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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Judgment reserved on: 14.05.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.08.2026
+
O.M.P. 7/2017, I.A. 5008/2017 (Stay), I.A. 1190/2025 (U/O
XIII Rule 3) & I.A. 1191/2025 (U/O VIII Rule 1A(3))
LALIT MODI
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Inderbir Singh Alagh,
Senior Advocate along with
Mr. Tushar Parashar, Mr. Amit
Pandey and Mr. Bhanu Pratap
Singh Phore, Advocates.
versus
BDR BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through:
+
Mr. Prashant Mehta, Ms.
Diksha Goswami, Ms. Prachi
Kohli, Mr. Nitin Bajaj and Ms.
Niharika Tiwari, Advocates.
EX.P. 69/2017, EX.APPL.(OS) 169/2018 (U/O 21 Rule 58, 98,
101 & 104), EX.APPL.(OS) 173/2018 (Stay), EX.APPL.(OS)
796/2020 (U/O 39 Rule 2A) & EX.APPL.(OS) 76/2025 (U/O
VII Rule 14)
BDR BUILDERS & DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD.
.....Decree Holder
Through:
Mr. Prashant Mehta, Ms.
Diksha Goswami, Ms. Prachi
Kohli, Mr. Nitin Bajaj and Ms.
Niharika Tiwari, Advocates.
versus
SHRI LALIT MODI
.....Judgement Debtor
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
Through:
Mr. Inderbir Singh Alagh,
Senior Advocate along with
Mr. Tushar Parashar, Mr. Amit
Pandey and Mr. Bhanu Pratap
Singh Phore, Advocates.
For Objector-Romi Garg:
Ms. Nandni Sahni, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Objection Petition, being O.M.P. No. 7/20171,
has been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 19962, seeking the setting aside of the Arbitral Award dated
12.01.20173 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
2.
At the outset, it is necessary to notice the preliminary objection
raised by BDR Builders and Developers Private Limited, the
Respondent in the Objection Petition. According to the Respondent,
the learned Arbitrator had initially rendered an Arbitral Award dated
21.11.20164, which was passed with the consent of the parties and
therefore constituted a consent award. It is the Respondent's case that
the Impugned Award, which has been impugned in the present
proceedings, did not constitute a fresh, independent, or substantive
arbitral determination. Rather, the said Award was merely an
Objection Petition
A&C Act
Impugned Award/ Award dated 12.01.2017/ Arbitral Award dated 12.01.2017/ Engrossed Award
Original Award/ Award dated 21.11.2016/ Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016/ Arbitral Award
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
engrossment of the Original Award on non-judicial stamp paper for
the limited purpose of facilitating its registration before the office of
the learned Sub-Registrar, New Delhi.
3.
Proceeding on the aforesaid basis, the Respondent vehemently
contends that, insofar as a challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act
is concerned, the only award that could conceivably be assailed is the
Original Award. It is further submitted that the said award, being a
consent award, is ex facie not amenable to challenge under Section 34
of the A&C Act.
4.
The Respondent also argues that even assuming a challenge
were maintainable, such challenge could only be directed against the
Original Award and not against the Impugned Award. According to
the Respondent, the Impugned Award is merely a stamped
reproduction of the original award and does not possess an
independent legal existence so as to constitute a separate arbitral
award capable of being challenged under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
5.
Alongside the Objection Petition, the connected Execution
Petition, being EX.P. No. 69/20175, has been instituted under Section
36 of the A&C Act seeking enforcement and execution of the Arbitral
Award. Significantly, the Execution Petition seeks enforcement of
both the Original Award and the Impugned Award. The nature of the
relief sought is evident from Clause 3 of the Execution Petition, which
reads as under:
“…..
Date
of
Decree/order
of
which
execution is
Arbitration Award (Non Commercial) dated
21.11.2016 passed with the consent of the
parties (Engrossed on Stamp Paper on
12.01.2107 by the Arbitrator) by Shri
Execution Petition
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
sought
Naresh Gupta (Advocate), Sole Arbitrator.
Copy of the Consent Award dated
21.11.2016 and Engrossed Award dated
12.1.2017 are enclosed as Annexures A1 &
A2, copy of the Board Resolution of the
Decree Holder in favour of its Director to
file the present execution is Annexure A-3,
respectively.
…”
6.
Since both the aforesaid Petitions arise out of the same arbitral
proceedings and concern the validity and enforceability of the same
award(s), this Court considers it appropriate to dispose of both matters
by way of the present common judgment.
7.
It is pertinent to note that the maintainability and ultimate fate
of the Execution Petition is intrinsically dependent upon the outcome
of the Objection Petition. If the challenge to the Arbitral Award
succeeds, the very foundation on which the execution proceedings rest
would cease to exist. Consequently, the issues arising in the Petition
under Section 34 of the A&C Act necessarily require consideration
and adjudication in the first instance before any question relating to
enforcement can be examined.
8.
For the sake of convenience, consistency, and clarity, the
parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same rank and
nomenclature as assigned to them in the Objection Petition.
9.
It is clarified that the Execution Petition shall remain entirely
subject to the outcome of the Objection Petition. Accordingly, in the
event the challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act succeeds and
the Arbitral Award is set aside, the Execution Petition would
necessarily fail and shall be liable to be dismissed. Conversely, the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
question of enforcement would arise only if the award survives
judicial scrutiny in the present proceedings.
BRIEF FACTS:
10.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts emerging from the
arbitral record, which are germane to the adjudication of the present
Petition, are set out hereinbelow:
(a) The arbitral record reflects that during the period between the
years 2009 and 2012, the Respondent extended financial
assistance to the Petitioner. Following the same, the parties
entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 24.06.20146 in respect
of the entire freehold built-up property admeasuring
approximately 858 square yards, bearing No. 32, Pashchimi
Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi7.
(b) Subsequently, disputes and differences arose between the
parties in relation to the said Agreement to Sell on account of
the alleged non-performance and non-compliance of the
respective obligations arising thereunder.
(c) Since the Agreement to Sell contained an arbitration clause
providing for resolution of disputes through arbitration, the
parties, by a joint communication dated 05.10.2016, requested
the learned Sole Arbitrator to enter upon the reference and
adjudicate the disputes and differences which had arisen
between them in relation to the Subject Property.
Agreement to Sell
Subject Property
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
(d) Acting upon the said joint request, the learned Arbitrator
entered upon the reference vide communication dated
05.10.2016 and thereafter proceeded to conduct the arbitral
proceedings between the parties.
(e) Upon conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, the learned
Arbitrator made and signed an Arbitral Award dated
21.11.2016. The said Award was also signed by the parties and,
inter alia, directed specific performance of the Agreement to
Sell in respect of the Subject Property and further directed
delivery of physical possession thereof in favour of the
Respondent.
(f)
It is the specific case of the Respondent that the Original Award
dated 21.11.2016 was in the nature of a consent award.
According to the Respondent, the said Award was subsequently
engrossed on judicial stamp paper by the learned Arbitrator on
12.01.2017 and was thereafter forwarded and delivered to the
respective parties under cover of a forwarding letter dated
22.01.2017. The aforesaid assertions, however, are categorically
disputed by the Petitioner.
(g) It is in the aforesaid factual background, along with the other
facts and circumstances pleaded and contentions advanced by
the Petitioner, that the present Objection Petition has been
instituted under Section 34 of the A&C Act, impugning the
Award engrossed on judicial stamp paper dated 12.01.2017.
The Petitioner assails the Impugned Award primarily on
grounds pertaining to the legality and validity of the arbitral
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
proceedings, the procedure adopted by the learned Arbitrator
before, during and after the making of the Award.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
11.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
would assail the Impugned Award principally on the grounds that the
appointment of the learned Arbitrator as well as the conduct of the
arbitral proceedings were not in accordance with law and that the
learned Arbitrator failed to maintain the degree of independence and
impartiality required of an arbitral tribunal under the A&C Act,
thereby rendering the entire arbitral process fundamentally defective
and the Impugned Award liable to be set aside.
12.
Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the Impugned
Award is actuated by malice and vitiated by fraud, inasmuch as the
same is alleged to be the outcome of collusion and active connivance
between the Respondent and the learned Arbitrator through a
fraudulent
appointment
of the Arbitrator, fabricated arbitral
proceedings, manipulated records and documents, and other dishonest
means, all of which were allegedly employed with the object of
illegally depriving the Petitioner of his valuable immovable property
and causing him wrongful loss.
13.
In support of the aforesaid challenge, learned Senior Counsel
for the Petitioner would contend that the learned Arbitrator lacked the
requisite independence and impartiality and that the circumstances
surrounding his appointment, coupled with his conduct before, during
and after the arbitral proceedings, raise justifiable doubts regarding his
neutrality, while referring to various instances which, according to the
Petitioner,
establish
that
the
learned
Arbitrator
maintained
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
longstanding professional relationships with the Respondent and its
Directors both prior to accepting the reference and even after the
conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, thereby striking at the very root
of the arbitral process.
14.
Elaborating the said contention, learned Senior Counsel would
place reliance upon certain deeds drafted by the learned Arbitrator for
the Respondent and its Directors during the period between 2008 and
2012 and submit that the said documents demonstrate that the learned
Arbitrator had acted as the legal advisor, consultant and counsel for
the Respondent over a considerable period of time, while further
contending that the learned Arbitrator regularly represented and
advised the Respondent and its affiliated entities, enjoyed significant
professional and commercial relationships with them, exercised
considerable influence in matters concerning the Respondent, derived
substantial professional income from such engagements and
maintained close professional as well as familial relationships with
persons controlling the Respondent Company, all of which, according
to the Petitioner, constitute circumstances giving rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence and impartiality.
15.
In further support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Senior
Counsel would place reliance upon a typed copy of an alleged reply
dated 08.03.2018, stated to form part of the record of the connected
Execution Petition and to have been submitted by the learned
Arbitrator in response to a notice issued to him by an authority, while
contending that the contents thereof constitute clear admissions
regarding
the
learned
Arbitrator's
longstanding
professional
relationship with the Respondent and its Directors before, during and
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
after the arbitral proceedings, and particular emphasis is placed upon
paragraphs (c), (e), (f), (h), (i), (j) and (k) thereof.
16.
According to the learned Senior Counsel, the aforesaid reply
contains the learned Arbitrator's acknowledgment that he had known
the Respondent Company and its Directors for several years, had
rendered legal opinions and drafted various documents on their behalf,
had received professional fees from the Respondent, that his wife had
acquired equity shares in a company after the conclusion of the
arbitral proceedings, and that no disclosure under Section 12 of the
A&C Act had been made on the premise that both parties were already
aware of his prior association with them. For the sake of convenience,
the said reply is reproduced hereunder in toto:
“I am in receipt of your notice dated 2.3.2018 directing me to
furnish few details and documents, I wish to submit my reply as
under:a) As per the order dated 25.4.2017, passed by the Hon'ble Delhi
High Court in OMP No.7/2017 titled as Lalit Modi vs BDR
Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd., the entire arbitration records
have been submitted in original in the High court. Copy of the
order dated 25.4.2017 and receipt of record dated 4.5.2017 are
annexed herewith.
b) All the arbitration proceedings took place at my office at R-36,
Ground Floor, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi. There is no CCTV
camera installed at my office. The proof of appearance of Lalit
Modi is available in the arbitration record in the form of
proceeding sheets.
c) I know M/s BDR Builder & Developers Pvt. Ltd and its
directors for past many years. During the course of my
professional duties, Mr. Rajesh Gupta had sought opinion in
various matters. I have also drafted few deeds for the sale and
purchase of various properties for Mr. Rajesh Gupta and his
company. I cannot give any specific number of
deeds/advise/professional work done by me for Mr. Rajesh
Gupta or his company. I do not have any such record or detail
available with me.
d) No transaction as described in your notice ever took place
between me with BDR Group/Rajesh Gupta.
e) For my professional services, I had received a sum of
Rs.50,000/-on 12.1.2017 and also on 22.2.2017. These amounts
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
was towards my legal charges for two arbitration proceedings.
