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C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
Reserved On
: 23/04/2026
Pronounced On : 02/07/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 145 of 2025
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR AMENDMENT) NO. 1 of 2025
In R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 145 of 2025
With
R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 304 of 2025
With
R/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 773 of 2026
In
R/PETN. UNDER ARBITRATION ACT NO. 39 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRAL R. MEHTA
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
==========================================================
ABHISHEK SURESH MEHTA & ORS.
Versus
M/S PARTH DEVELOPERS & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR RUTUL P DESAI(6498) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3
MAYANK K TRIVEDI(7906) for the Respondent(s) No. 6,7
MR KK TRIVEDI(934) for the Respondent(s) No. 6,7
MR MEHUL SHARAD SHAH(773) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRAL R. MEHTA
CAV JUDGMENT
1.
By way of the present petitions filed
under Section 29A(4) and (5) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Rule 34.6 of
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
the
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
Arbitration
International),
Centre
High
Court
(Domestic
and
Gujarat
Rules,
of
2021, the petitioners have approached this Court
seeking extension of the mandate of the learned
Sole Arbitrator, Hon’ble Ms. Justice H.N. Devani
(Retd.), in Arbitration Case No. 6 of 2022. The
prayer is to extend the time for a further period
of
six
months
extended
from
period,
the
expiry
20th
December,
i.e.
of
the
last
2025,
and
thereafter for a further period of six months
from 20th June, 2026, in the interest of justice,
so as to enable the learned Sole Arbitrator to
pronounce and publish the arbitral award.
2.
The brief facts necessary for deciding
the present petitions are as under:
2.1
The
initiated
arbitration
pursuant
to
the
proceedings
were
order
07th
dated
January, 2022 passed by the High Court of Gujarat
appointing Hon’ble Ms.Justice H.N. Devani (Retd.)
as
the
learned
Sole
Arbitrator
under
the
Arbitration Centre (Domestic and International),
High Court of Gujarat Rules, 2021. The parties
were governed by the said Rules, and upon her
appointment, the learned Sole Arbitrator entered
upon
the
reference
to
adjudicate
between the parties.
the
disputes
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
2.2
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
The
claimant
filed
its
Statement
of
Claim on or about 28th February, 2022. Respondent
Nos.1,
2,
Defence
along
2022.
and
with
filed
their
Statement
Counter
Claim
on
Respondent
No.4
filed
its
09th
May,
2022,
whereas
Defence
on
12 th
of
May,
Statement
of
respondent
Nos.6 and 7 filed their Statement of Defence and
Counter
Claim
on
13th
May,
2022.
The
claimant
thereafter filed its rejoinder as well as its
Statement of Defence to the respective Counter
Claims on or about 20th June, 2022. Accordingly,
in terms of Rules 24 and 25 read with Rule 34.4
of the Rules, 2021, the pleadings stood completed
on 20th June, 2022, from which date the statutory
period of twelve months commenced.
2.3
Upon
completion
of
pleadings
and
settlement of the terms of reference, the parties
undertook the process of admission and denial of
documents and thereafter led oral evidence. In
all, nineteen witnesses were examined and crossexamined before the learned Tribunal. The crossexamination
was
extensive
and
ultimately
concluded
on
22nd
September,
2023.
Since
initial
period
of
twelve
months
was
due
the
to
expire, the parties, by consent, filed a pursis
under Rule 34.5 of the Rules, 2021 extending the
mandate of the learned Tribunal by six months,
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
and accordingly the period stood extended up to
20th December, 2023.
2.4
the
Thereafter, when the matter had reached
stage
of
final
hearing
and
the
extended
period was due to expire on 20th December, 2023,
the applicants filed Arbitration Petition No.190
of
seeking
a
further
extension
of
six
months. By order dated 20th December, 2023, this
Court extended the mandate of the learned Sole
Arbitrator up to 20th June, 2024.
2.5
During
the
learned
Tribunal
said
heard
extended
and
period,
concluded
the
the
oral
arguments of all the parties on 11th April, 2024.
Thereafter,
the
pronouncement
of
matter
the
was
arbitral
reserved
for
award,
while
granting one month’s time to the parties to file
their written submissions.
2.6
and
Having regard to the voluminous record
the
complex
issues
arising
out
of
the
business transactions of the partnership firm and
the inter se disputes between the partners, the
learned
Tribunal
required
additional
time
to
prepare and pronounce the arbitral award. Since
it
was
not
likely
that
the
award
could
be
pronounced before 20th June, 2024, the applicants
preferred IAP No.116 of 2024 seeking a further
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
extension of six months.
2.7
As the extended period was thereafter to
expire
on
20th
December,
2024,
the
applicants
filed Arbitration Petition No.39 of 2025 seeking
a further extension of six months, i.e. upto 20th
June, 2025. The said petition came to be allowed
by this Court by order dated 13th March, 2025.
2.8
Even as on the date of filing of the
present
petitions,
been
pronounced.
the
It
arbitral
has
been
award
has
not
stated
that
the
learned Sole Arbitrator requires further time and
that the award is not likely to be pronounced
before
20th
therefore,
June,
filed
2025.
the
The
present
applicants
have,
petitions
seeking
extension of the mandate for a further period of
six months from 20th June, 2025 to enable the
learned Sole Arbitrator to pronounce the arbitral
award.
3.
Heard
learned
Senior
Advocate
Mr.Deven
Parikh with learned Advocate Mr.Rutul Desai for
the petitioners, Learned Advocate Mr.Mehul Sharad
Shah
for
respondent
Nos.1
to
and
Learned
Advocate Mr.K.K. Trivedi for respondent Nos.6 and
7.
4.
At
the
outset,
learned
advocate
Mr.
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
Mehul Shah appearing for the respondent raised a
preliminary
objection
by
placing
reliance
upon
the recent decision of the Apex Court in Jagdeep
Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule reported in 2026 INSC
92. It was contended that, in view of the said
decision, the jurisdiction to extend the mandate
of an arbitral tribunal under Section 29A(4) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vests
only
in
the
application
Court
under
competent
Section
to
entertain
an
challenging
the
relied
the
arbitral award.
