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2026:HHC:7985
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2977 of 2025
Reserved on: 9.3.2026
Date of Decision: 20.3.2026.
Lovkesh Kumar
…. Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
…. Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Chetan Thakur, Advocate,
vice Mr Arun Sehgal, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 91 of 2025, dated 11.7.2025,
registered at Police Station Jawali, District Kangra, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 109(1),
126(2), 115(2) and 117(1) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
victim had parked his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-54C-
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:7985
0421 near his house on 11.7.2025. The accused asked the
informant and the victim to transport the sand, but they
declined. The accused threatened to damage the windscreen with
the hammer if the sand was not transported. The victim tried to
stop the accused, but the accused slapped him. The accused
inflicted a hammer blow on the victim’s head. The victim was
taken to the hospital. The matter was reported to the police. The
police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The police
arrested the petitioner. The allegations made against him are
false. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions
that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the informant and the victim were sifting sand on
11.7.2025 at about 11.30 am. The victim had parked his vehicle
bearing registration No. HP-54C-0421 near his home. The
petitioner asked the informant and the victim to remove the
vehicle. They told the petitioner to wait for some time. The
petitioner also asked them to transport the sand, but they
declined. The petitioner took up an iron hammer and threatened
to damage the windscreen of the vehicle. The victim went to the
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vehicle to ask the petitioner not to damage it. The petitioner
slapped the victim and inflicted a blow on the victim’s head with
a hammer. The victim was taken to the hospital, and the matter
was reported to the police. The police investigated the matter and
arrested the petitioner. The Medical Officer found a temporal
fracture of the cranium. The police recovered the hammer. No
blood was detected on the hammer. The police filed a charge
sheet before the Court on 21.2.2026. The matter is listed before
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nurpur, on 20.4.2026 and
21.4.2026 for recording the statements of witnesses. The
petitioner had committed a heinous offence. He would threaten
the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status
report.
4.
I have heard Mr Chetan Thakur, learned vice counsel
representing the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned
Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr Chetan Thakkur, learned vice counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he
was falsely implicated. No blood was found on the hammer
stated to have been used by the petitioner, which falsifies the
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prosecution’s case. The police have filed the charge sheet before
the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining
the petitioner in custody. Therefore, he prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner
had inflicted a blow on the victim’s head with an iron hammer.
The victim suffered a fracture on the head. The nature of the
offence is heinous. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition
be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. InGudikantiNarasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
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“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing
of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
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accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the
court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic
itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce
prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should
always be coupled with other circumstances warranting
the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the
basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more
heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection
of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
2026:HHC:7985
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
2026:HHC:7985
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022)
4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported
by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the
nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if
any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a
conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an
accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.
Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC
261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the
gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests
otherwise. It was observed at page 308:
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2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not
jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences
or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner
who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not
intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.
3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely
to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and
must weigh with us when considering the question of jail.
So also, the heinousness of the crime….”
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
It is specifically mentioned in the status report that
the petitioner had inflicted injuries on the victim’s head with a
hammer. The hammer is a dangerous weapon, and the skull is a
vital part of the body. Had the death been caused, the petitioner
would have been guilty of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 103 of the BNS; however, the victim
survived, and the petitioner would be prima facie liable for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 109(1) of the
BNS.
12.
It was submitted that no blood was found on the
hammer, which falsifies the prosecution’s version that the
injuries were caused by a hammer. This submission will not help
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the petitioner. The victim’s statement is to be prima facie
accepted as correct that the petitioner had inflicted injuries by
means of a hammer, and merely because the police failed to
recover the hammer used by the petitioner or the hammer did
not contain the blood will not make the prosecution’s case
suspect. It is a matter of appreciation of evidence and would be
seen after the conclusion of the trial. Hence, no advantage can be
derived from this submission.
13.
The offence of attempt to murder is punishable with
life imprisonment under Section 109(1) of BNS. Thus, the
punishment is severe. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of
A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327
that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to
bail. It was observed at page 244:
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and
the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to
secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
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regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible
in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime
charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of
the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned
by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably
presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of
bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage
of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50
ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this
approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order
of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
sufficient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and
because the detention is necessary to ensure his
appearance at trial .... It is a very important element
in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail,
would appear to take his trial; and I think that in
coming to a determination on that point three
elements will generally be found the most
important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by
which it is supported, and the punishment to which
the party would be liable if convicted. In the present
case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the
evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of
the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the
offence is, by law, death.”
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
14.
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Therefore, considering the nature of the offence and
the severity of the punishment, the petitioner cannot be released
on bail.
15.
No other point was urged.
16.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
17.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
20th March, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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