Copy of the bank statement of Standard Chartered Bank
reflecting the two entries is annexed.
f) No such declaration was made. I was known to both the parties.
Both the parties knew that I know the order party. There was a
joint request from both of them as such there was no question of
giving any such declaration.
g) There was no other transaction with BDR/Rajesh Gupta except
the two transactions mentioned above.
h) Yes, I had conducted one more arbitration proceedings at the
joint requests, of BDR and Mrs. Nirmala Modi w/o Surender
Modi regarding property No. D-20, South Ex Part-2. This
arbitration was started in 15.7.2016 and award was passed on
23.12.2016. Nirmala Modi was real sister in law (Bhabhi) of
Mr. Lalit Modi.
i) After conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, my wife had
acquired 15% equity shares in the company known as Renu
Farms Pvt Ltd. on 5.4.2017, against making an
investment/payment of Rs.1.98 Crores on 3.4.2017. Copy of
bank statement of Smt. Seema Gupta of Standard Chartered
Bank is annexed.
j) Since both Lalit Modi and Rajesh Gupta knew that I know both
of them and also the fact that I was already conducting
arbitration in the matter of Nirmala Modi as such realizing and
appreciating my independence and unbiased attitude in the
arbitration proceedings, Lalit Modi and Rajesh Gupta both
requested me for conducting arbitration between them as well.
Since I was known to both the parties and both of them knew
my previous associations with both of them, as such there was
no reason for issuing any such declaration. I conducted the
arbitration proceedings in utmost independent, fair and impartial
manner without any bias or favour to any party.
k) Yes I had written the letter dated 22.1.2017 to the Sub-registrar.
It was sent on the request of Mr. Rajesh Gupta. I do not have a
copy of the letter. I had not written any such letter earlier.
I hope you will find the above satisfactory. I am ready and willing
to provide any such other and further details and documents as
your goodself may desire. I may add that Nirmala Modi has
already accepted the award by giving her no objection to the
execution proceedings in execution petition no.72/2017 before
Hon'ble Delhi Court. Present FIR is nothing but a ploy to extort
money from me by humiliating and harassing me and to settle the
score with Rajesh Gupta by Mr. Romi Garg. It may be pointed out
that Mr. Romi Garg had attempted to challenge the award dated
12.1.2017 before the DHC but the same was dismissed by order
dated 16.1.2018 in CS OS No.14/2018. Copy enclosed.
Thanking you
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
Yours truly,
Sd/(Naresh Gupta)
Advocate 8/3/18
Sd/(Mr. Rishabh Agnihotri)
D/2839/16
Cell No.9999642005”
17.
Relying upon the aforesaid material, learned Senior Counsel
would submit that the arbitral proceedings stood vitiated from their
inception since the learned Arbitrator failed to make the mandatory
disclosure contemplated under Section 12(1) of the A&C Act and it
was only subsequently discovered that the learned Arbitrator had been
rendering legal services to the Respondent Company and its Directors,
which circumstance, according to the Petitioner, itself gives rise to
justifiable doubts regarding his independence and impartiality and
consequently renders the arbitral proceedings void ab initio.
18.
Learned Senior Counsel would further assail the manner in
which the arbitral proceedings culminated in the passing of the
Impugned Award and submit that the procedure adopted by the
learned Arbitrator is wholly contrary to law and strikes at the very
foundation of a fair adjudicatory process, inasmuch as although the
Award bears the date 21.11.2016, it was never communicated to the
Petitioner on that date and the learned Arbitrator is alleged to have
thereafter made unilateral alterations and modifications in the Award,
which fact, according to the Petitioner, is undisputed, before the
Award was ultimately communicated to the parties.
19.
It would further be submitted that once any arbitral award is
made and published, the learned Arbitrator is not empowered to make
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
unilateral alterations therein without notice to or consent of the parties
and that such a course of action is wholly contrary to the basic
principles governing arbitral adjudication, while it would also be
contended that the document dated 21.11.2016 cannot be regarded as a
valid arbitral award since the Award was engrossed on stamp paper
and communicated to the parties only after substantive changes had
allegedly been incorporated therein on 12.01.2017.
20.
In support of the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel
would draw the attention of this Court to the forwarding letter dated
22.01.2017 addressed by the learned Arbitrator to the Petitioner,
wherein the learned Arbitrator stated that "...the consent award was
made and published by me on 21.11.2016. The said award has now
been engrossed on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 5,85,000/- for the
purpose of registration of the Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016."
21.
In this reference, it would be submitted that there was never any
consensus ad idem between the parties with respect to the Engrossed
Award dated 12.01.2017 and, therefore, once substantive changes had
been introduced after the purported publication of the Award dated
21.11.2016, the same could no longer be described as a consent
award.
22.
Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the
Impugned Award dated 12.01.2017 contains substantive alterations
introduced after the alleged publication of the Award dated
21.11.2016 and that such post-award modifications, being beyond the
jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator, render the Award legally
unsustainable.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
23.
Proceeding further and without prejudice to the aforesaid
submissions, learned Senior Counsel would submit that immediately
upon the making and publication of the Award dated 21.11.2016, the
learned Arbitrator became functus officio and his mandate stood
exhausted, and that, save and except the limited powers expressly
preserved under the A&C Act to correct clerical or typographical
errors, interpret the Award or make an additional award in the
circumstances contemplated therein, the learned Arbitrator ceased to
possess any jurisdiction to alter, modify or supplement the substantive
contents of the Award, with the consequence that the alterations
allegedly made on 12.01.2017 are wholly without jurisdiction and non
est in the eyes of law.
24.
Learned Senior Counsel would further draw the attention of this
Court to the communication dated 22.01.2017 addressed by the
learned Arbitrator to the Sub-Registrar, Palika Bhawan, New Delhi,
whereby the learned Arbitrator informed the Sub-Registrar regarding
the Award in respect of the subject property and requested that no
deed, document, letter or other correspondence relating to the
cancellation of the General Power of Attorney dated 10.02.2016
executed by the Petitioner in favour of Mr. Dinesh Gupta be
entertained and that any such document, if received, be immediately
brought to his notice.
25.
It would be submitted that the aforesaid communication
unmistakably demonstrates that even after the alleged conclusion of
the arbitral proceedings the learned Arbitrator continued to exercise
authority over matters forming part of the subject matter of the
reference, while the issuance of such directions to the learned SubSignature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
Registrar was wholly dehors the arbitral mandate and beyond the
jurisdiction conferred upon the learned Arbitrator under the A&C Act,
thereby demonstrating, according to the Petitioner, a patent
transgression of the jurisdictional limits governing an arbitral tribunal.
26.
Per Contra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent would submit that the Impugned Award has been validly
passed in accordance with the provisions of the A&C Act and does
not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference under Section 34
thereof, and consequently the present petition is liable to be dismissed.
27.
Learned Counsel would submit that the Petitioner's contention
that the Impugned Award is not a consent award is wholly
misconceived, inasmuch as during the pendency of the arbitral
proceedings both parties had jointly informed the learned Arbitrator
that they had amicably resolved all their disputes and had arrived at
mutually agreed terms of settlement, whereupon the learned Arbitrator
reduced the said settlement into the form of an arbitral award on
21.11.2016, which award was duly signed in original by the Petitioner
as well as by the Respondent Company through Shri Rajesh Gupta.
28.
It would, therefore, be submitted that the Impugned Award is
nothing but an award on agreed terms passed under Sections 30 and
31(3)(b) of the A&C Act and, being founded entirely upon the
consensus of the parties, is not liable to be assailed in proceedings
under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
29.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent would further submit that
the engrossment of the Award dated 21.11.2016 on non-judicial stamp
paper on 12.01.2017 neither alters the character nor affects the validity
or finality of the consent award, since such engrossment was
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
undertaken with the knowledge and consent of both parties solely for
the purpose of registration, and therefore cannot constitute a ground
for setting aside the Award.
30.
It
would
further
be
submitted
that
the
subsequent
communication addressed by the learned Arbitrator to the learned
Sub-Registrar was also issued with the consent and knowledge of the
parties and, consequently, the same cannot be construed as affecting
either the legality or the finality of the arbitral award.
31.
Learned Counsel would further submit that both the Petitioner
and the Respondent had, of their own volition and by mutual
agreement, approached the learned Arbitrator for adjudication of their
disputes and, therefore, the Petitioner cannot now be permitted to
challenge either the appointment of the learned Arbitrator or the
arbitral proceedings after having voluntarily participated therein.
32.
It would further be submitted that the learned Arbitrator was
well known to both parties and it was precisely because of such
familiarity and mutual confidence that he came to be appointed as the
Sole Arbitrator with the consent of both sides.
33.
In response to the allegations regarding the learned Arbitrator's
prior professional association with the Respondent, learned Counsel
for the Respondent would draw the attention of this Court to various
deeds dating back to the year 2010, which, according to him, had also
been drafted by the learned Arbitrator on behalf of the Petitioner, and
would submit that the learned Arbitrator had, in the ordinary course of
his legal practice, rendered professional services to several individuals
including both the Petitioner and the Respondent.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
34.
It would accordingly be contended that merely because the
learned Arbitrator had drafted certain deeds or rendered professional
services for the Respondent in the past cannot, by itself, give rise to
any inference of bias or lack of independence.
35.
Insofar as the typed copy of the alleged reply dated 08.03.2018,
stated to form part of the record of the connected execution
proceedings and to have been submitted by the learned Arbitrator in
response to a notice issued to him by an authority, is concerned,
learned Counsel for the Respondent would, at the outset, submit that
the Petitioner was fully aware, even prior to the commencement of the
arbitral proceedings, of the learned Arbitrator's previous acquaintance
and professional association, and that it was for this very reason that
both parties had jointly approached the learned Arbitrator and
addressed a joint communication requesting him to adjudicate their
disputes.
36.
It would, therefore, be submitted that the absence of a
disclosure under Section 12(1) of the A&C Act is of no legal
consequence in the facts of the present case, particularly when the
alleged prior associations were admittedly within the knowledge of
both parties, and in any event none of the circumstances relied upon
by the Petitioner falls within any of the disqualifications or grounds
specified under either the Fifth Schedule or the Seventh Schedule to
the A&C Act so as to render the learned Arbitrator either ineligible to
act or lacking in independence.
37.
Learned Counsel would further submit that, the Impugned
Award being an award on agreed terms, the objections now sought to
be raised by the Petitioner regarding alleged bias, lack of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
independence or justifiable doubts are hopelessly belated and legally
untenable, and that, without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions,
the alleged reply dated 08.03.2018 cannot in any event be relied upon
by the Petitioner since it does not form part of the record of the of the
Objection proceedings, no original or authenticated copy thereof has
been produced, and what has been placed on record is merely a typed
copy whose source and authenticity remain wholly unestablished.
ANALYSIS:
38.
This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions
advanced on behalf of the parties and, with the able assistance of the
learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner and the learned counsel for
the Respondent, has perused the Impugned Award, the entire arbitral
record, and the other documents and materials placed before this
Court and referred to during the course of arguments.
39.
At the outset, it is apposite to note that this Court remains
conscious of the limited scope of its jurisdiction while examining an
objection petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act. There is a
consistent and evolving line of precedents whereby the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has authoritatively delineated and settled the contours
of judicial intervention in such proceedings.