4.1
Learned
Advocate
also
on
following judgments to buttress his submissions:
(i)
Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s.Bharat
Textiles [SLP (C) No.13779 of 2025],
(ii)
Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb [(1999)
4 SCC 396],
(iii)
Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Berger Paints India Ltd. [(2025) 10
SCC 802],
(iv)
Chiranjilal
Shrilal
(Deceased) through Lrs.
Singh [(1993) 2 SCC 507],
v.
Goenka
Jasjit
(v)
Nimet Resources Inc. v. Essar Steels
Ltd. [(2009) 17 SCC 313],
(vi)
Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) v.
BSC & C and C JV [2024 SCC OnLine SC
1801],
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
(vii)
Petition
under
Arbitration
Act
No.132 of 2024 decided by the High
Court of Gujarat vide order dated
22nd November, 2024,
(viii)
Coimbatore
Integrated
Waste
Management Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Coimbatore
City
Municipal
Corporation [2026 LawSuit (Mad) 83],
(ix)
C B Ramkumar S/o. Late I B Menon:
Lalitha Ramkumar W/o C B Ramkumar v.
M/s.Himalaya Prime Assets Pvt. Ltd.
[2026 LawSuit (Kar) 223],
(x)
Era International v. Aditya Birla
Global Trading India Pvt. Ltd. [2024
SCC OnLine Bom 835].
4.2
Learned Advocate Mr.Shah, on the basis
of the aforesaid, requested this Court not to
entertain the present petition.
5.
Per
contra,
learned
Senior
Advocate
Mr.Deven Parikh appearing for the petitioner made
the following submissions:
5.1
Learned
Senior
Advocate
submitted
that
while appointing the learned Sole Arbitrator by
order
dated
07th
January,
passed
in
Arbitration Petition No.91 of 2020, this Court
specifically
directed
that
the
arbitration
proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration
Centre (Domestic and International), High Court
of Gujarat Rules, 2021, and that both parties
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
shall
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
be
bound
by
the
said
Rules.
It
was
submitted that the parties have all throughout
acted in accordance with the said Rules without
raising any objection. Therefore, it is no longer
open
for
the
respondent
petition
for
extension
Section
29A(4)
cannot
Court
by
overlooking
2021.
It
was,
to
contend
of
be
the
that
mandate
entertained
Rule
34.6
therefore,
of
urged
under
by
the
the
this
Rules,
that
the
preliminary objection deserves to be rejected.
5.2
It was further submitted that all the
earlier
applications
seeking
extension
of
the
mandate were filed before this Court under Rule
34.6 of the Rules, 2021 and no objection was ever
raised
by
the
applicability
respondent.
of
Rule
Having
34.6
on
accepted
the
the
earlier
occasions, the respondent cannot now contend that
the petitioners should approach the civil court
for extension of time.
5.3
Learned
Senior
Advocate
submitted
that
the Rules, 2021 continue to hold the field and
have not been challenged. The said Rules, having
statutory force, are binding on the parties. Rule
34.6
specifically
empowers
the
High
Court
to
extend the mandate of the arbitral tribunal on an
application
made
by
any
party.
Therefore,
in
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
terms of the statutory Rules, this Court alone
has the jurisdiction to extend the mandate and
the petitioners cannot be relegated to the civil
court under Section 29A(5) of the Act.
5.4
It
was
next
submitted
that
party
autonomy is the cornerstone of arbitration law.
Parties
are
free
to
adopt,
by
agreement,
the
rules that would govern the arbitral proceedings.
In
the
present
applicability
of
case,
the
having
Rules,
accepted
by
the
their
conduct, the parties cannot now depart from the
said Rules.
5.5
It was submitted that by referring the
disputes to arbitration in accordance with the
Rules, 2021, this Court had referred the matter
to an institutional arbitration. In the absence
of
any
objection
to
such
reference,
the
respondents cannot now dispute the jurisdiction
of this Court to extend the mandate under Rule
34.6. It was further submitted that the decision
in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra) does not deal with
institutional
arbitration
where
the
governing
rules of the institution specifically confer such
power upon the High Court.
5.6
Learned
Senior
Advocate
further
submitted that, in arbitration, parties are not
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
only free to adopt the procedure governing the
proceedings but are also entitled to agree upon
the
forum
exercising
supervisory
jurisdiction.
Therefore, once the parties accepted the Rules,
2021, Rule 34.6 alone would govern the extension
of the mandate. It was contended that, in the
peculiar facts of the present case, where the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice referred the disputes
to
the
Arbitration
Centre
with
a
specific
direction that the Rules, 2021 would apply, any
extension
of
the
mandate
must
necessarily
be
sought under Rule 34.6 before this Court.
5.7
It
was
also
submitted
that
the
High
Court Arbitration Centre is entitled to provide,
under its Rules, that its proceedings shall be
supervised by the High Court alone and not by the
District Court. Consequently, Rule 34.6 confers
jurisdiction exclusively upon the High Court to
extend the mandate of the arbitral tribunal.
5.8
Lastly,
it
was
submitted
that
the
Arbitration Centre has framed a complete set of
Rules
governing
institutional
arbitration,
including Rule 34.6 relating to extension of the
mandate.
Once
the
parties
have
chosen
to
be
governed by those Rules, the procedure prescribed
therein
must
be
followed.
According
to
the
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
learned
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
Senior
agreed
to
the
Advocate,
the
supervisory
parties
having
jurisdiction
of
the
High Court in matters relating to extension of
the
mandate,
such
an
arrangement
is
neither
inconsistent with nor contrary to the fundamental
policy of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
It
was,
therefore,
submitted
that
the
principle of party autonomy permits the parties
to
adopt
such
procedural
framework
even
in
matters concerning Section 29A of the Act.
5.9
By
making
above
submissions,
learned
Senior Advocate requested this Court to reject
the
preliminary
objection
raised
by
the
the
aforesaid
respondents.
5.10
To
contentions,
substantiate
Learned
Senior
Advocate
relied
on
the following decisions:
(i)
Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of
India [(2014) 7 SCC 603];
(ii)
Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings
LLC v. Future Retail Ltd. [(2022) 1
SCC 209];
(iii)
Hindustan Construction Company Ltd.
Through
its
Authorised
Signatory
Yogesh Dalal v. Bihar Rajya Pul
Nirman Nigam Ltd. [2025 LawSuit (SC)
1542] and
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
(iv)
P.R. Shah Shares and Stock Brokers
Pvt. Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities Pvt.
