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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 20.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.04.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 27.04.2026
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W.P.(C) 14643/2024
LT COL BEANT SINGH (RETD)
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. T. Parshad, Adv.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Rohan Jaitley, CGSC-UOI
with Mr. Akshay Sharma, Mr.
Dev Pratap Shahi, Mr. Varun
Pratap Singh and Mr. Yogya
Bhatia, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1.
The present Petition, preferred by the Petitioner, assails the
correctness of the order dated 09.08.2024 [hereinafter referred to as
the „Impugned Order‟] passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal,
Principal Bench, New Delhi [hereinafter referred to as „AFT‟] in O.A.
No. 404/2016, whereby the Original Application filed by the
Petitioner seeking grant of back wages for the period from 04.12.2001
to 04.03.2013 has been dismissed. The Petitioner further assails the
order dated 13.09.2012, as modified by corrigendum dated
15.02.2013, as well as the order dated 16.11.2015 passed by the
Central Government, to the limited extent they deny him back wages
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for the aforesaid period.
2.
The issue which arises for consideration in the present Petition
is as to whether the Petitioner, whose conviction in the General Court
Martial has attained finality but whose sentence was subsequently
commuted resulting in his reinstatement in service, is entitled to back
wages for the period during which he admittedly did not render
service.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
3.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present
Petition, the relevant facts, in brief, are required to be noticed.
4.
The Petitioner was commissioned in the Indian Army on
15.12.1984 in the Corps of Engineers. While serving as Garrison
Engineer (Project) at Agra, disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against him, which culminated in his trial by a General Court Martial
under the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 [hereinafter referred to as
„the Act‟].
5.
The proceedings before the General Court Martial commenced
on 28.02.2001 and concluded on 12.04.2001, whereby the Petitioner
was found guilty of the charges levelled against him and was
sentenced to be cashiered from service and to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of one year. Upon confirmation of the
findings and sentence by the competent authority, the unexpired
portion of the sentence of rigorous imprisonment was remitted;
however, the punishment of cashiering was allowed to take effect with
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effect from 04.12.2001. A statutory petition preferred by the Petitioner
under Section 164(2) of the Act came to be rejected by the Central
Government on 08.08.2003.
6.
Aggrieved by the findings and sentence recorded by the General
Court Martial, as well as the rejection of his statutory petition, the
Petitioner initially approached this Court by way of W.P.(C) No.
772/2004. Upon constitution of the AFT, the said writ petition stood
transferred and was registered as T.A. No. 503/2009 before the AFT.
The AFT, after considering the matter, vide judgment dated
02.05.2011, partly allowed the Transferred Application, however, only
to the limited extent of the quantum of sentence, and remitted the
matter to the Respondents for reconsideration of the sentence in light
of the mitigating circumstances noticed therein. It is material to note
that the findings of guilt recorded by the General Court Martial were
not interfered with and, thus, attained finality. The Petitioner did not
assail the correctness of the AFT judgment dated 02.05.2011.
7.
Pursuant to the aforesaid judgment dated 02.05.2011 passed by
the AFT, the matter was reconsidered by the Central Government,
which, vide order dated 13.09.2012, in exercise of powers under
Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Act, commuted the
sentence awarded to the Petitioner. The punishment of cashiering was
substituted with the directions that the Petitioner shall take rank and
precedence as if his appointment as substantive Major bore date
25.12.1996 and that he be severely reprimanded. The said order,
however, specifically provided that the Petitioner shall not be entitled
to back wages on the principle of “no work no pay”. Thereafter, by a
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subsequent corrigendum dated 15.02.2013, the Petitioner was directed
to be reinstated in service, albeit without grant of back wages for the
intervening period.
8.
Pursuant to the aforesaid corrigendum dated 15.02.2013, the
Petitioner was reinstated in service and, in furtherance thereof, a
posting order dated 04.03.2013 came to be issued by the competent
authority, whereupon the Petitioner joined duties on 05.03.2013.
Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted a statutory complaint seeking
grant of back wages for the period from 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013.
The said complaint, upon consideration, came to be rejected by the
Central Government vide order dated 16.11.2015.
9.
Aggrieved by the rejection of his statutory complaint, the
Petitioner approached the AFT by filing O.A. No. 404/2016, inter
alia, seeking grant of back wages for the period during which he
remained out of service. The AFT, upon hearing the parties and
considering the material on record, framed the principal issue as to
whether the Petitioner was entitled to pay and allowances for the
period from 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013, when he had not rendered
service.
10.
The AFT, while noticing the factual background and the earlier
order dated 02.05.2011 passed in T.A. No. 503/2009, recorded that the
interference in the earlier round of litigation was confined only to the
quantum of sentence and that the findings of guilt recorded by the
General Court Martial had not been disturbed. The AFT further held
that the Petitioner was never acquitted of the charges and that his
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conviction had attained finality. Upon consideration of the legal
position and the judgments relied upon by the parties, the AFT
concluded that the principle of “no work no pay” was applicable in the
facts of the present case, particularly in view of the finding that the
Petitioner was kept out of service on account of charges for which he
stood convicted. Consequently, the Original Application was
dismissed as being devoid of merit.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
11.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
11.1. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that the AFT has
erred in applying the principle of “no work no pay” to the facts of the
present case. It was contended that the punishment of cashiering
imposed upon the Petitioner by the General Court Martial was found
to be excessive and disproportionate, which led to its commutation by
the Central Government and the consequent reinstatement of the
Petitioner in service.