40.
In this regard, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court, after an exhaustive consideration of a catena of earlier
judgments, in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power
Cooling Solutions (India) (P) Ltd.8, while dealing with the grounds of
conflict with the public policy of India and patent illegality, made
certain pertinent observations, which are reproduced hereunder:
(2025) 2 SCC 417
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
“Relevant legal principles governing a challenge to an arbitral
award
30. Before we delve into the issue/sub-issues culled out above, it
would be useful to have a look at the relevant legal principles
governing a challenge to an arbitral award. Recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made through an application
for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-sections (2),
(2-A) and (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Sub-section (2) of
Section 34 has two clauses, (a) and (b). Clause (a) has five subclauses which are not relevant to the issues raised before us.
Insofar as clause (b) is concerned, it has two sub-clauses,
namely, (i) and (ii). Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) is not relevant to
the controversy in hand. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) provides
that if the Court finds that the arbitral award is in conflict with
the public policy of India, it may set aside the award.
Public policy
31. “Public policy” is a concept not statutorily defined, though it
has been used in statutes, rules, notification, etc. since long, and
is also a part of common law. Section 23 of the Contract Act,
1872 uses the expression by stating that the consideration or
object of an agreement is lawful, unless, inter alia, opposed to
public policy. That is, a contract which is opposed to public
policy is void.
*****
37. What is clear from above is that for an award to be against
public policy of India a mere infraction of the municipal laws of
India is not enough. There must be, inter alia, infraction of
fundamental policy of Indian law including a law meant to serve
public interest or public good.
*****
The 2015 Amendment in Sections 34 and 48
42. The aforementioned judicial pronouncements were all prior
to the 2015 Amendment. Notably, prior to the 2015 Amendment
the expression “in contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law” was not used by the legislature in either Section
34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b). The pre-amended Section
34(2)(b)(ii) and its Explanation read:
*****
44. By the 2015 Amendment, in place of the old Explanation to
Section 34(2)(b)(ii), Explanations 1 and 2 were added to remove
any doubt as to when an arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
45. At this stage, it would be pertinent to note that we are
dealing with a case where the application under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act was filed after the 2015 Amendment, therefore the
newly
substituted/added
Explanations
would
apply
[SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15
SCC 131].
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46. The 2015 Amendment adds two Explanations to each of the
two sections, namely, Section 34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b),
in place of the earlier Explanation. The significance of the newly
inserted Explanation 1 in both the sections is two-fold. First, it
does away with the use of words : (a) “without prejudice to the
generality of sub-clause (ii)” in the opening part of the preamended Explanation to Section 34(2)(b)(ii); and (b) “without
prejudice to the generality of clause (b) of this section” in the
opening part of the pre-amended Explanation to Section
48(2)(b); secondly, it limits the expanse of public policy of India
to the three specified categories by using the words “only if”.
Whereas, Explanation 2 lays down the standard for adjudging
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law by providing that a review on merits of the dispute
shall not be done. This limits the scope of the enquiry on an
application under either Section 34(2)(b)(ii) or Section 48(2)(b)
of the 1996 Act.
47. The 2015 Amendment by inserting sub-section (2-A) in
Section 34, carves out an additional ground for annulment of an
arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations. Sub-section (2-A) provides that the
Court may also set aside an award if that is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award. This power of the
Court is, however, circumscribed by the proviso, which states
that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.
48. Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii), specifies that an
arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only
if:
(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or
corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice.
49. In the instant case, there is no allegation that the making of
the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption, or was
in violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Therefore, we shall
confine our exercise in assessing as to whether the arbitral
award is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law, and/or whether it conflicts with the most basic notions of
morality or justice. Additionally, in the light of the provisions of
sub-section (2-A) of Section 34, we shall examine whether there
is any patent illegality on the face of the award.
50. Before undertaking the aforesaid exercise, it would be
apposite to consider as to how the expressions:
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(a) “in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian
law”;
(b) “in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or
justice”; and
(c) “patent illegality” have been construed.
In contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law
51. As discussed above, till the 2015 Amendment the expression
“in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law”
was not found in the 1996 Act. Yet, in Renusagar Power Co.
Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, in the
context of enforcement of a foreign award, while construing the
phrase “contrary to the public policy”, this Court held that for a
foreign award to be contrary to public policy mere contravention
of law would not be enough rather it should be contrary to:
(a) the fundamental policy of Indian law; and/or
(b) the interest of India; and/or
(c) justice or morality.
*****
55. The legal position which emerges from the aforesaid
discussion is that after “the 2015 Amendments” in Section
34(2)(b)(ii) and Section 48(2)(b) of the 1996 Act, the phrase “in
conflict with the public policy of India” must be accorded a
restricted meaning in terms of Explanation 1. The expression “in
contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law” by use
of the word “fundamental” before the phrase “policy of Indian
law” makes the expression narrower in its application than the
phrase “in contravention with the policy of Indian law”, which
means mere contravention of law is not enough to make an
award vulnerable. To bring the contravention within the fold of
fundamental policy of Indian law, the award must contravene all
or any of such fundamental principles that provide a basis for
administration of justice and enforcement of law in this country.
56. Without intending to exhaustively enumerate instances of
such contravention, by way of illustration, it could be said that:
(a) violation of the principles of natural justice;
(b) disregarding orders of superior courts in India or the binding
effect of the judgment of a superior court; and
(c) violating law of India linked to public good or public
interest, are considered contravention of the fundamental policy
of Indian law.
However, while assessing whether there has been a
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law, the
extent of judicial scrutiny must not exceed the limit as set out
in Explanation 2 to Section 34(2)(b)(ii).
*****
Patent illegality
65. Sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which was
inserted by the 2015 Amendment, provides that an arbitral
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award not arising out of international commercial arbitrations,
may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the
award is visited by patent illegality appearing on the face of the
award. The proviso to sub-section (2-A) states that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.
66. In ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705, while
dealing with the phrase “public policy of India” as used in
Section 34, this Court took the view that the concept of public
policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and
public interest. If the award, on the face of it, patently violates
statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest.
Thus, an award could also be set aside if it is patently illegal. It
was, however, clarified that illegality must go to the root of the
matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature, it cannot be held
that award is against public policy.
67. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49, this Court
held that an award would be patently illegal, if it is contrary to:
(a) substantive provisions of law of India;
(b) provisions of the 1996 Act; and
(c) terms of the contract [See also three-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. SAL Udyog (P) Ltd.,
(2022) 2 SCC 275].
The Court clarified that if an award is contrary to the substantive
provisions of law of India, in effect, it is in contravention of
Section 28(1)(a) of the 1996 Act. Similarly, violating terms of
the contract, in effect, is in contravention of Section 28(3) of the
1996 Act.
68. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131 this Court specifically dealt with the 2015
Amendment which inserted sub-section (2-A) in Section 34 of
the 1996 Act. It was held that “patent illegality appearing on the
face of the award” refers to such illegality as goes to the root of
matter, but which does not amount to mere erroneous
application of law. It was also clarified that what is not
subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”,
namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to “public
policy” or “public interest”, cannot be brought in by the
backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground
of patent illegality [See SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131]. Further, it was observed,
reappreciation of evidence is not permissible under this category
of challenge to an arbitral award [See SsangyongEngg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
Perversity as a ground of challenge
69. Perversity as a ground for setting aside an arbitral award was
recognised inONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.,
(2014) 9 SCC 263. Therein it was observed that an arbitral
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decision must not be perverse or so irrational that no reasonable
person would have arrived at the same. It was observed that if an
award is perverse, it would be against the public policy of India.
70. In Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 certain
tests were laid down to determine whether a decision of an
Arbitral Tribunal could be considered perverse. In this context,
it was observed that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence; or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant
to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision, such
decision would necessarily be perverse.
However, by way of a note of caution, it was observed that
when a court applies these tests it does not act as a court of
appeal and, consequently, errors of fact cannot be corrected.
Though, a possible view by the arbitrator on facts has
necessarily to pass muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master
of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon. It was
also observed that an award based on little evidence or on
evidence which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal
mind would not be held to be invalid on that score.
71. In SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI,
(2019) 15 SCC 131, which dealt with the legal position post the
2015 Amendment in Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it was observed
that a decision which is perverse, while no longer being a
ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would
certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of
the award. It was pointed out that an award based on no
evidence, or which ignores vital evidence, would be perverse
and thus patently illegal. It was also observed that a finding
based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the
arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence
inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the
parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as
perverse [See SsangyongEngg. &
Construction
Co.
Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131].
72. The tests laid down in Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3
SCC 49 to determine perversity were followed
in SsangyongEngg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI, (2019)
15 SCC 131 and later approved by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Patel Engg. Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power
Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC 167.
73. In a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in
DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., (2024) 6
SCC 357, the ground of patent illegality/perversity was
delineated in the following terms: (SCC p. 376, para 39)
“39. In essence, the ground of patent illegality is available
for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the
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arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at it; or the
construction of the contract is such that no fair or
reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the
arbitrator is not even a possible view. A finding based on
no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital
evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside under the head of “patent illegality”.
An award without reasons would suffer from patent
illegality. The arbitrator commits a patent illegality by
deciding a matter not within its jurisdiction or violating a
fundamental principle of natural justice.”
Scope of interference with an arbitral award
74. The aforesaid judicial precedents make it clear that while
exercising power under Section 34 of the 1996 Act the Court
does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award. Interference with
an arbitral award is only on limited grounds as set out in Section
34 of the 1996 Act. A possible view by the arbitrator on facts is
to be respected as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the
quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon. It is only
when an arbitral award could be categorised as perverse, that on
an error of fact an arbitral award may be set aside. Further, a
mere erroneous application of the law or wrong appreciation of
evidence by itself is not a ground to set aside an award as is
clear from the provisions of sub-section (2-A) of Section 34 of
the 1996 Act.
75. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.,
(2019) 20 SCC 1, paras 27-43, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court held that courts need to be cognizant of the fact that
arbitral awards are not to be interfered with in a casual and
cavalier manner, unless the court concludes that the perversity
of the award goes to the root of the matter and there is no
possibility of an alternative interpretation that may sustain the
arbitral award. It was observed that jurisdiction under Section 34
cannot be equated with the normal appellate jurisdiction. Rather,
the approach ought to be to respect the finality of the arbitral
award as well as party's autonomy to get their dispute
adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law.”
41.
Before examining the rival contentions advanced by the parties
on the merits, this Court considers it appropriate to first deal with the
preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Respondent that the
Award, being an award on agreed terms or a consent award, is not
amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
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42.
Upon a careful consideration of the statutory scheme of the
A&C Act, this Court is unable to accept the said contention of the
Respondent. In arriving at this conclusion, this Court takes note of the
scheme and interplay of Sections 30, 31 and 34 of the A&C Act, the
relevant portions whereof are reproduced hereunder:
“30. Settlement. - (1) It is not incompatible with an arbitration
agreement for an arbitral tribunal to encourage settlement of the
dispute and, with the agreement of the parties, the arbitral tribunal
may use mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any time
during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement.
(2) If, during arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the
arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings and, if requested
by the parties and not objected to by the arbitral tribunal, record the
settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms.
(3) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall be made in accordance
with section 31 and shall state that it is an arbitral award.
(4) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall have the same status
and effect as any other arbitral award on the substance of the
dispute.”
*****
31. Form and contents of arbitral award. - (1) An arbitral award
shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the
arbitral tribunal.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in arbitral proceedings with
more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all the
members of the arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient so long as the
reason for any omitted signature is stated.
(3) The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is
based, unless(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under section
30.