Ltd. [(2012) 1 SCC 594].
Learned advocate Mr.Amit Thakkar adopted
6.
the
submissions
advanced
by
learned
Senior
Advocate Mr.Deven Parikh. However, in so far as
Miscellaneous Civil Application No.773 of 2026 in
Arbitration Petition No.39 of 2025 is concerned,
he questioned its maintainability by relying upon
the
provisions
of
Order
XLVII
of
the
Code
of
Civil Procedure, 1908.
6.1
Order
It was submitted that the Explanation to
XLVII
makes
it
abundantly
clear
that
a
judgment cannot be reviewed merely because the
legal
position
subsequently
on
been
which
it
was
based
reversed
or
modified
has
by
a
superior court in another case. According to the
learned advocate, the present Miscellaneous Civil
Application is founded entirely on the decision
of the Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra),
rendered on 29th January, 2026.
6.2
It was further submitted that the orders
sought to be reviewed and recalled were passed on
13th March, 2025 and 21st March, 2025, much prior
to the pronouncement of the judgment in Jagdeep
Chowgule
(supra).
Therefore,
a
subsequent
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
declaration
of
law
by
the
Apex
Court
cannot
furnish a ground to seek review of orders passed
before
such
contended
declaration.
that
the
It
review
was,
therefore,
application
is
misconceived and deserves to be dismissed.
7.
In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr. Shah
made the following submissions:
7.1
It was submitted that no distinction can
be drawn between an institutional arbitration and
an ad hoc arbitration so far as the applicability
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is
concerned. According to the learned advocate, the
provisions of the Act apply uniformly to both
forms of arbitration.
7.2
Learned advocate further submitted that
when
Rule
(Domestic
34.6
and
of
the
Arbitration
International),
High
Centre
Court
of
Gujarat Rules, 2021 was framed, the jurisdiction
to extend the mandate under Sections 29A(4) and
29A(5) vested in the High Court, and therefore
the
expression
“High
Court”
came
to
be
incorporated in the said Rule. It was contended
that, in any case, the Rules of the Arbitration
Centre
cannot
override
the
provisions
of
the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According
to the learned advocate, in view of the recent
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
decision of the Apex Court interpreting Section
29A(4), it has now been authoritatively held that
the expression “Court” refers to the court having
jurisdiction
to
entertain
an
Section
of
the
Consequently,
Act.
application
under
to
the
extent Rule 34.6 is inconsistent with the said
interpretation of Section 29A(4), it cannot be
given effect to.
7.3
advocate
On
the
for
aforesaid
the
submissions,
respondents
prayed
learned
that
the
preliminary objection be upheld.
CONTROVERSY BEFORE THE COURT AS FOLLOWS:
8.
Having
advanced
the
the
learned
advocates
parties
and
by
respective
material
considered
placed
on
submissions
upon
perusal
record,
the
for
the
of
the
following
questions arise for determination:
(i)
Whether,
case,
in
the
the
facts
of
the
present
jurisdiction
to
extend
the
mandate of the learned Sole Arbitrator
is to be determined in accordance with
Section
29A(4)
Conciliation
of
the
Arbitration
Act,
1996,
as
and
interpreted
by the Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule
(supra), or in accordance with Rule 34.6
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
of the Arbitration Centre (Domestic and
International),
Rules,
2021,
High
Court
of
Gujarat
which
the
parties
had
agreed to be governed by?
(ii)
Whether the principle of party autonomy
permits the parties, either by agreement
or by adopting institutional arbitration
rules, to confer jurisdiction upon the
High Court to entertain an application
for extension of the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate,
notwithstanding
Section
29A
of
the
the
scheme
Arbitration
of
and
Conciliation Act, 1996?
(iii)
Whether
Rule
34.6
Centre
(Domestic
of
the
Arbitration
and
International),
High Court of Gujarat Rules, 2021 can
operate
independently
over,
the
contained
of,
or
jurisdictional
in
Section
29A
prevail
framework
of
the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
9.
So as to decide the aforesaid question,
in my view, provisions of Section 29A(4) deserves
consideration. For the sake of brevity, the same
is hereby reproduced hereunder:
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
“29A.
Time
award.(1) …
(2) …
(3) …
…
…
…
Limit
for
arbitral
…
…
…
(4) If the award is not made within
the period specified in sub-section
(1) or the extended period specified
under sub-section (3), the mandate of
the
arbitrator(s)
shall
terminate
unless the Court has, either prior to
or after the expiry of the period so
specified, extended the period:
Provided that while extending the
period under this sub-section, if the
Court finds that the proceedings have
been
delayed
for
the
reasons
attributable to the arbitral tribunal,
then, it may order reduction of fees
of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five
per cent for each month of such delay:
Provided further that where an
application under sub-section (5) is
pending, the mandate of the arbitrator
shall continue till the disposal of
the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator
shall be given an opportunity of being
heard before the fees is reduced.”
10.
A plain reading of Section 29A of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 makes it
evident
that,
international
except
in
commercial
the
case
arbitration,
of
an
the
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
arbitral
tribunal
is
required
to
make
the
arbitral award within a period of twelve months
from the date of completion of pleadings under
Section
23(4)
prescribed
nature
of
by
and
the
forms
statutory
the
Act.
The
time
legislature
is
mandatory
in
part
the
an
integral
framework
governing
limit
of
arbitral
proceedings.
Under
Section
29A(3),
the
legislature
has consciously preserved the principle of party
autonomy
by
permitting
the
parties,
by
mutual
consent, to extend the mandate of the arbitral
tribunal for a further period not exceeding six
months.
Thus,
to
that
limited
extent,
the
continuation of the arbitral proceedings remains
within the control of the parties.
However, the statutory scheme undergoes
a marked change once the initial period of twelve
months and the consensual extension of six months
expire. Section 29A(4) expressly provides that,
upon expiry of the said period, the mandate of
the
arbitral
tribunal
stands
terminated
unless
the Court extends the period. At that stage, the
legislature has consciously withdrawn the matter
from the domain of party autonomy and entrusted
it to judicial supervision. The continuation of
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
the arbitral tribunal thereafter depends solely
upon an order of the Court passed on sufficient
cause
being
shown
and
on
such
terms
and
conditions as it may deem fit. The Court is also
empowered, if the circumstances so warrant, to
substitute
the
arbitrator
while
granting
such
extension.
