M.C. Mehta vs Union of India & Ors.

HELD: 1.1 The Monitoring Committee was appointed and empowered by this Court to take action within the powers conferred. In the teeth of various statutes, it would act strictly within the four corners of the powers conferred on it by this Court. When the various orders passed by this Court from time to time, before the constitution of the Monitoring Committee, are considered it is found that this Court at no point in time has empowered the Monitoring Committee to take action with respect to residential premises not used for commercial purpose. This Court initially passed an order on 7.5.2004 and constituted the Monitoring Committee comprising of (i) Chief Secretary of Delhi, (ii) Commissioner of Police, Delhi, (iii) Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Delhi and (iv) Vice-Chairman of Delhi Development Authority. It was ordered that Monitoring Committee would be responsible for the stoppage of illegal industrial activities. The Monitoring Committee was constituted by this Court vide judgment and order dated 16.2.2006 in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 399. The only question for consideration of this Court was the misuse of the residential premises for illegal or commercial purposes. It is clear from the order dated 16.2.2006 in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India that this Court noted unauthorized construction but appointed the Monitoring Committee to put a restraint on the misuse of the residential premises for the unauthorized/commercial purpose. Pursuant to the order dated 16.2.2006, the Monitoring Committee was formed on 24.3.2006. The court again emphasized that its order should be carried out in letter and spirit in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India reported in (2006) 3 SCC 429 passed on 24.3.2006. This Court directed to prevent misuse of the property in accordance with the previous order to mean that residential premises/ area should not be used for commercial purposes. In compliance with the directions issued by this Court on 24.4.2018 for the constitution of the Special Task Force, an Office Memorandum dated 25.4.2018 was issued, which was not with respect to the conferral of powers on the Monitoring Committee, but of the Special Task Force. The Monitoring Committee was authorized to take care of the unauthorized colonies, and the Special Task Force was directed to remove the encroachments from the public roads and public streets. This Court considered Report No.114 and thereby had passed certain orders. Report No.114 of 2018 is related to unauthorized constructions and commercial activities in 1797 unauthorized colonies. Thus, the order of this Court was confined to the unauthorized colonies and commercial activities mentioned in the report as to encroachment on the public land. This Court specifically dealt with in several orders the questions relating to power and the purpose for which the Monitoring Committee had been appointed. Matter of encroachment is a matter of concern, but the Monitoring Committee can act within the four corners of powers conferred upon it and purpose for which the court appointed the Monitoring Committee. It cannot exceed its powers and take any action beyond its authorization by the court. [Paras 17-19 (i), (ii), (vi), 20, 31, 32, 36 and 43][732-C-E; 733-A-B; 735C; 743-E-F; 744-F; 760-D; 761-C-D; 763-A-B; 766-G] M. C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors, (2006) 3 SCC

399 : [2006] 2 SCR 264; M. C. Mehta v. Union of India reported in (2006) 3 SCC 429 – referred to.

1.2 It is apparent from the various orders passed by this Court from time to time and from the various reports of the Monitoring Committee that it was never authorized by this Court to take action against the residential premises that were not being used for commercial purposes. It was appointed only to check the misuser of the residential properties for commercial purposes. After that, this Court directed that the Monitoring Committee should also look into the matter of “encroachment on the public land” and “unauthorized colonies” that have come up on the public land and were wholly unauthorized without sanction. At no point in time, this Court had empowered the Monitoring Committee to act vis-à-vis to the purely residential premises. The power of sealing of property carries civil consequences. A person can be deprived of the property by following a procedure in accordance with law. The Monitoring Committee is not authorized to take action concerning the residential premises situated on the private land. If there is unauthorized construction or in case of deviation, the requisite provisions are under the DMC Act, such as sections 343, 345, 347(A), 347(B). The mode of action and adjudication under the Act is provided including appellate provisions and that of the Tribunal. It would not be appropriate to the Monitoring Committee to usurp statutory powers and act beyond authority conferred upon it by the Court. The Monitoring Committee could not have sealed the residential premises, which were not misused for the commercial purpose as done vide Report No.149, nor it could have directed the demolition of those residential properties. [Paras 85, 86][782-H; 783-A-E]