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of
arbitration as determined in accordance with section 20 and the
award shall be deemed to have been made at that place.
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be
delivered to each party.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral
proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on any matter with
respect to which it may make a final arbitral award.
****
..”
*****
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“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse
to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award in accordance with subsection (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if(a) the party making the application establishes on the basis of the
record of the arbitral tribunal that(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any
indication thereon, under the law for the time being in
force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which
contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a
provision of this Part from which the parties cannot
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of
India.
Explanation 1.- For the avoidance of any doubt, it is
clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy
of India, only if, (i) the making of the award was induced or affected by
fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or
section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of
Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of
morality or justice.
Explanation 2.- For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to
whether there is a contravention with the fundamental
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policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits
of the dispute.
(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than
international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the
Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent
illegality appearing on the face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the
ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation
of evidence.
****
..”
43.
A conjoint reading of Sections 30, 31 and 34 of the A&C Act
demonstrates that the Act does not create two distinct classes of
arbitral awards, namely, awards rendered upon adjudication and
awards passed on agreed terms, insofar as the availability of the
statutory remedy under Section 34 is concerned.
44.
Equally, there is no provision, either express or implied, which
excludes an arbitral award passed on agreed terms from the ambit of
judicial scrutiny under Section 34 of the A&C Act merely because it
embodies a settlement arrived at between the parties. Had the
legislature intended to confer such immunity upon a consent award, it
would have expressly so provided. The absence of any such exclusion
is a clear indication that every arbitral award, irrespective of its nature,
remains subject to the limited supervisory jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
45.
Section 30 of the A&C Act is an enabling provision intended to
encourage amicable settlement of disputes during the pendency of
arbitral proceedings. It authorises the Arbitral Tribunal, upon the
request of the parties, to terminate the proceedings and record the
settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms, while subsection (4) expressly provides that such an award "shall have the same
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status and effect as any other arbitral award on the substance of the
dispute." Thus, the statute itself places an award on agreed terms at
par with every other arbitral award.
46.
Correspondingly, Section 31 of the A&C Act prescribes the
form and contents of every arbitral award and, by virtue of Section
31(3), carves out only one limited distinction, namely, that while an
arbitral award is ordinarily required to state the reasons upon which it
is based, such requirement stands dispensed with in the case of an
award on agreed terms under Section 30. Beyond this limited
exemption from recording reasons, the A&C Act neither accords any
special status to a consent award nor grants it immunity from judicial
scrutiny.
47.
The position becomes even clearer from Section 34 of the A&C
Act, which governs recourse against an arbitral award. The provision
uniformly employs the expression "an arbitral award" without
drawing any distinction between an adjudicatory award and an award
on agreed terms. Likewise, the grounds enumerated in Sections 34(2)
and 34(2A) of the A&C Act are framed in general terms and relate to
the legality of the arbitral process, the jurisdiction and composition of
the Arbitral Tribunal, compliance with the mandatory provisions of
the Act, observance of the Principles of Natural Justice, patent
illegality, and conflict with the public policy of India.
48.
None of these grounds is excluded merely because the award
records a settlement between the parties. Consequently, every arbitral
award, irrespective of whether it is founded upon adjudication or upon
the consent of the parties, must satisfy the minimum statutory
requirements prescribed under the A&C Act and remain capable of
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being tested on the limited grounds recognised under Section 34,
wherever such grounds are legitimately attracted.
49.
At the same time, the fact that an award has been passed on
agreed terms cannot be ignored while determining the scope of
judicial examination. Since such an award substantially reflects the
settlement voluntarily arrived at between the parties rather than an
adjudication on the merits by the Arbitral Tribunal, the Court would
ordinarily refrain from examining the correctness, fairness or
adequacy of the terms of settlement.
50.
Nevertheless, the Court is not denuded of its jurisdiction to
examine whether the award truly represents a lawful settlement,
whether the consent of the parties was validly obtained and was free
from fraud, coercion, undue influence or any other vitiating
circumstance, whether the mandatory provisions of the A&C Act have
been complied with, and whether any of the statutory grounds
contemplated under Section 34 of the A&C Act are otherwise
established. If any such ground is made out, the mere description of
the award as a consent award cannot, by itself, operate as an absolute
bar to judicial interference.
51.
Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
preliminary objection raised by the Respondent cannot be accepted.
While the scope of interference with an award on agreed terms is
undoubtedly narrower than that applicable to an adjudicatory award,
there is no statutory embargo under the A&C Act against maintaining
a petition under Section 34 merely because the award is a consent
award. The distinction lies not in the maintainability of the challenge
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but in the limited nature of the scrutiny to be undertaken. The
preliminary objection raised by the Respondent is, therefore, rejected.
52.
At this juncture, this Court now proceeds to examine the matter
on merits. For that purpose, this Court considers it apposite to
recapitulate the relevant arbitral proceedings commencing from the
constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal until the challenge thereto in the
present Petition, as the chronology of events assumes considerable
significance in the adjudication of the issues involved.
53.
It is an undisputed position borne out from the record that, upon
disputes arising between the parties in relation to the Agreement to
Sell dated 24.06.2014, both the Petitioner and the Respondent, acting
through its Director, Shri Rajesh Gupta, jointly approached Shri
Naresh Gupta, Advocate, on 05.10.2016 requesting him to enter upon
the reference as the Sole Arbitrator in terms of Clause 13 of the
Agreement to Sell.
54.
The request was made by way of a joint letter signed by both
parties and personally delivered to the proposed Arbitrator. The said
communication unequivocally records that disputes had arisen
between the parties in relation to the subject property and that both
parties jointly requested Shri Naresh Gupta, Advocate, to adjudicate
the disputes as the learned Sole Arbitrator, further agreeing that his
decision would be final and binding upon them. For ready reference,
the contents of the said letter are reproduced hereinbelow:
“By hand
Dated 05.10.2016
From:
1. Shri Lalit Modi
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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S/o Shri J.R. Modi,
R/o, 32, Paschimi Marg,
Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi-110075
2. M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
through its Director Shri Rajesh Gupta
C-43, (Lower Ground Floor),
Jangpura Extension,
New Delhi
To
Shri Naresh Gupta (Advocate),
R 36, Greater Kailash Part 1.
New Delhi-110048
Sub: Reference of disputes in terms of Agreement to Sell dated
24.06.2014, in respect of Property No. 32. Paschimi Marg,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi
Dear Sir,
That certain disputes, relating to and concerning with the said
property, emanating out the said Agreement to Sell dated
24.06.2014, arose between us.
The Agreement to Sell dated 24.06.2014, provides for resolution
of the disputes in terms of Clause 13 of the said Agreement,
which provides the resolution through Sole Arbitrator.
We, hereby request you to act as the sole arbitrator in the
matters in dispute referred to you for arbitration.
That your decision shall be final and binding upon both of us.
Yours Obliged,
Sd/Lalit Modi
55.
M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
Sd/Rajesh Gupta (Director)”
On the very same day, i.e., 05.10.2016, the learned Arbitrator
accepted the reference and formally entered upon the arbitral
proceedings. A written communication accepting his appointment was
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issued by him, whereby the first sitting of the arbitral proceedings was
fixed for 18.10.2016 at his office situated at R-36, Greater Kailash-I,
New Delhi. Significantly, the said communication was not only signed
by the learned Arbitrator but was also acknowledged by both parties
in token of receipt thereof, thereby evidencing their acceptance of the
commencement of the arbitral proceedings. The contents of the said
communication are reproduced hereinbelow:
“To
Dated 05.10.2016
1. Shri Lalit Modi
S/o Shri J.R. Modi,
R/o, 32, Paschimi Marg,
Vasant Vihar,
New Delhi-110075
2. M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
through its Director Shri Rajesh Gupta
C-43, (Lower Ground Floor),
Jangpura Extension, New Delhi
Ref: Your Letter dated 05.10.2016
Sub: Reference of disputes in terms of Agreement to Sell dated
24.06.2014, in respect of Property No. 32, Paschimi Marg,
Vasant Vihar, New Delhi
Dear Sirs,
1, have received your letter wherein, you both have requested me
to enter upon reference as Sole Arbitrator and adjudicate the
differences between you regarding Sale of Property No. 32,
Paschimi Marg, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, by Shri Lalit Modi to
M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd., which is subject matter
of the present arbitration proceedings.
As, desired by you, I hereby enter upon reference and accordingly.
you both are hereby informed that I (the Sole Arbitrator) shall hold
a meeting on 18.10.2016 at R-36, Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi, at
5:00 P.M., as the first hearing and you are required to attend
personally or through a representative duly appointed or counsel
duly authorised with all documents in your possession or power
touching the disputes referred to the decision of the arbitrator
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
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(myself). In case you do not attend at the said hearing. I (the Sole
Arbitrator) shall be constrained to proceed ex-parte
Sd/Naresh Gupta (Advocate),
Sole Arbitrator
R-36, Greater Kailash Part-I,
New Delhi-110048
Confirmed having receipt the above Notice:
Sd/Shri Lalit Modi
56.
Sd/M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
Rajesh Gupta (Director)”
Pursuant thereto, the first sitting of the arbitral proceedings was
held on 18.10.2016. Both the Petitioner and Shri Rajesh Gupta,
Director of the Respondent Company, appeared in person before the
learned Arbitrator. During the said proceedings, preliminary directions
were issued for completion of pleadings and filing of the requisite
documents by the respective parties. The matter was accordingly
adjourned to 28.10.2016.
57.
On 28.10.2016, both parties again appeared before the learned
Arbitrator. On the said date, the Respondent filed its Statement of
Claim along with the supporting documents. The proceedings were
thereafter adjourned to 29.10.2016.
58.
On 29.10.2016, both parties once again remained present before
the learned Arbitrator. On that date, the Petitioner filed his reply to the
Statement of Claim. During the course of the proceedings, the
Petitioner expressed the possibility of an amicable settlement between
the parties. Although the Respondent initially expressed its desire that
the disputes be adjudicated through arbitration, the learned Arbitrator,
with a view to facilitating an amicable resolution of the disputes,
adjourned the proceedings to 14.11.2016 and directed the parties to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
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place on record any settlement that might be arrived at before the next
date of hearing. The parties were also directed to produce the original
documents in support of their respective claims on the next date of
hearing. Since the Order dated 29.10.2016 assumes relevance for the
present controversy, the same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“Present:
Dated 29.10.2016
Naresh Gupta (Advocate), Sole Arbitrator
and
Shri Rajesh Gupta (Director) for M/s BDR Builders & Developers
Pvt. Ltd., (the claimant) and Shri Lalit Modi (the respondent).
The claim petition filed by Shri Rajesh Gupta on behalf of the
company is already on record. Reply to the claim petition is being
filed today by Shri Lalit Modi, which is also taken on record, with
copy supplied to the claimant.
Shri Lalit Modi, (the respondent) during the course of meeting.
expressed that there might be some chances of settlement amongst
them and thus seeks some more time. The claimant, however,
denied any such settlement and wanted to resolve the issue through
arbitration itself.
However, in the interest of justice and on the request of the
respondent, the matter is adjourned for 14.11.2016, at the same
Venue at 5:00 P.M. The parties are now directed to place on record
any such settlement, if any, effected between them. If no such
settlement is arrived at latest by 14.11.2016, then the matter shall
be heard and decided on merits. The parties are further directed to
produce all original documents in support of their respective
claim(s) on the next date of hearing.
Sd/Naresh Gupta (Advocate),
(Sole Arbitrator)
Sd/Shri Lalit Modi
Sd/M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
Rajesh Gupta (Director)”
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
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59.