The
scheme
of
a
careful
legislative
reflects
Section
29A,
therefore,
balance
between
party autonomy and judicial oversight. While the
parties enjoy complete freedom to grant a onetime extension of six months by mutual consent,
any further continuation of the arbitral tribunal
is placed exclusively under the control of the
Court. The provision is not merely procedural;
rather, it constitutes a self-contained statutory
mechanism
regulating
the
time
within
which
an
arbitral award is to be made and prescribing the
manner
in
tribunal
which
may
the
mandate
continue
beyond
of
the
the
arbitral
prescribed
period.
10.1
Section
29A
thus
imposes
a
statutory
obligation upon the arbitral tribunal to render
its award within a maximum period of eighteen
months, comprising the original period of twelve
months and the additional six months that may be
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
granted by consent of the parties. Beyond this
period, the mandate can continue only upon an
order of the Court under Section 29A(4).
Viewed
from
this
perspective,
neither
the parties nor an arbitral institution can, by
agreement or by institutional rules, provide for
any
mechanism
tribunal’s
permitting
mandate
beyond
extension
the
of
statutory
the
period
without recourse to the Court. Significantly, the
Act does not carve out any exception excluding
institutional arbitrations seated in India from
the
operation
of
Section
29A.
Consequently,
irrespective of whether the arbitration is ad hoc
or institutional, any extension of the arbitral
tribunal’s
mandate
beyond
the
statutory
period
must necessarily be sought from the “Court” as
understood
under
Section
29A
read
with
the
definition contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the
Act.
11.
under
At
any
this
stage,
oblivion
this
with
Court
regard
to
cannot
the
be
recent
pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of
Jagdeep
Chowgule
consider
the
(supra).
relevant
It
would
portion
of
be
apt
the
said
decision. The same is quoted as under:
“5.
As
we
begin
to
examine
the
to
very
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same questions, ably canvassed before us by
Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar and Mr. Amit Pai,
learned counsels for the appellant and the
respondents respectively, we would prefer to
reframe the question, which is as simple and
straight forward as follows:If an arbitral tribunal - appointed by
the
High
Court
or
by
the
parties
concerned – does not complete proceedings
within the required or extended time
limit, can an application to extend time
under Section 29A of the Act can be filed
before the High Court or the Civil Court?
6.
We are of the opinion that there
was no need to split the questions into two,
one for a situation when the High Court
constitutes
the
arbitral
tribunal
under
Section 11(6) and the other, when the parties
themselves constitute it under Section 11(2).
Perhaps by asking the wrong questions, the
Division Bench arrived at wrong answers. It
is not just this Division Bench, in fact this
perceived duality in the appointment process
has
given
rise
to
divergent
views
of
different High Courts. Before we deal with
the divergent views of the High Court,
followed by our analysis, short and necessary
facts are as follows.
IV. Divergence in the opinion of the High
Courts on interpretation of “Court” under
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act
8.
A large number of decisions of the High
Courts on interpretation of Section 29A of
the Act can be categorized into following two
streams.
A. Judgments taking the view that ‘Court’ in
Section 29A is Court as defined in Section
2(1)(e).
9. The first stream of High Court decisions
in Mormugao Port Trust v. Ganesh Benzoplast
Ltd. [WP No. 3 of 2020 (High Court of Bombay
at Goa)], M/s A'Xykno Capital Services
Private Ltd. V State of UP [2023 SCC OnLine
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AII 2991], and Dr. VV Subbarao v. Dr. Appa
Rao Mukkamala & Ors. [2024 SCC OnLine AP
1668], hold that the expression ‘Court’ in
Section 29A is the Court as defined under
Section 2(1)(e), irrespective of the event
that the arbitral tribunal was constituted by
the Supreme or High Courts under Section
11(6) or by consent of parties under Section
11(2) of the Act. They hold that, once an
arbitrator has been appointed through the
judicial process, the Courts become functus
officio and applications seeking extension of
mandate under Section 29A are to be filed
before Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e).
9.1 Further, as per this stream of decisions,
the text of the legislation is unambiguous.
Neither a High Court not having original
ordinary civil jurisdiction has been included
with
regard
to
entertainability
of
an
application
under
Section
29A,
nor
a
Principal Civil Court has been excluded from
Section 2(1)(e) for purpose of Section 29A.
Some of these decisions clarify that, when
the
legislature
intended
to
delineate
jurisdictions, requisite provisions have duly
been made, as exemplified through Sections 47
and 57, whereby jurisdiction of Civil Courts
is expressly excluded. Further, Section 29A
stipulates no distinction between arbitrators
appointed with the consent of parties or by
Constitutional Courts under Section 11.
B. Other stream of judgments interpreting
Court in Section 29A in the ‘context’ to
disapply Section 2(1)(e).
10. The
second
stream
of
High
Court
decisions in Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel v.
Bhanubhai Ramanbhai Patel [2018 SCC OnLine
Guj 5017], Cabra Instalaciones Y. Servicios
v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution
Co. Ltd. [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1437], DDA v.
Tara Chand Sumit Construction Co. [2020 SCC
OnLine Del 2501], Amit Kumar Gupta v. Dipak
Prasad [2021 SCC OnLine Cal 2174], Magnus
Opus IT Consulting Pvt Ltd v. Artcad Systems
[2022 SCC OnLine Bom 2861], Indian Farmers
Fertilizers Cooperative Limited v. Manish
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Engineering Enterprises [2022 SCC OnLine All
150], Best Eastern Business House Pvt. Ltd.
v. Mina Pradhan [2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997],
Ovington Finance Pvt Ltd. v. Bindiya Naga
[2023
SCC
OnLine
Del
8765],
K.I.P.L.
Vistacore Infra Projects J.V. v. Municipal
Corporation of the city of Ichalkarnj [2024
SCC Online Bom 327], M/S Geo Miller Company
Private Limited v. UP Jal Nigam and Ors.
