999 was preferred
on the ground that the proceedings were conducted in violation of
principles of natural justice. By order dated 08.06.2001, the writ
petition came to be allowed by setting aside the impugned order
of dismissal. The respondent Port Trust preferred W.A. No.1585
of 2001, which eventually came to be dismissed vide order dated
15.10.2001. However, in further appeal before Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Civil Appeal No.8238 of 2001, the matter came to be
remanded back to the disciplinary authority with a direction to
continue the enquiry from the stage where proceedings were held
to be improperly conducted.
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
(c)
Eventually, the enquiry came to be completed and by order
dated 23.12.2002, the disciplinary authority once again imposed
penalty of dismissal from service from 31.03.2001.
The
petitioner’s husband attained age of superannuation on the said
date of 31.03.2001. Aggrieved by the same, he preferred appeal
before the 1st respondent on 04.02.2003.
By impugned order
dated 07.01.2005, the 2nd respondent has intimated that appeal
so preferred came to be rejected by the 1 st respondent, however,
ordered for payment of subsistence allowance for the period from
05.02.1999 to 30.03.2001.
(d)
Assailing the same, present writ petition is preferred.
3.
Heard
Sri
K.R.S.Prakash
Rao,
learned
counsel,
representing Smt.A.V.S.Laxmi, learned counsel for petitioner on
record. Despite service of notice, none appears for respondents
and have not filed any counter so far.
4.
As the matter is of the year 2005, this Court is not inclined
to wait for the respondents to file counter any more.
5.
Perused the record and considered the submissions of
learned counsel for petitioner.
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
6.
The
facts
narrated
above
are
not
in
controversy.
Petitioner’s husband suffered order of dismissal not once but
twice. In the earlier ground of litigation, the order of dismissal
from service came to be interdicted by this Court, which was later
got confirmed by the Division Bench. However, in appeal, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has remanded the matter back with following
observation:
“We, therefore, maintain the order and judgment of the
High Court on the ground that principles of natural
justice were not complied with by the enquiry officer and
permit the enquiry officer to proceed with the enquiry
from the stage it was held to be vitiated by the High
Court.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the
respondent superannuated.
The retirement of the
respondent herein shall be subject to the result of such
enquiry, which may be undertaken by the appellant.”
7.
Eventually, the disciplinary authority has embarked on the
enquiry and by order dated 23.12.2002, yet again, punishment of
dismissal from service came to be awarded. The said order being
appealable before 1st respondent, petitioner’s husband chose to
prefer appeal on 04.02.2003.
But curiously, the order dated
07.01.2005, which is communicated by the disciplinary authority
on behalf of the appellate authority, merely intimates the decision
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
being made by the appellate authority.
It is not known as to
whether any separate order was passed by the appellate
authority.
8.
Be that as it may, it is the case of petitioner that no such
order ever came to be communicated and the only order that was
communicated being the one dated 07.01.2005, under challenge.
Aforesaid order does not set out the reasons as to why appeal
came to be disposed of.
9.
On perusal of record, it is very much apparent that
petitioner’s husband preferred appeal which nearly ran into 63
pages, therefore, the appellate authority, before passing any
order, ought to have given the petitioner an opportunity of hearing
and recorded reasons in support of its decision.
10.
It is trite law that recording or providing reasons by quasi-
judicial authority is basic requirement as the aggrieved party is
required to know the reasons on which the decision has been
made for the purpose of assailing it before higher forums. In
Kranti Associate (P) Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan 1, the
Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraphs 12 and 47 held as follows:
(2010) 9 SCC 496
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
"12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority
in support of its decision came up for consideration before
this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a
sort of demarcation between administrative orders and
quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the
distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and
virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this
Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC
262: AIR 1970 SC 150]
47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record
reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support
of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done
it must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint
on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasijudicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by
the
decision-maker
on
relevant
grounds
and
by
disregarding extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decision-making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by
superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to
rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually
the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can
be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver
them. All these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors
have been objectively considered. This is important for
sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decision-making process then it is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to
the
doctrine
of
precedent
or
to
principles
of
incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear
and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubberstamp
reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making
process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua
non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency
in decisionmaking not only makes the judges and decisionmakers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 73137].)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from
the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of human rights
and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence.
(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital
role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due
process”.”
11.
As seen from the record, it is very much apparent that the
petitioner’s husband passed away on 17.05.2004, after filing of
appeal on 04.02.2003. Immediately, thereafter, writ petitioner by
letter dated 30.06.2004, brought the same to the notice of
1st respondent and also requested to consider the appeal and
pass orders expeditiously. Only thereafter, the 2 nd respondent
has, by order dated 07.01.2005, communicated the decision of
1st respondent rejecting the appeal.
12.
The procedure adopted by 1st respondent in dealing with
appeal is clearly in violation of principles of natural justice. Firstly,
1st respondent ought to have heard the writ petitioner before
embarking on disposal of the appeal. Further, even otherwise, as
CGR, J
W.P. No.15156 of 2005
1st respondent has not passed speaking order setting out reasons
dealing with the grounds of appeal raised by the appellant in
coming to final decision, the same also clearly stands vitiated.
13.
For the reasons stated above, the order dated 07.01.2005
passed by 2nd respondent communicating the outcome of appeal,
as decided by 1st respondent, is hereby set aside and the matter
is remanded back to the 1st respondent to reconsider the appeal.
The 1st respondent shall provide an opportunity of hearing to the
writ petitioner to represent the case either by herself or through
appropriate legal counsel and thereafter pass a speaking order.
The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
14.
Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of. No costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending in this case, if
any, shall stand closed.
CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J
ss
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