On 14.11.2016, both parties again appeared before the learned
Arbitrator. During the proceedings, they jointly informed the learned
Arbitrator that they had amicably resolved all disputes pertaining to
the subject property. Their joint statements were duly recorded by the
learned Arbitrator in the proceedings of the same date and were signed
by both the parties as well as the learned Arbitrator, thereby
evidencing their unequivocal consent to the terms so recorded. Since
the proceedings dated 14.11.2016 constitute the very foundation of the
arbitral award subsequently rendered, the entire order dated
14.11.2016 is reproduced hereinbelow:
“Present:
Dated: 14.11.2016
Naresh Gupta (Advocate), Sole Arbitrator
and
Shri Rajesh Gupta (Director) for M/s BDR Builders & Developers
Pvt. Ltd., (the claimant) and Shri Lalit Modi (the respondent).
That both the parties (i.e. the Claimant and the Respondent), have
jointly stated that they have amicably settled their disputes qua the
said property, pertaining to the present arbitration proceedings and
have made a statement before me accordingly. Original documents
I directed to be produced on the last date of hearing are produced
before me by the claimant, which is admitted and confirmed by the
respondent.
Shri Rajesh Gupta, the claimant, forgave its claim for expenses /
compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- against the
respondent. As regards the payment of the balance sale
consideration of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-, Rs. 12,80,000/- is stated to have
been adjusted towards payment of deduction of TDS, which shall
be deposited by the claimant in the account of the respondent with
the Tax Authorities and the remaining Rs. 87,20,000/- is stated to
have been adjusted towards payment of license fee for the grant of
permissive license to the respondent to stay in the said property till
31.03.2017. Thus, claimed the adjustment of the balance sale
consideration as such. Further, the claimant prayed for the passing
of the decree of Specific Performance in its favour and against the
respondent. The claimant today also informed and placed on record
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
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a General Power of Attorney dated 10.02.2016, duly executed and
registered by the respondent in favour of Shri Dinesh Gupta, who
is one of the Director in the Claimant Company, inter-alia,
authorizing the said attorney to do all acts deeds and things
pertaining to the said property including sale / transfer thereof
including execution/registration of the sale documents / sale deeds
etc. The claimant further informed and placed on record that in
order to safeguard the rights and interest of the claimant, the
respondent also executed and got registered a Will dated
10.02.2016 in favour of Shri Dinesh Gupta, devising and
bequeathing all his right, title and interest in the said property in
favour of Shri Dinesh Gupta, absolutely and forever.
Further, the respondent agreed to such offer being made by the
claimant, however, requested the permissive license to stay in the
property be extended till 30.06.2017, without any further payment
of any license fee/rent/other charges. During detailed discussion
and mediation and knowing fully-well that the delay was not
attributable. due to fault of the claimant, the respondent agreed to
proposal of the claimant and further agreed to vacate and handover
vacant possession of the said property to the claimant on or before
31.03.2017. The said General Power of Attorney and Will dated
10.02.2016, are also confirmed and admitted by the respondent.
Thus the respondent gave his consent for the passing of the decree
of Specific Performance in favour of the Claimant The respondent
also assured and declared that the said General Power of Attorney
and Will dated 10.02.2016, shall not be revoked or altered by the
respondent at any time hereinafter.
Now the matter is adjourned for 21.11.2016, at the same Venue at
5:00 P.M. On the said date, I shall pronounce my Award in the
presence of the parties.
The parties are directed to remain present on the said date.
Sd/Naresh Gupta (Advocate),
(Sole Arbitrator)
Sd/Shri Lalit Modi
60.
Sd/M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
Rajesh Gupta (Director)”
At this stage, it becomes pertinent to note that the proceedings
conducted by the learned Arbitrator up to 14.11.2016 are in complete
conformity with the mandate of Section 30 of the A&C Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
61.
Section 30(1) of the A&C Act expressly recognises that it is not
incompatible with an arbitration agreement for an Arbitral Tribunal to
encourage settlement of disputes and, with the consent of the parties,
to adopt mediation, conciliation or any other procedure during the
pendency of the arbitral proceedings for facilitating such settlement.
Further, Section 30(2) provides that where, during the arbitral
proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the Arbitral Tribunal shall
terminate the proceedings and, if so requested by the parties and not
objected to by the Tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an
arbitral award on agreed terms.
62.
The record demonstrates complete compliance with the
aforesaid statutory mandate. It is evident that the parties voluntarily
settled their disputes before the learned Arbitrator, whereupon the
terms of settlement were duly recorded in the proceedings dated
14.11.2016. Thereafter, the learned Arbitrator proceeded to embody
the settlement in the form of an arbitral award.
63.
Accordingly, on 21.11.2016, the learned Arbitrator rendered an
arbitral award incorporating the agreed terms of settlement, whereby
the consensus arrived at between the parties was given binding legal
effect, including the grant of a decree for specific performance in
terms of the settlement.
64.
In the considered opinion of this Court, the Arbitral Award
dated 21.11.2016 is fully consistent with the statutory scheme
envisaged under Sections 30 and 31 of the A&C Acct. Section 30(3)
of the A&C Act mandates that an arbitral award on agreed terms shall
be made in accordance with Section 31 of the A&C Act and shall
expressly state that it is an arbitral award. Equally, Section 31(3)(b) of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
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the A&C Act specifically dispenses with the requirement of recording
reasons where the award is an arbitral award on agreed terms under
Section 30.
65.
It is also noteworthy that the Award dated 21.11.2016 bears the
signatures of both parties as well as that of the learned Arbitrator,
thereby unmistakably evidencing not only the consensus between the
parties but also their acceptance of the terms embodied in the Award.
Since the contents of the Award assume significance for the
adjudication of the present Petition, the operative portion thereof is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“AWARD
1. That I hereby pass a decree of Specific Performance of the Said
Agreement to Sell dated 24.06.2014 in favour of the claimant
and against the respondent in respect of the said property i.e.
Entire Freehold Built Up Property bearing No. 32, Street No.
Paschimi Marg, situated at Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, along with
the ownership rights in the plot of land underneath measuring
858 Sq. Yds, with all rights, title and interest, easements,
privileges and appurtenances thereto, with all fittings, fixtures,
connections, structure standing thereon, with all rights of
ownership and possession, with direction to the respondent to
execute and get registered the Sale Deed of the said property in
favour of the claimant or its nominee(s) on or before
31.03.2017, against handing over vacant possession at the cost
and expenses of the claimant. In case of failure on the part of the
respondent to execute and get registered such sale deed, then in
that event, the said attorney holder Shri Dinesh Gupta shall be
fully entitled and empowered, without any claim/objection
therein by the respondent or any of his legal heirs, successors
etc. for execution/registration of the said sale deed, at the cost of
the claimant.
2. As regards the payment of the balance sale consideration of Rs.
1,00,00,000/-, Rs. 12,80,000/-, stands adjusted towards payment
of deduction of TDS, which shall be deposited by the claimant
in the account of respondent with the Tax Authorities, within a
period of 30 days from the date hereof and the remaining sum of
Rs. 87,20,000/-stands adjusted towards payment of license fee
for the grant of permissive license to the respondent to stay in
the said property till 31.03.2017. The legal and symbolic
possession of the said property shall henceforth vest absolutely
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
and forever in favour of the claimant with direction to the
respondent to vacate and handover vacant possession of the said
property, with all fitting, fixtures, furniture and other
installations/improvements made by the respondent therein, on
AS IS WHERE IS BASIS, latest by 31.03.2017. The interest
payable to the Tax Authorities, for delay in depositing TDS
shall be to the account of the Claimant. The claim for
compensation of Rs. 5,00,00,000/- has already been forgiven by
the claimant, as per his statement duly recorded in the order
sheet dated 14.11.2016.
3. The claimant is directed to deposit a Non Judicial Stamp Paper
worth Rs. 5,85,500/- and Registration Fee amounting to Rs.
58,54,500/- required for getting the award registered before the
office of the concerned Sub-Registrar. The parties to the award
have signed the same in token of their having accepted the terms
of the same and in token of the fact that they would not
challenge the same and the award would have a binding effect
upon them and their respective legal heirs, successor etc., at all
times.
4. The cost of the arbitration proceedings, including arbitrator's fee
in all amounting to Rs. 50,000/-, shall be paid by the claimant.
5. A certified copy of this Award will be handed over to each of
the parties for their record and further compliances, after
completion of the registration formalities.
6. The Award is accordingly made and published by me.
Dated: 21.11.2016
Sd/Naresh Gupta (Advocate),
(Sole Arbitrator)
Sd/Sd/Rajesh Gupta (Director)
Shri Lalit Modi
M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.
(Consenting Claimant Party)
(Consenting Respondent Party)”
66.
A plain reading of the Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016 leaves
no manner of doubt that the same is an arbitral award on agreed terms
within the meaning of Section 30 of the A&C Act. The Award does
not contravene any of the statutory requirements prescribed under
Sections 30 and 31 of the A&C Act. Rather, it is evident that the
award has been rendered in due compliance with the statutory
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
O.M.P. 7/2017 & connected matter
framework governing arbitral awards on agreed terms. Consequently,
this Court has no hesitation in holding that the Award dated
21.11.2016 constitutes a valid arbitral award rendered strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the A&C Act and is, therefore,
entitled to the same sanctity, finality and legal effect as any other
arbitral award rendered under the said Act.
67.
It is further significant to note that, on the very same date, i.e.,
21.11.2016, both parties executed a separate document titled
"Acceptance". By the said document, the Petitioner as well as Shri
Rajesh Gupta, Director of the Respondent Company, unequivocally
acknowledged the passing of the Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016 and
voluntarily accepted the same in its entirety. They further declared
that neither of them had any claim, counterclaim or demand against
the other in respect of the subject property and expressly undertook
that the said award would not be challenged on any ground
whatsoever. The execution of the said document leaves no manner of
doubt that the parties consciously accepted the award as a complete
and final resolution of their disputes. For the sake of completeness, the
contents of the said Acceptance are reproduced hereinbelow:
“A C C E P T A N C E
We, Shri Lalit Modi and Shri Rajesh Gupta (Director) M/s BDR
Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd., the parties to the above
Arbitration Proceedings, do hereby agree and accept willfully the
Award dated 21.11.2016, passed by the Sole Arbitrator Shri
Naresh Gupta Advocate, in totality.
We, neither have any claim, counter-claims and/or demand against
one another qua the said property nor there is any matter in dispute
between us qua the said property.
That the said Award shall not be challenged by any one of us on
any ground whatsoever.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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PLACE: NEW DELHI
DATED: 21.11.2016
Sd/Shri Lalit Modi
68.
Sd/M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
Rajesh Gupta (Director)”
Apart from the aforesaid Acceptance, proceedings were also
recorded by the learned Arbitrator on 21.11.2016. The said
proceedings record that the arbitral award was pronounced in the
presence of both parties and that both parties signed the award in
token of their acceptance thereof. The proceedings further record that,
at the request of both parties, the learned Arbitrator was requested to
have the award registered before the office of the concerned SubRegistrar. Accordingly, the learned Arbitrator directed the Respondent
Company to deposit the requisite stamp duty and registration charges
within a period of eight weeks so as to facilitate the registration of the
award. The said proceedings, which bear the signatures of the learned
Arbitrator as well as both parties, are reproduced hereinbelow:
“Present:
Dated: 21.11.2016
Naresh Gupta (Advocate), Sole Arbitrator
and
Shri Rajesh Gupta (Director) for M/s BDR Builders & Developers
Pvt. Ltd., (the claimant) and Shri Lalit Modi (the respondent).