[2024 SCC OnLine All 1676], Best Eastern
Business House Pvt. Ltd. v. Mina Pradhan
[2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7997], and M/s. Premco
Rail Engineering Ltd. v. Indian Institute of
Technology, Indore [Arbitration Case No.88 of
2025 (High Court of Madhya Pradesh)] hold
that in cases where the appointment of
arbitrator is by the High Court under Section
11(6), applications for extension of time
under Section 29A cannot be made before Civil
Courts.
The primary concern in these
decisions is, if the expression “Court” in
Section 2(1)(e) is interpreted to mean only
the Court as defined there, it will create a
jurisdictional anomaly, that is, the High
Court would be appointing the arbitrator and
the Civil Court, a Court inferior to it,
could be asked to extend the arbitrator’s
mandate and would also have the jurisdiction
to substitute the arbitrator appointed by the
High Court.
10.1
It
is
reasoned
that
as
the
exclusive power of appointment of arbitrator
under Section 11 is of the Supreme Court or
the High Courts, the ancillary power of
extension or substitution can only be of
these
Courts,
or
else
a
situation
of
“conflict of power” between the Civil Court
and the High Court would arise in cases of
domestic arbitration and a similar conflict
would arise between the High Court and the
Supreme Court in cases of international
commercial arbitration.
10.2
To obviate the situation, these
lines of decisions adopt the interpretative
principle of giving “contextual” meaning to
the expression ‘Court’ in Section 29A by
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referring and relying on the phrase “in this
Part, unless the context otherwise requires”
in Section 2(1) of the Act. The High Courts,
for instance the High Court of Gujarat in
Nilesh Ramanbhai Patel (Supra) followed by
the Delhi High Court in DDA v. Tara Chand
(Supra) [2020 SCC OnLine Del 2501] were
troubled by the power of principal Civil
Court to substitute arbitrators appointed by
the High Court. To resolve this complexity,
they have taken the view that “Court” under
Section 29A for extension of the mandate of
the arbitral tribunal in the context of the
arbitral tribunal being constituted by the
High Court or the Supreme Court under Section
11(6), shall not be the “Court” as defined in
Section 2(1)(e), but the High Court or the
Supreme Court under Section 11(6).
12.
The Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 is a complete code. While Chapter I
of the Act relates to definitions, limits of
judicial intervention and waiver. Chapter II
defines
the
scope
of
an
arbitration
agreement, the obligation of a judicial
authority to refer the parties to the
agreement to arbitration and power of the
Court to provide interim measures. Chapter
III relates to the initiation and composition
of arbitral tribunal, as also the procedure
and
remedies
for
challenging
the
appointments.
Chapter
IV
relates
to
jurisdiction
of
arbitral
tribunals,
its
powers to examine its own competence and also
to provide interim measures. Chapter V deals
with the conduct of arbitral proceedings. The
process of making of award and termination of
arbitral proceedings is dealt with in Chapter
VI. Finally, Chapters VII, VIII and IX relate
to judicial remedies for challenging the
award, appeal, finality and enforcement.
True Text and Context of Section 29A
16.
As we move away from the process of
“Appointment of Arbitrators” under Section 11
and arrive at the “Conduct of Arbitral
Proceedings” and “Making of Arbitral Award
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and
Termination”,
which
procedures
are
articulated in Chapters V and VI, we notice
the
Parliament’s
endeavour
to
introduce
principles of integrity and efficiency in
working
of
the
alternative
remedy
by
prescribing time limits. This is an important
feature, introduced through Section 29A,
w.e.f.
23.10.2015.
The
Section
in
its
entirety has already been extracted for ready
reference, but a holistic reading of the
provision with other parts of the Act
mandates as follows;
(i) Sub-Section (1) of Section 29A mandates
that the award shall be made within 12
months of the completion of pleadings
before the Arbitral Tribunal. While subSection (2) incentivises expeditious making
of the Award, proviso to sub-Section (4)
and sub-Section (8) authorises the Court to
impose penalty for delay in making the
award.
(ii) Sub-Section (3) enables parties, by
consent, to extend the period of 12 months
for making the award by a further period
not exceeding 6 months.
(iii) If the award is not made within the
stipulated period of 12 months or the
extended period of 6 months, the mandate of
the arbitrator(s) shall terminate.
(iv) This termination is subject to the
power of the Court to extend the period.
(v) The ‘Court’ under Section 29A shall be
the
Civil
Court
of
ordinary
original
jurisdiction in a district and includes the
High Court in exercise of its original
civil jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e),
and shall not be the High Court or the
Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the
Act. Equally, Section 42 of the Act
relating to jurisdiction for application
will not apply to Section 11 of the Act.
(vi) There is no statutorily prescribed
time limit for the Court to exercise its
power under Section 29A(4) for extending
the period, except for its own restraint.
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The Court can exercise the power before or
after the expiry of the period under subSections 29A(1) or (3). Further, there is
no
prescription
of
outer
limit
for
extending time for conclusion of arbitral
proceedings. Given this power, the Court
will
exercise
it
with
circumspection,
balancing the remedy with rights of other
stake holders.
(vii) The power of the Court to extend the
time under sub-Section (4) may be exercised
on an application by any of the parties.
Once such an application for extension of
time is pending, the mandate of the
arbitrator shall continue till the disposal
of such application under sub-Section (9).
The Court shall also endeavour to dispose
of such an application within 60 days.
(viii)
Under
Section
29A(6),
while
exercising the power of extension, it shall
be open to the Court to substitute one or
all
the
arbitrators.
This
is
a
discretionary power that the Court would
exercise in the facts and circumstances of
the
case.
Upon
substitution,
the
reconstituted tribunal shall be deemed to
be
in
continuation
of
the
previously
appointed tribunal as per Section 29A(7)
and shall continue from the stage already
reached and on the basis of evidence
already on record. The newly appointed
arbitrators
shall
be
deemed
to
have
received the evidence and materials.
(ix) Vesting of the power of substitution,
under Section 29A(6), is on the Court and
this Court is the Court as defined in
Section 2(1)(e). The text as well as the
context
for
identifying
the
Court
in
Section 29A(6), as well as in 29A(4), is
the
Court
in
Section
2(1)(e).
The
expression ‘Court’ in other provisions must
be guided by the meaning given in Section
2(1)(e).
17.