11.2. It was argued that such commutation of sentence would, in
effect, relate back to the date of imposition of punishment and,
therefore, the Petitioner is liable to be treated as having continued in
service without interruption. On this premise, it was urged that the
denial of back wages for the intervening period is arbitrary and
amounts to the Respondents taking advantage of their own alleged
wrong.
11.3. It was further submitted that the Petitioner was always willing
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to serve and was kept out of service on account of an iniquitous
punishment, which was subsequently corrected, and thus, the principle
of “no work no pay” would have no application in the present case.
12.
Contentions of the Respondents:
12.1. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents supported the
Impugned Order and contended that the Petitioner was duly tried by a
General Court Martial and was found guilty of the charges levelled
against him, and that such finding of guilt has attained finality, as the
same was never set aside. It was submitted that the Petitioner
remained out of service as a direct consequence of his own
misconduct culminating in such conviction.
12.2. It was further submitted that the interference in the earlier round
of litigation was confined only to the quantum of sentence and not to
the conviction, and therefore, the Petitioner cannot claim any
consequential monetary benefits as a matter of right. It was contended
that the commutation of sentence and reinstatement granted to the
Petitioner were in the nature of relief extended upon reconsideration
of the quantum of punishment and subject to specific conditions, and
cannot be construed as a declaration that the earlier punishment was
void ab initio or as conferring a right to claim back wages.
12.3. It was further argued that in the absence of actual discharge of
duties during the relevant period, the Petitioner is not entitled to back
wages, in view of the settled principle of “no work no pay”, which has
been consistently affirmed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, including
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in Paluru Ramakrishnaiah v. Union of India1 and Baldev Singh v.
Union of India2, and which squarely applies to the facts of the present
case.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS:
13.
This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced
on behalf of the parties and perused the material on record.
14.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that the scope of
interference by this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with an order passed by the
AFT, is limited. This Court does not sit in appeal over the decisions of
the AFT and would interfere only where the impugned order is shown
to suffer from patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. Reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a plausible view taken by
the AFT is not warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is in the
aforesaid limited scope of judicial review that the controversy
involved in the present Petition is required to be examined.
15.
At the outset, it is required to be emphasised that the Petitioner
was subjected to a General Court Martial and was found guilty of the
charges levelled against him. The findings of guilt recorded by the
General Court Martial were never set aside at any stage. In fact, even
in the earlier round of litigation before the AFT` in T.A. No.
503/2009, the interference was expressly confined to the quantum of
sentence, and the conviction of the Petitioner was left undisturbed.
(1989) 2 SCC 541
(2005) 8 SCC 747
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Consequently, the conviction attained finality.
16.
In such circumstances, the present case cannot be equated with
a case where termination of service is held to be illegal or where an
employee is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. The
distinction between a case of acquittal or exoneration and a case
where the conviction subsists but the sentence is modified is well
recognised in service jurisprudence, and the consequences flowing
therefrom are materially different. The Petitioner‟s conviction arose
from charges forming the subject matter of the General Court Martial
proceedings, which stood proved and were not interfered with.
17.
The principal submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner
proceeds on the premise that once the sentence awarded by the
General Court Martial was commuted by the Central Government, the
same would relate back to the date of imposition of punishment and
would obliterate the consequences flowing from the earlier sentence,
thereby entitling the Petitioner to all consequential benefits, including
back wages. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention.
18.
The power exercised by the Central Government under Section
163(2) read with Section 179 of the Act is one of alteration or
commutation of sentence and does not amount to a declaration that the
original punishment was void ab initio or non est in the eyes of law.
The commutation of sentence, in the facts of the present case, was
undertaken in compliance with the directions issued by the AFT to
reconsider the quantum of punishment in light of mitigating
circumstances and comparative treatment. Such commutation,
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therefore, is in the nature of a modification of the punishment and
does not result in setting aside the conviction or underlying
proceedings. Consequently, the contention that the Petitioner must be
deemed to have been in continuous service for all purposes, including
entitlement to back wages, cannot be accepted.
19.
Moreover, the question as to entitlement of the Petitioner to
back wages is also required to be examined in light of the settled
principle of “no work no pay”. It is a well-established principle of
service jurisprudence that salary is ordinarily payable for the period
during which an employee has actually discharged duties, and not
otherwise. Though exceptions to the said principle have been
recognised in cases where an employee is wrongfully prevented from
discharging duties on account of an illegal or unjustified action of the
employer, such exception would have no application in a case where
the employee was kept out of service on account of a conviction
which has attained finality.
20.
The said principle has been consistently affirmed by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in decisions such as Paluru Ramakrishnaiah
(supra) and Baldev Singh (supra), wherein it has been held that an
employee is not entitled to salary for a period during which he has not
actually discharged duties, even if certain benefits are subsequently
extended.
21.
In the present case, as noticed hereinabove, the Petitioner was
found guilty by a General Court Martial and his conviction has
attained finality. The period during which the Petitioner remained out
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of service was a direct consequence of the sentence imposed upon him
pursuant to such conviction. The subsequent commutation of sentence,
which was limited to modification of the punishment, does not efface
the fact that the Petitioner did not render service during the relevant
period. In these circumstances, the application of the principle of “no
work no pay” by the AFT cannot be faulted.
CONCLUSION:
22.
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the Impugned Order does not suffer from any
infirmity.
23.
Accordingly, finding no merit in the present Petition, the same
is dismissed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
APRIL 27, 2026
jai/pal
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