1, Naresh Gupta (Advocate) Sole Arbitrator in the present Arbitral
proceedings announced the Award in the presence of the parties,
the parties signed the Award in token of their acceptance to the
same and requested me to get it registered before the SubRegistrar. Accordingly steps will be taken in this regard. The
claimant is directed to deposit a Non-Judicial Stamps of Rs.
5,85,500/- and Registration Fee at the rate of 1% of the Circle
Value of the Property amounting to Rs. 58,54,500/- within (8)
eight weeks from today, so that necessary formalities regarding
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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registration of the Award be taken. The cost of the arbitration
proceedings shall be paid by the claimant.
NARESH GUPTA (Advocate)
(Sole Arbitrator)
Sd/Shri Lalit Modi
69.
Sd/M/s BDR Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd.,
Rajesh Gupta (Director)”
Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the Respondent Company
deposited the requisite non-judicial stamp papers on 12.01.2017.
Thereafter, the learned Arbitrator engrossed the arbitral award on the
said stamp papers. While doing so, the learned Arbitrator substituted
Paragraph 6 of the award dated 21.11.2016, which originally read,
"The Award is accordingly made and published by me," with the
following:
"The Award is accordingly made and published by me on
21.11.2016 which is now being engrossed on Non-Judicial Stamp
Paper of Rs. 5,85,500/- for the purpose of getting the same
registered with the office of the learned Sub-Registrar, New
Delhi."
70.
Thereafter, the engrossed copy of the Award was signed by the
learned Arbitrator and forwarded to the parties under a forwarding
letter dated 22.01.2017. A copy of the engrossed award was also
transmitted to the office of the concerned Sub-Registrar for the
purposes of registration.
71.
The aforesaid acts of engrossing the award on the requisite
stamp papers and forwarding the same to the parties as well as to the
office of the Sub-Registrar were undertaken pursuant to the express
request jointly made by both parties, as recorded in the proceedings
dated 21.11.2016. It is no doubt true that the A&C Act does not
specifically contemplate such a procedure after the publication of an
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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arbitral award. Nevertheless, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the present case, these subsequent acts were merely consequential and
ministerial in nature and cannot be construed as affecting either the
legality, validity or finality of the Arbitral Award, which had already
come into existence upon its pronouncement on 21.11.2016. In any
event, the communication to the Sub-Registrar was based on the
agreement as between the parties.
72.
By the time the Award came to be engrossed on the stamp
papers, the arbitral award had already been validly made and
published, and had also been unequivocally accepted by both parties.
The subsequent engrossment neither altered nor modified any of the
substantive terms embodied in the award, nor did it amount to the
making of a fresh or substituted award. The acts undertaken thereafter
were purely administrative and ministerial in nature, intended solely
to facilitate the registration of the award in accordance with the
request jointly made by the parties. Such acts cannot invalidate or
diminish the legal efficacy of an otherwise valid consent award.
73.
This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016 attained finality on the very date of
its pronouncement. The subsequent engrossment of the award on
stamp papers and its communication to the office of the Sub-Registrar
were merely consequential steps undertaken with the consent of both
parties for the limited purpose of facilitating its registration. These
subsequent steps neither reopened the arbitral proceedings nor
modified, substituted or superseded the award already rendered.
74.
It is true that, as a matter of principle, once an arbitral award
has been made and published, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ordinarily stands exhausted, except to the limited extent expressly
recognised under the A&C Act, such as correction, interpretation or
the making of an additional award under Section 33 of the A&C Act.
However, in the peculiar facts of the present case, where the award
itself was an award on agreed terms, the parties had expressly
requested the learned Arbitrator to facilitate its registration, and no
alteration whatsoever was made to the substantive rights or
obligations embodied in the award, the subsequent acts of
engrossment and communication cannot be regarded as rendering the
award vulnerable or unenforceable. At the highest, such acts may raise
an issue of procedural propriety, but they do not affect the validity or
finality of the arbitral award itself.
75.
While exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the A&C Act,
this Court is primarily concerned with examining the legality and
validity of the arbitral award and whether any of the statutory grounds
for setting aside the award are made out. As already noticed
hereinabove, the Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016 fully satisfies the
requirements prescribed under Sections 30 and 31 of the A&C Act
and attained finality on the date of its publication.
76.
This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the
subsequent acts undertaken by the learned Arbitrator for the purposes
of engrossment and registration neither affect the legal character or
finality of the award nor furnish any ground whatsoever for setting
aside the same under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
77.
The Court shall now consider the remaining substantial
contentions advanced by the Petitioner, namely, the alleged failure of
the learned Arbitrator to make the disclosures mandated under Section
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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12(1) of the A&C Act and the various circumstances relied upon by
the Petitioner to contend that there existed justifiable doubts regarding
the independence and impartiality of the learned Arbitrator.
78.
Since both issues are intrinsically connected and arise from the
statutory framework governing the appointment and challenge of
arbitrators, it is apposite to first examine the relevant provisions of the
A&C Act, which are reproduced hereinbelow:
“12. Grounds for challenge.- (1) When a person is approached in
connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he shall
disclose in writing any circumstances,(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any past or
present relationship with or interest in any of the parties or in
relation to the subject-matter in dispute, whether financial,
business, professional or other kind, which is likely to give rise
to justifiable doubts as to his independence or impartiality; and
(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient time to
the arbitration and in particular his ability to complete the entire
arbitration within a period of twelve months.
Explanation 1.- The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule shall
guide in determining whether circumstances exist which give rise
to justifiable doubts as to the independence or impartiality of an
arbitrator.
Explanation 2.- The disclosure shall be made by such person in the
form specified in the Sixth Schedule.
(2) An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and throughout
the arbitral proceedings, shall, without delay, disclose to the parties
in writing any circumstances referred to in sub-section (1) unless
they have already been informed of them by him.
(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality, or
(b) he does not possess the qualifications agreed to by the parties.
(4) A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by him, or in
whose appointment he has participated, only for reasons of which
he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.
(5) Notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary, any
person whose relationship, with the parties or counsel or the
subject-matter of the dispute, falls under any of the categories
specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be
appointed as an arbitrator:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Provided that parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen
between them, waive the applicability of this sub-section by an
express agreement in writing.”
“13. Challenge procedure. - (1) Subject to sub-section (4), the
parties are free to agree on a procedure for challenging an
arbitrator.
(2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), a party
who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall, within fifteen days
after becoming aware of the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or
after becoming aware of any circumstances referred to in subsection (3) of section 12, send a written statement of the reasons
for the challenge to the arbitral tribunal.
(3) Unless the arbitrator challenged under sub-section (2)
withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the
challenge, the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge.
(4) If a challenge under any procedure agreed upon by the parties
or under the procedure under subsection (2) is not successful, the
arbitral tribunal shall continue the arbitral proceedings and make
an arbitral award.
(5) Where an arbitral award is made under sub-section (4), the
party challenging the arbitrator may make an application for setting
aside such an arbitral award in accordance with section 34.
(6) Where an arbitral award is set aside on an application made
under sub-section (5), the Court may decide as to whether the
arbitrator who is challenged is entitled to any fees.”
79.
A conjoint reading of Sections 12 and 13 of the A&C Act
reveals the legislative framework governing the obligation of
disclosure cast upon a proposed as well as an appointed arbitrator; the
circumstances which may give rise to justifiable doubts regarding an
arbitrator's
independence
or
impartiality;
the
procedure
for
challenging an arbitrator on such grounds; and the consequences
flowing from the acceptance or rejection of such challenge. These
provisions must therefore be construed harmoniously to ascertain the
true scope of the statutory obligations imposed upon an arbitrator and
the corresponding rights and remedies available to a party seeking to
question the arbitrator's appointment or continuance.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
10:53:11
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80.
Section 12(1) of the A&C Act unequivocally mandates that
every person approached in connection with his possible appointment
as an arbitrator shall make a written disclosure of all circumstances
that may have a bearing upon his independence or impartiality. The
obligation extends to the disclosure of any direct or indirect past or
present relationship with, or interest in, any of the parties or in relation
to the subject matter of the dispute, whether financial, business,
professional or of any other nature, which is likely to give rise to
justifiable doubts regarding the arbitrator's independence or
impartiality. The provision further requires disclosure of any
circumstance likely to affect the arbitrator's ability to devote sufficient
time to the arbitration and, in particular, to conclude the proceedings
within the prescribed statutory period.
81.
Explanation 1 to Section 12(1) clarifies that the circumstances
enumerated in the Fifth Schedule shall serve as a guide for
determining whether circumstances exist which give rise to justifiable
doubts regarding the independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.
Explanation 2 further mandates that such disclosure shall be made in
the form prescribed in the Sixth Schedule.
82.
Section 12(2) extends the obligation of disclosure beyond the
stage of appointment by imposing a continuing statutory duty upon
the arbitrator to disclose, without delay and in writing, any
circumstance referred to in Section 12(1) which may arise or come to
his knowledge after his appointment and throughout the arbitral
proceedings, unless such circumstance has already been disclosed to
the parties. The legislative intent is thus to ensure complete
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transparency throughout the arbitral process by imposing a continuing
obligation of disclosure upon the arbitrator.
83.
However, although Sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the A&C Act
prescribe the obligation of disclosure in mandatory terms, neither
provision provides that every instance of non-disclosure, delayed
disclosure, incomplete disclosure or inaccurate disclosure would, by
itself, invalidate the arbitral proceedings or render the arbitrator de
jure incapable of acting. Likewise, the statute does not provide that
every omission to disclose a circumstance falling within the Sixth
Schedule automatically vitiates the arbitral process.
84.
The consequences of any alleged non-disclosure must therefore
be gathered from the remaining provisions of Section 12 of the A&C
Act. In this context, Section 12(3) assumes significance, as it provides
that an arbitrator may be challenged only if circumstances exist which
give rise to justifiable doubts regarding his independence or
impartiality; or he does not possess the qualifications agreed upon by
the parties.
85.
The Legislature has consciously employed the restrictive
expression "only if", thereby confining the permissible grounds of
challenge. Consequently, every instance of non-disclosure does not,
ipso facto, constitute a valid ground for challenging an arbitrator. The
determinative enquiry is not whether there has merely been a failure to
disclose, but whether the underlying circumstance is of such a nature
as to give rise to justifiable doubts regarding the arbitrator's
independence or impartiality. Thus, the omission to disclose is not an
independent ground of challenge; rather, it is the underlying
circumstance itself, whether disclosed or undisclosed, that must
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satisfy the statutory test prescribed under Section 12(3) of the A&C
Act.
86.
Section 12(4) further provides that where a party has itself
appointed the arbitrator or participated in his appointment, such party
may challenge the arbitrator only on grounds of which it became
aware after the appointment was made. The object of this provision is
to prevent a party from acquiescing in the appointment process and
thereafter raising objections founded upon facts that were already
within its knowledge.
87.
Section 12(5) of the A&C Act, however, operates in an
altogether different sphere. It commences with a non obstante clause
and creates an absolute statutory disqualification by providing that any
person whose relationship with the parties, their counsel, or the
subject matter of the dispute falls within any of the categories
specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be ineligible to be appointed
as an arbitrator. Such ineligibility is not contingent upon proof of
actual bias or even the existence of justifiable doubts; it operates by
force of law. The only exception is contained in the proviso, whereby
the parties may, after disputes have arisen, expressly waive the
applicability of Section 12(5) by an agreement in writing.
88.
At this stage, it is also necessary to examine the relationship
between the Fifth and Seventh Schedules to the A&C Act. Although
both
Schedules
deal
with
circumstances
bearing
upon
the
independence and impartiality of arbitrators, they operate in distinct
statutory fields and serve different purposes.
89.