Before
we
examine
the
interpretative choices of the Court to
decipher the true meaning of a word on the
basis of the context, it is necessary for us
to consider if perceptions such as “inferior
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Court”, “conflict of power”, “hierarchy” or
even a “jurisdictional anomaly”, can supply
“context” for deviating from a definition
supplied by the Parliament to an expression.
We have no hesitation in holding that
interpretation based on a perception of
status or hierarchy of Courts is opposed to
the fundamental conception of rule of law. It
is apt to refer to the famous statement of
Dicey that, ‘however high you may be, the law
is above you.’ Law, and law alone is the
source of power.
20.
For the reasons stated above, we
are of the opinion that the conclusion on the
ground that there will be hierarchical
difficulties,
conflict
of
power
or
jurisdictional anomaly if a Civil Court
entertains application under Section 29A for
extension of time of an arbitral tribunal if
the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act
has appointed the arbitrator(s) is untenable.
This approach is hereby rejected.
VIII.
Interpretation
of
“Court” in Section 2(1)(e)
the
expression
21.
It is a settled principle of
statutory interpretation that a defined term
must ordinarily bear the meaning assigned to
it “unless the context otherwise requires”.
Further,
in
State
of
West
Bengal
v.
Associated Contractors [(2015) 1 SCC 32], a
three-judge bench held that no Court other
than the one defined in Section 2(1)(e) gets
qualified as ‘Court’ under Part I of the Act,
1996. It observed that,
“25. …. (a) Section 2(1)(e) contains an
exhaustive definition marking out only the
Principal
Civil
Court
of
Original
Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court
having original civil jurisdiction in the
State, and no other court as “court” for
the purpose of Part I of the Arbitration
Act, 1996.”
22.
Similarly, in Nimet Resources Inc.
& Anr. v. Essar Steels Ltd. [(2009) 17 SCC
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313] where this Court considered Section 2(1)
(e) in the context of Section 14 observed as
under:
“8. Application in terms of sub-section (2) of
Section 14, thus, lies before a “court” within
the meaning of the 1996 Act.
9. It is only thus the “court”, within the
meaning of the provisions of the said Act which
can entertain such an application raised by the
parties herein and determine the dispute therein
on merit.
10. Unlike the 1940 Act, “court” has been defined
in Section 2(1)(e) to mean:
“2. (1)(e) ‘Court’ means the Principal
Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a
district, and includes the High Court in
exercise of its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide
the questions forming the subjectmatter of
the arbitration if the same had been the
subjectmatter of a suit, but does not
include any civil court of a grade inferior
to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court
of Small Causes;”
11. As a “court” has been defined in the 1996 Act
itself, an application under Section 14(2) would
be maintainable only before the Principal Civil
Court which may include a High Court having
jurisdiction but not this Court.
12. This Court in passing its order dated 27-92000, as noticed hereinbefore, did not and could
not retain any jurisdiction in itself as could be
done in suitable cases under the 1940 Act. It
even did not determine the validity or otherwise
of the arbitration agreement. It allowed the
parties to take recourse to their remedies before
the learned arbitrator. When the said order was
passed, this Court was considered to have only an
administrative power, but the same has since been
held to be a judicial power in SBP & Co. v. Patel
Engg.
Ltd.
[(2005)
SCC
618]
The
said
jurisdiction, however, does not extend to Section
14 of the Act.
13. The definition of “court” indisputably would
be subject to the context in which it is used. It
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may also include the appellate courts. Once the
legislature
has
defined
a
term
in
the
interpretation clause, it is not necessary for it
to use the same expression in other provisions of
the Act. It is well settled that meaning assigned
to a term as defined in the interpretation clause
unless the context otherwise requires should be
given the same meaning.
14. It is also well settled that in the absence
of any context indicating a contrary intention,
the same meaning would be attached to the word
used in the later as is given to them in the
earlier statute. It is trite that the words or
expression used in a statute before and after
amendment should be given the same meaning. It is
a settled law that when the legislature uses the
same words in a similar connection, it is to be
presumed that in the absence of any context
indicating a contrary intention, the same meaning
should attach to the words.
18. Jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the 1996
Act is used for a different purpose. The Chief
Justice or his designate exercises a limited
jurisdiction. It is not as broad as sub-section
(4) of Section 20 of the 1940 Act. When an
arbitrator is nominated under the 1996 Act, the
court does not retain any jurisdiction with it.
It becomes functus officio subject of course to
exercise
of
jurisdiction
in
terms
of
constitutional provisions or the Supreme Court
Rules.”
(emphasis supplied)
23.
Nimet Resources (Supra) clarifies
two
propositions
of
enduring
relevance.
First, that applications concerning conduct,
continuation, termination or substitution of
an arbitral mandate, whether under Section 14
or
otherwise,
are
matters
of
curial
supervision and must be instituted before the
“Court” as statutorily defined. Second, that
the jurisdiction exercised under Section 11
is
limited
and
exhausted
upon
the
constitution
of
the
arbitral
tribunal,
leading to the appointing Court becoming
functus officio thereafter. These principles
apply with equal force to Section 29A. The
extension of mandate or substitution of an
arbitrator under Section 29A does not partake
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the character of “appointment” under Section
11, but is a measure designed to ensure
timely conclusion of arbitration. Absence of
any contextual indicia to the contrary, the
expression “Court” in Section 29A must,
therefore, be accorded the meaning assigned
to it under Section 2(1)(e).
X Conclusion
27.
In view of the above, we allow the
appeals, set aside the reference of the
Division Bench in Writ Petition No. 88 of
2024 dated 07.08.2024 and the subsequent
judgment and order of the Single Judge of the
High Court in Writ Petition No. 88 of 2024
dated 21.08.2024 and restore the judgment of
the Commercial Court in Civil Miscellaneous
Application No. 20/2023/A dated 02.01.2024.
Parties are at liberty to move the Commercial
Court for further extension under Section
29A(5) for exercising Court’s power under
Section 29A(4). The Court shall consider the
application, hear the parties and pass
appropriate orders.”
12.
this
Having considered the rival submissions,
Court
contentions
now
proceeds
advanced
on
to
examine
the
behalf
of
the
contention
of
the
petitioners.
12.1
The
petitioners
principal
is
founded
upon
Rule
34.6
of
the
Arbitration Centre (Domestic and International),
High Court of Gujarat Rules, 2021, which provides
that an application for extension of the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal shall lie before the
High Court. It is true that the reference to
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arbitration
in
the
present
case
was
made
in
accordance with the said Rules and the parties
had agreed to be governed by them. However, that
by itself cannot conclude the issue.