1.3 Article 300A of the Constitution provides that nobody can be deprived of the property and right of residence otherwise in the manner prescribed by law. When the statute prescribes a mode, the property’s deprivation cannot be done in other modes since this Court did not authorize the Committee to take action in the matter. It is quite apparent that particularly when the Monitoring Committee is not empowered to take action, the incumbents could not have been deprived of the due process of protection in accordance with law. As against the action of the Monitoring Committee, no appeal lies elsewhere. Even High Court is not authorized to entertain any matter and scrutinize its action, such is the drastic step taken by this Court by way of an exceptional measure in public interest, and it is confined to the misuse of residential property for commercial purpose and encroachments and unauthorized construction on the public land, roads. [Paras 87, 88][783-E-F; 788-E-F]

State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC

77 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 1; K. T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member, (2006)

8 SCC 502 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 534; State of U. P. v. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911; Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U. P. & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 354 : [2011] 12 SCR 191; Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal Corporation (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9 SCR 373; Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors., (2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6 SCR 799; State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors., (1969) 1 SCC 509 : [1969] 3 SCR 341; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517; Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher (2013) 5 SCC 627 : [2013] 2 SCR

664 – relied on.

1.4 After going through the report of the Monitoring Committee and other reports which have been relied upon by the Amicus Curiae, there is no scintilla of doubt that the Monitoring Committee in the past at any point of time did not seal any residential premises being used for residential purposes, situated on the private land nor it could have ordered demolition. The ‘caption’ of the various reports of Monitoring Committee i.e. “PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE MONITORING

COMMITTEE FOR SEALING OF COMMERCIAL

ESTABLISHMENTS IN RESIDENTIAL PREMISES” makes it absolutely clear that Monitoring Committee did not entertain any doubt about the purpose for which it was constituted. Apart from that, it was authorized by subsequent orders to act with respect to unauthorized construction on the public land and roads that too, which violated the MPD-2021. The alternative submission was raised that the Monitoring Committee acted bonafidely at the instance of the letter written by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. This Court is of the opinion that the Monitoring Committee could not have acted based on any such letter. It was not permissible for the Monitoring Committee to act in the matter. May be that it acted under some confusion created by the letter. Be that as it may. This Court does not want to go further into the matter of bona fide. However, it is apparent that its action was beyond the purpose for which it had been appointed. This Court is not going into the merits of the other submissions, whether the premises are authorized or unauthorized, can be regularized or not, compounding can be done, or whether there is any deviation made. The report of the Monitoring Committee and findings recorded by it are of no use as it had no such authority to go into the various questions. This Court did not appoint the Monitoring Committee concerning each and every residential building on private land not misused for commercial purposes and to deal with the same. In the present matter, this Court itself is monitoring the matter for a limited public purpose. It has not taken away the powers of statutory authorities under the Act concerning other matters except specified in the order. [Paras 89-91][788-G-H; 789-A-F]

1.5 Report No.149 and other reports submitted subsequently in connection with Report No.149 and entire action of sealing pursuant thereto is quashed. Notices issued directing demolition where the matter was being heard by this Court and the Monitoring Committee had no power to look into the matter and to take any action are also quashed. The property sealed as per Report No.149 be de-sealed, and possession be restored to the owners forthwith. [Para 93][789-G-H]

A. R Antulay v. R. S. Nayak & Anr. (1988) 2 SCC 602 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 1; Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra (1995) 6 SCC 447 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 89; Prem Chand Garg v. Executing Commissioner U.P., AIR 1963 SC 996 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 885; SCBA v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 : [1998] 2 SCR 795; Arif Hameed v. State of J & K, (1989) 2 Suppl. SCC 364 : [1989] 3 SCR 19 – referred to.