The Fifth Schedule, referred to in Explanation 1 to Section
12(1) of the A&C Act, contains thirty-four illustrative entries which
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serve only as guiding circumstances for determining whether
justifiable doubts exist regarding an arbitrator's independence or
impartiality. The entries are neither exhaustive nor conclusive and
merely indicate situations that may warrant examination under Section
12(3), depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
90.
The Seventh Schedule, in contrast, contains nineteen entries and
is directly linked to Section 12(5) of the A&C Act. Significantly, each
of the nineteen entries contained in the Seventh Schedule is also found
within the Fifth Schedule. The Seventh Schedule is thus a narrower
subset of the Fifth Schedule comprising those relationships and
circumstances which the Legislature has considered sufficiently grave
to attract automatic statutory ineligibility.
91.
A plain reading of Sections 12(1) and 12(2), along with the
entries contained in the Fifth and Seventh Schedules, makes it evident
that the obligation of disclosure is confined to existing or past
relationships, interests, or circumstances that either exist at the time of
the proposed appointment or arise during the pendency of the arbitral
proceedings. Neither the substantive provisions nor the entries
contained in the Fifth or Seventh Schedules require an arbitrator to
disclose speculative or future events, relationships, or circumstances
that have not yet come into existence.
92.
While every circumstance falling within the Seventh Schedule
would necessarily constitute a circumstance giving rise to justifiable
doubts regarding an arbitrator's independence or impartiality, the
remaining entries contained exclusively in the Fifth Schedule do not
result in automatic disqualification but merely provide guidance in
determining whether, on the facts of a particular case, circumstances
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exist giving rise to such justifiable doubts within the meaning of
Section 12(3) of the A&C Act. Accordingly, where a case falls
exclusively within the Fifth Schedule, the challenge must be examined
in accordance with Sections 12(3) and 13 of the A&C Act.
93.
Section 13 of the A&C Act prescribes the procedure for
challenging an arbitrator. In the absence of an agreed procedure, a
party intending to challenge the arbitrator is required, within fifteen
days of becoming aware either of the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal or of the circumstances referred to in Section 12(3) of the
A&C Act, to submit a written statement setting out the grounds of
challenge before the arbitral tribunal. Unless the challenged arbitrator
withdraws from office or the opposite party accepts the challenge, the
arbitral tribunal itself is required to decide the challenge.
94.
If the challenge is rejected, the arbitral tribunal continues with
the proceedings and renders the arbitral award. The unsuccessful party
is not left without a remedy, as Section 13(5) of the A&C Act
expressly preserves its right to assail the arbitral award under Section
34 on the ground that the challenge to the arbitrator was wrongly
rejected.
95.
Sections 12 and 13 of the A&C Act, when read together,
constitute a comprehensive statutory code governing disclosures by
arbitrators, the distinction between circumstances giving rise to
justifiable doubts and those resulting in statutory ineligibility, the
procedure for raising objections to an arbitrator's appointment or
continuance, and the remedies available to an aggrieved party. These
provisions make it abundantly clear that, although disclosure is
mandatory, every instance of non-disclosure does not automatically
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invalidate the arbitral proceedings. The decisive consideration always
remains whether the circumstance, whether disclosed or undisclosed,
is of such a nature as to either give rise to justifiable doubts regarding
the arbitrator's independence or impartiality under Section 12(3), or
attract one of the statutory disqualifications specified in the Seventh
Schedule read with Section 12(5).
96.
At this stage, this Court also considers it appropriate to refer to
the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in HRD Corpn. v. GAIL
(India) Ltd.9, wherein the statutory scheme embodied in Sections 12
and 13 and the Fifth and Seventh Schedules to the A&C Act was
explained. The Apex Court drew a clear distinction between
circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts regarding an arbitrator's
independence or impartiality, governed by Section 12(3) read with the
Fifth Schedule, and circumstances rendering an arbitrator statutorily
ineligible under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule.
97.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in that judgement, categorically
held that while the Fifth Schedule merely serves as a guide for
determining whether circumstances exist giving rise to justifiable
doubts regarding an arbitrator's independence or impartiality, the
Seventh Schedule identifies a narrower and more serious class of
circumstances which render the arbitrator de jure ineligible to act.
98.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that Items 1 to 19 of
the Fifth Schedule are identical to the entries contained in the Seventh
Schedule and have been incorporated into the Fifth Schedule primarily
for the purpose of disclosure. The object of requiring disclosure of
those circumstances is to enable the parties to make an informed
(2018) 12 SCC 471
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decision, since such information ordinarily lies within the exclusive
knowledge of the proposed arbitrator. The Apex Court further
clarified that challenges founded upon the Fifth Schedule are to be
determined in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section
13 of the A&C Act, whereas cases falling within the Seventh
Schedule stand on an entirely different footing, as they result in
statutory ineligibility under Section 12(5), rendering the arbitrator de
jure incapable of acting. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court are reproduced hereinbelow:
“11. Under Section 12, it is clear that when a person is approached
in connection with his possible appointment as an arbitrator, he has
to make a disclosure in writing, in which he must state the
existence of any direct or indirect present or past relationship or
interest in any of the parties or in relation to the subject-matter in
dispute, which is likely to give justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality. He is also to disclose whether he can
devote sufficient time to the arbitration, in particular to be able to
complete the entire arbitration within a period of 12 months. Such
disclosure is to be made in a form specified in the Sixth Schedule,
grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule being a guide in determining
whether such circumstances exist. Unlike the scheme contained in
the IBA Guidelines, where there is a Non-Waivable Red List,
parties may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them,
waive the applicability of the items contained in the Seventh
Schedule by an express agreement in writing. The Fifth, Sixth and
Seventh Schedules are important for determination of the present
disputes, and are set out with the corresponding provisions of the
IBA Guidelines hereunder:
*****
12. After the 2016 Amendment Act, a dichotomy is made by the
Act between persons who become “ineligible” to be appointed as
arbitrators, and persons about whom justifiable doubts exist as to
their independence or impartiality. Since ineligibility goes to the
root of the appointment, Section 12(5) read with the Seventh
Schedule makes it clear that if the arbitrator falls in any one of the
categories specified in the Seventh Schedule, he becomes
“ineligible” to act as arbitrator. Once he becomes ineligible, it is
clear that, under Section 14(1)(a), he then becomes de jure unable
to perform his functions inasmuch as, in law, he is regarded as
“ineligible”. In order to determine whether an arbitrator is de jure
unable to perform his functions, it is not necessary to go to the
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Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. Since such a person would lack
inherent jurisdiction to proceed any further, an application may be
filed under Section 14(2) to the Court to decide on the termination
of his/her mandate on this ground. As opposed to this, in a
challenge where grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule are disclosed,
which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's
independence or impartiality, such doubts as to independence or
impartiality have to be determined as a matter of fact in the facts of
the particular challenge by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13.
If a challenge is not successful, and the Arbitral Tribunal decides
that there are no justifiable doubts as to the independence or
impartiality of the arbitrator/arbitrators, the Tribunal must then
continue the arbitral proceedings under Section 13(4) and make an
award. It is only after such award is made, that the party
challenging the arbitrator's appointment on grounds contained in
the Fifth Schedule may make an application for setting aside the
arbitral award in accordance with Section 34 on the aforesaid
grounds. It is clear, therefore, that any challenge contained in the
Fifth Schedule against the appointment of Justice Doabia and
Justice Lahoti cannot be gone into at this stage, but will be gone
into only after the Arbitral Tribunal has given an award. Therefore,
we express no opinion on items contained in the Fifth Schedule
under which the appellant may challenge the appointment of either
arbitrator. They will be free to do so only after an award is
rendered by the Tribunal.
13. Confining ourselves to ineligibility, it is important to note that
the Law Commission by its 246th Report of August 2014 had this
to say in relation to the amendments made to Section 12 and the
insertion of the Fifth and Seventh Schedules:
“59. The Commission has proposed the requirement of
having specific disclosures by the arbitrator, at the stage of
his possible appointment, regarding existence of any
relationship or interest of any kind which is likely to give
rise to justifiable doubts. The Commission has proposed
the incorporation of the Fourth Schedule, which has drawn
from the red and orange lists of the IBA Guidelines on
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, and
which would be treated as a “guide” to determine whether
circumstances exist which give rise to such justifiable
doubts. On the other hand, in terms of the proposed
Section 12(5) of the Act and the Fifth Schedule which
incorporates the categories from the red list of the IBA
Guidelines (as above), the person proposed to be
appointed as an arbitrator shall be ineligible to be so
appointed, notwithstanding any prior agreement to the
contrary. In the event such an ineligible person is
purported to be appointed as an arbitrator, he shall be de
jure deemed to be unable to perform his functions, in
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terms of the proposed Explanation to Section 14.
Therefore, while the disclosure is required with respect to
a broader list of categories (as set out in the Fourth
Schedule, and as based on the red and orange lists of the
IBA Guidelines), the ineligibility to be appointed as an
arbitrator (and the consequent de jure inability to so act)
follows from a smaller and more serious sub-set of
situations (as set out in the Fifth Schedule, and as based on
the red list of the IBA Guidelines).
60.
The
Commission,
however,
feels
that real and genuine party autonomy must be respected,
and, in certain situations, parties should be allowed to
waive even the categories of ineligibility as set in the
proposed Fifth Schedule. This could be in situations of
family arbitrations or other arbitrations where a person
commands the blind faith and trust of the parties to the
dispute, despite the existence of objective “justifiable
doubts” regarding his independence and impartiality. To
deal with such situations, the Commission has proposed
the proviso to Section 12(5), where parties
may, subsequent to disputes having arisen between them,
waive the applicability of the proposed Section 12(5) by
an express agreement in writing. In all other cases, the
general rule in the proposed Section 12(5) must be
followed. In the event the High Court is approached in
connection with appointment of an arbitrator, the
Commission has proposed seeking the disclosure in terms
of Section 12(1) and in which context the High Court or
the designate is to have “due regard” to the contents of
such disclosure in appointing the arbitrator.”
(emphasis in original)
14. The enumeration of grounds given in the Fifth and Seventh
Schedules have been taken from the IBA Guidelines, particularly
from the Red and Orange Lists thereof. The aforesaid guidelines
consist of three lists. The Red List, consisting of non-waivable and
waivable guidelines, covers situations which are “more serious”
and “serious”, the “more serious” objections being non-waivable.
The Orange List, on the other hand, is a list of situations that may
give rise to doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or
independence, as a consequence of which the arbitrator has a duty
to disclose such situations. The Green List is a list of situations
where no actual conflict of interest exists from an objective point
of view, as a result of which the arbitrator has no duty of
disclosure. These Guidelines were first introduced in the year 2004
and have thereafter been amended, after seeing the experience of
arbitration worldwide. In Part 1 thereof, general standards
regarding impartiality, independence and disclosure are set out.
*****
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17. It will be noticed that Items 1 to 19 of the Fifth Schedule are
identical with the aforesaid items in the Seventh Schedule. The
only reason that these items also appear in the Fifth Schedule is for
purposes of disclosure by the arbitrator, as unless the proposed
arbitrator discloses in writing his involvement in terms of Items 1
to 34 of the Fifth Schedule, such disclosure would be lacking, in
which case the parties would be put at a disadvantage as such
information is often within the personal knowledge of the arbitrator
only. It is for this reason that it appears that Items 1 to 19 also
appear in the Fifth Schedule.”
99.
While emphasising the mandatory nature and significance of
the disclosure contemplated under Section 12(1) of the A&C Act, a
Coordinate Bench of this Court in Manish Anand v. Fiitjee Ltd.10
nevertheless held that the A&C Act does not provide that every
instance of non-disclosure or improper disclosure would, by itself,
automatically terminate the mandate of the arbitrator or render him de
jure incapable of continuing with the arbitral proceedings. The
relevant observations made in the said judgment are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“4. It is further contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the
Arbitrator so appointed by the respondent has not given his
disclosure in terms of Section 12(1) of the Act and therefore, he
is de jure ineligible to proceed with the arbitration.