Rule 34.6 was framed in the year 2021
when the legal position regarding Section 29A of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had
not been authoritatively settled. Subsequently,
the Apex Court, in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra), has
interpreted
Section
29A
in
conjunction
with
Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and has categorically
held that an application for extension of the
mandate
must
be
presented
before
the
Court
competent to entertain a challenge under Section
34 of the Act. Once the statutory provision has
been
authoritatively
interpreted
by
the
Apex
Court, Rule 34.6 must necessarily yield to such
interpretation.
applied
in
The
Rule,
disregard
therefore,
of
Section
cannot
be
29A
as
interpreted by the Apex Court.
12.2
Equally
untenable
is
the
contention
that, since earlier applications for extension
were entertained by this Court under Rule 34.6
without
objection,
the
respondents
are
now
precluded from raising the issue of jurisdiction.
All the earlier orders extending the mandate were
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passed prior to the pronouncement of the decision
in Jagdeep Chowgule (supra). Once the Apex Court
has declared the law, the same becomes binding on
all
courts
by
Constitution.
virtue
of
Article
of
the
Article
further
obliges
all
civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of
the
Supreme
Court.
Consequently,
the
jurisdictional issue must now be examined in the
light of the law declared by the Apex Court,
irrespective of the course adopted in the earlier
proceedings.
12.3
The
continues
further
to
submission
operate
as
it
that
Rule
34.6
has
not
been
challenged also does not merit acceptance. It is
well settled that subordinate legislation must
conform to the parent statute. If a rule is found
to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act
or with the law declared by the Apex Court while
interpreting the Act, such inconsistency cannot
be ignored merely because the rule has not been
specifically challenged. The duty of the Court is
to harmoniously construe the Rules with the Act.
Therefore,
Rule
34.6
must
operate
subject
to
Section 29A and cannot be construed in a manner
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.
12.4
Much
emphasis
was
placed
on
the
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principle of party autonomy, which undoubtedly
constitutes one of the foundational principles of
arbitration law. The Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 accords considerable freedom to parties
in matters relating to the arbitration agreement,
the number and appointment of arbitrators, the
procedure to be followed, the place and language
of
arbitration
and
several
other
procedural
aspects. The legislative intent is to minimise
judicial
intervention
and
facilitate
efficient
resolution of disputes through arbitration.
However, party autonomy under the Act is
not absolute. It operates only in those areas
where the statute expressly permits the parties
to
exercise
their
choice.
Wherever
the
Act
prescribes a mandatory statutory procedure, party
autonomy necessarily gives way to the legislative
mandate.
Section 29A is one such provision. While
Section
29A(3)
permits
the
parties,
by
mutual
consent, to extend the mandate of the arbitral
tribunal
for
a
further
period
of
six
months,
Section 29A(4) mandates that any extension beyond
that period can be granted only by the Court.
Thus,
the
statute
itself
draws
a
clear
distinction between the sphere reserved for party
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and
the
sphere
reserved
for
judicial
supervision. Once the statutory period together
with
the
consensual
extension
expires,
the
continuation of the arbitral tribunal ceases to
be a matter of agreement between the parties and
becomes subject exclusively to the jurisdiction
of the Court.
In
that
view
of
the
matter,
party
autonomy
cannot
be
stretched
to
permit
parties,
either
by
agreement
or
by
the
adopting
institutional rules, to confer jurisdiction upon
a Court which the statute does not recognise.
Jurisdiction
is
conferred
by
law
and
not
by
consent. Once the expression “Court” occurring in
Section
29A
has
been
interpreted
by
the
Apex
Court with reference to Section 2(1)(e) of the
Act, the parties cannot, by agreement, substitute
another forum for the one contemplated by the
statute.
12.5
Thus, principle of party autonomy in the
arbitration law, in my considered opinion, there
cannot
be
any
cavil
with
regard
to
the
said
proposition. Arbitration law and its object is to
minimize
the
supervisory
providing
speedy
disposal
role
of
the
of
courts,
dispute
with
amicable, swift and co-efficient settlement with
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a formal award while ensuring that arbitration
proceedings are just, fair and effective. While
making
arbitration
proceedings
speedy
and
effective, legislature has also added pinch of
friendliness by extending certain flexibilities
to the parties to the agreement/ arbitration. The
parties to the arbitration are free to adopt the
procedure. At the same time, such autonomy is not
absolute in nature. The party autonomy operates
in area where the statute is permissive, but at
the
same
time,
it
is
excluded
provisions
are
mandatory
such
where
as
the
court’s
supervision under certain provisions of the Act.
On overall consideration of the Arbitration Act,
1996, party autonomy is permissive under Section
7 where party decides whether to arbitrate, scope
of
dispute,
left
open
etc.
to
Meaning
have
an
thereby,
agreement
parties
to
submit
are
to
themselves to arbitration proceedings. So far as
Sections 10 and 11 are concerned, parties are
left
to
their
Arbitrators
and
autonomy
to
procedure
choose
number
of
for
appointment
thereof. Section 19 of the Arbitration Act would
allow the parties to have their own procedure
precisely, parties can decide their own mode of
recording of evidence, procedure for conducting
the proceedings etc. In view of provisions of
Section 20, parties are also left to decide seat
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venue
of
arbitration.
Once
the
seat
of
arbitration is decided, applicability of curial
law of court’s jurisdiction would be determined.
Accordingly,
decided
once
under
arbitration
is
the
place
of
arbitration
is
Section
and
if
place
of
situated
in
India,
Indian
law
shall be applicable being a mandatory position.
At this stage, it is required to be noted that in
the present case, seat of arbitration is within
the territory of India and thereby curial law of
procedure shall be applicable. As per Section 22,
parties are also free to agree upon the language
to be used in arbitration proceedings. Likewise,
Sections 29B and 31A are also reflects eminence
to
party
Section
autonomy.
29A
is
Now,
if
the
provision
concerned,
the
same
of
being
statutorily mandated, although limited autonomy
for extension of time of six months is granted to
the party, but the moment the mandate is expired;
Section 29A(4) becomes eminent and in that event,
only court can grant further extension and not
the party as per their claimed autonomy. When the
party
autonomy
is
restricted
for
extension
of
mandate, it is not digestible that a party can
choose a court who can extend the mandate. Party
autonomy does not give any leverage to any of the
parties
to
the
arbitration
to
have
their
own
choice of court upon which, by way of agreement,
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
they can invest powers for extension of mandate
de hors the provisions of Section 29A(4) of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. Under the circumstances,
party autonomy recognized under the provisions of
the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not absolute in all
the provisions, but limited to the area which is
statutorily prescribed within the Act itself.
12.6
The
contention
that
the
Arbitration
Centre is entitled to provide, under its Rules,
that
the
High
Court
alone
shall
supervise
proceedings conducted under its aegis also cannot
be
accepted.
An
arbitral
institution
is
undoubtedly competent to frame rules governing
the
conduct
of
proceedings
before
it
and
to
regulate procedural matters for the convenience
of the parties. Nevertheless, such rules cannot
override or dilute the mandatory provisions of
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
Act,
1996.
Institutional rules supplement the statute; they
cannot supplant it.
Acceptance
contention
would,
of
in
the
effect,
petitioners’
permit
every
arbitral institution to determine for itself the
forum
having
jurisdiction
under
Section
29A,
thereby defeating the uniform statutory framework
enacted
by
Parliament.
Such
plainly impermissible.
a
consequence
is
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
12.7
The
have
adopted
thereof
submission
the
must
that,
Rules,
once
2021,
necessarily
the
every
be
parties
provision
enforced
also
deserves to be rejected. Ordinarily, parties are
bound
by
the
arbitration
adherence
procedural
they
is
rules
have
chosen.
subject
to
governing
the
However,
such
one
fundamental
limitation, namely that the institutional rules
must remain consistent with the provisions of the
Act. To the extent any provision of the Rules is
inconsistent
with
the
Act,
or
with
the
law
declared by the Apex Court while interpreting the
Act, the statutory mandate must prevail.
Accordingly,
Jagdeep
Chowgule
after
(supra),
the
Rule
decision
34.6
in
cannot
be
applied in a manner inconsistent with Section 29A
read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.
13.
So far as the authorities relied upon by
the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner
are concerned, this Court is of the view that
they turn on their own facts and the legal issues
arising
therein
are
materially
different
from
those involved in the present case. The principal
submission of the petitioner is that Rule 34.6 of
the
Arbitration
Centre
(Domestic
and
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
International),
High
Court
of
Gujarat
Rules,
2021, being part of the curial law chosen by the
parties, must continue to govern the issue of
extension of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate.
There
can
be
no
dispute
with
the
proposition that parties are free to adopt the
curial law governing the conduct of the arbitral
proceedings. However, the issue that arises in
the
present
case
is
altogether
different.
The
question is whether a provision of the curial
law, which has subsequently become inconsistent
with the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 as interpreted by the Apex
Court, can still be enforced merely because it
was adopted by the parties.
None of the decisions relied upon by the
learned
Senior
institutional
Advocate
rule
or
lays
curial
down
that
provision,
an
once
adopted by the parties, would continue to prevail
even
if
it
becomes
inconsistent
with
the
provisions of the parent statute. In that view of
the matter, the authorities relied upon by the
petitioner are clearly distinguishable on facts
as
well
as
on
the
legal
issue
involved
and,
therefore, do not advance the petitioner’s case.
14.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
preliminary
objection
raised
on
behalf
of
the
respondents
deserves
to
accepted
and
is
be
accordingly upheld.
15.
Consequently,
in
view
of
the
law
declared by the Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v.
Sheela Chowgule, reported in 2026 INSC 92, this
Court
lacks
present
the
petitions
Arbitration
petitions
and
are,
jurisdiction
under
to
Section
Conciliation
therefore,
entertain
the
29A(4)
of
the
1996.
The
Act,
dismissed
as
not
maintainable, with liberty to the petitioners to
approach the competent Court having jurisdiction
under Section 29A(4) of the Act for appropriate
relief.
It is clarified that the period spent by
the
petitioners
in
bona
fide
prosecuting
the
present proceedings before this Court shall stand
excluded while computing limitation, if any, in
accordance with law.
16.
In view of the dismissal of Arbitration
Petition No.145 of 2025, Civil Application No.1
of
survive
filed
for
therein
for
consideration
amendment
and
is
does
not
accordingly
disposed of as having become infructuous.
17.
In
so
far
as
Miscellaneous
Civil
C/ARBI.P/145/2025
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
Application
No.773
concerned,
the
of
same
seeking
review
is
is
founded
upon
the
subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Jagdeep
Chowgule
(supra).
reviewed
were
The
orders
admittedly
sought
to
be
prior
to
the
passed
pronouncement of the said decision.
The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 of
the
Code
of
provides
Civil
that
a
Procedure,
subsequent
expressly
reversal
or
modification of the legal position by a superior
Court
in
another
case
does
not
constitute
a
ground for review of a judgment rendered earlier.
In view thereof, a subsequent declaration of law
by
the
Apex
Court
cannot
furnish
a
ground
to
review an order passed prior to such declaration.
Accordingly,
Miscellaneous
Civil
Application No.773 of 2026 is rejected. It is,
however,
clarified
that
all
the
rights
and
contentions of the respective parties are kept
open to be urged before the competent Court, if
so advised.
18.
Before parting, this Court considers it
appropriate to direct the Registry to place a
copy
of
this
judgment
before
the
appropriate
Committee constituted for the Arbitration Centre
(Domestic
and
International),
High
Court
of
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 02/07/2026
Gujarat, so that the Arbitration Centre (Domestic
and International), High Court of Gujarat Rules,
2021, particularly Rule 34.6, may be examined for
suitable modification or amendment to bring the
same in conformity with the law declared by the
Apex Court in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule
reported in 2026 INSC 92.
(NIRAL R. MEHTA,J)
FURTHER ORDER
After
Learned
pronouncement
Advocate
Mr.Rutul
of
Desai
the
judgment,
requested
this
Court to stay the judgment so as to enable them
to approach the higher forum.
In
view
of
the
discussion,
request
deserves no consideration. The same is rejected.
(NIRAL R. MEHTA,J)
ANUP
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