5. Section 12(1) of the Act is reproduced herein under:“12. Grounds for challenge.- [(1) When a person is
approached in connection with his possible appointment
as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any
circumstances—
(a) such as the existence either direct or indirect, of any
past or present relationship with or interest in any of the
parties or in relation to the subject-matter in dispute,
whether financial, business, professional or other kind,
which is likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his
independence or impartiality; and
(b) which are likely to affect his ability to devote sufficient
time to the arbitration and in particular his ability to
complete the entire arbitration within a period of twelve
months.
2018 SCC OnLine Del 7587
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Explanation 1.-The grounds stated in the Fifth Schedule
shall guide in determining whether circumstances exist
which give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
independence or impartiality of an arbitrator.
Explanation 2.-The disclosure shall be made by such
person in the form specified in the Sixth Schedule.]
6. Prior to its amendment by the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2015, Section 12(1) read as under:“12. Grounds for challenge.- [(1) When a person is
approached in connection with his possible appointment
as an arbitrator, he shall disclose in writing any
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to
his independence or impartiality.”
7. The Sixth Schedule of the Act is also reproduced herein under:“The sixth schedule
Name:
Contact Details:
Prior experience (including experience with arbitrations):
Number of ongoing arbitrations:
CIRCUMSTANCES DISCLOSING ANY PAST OR
PRESENT RELATIONSHIP WITH OR INTEREST IN ANY
OF THE PARTIES OR IN RELATION TO THE
SUBJECT-MATTER
IN
DISPUTE,
WHETHER
FINANCIAL, BUSINESS, PROFESSIONAL OR OTHER
KIND, WHICH IS LIKELY TO GIVE RISE TO
JUSTIFIABLE DOUBTS AS TO YOUR INDEPENDENCE
OR IMPARTIALITY (LIST OUT):
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT
YOUR ABILITY TO DEVOTE SUFFICIENT TIME TO
THE ARBITRATION AND IN PARTICULAR YOUR
ABILITY TO FINISH THE ENTIRE ARBITRATION
WITHIN TWELVE MONTHS (LIST OUT):”
8. Law Commission in its 246th report had explained the reasons
for introduction of 12(1) to the Act as under:“NEUTRALITY OF ARBITRATORS
53. It is universally accepted that any quasi-judicial
process, including the arbitration process, must be in
accordance with principles of natural justice. In the
context of arbitration, neutrality of arbitrators viz. their
independence and impartiality, is critical to the entire
process.
54. In the Act, the test for neutrality is set out in Section
12(3) which provides„12.(3) An arbitrator may be challenged only if(a) circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his independence or impartiality.…‟
55. The Act does not lay down any other conditions to
identify the “circumstances” which give rise to
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“justifiable doubts”, and it is clear that there can be many
such circumstances and situations. The test is not whether,
given the circumstances, there is any-actual-bias for that
is setting the bar too high; but, whether the circumstances
in question give rise to any-justifiable apprehensions-of
bias.
xxxxx
59. The Commission has proposed the requirement of
having specific disclosures by the arbitrator, at the stage
of his-possible-appointment, regarding existence of any
relationship or interest of any kind which is likely to give
rise to justifiable doubts. The Commission has proposed
the incorporation of the Fourth Schedule, which has
drawn from the red and orange lists of the IBA Guidelines
on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, and
which would be treated as a “guide” to determine whether
circumstances exist which give rise to such justifiable
doubts. On the other hand, in terms of the proposed
Section 12(5) of the Act and the Fifth Schedule which
incorporates the categories from the red list of the IBA
Guidelines (as above), the person proposed to be
appointed as an arbitrator shall be - ineligible - to be so
appointed, - notwithstanding - any prior agreement - to
the contrary. In the event such an ineligible person is
purported to be appointed as an arbitrator, he shall be de
jure deemed to be unable to perform his functions, in
terms of the proposed Explanation to Section 14.
Therefore, while the disclosure is required with respect to
a broader list of categories (as set out in the Fourth
Schedule, and as based on the red and orange lists of the
IBA Guidelines), the-ineligibility-to be appointed as an
arbitrator (and the consequent de jure inability to so act)
follows from a smaller and more serious sub-set of
situations (as set out in the Fifth Schedule, and as based
on the red list of the IBA Guidelines).”
9. The Law Commission in its Report further added a Note after its
recommendation to add the two Explanation(s) to Section 12 (1) of
the Act as under:
“[NOTE: This amendment is intended to further goals of
independence and impartiality in arbitrations, and only
gives legislative colour to the phrase “independence or
impartiality” as it is used in the Act. The contents of the
Fourth Schedule incorporate the Red and Orange lists of
the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts
of Interest in International Arbitration. While Mr.
Malhotra was of the view that the said provisions should
not apply to the public sector, excluding the public sector
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will render the provision susceptible to a challenge under
article 19 of the Constitution of India.]”
10. Reading of Section 12(1) of the Act with the Sixth Schedule
would clearly demonstrate the importance of the disclosure to be
made by the proposed Arbitrator who is approached by the parties
with his possible appointment as an Arbitrator. The disclosure is
relevant and necessary as independence and impartiality of the
Arbitrator are the hallmark of any arbitration proceedings. The
amended provision is enacted to identify „circumstances‟ which
give rise to „justifiable doubt‟ about the independence and
impartiality of the Arbitrator.
11. Having appreciated and re-emphasized the importance of the
disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act, the question is whether
an improper disclosure, as in the present case would render the
Arbitrator so appointed ineligible or de jure incapable of
proceeding with the arbitration proceedings. The answer to this, in
my opinion, has to be in the negative. The legislature, while
emphasizing on the disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act, has
not further stated that the consequence of such non-disclosure
would be automatic termination of the mandate of the Arbitrator so
appointed. In absence of such a legislative consequences, in my
opinion, it would depend on the facts of the given case whether the
mandate of the Arbitrator would stand terminated upon nondisclosure or giving a false disclosure under Section 12(1) of the
Act.”
100. The same principle was subsequently followed by the Calcutta
High Court in W.B. Housing Board v. Abhisek Construction11,
wherein it was, inter alia, held that a party which fails to challenge the
arbitrator's alleged non-disclosure before the arbitral tribunal in
accordance with the procedure prescribed under the A&C Act cannot
ordinarily be permitted to raise such a challenge for the first time in
proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C Act. The relevant
observations made in the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:
“9. It has been contended by the counsel for petitioner/award
debtor that there was no disclosure made in writing by the
arbitrator which is contrary to the mandate under Section 12(1) of
the Act. Therefore, the arbitral award must be set aside under
Section 34 on this ground.
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 827
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10. In the case of Manish Anand v. Fiitjee Ltd. reported in 2018
SCC OnLine Del 7587, the Delhi High Court propounded that
mere non-disclosure under Section 12(1) would not render the
arbitrator ineligible. Relevant portions have been extracted below“10. Reading of Section 12(1) of the Act with the Sixth
Schedule would clearly demonstrate the importance of the
disclosure to be made by the proposed Arbitrator who is
approached by the parties with his possible appointment
as an Arbitrator. The disclosure is relevant and necessary
as independence and impartiality of the Arbitrator are the
hallmark of any arbitration proceedings. The amended
provision is enacted to identify „circumstances‟ which give
rise to „justifiable doubt‟ about the independence and
impartiality of the Arbitrator.
11. Having appreciated and re-emphasized the importance
of the disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act, the
question is whether an improper disclosure, as in the
present case would render the Arbitrator so appointed
ineligible or de jure incapable of proceeding with the
arbitration proceedings. The answer to this, in my
opinion, has to be in the negative. The legislature, while
emphasizing on the disclosure under Section 12(1) of the
Act, has not further stated that the consequence of such
non-disclosure would be automatic termination of the
mandate of the Arbitrator so appointed. In absence of such
a legislative consequences, in my opinion, it would depend
on the facts of the given case whether the mandate of the
Arbitrator would stand terminated upon non-disclosure or
giving a false disclosure under Section 12(1) of the Act.”
Emphasis Added
11. Moreover, in the unamended Section 12(1) of the Act, the
challenge on ground of the arbitrator's non-disclosure under the
said section was provided for in Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Act
subject to restriction in Section 16(2) of the Act. This is because
the arbitral tribunal is competent to rule on aspects of its
competence and jurisdiction. The Act, being a complete code in
itself, in certain cases provides a procedure for challenge in case of
derogation from its provisions. In case of failure to challenge under
Section 13, this Court is of the view that deemed waiver under
Section 4 will apply. The relevant section is delineated below:“4 Waiver of right to object. -A party who knows that—
(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may
derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement, has
not been complied with and yet proceeds with the
arbitration without stating his objection to such noncompliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is
provided for stating that objection, within that period of
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time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so
object.”
12. As a result of the aforementioned provision, without
challenging the non-disclosure requirement before the arbitral
tribunal first, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take it up for the
first time under Section 34. While the fact that the arbitrator did
not make a disclosure under Section 12(1) as mandated by the Act
does hold significance, it cannot be the sole ground of setting aside
the instant arbitral award. Merely because the petitioner/award
debtor decided to wake up from its deep slumber, and raise this
ground for the very first time in the Section 34 application, without
having taken any recourse to other remedies available in the Act, it
will in no manner render the arbitral award void and invalid. As
law serves those who stand vigilant and at the same time it cannot
serve as a tool for a party to have a second pick at the cherry.
13. Hence, issue no. 1 is answered in the negative.”
(emphasis supplied)
101. As noted earlier, the principal grievance of the Petitioner
centres around the non-disclosure by the learned Arbitrator of the
disclosures contemplated under Section 12(1) read with the Sixth
Schedule of the A&C Act.
102. In furtherance of that, the Petitioner has contended that he
became aware of the alleged circumstances giving rise to doubts
regarding the independence and impartiality of the learned Arbitrator
only after the arbitral award had been rendered.
103. Although, having regard to the manner in which the learned
Arbitrator came to be appointed, this contention appears prima facie
difficult to accept, this Court does not consider it necessary to
examine its correctness. Even assuming, for the purposes of the
present proceedings, that the Petitioner's assertion is accepted at face
value, the outcome remains unaltered.
104. Now, the decisive question before this Court is whether the
circumstances allegedly not disclosed are such as to either attract any
of the statutory disqualifications enumerated in the Seventh Schedule
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read with Section 12(5) of the A&C Act, thereby rendering the learned
Arbitrator de jure ineligible to act; or constitute circumstances giving
rise to justifiable doubts regarding his independence or impartiality
within the meaning of Section 12(3) read with the Fifth Schedule.
105. Unless either of these statutory thresholds is satisfied, mere
non-disclosure, divorced from the nature and effect of the underlying
circumstance, cannot by itself constitute an independent ground for
invalidating either the appointment of the arbitrator or the arbitral
award.
106. The principal submission advanced by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Petitioner is that the learned Arbitrator had acted as
the legal advisor, consultant and counsel for the Respondent and its
Directors over a considerable period and, consequently, maintained a
substantial professional and commercial relationship with the
Respondent.
107. Upon examination of the material placed on record, this
contention is principally founded upon certain deeds and documents
stated to have been drafted by the learned Arbitrator for the
Respondent and its Directors during the period between the years
2008 and 2012.
108. Even assuming these documents to be genuine and accepting,
for the sake of argument, that the learned Arbitrator had indeed
rendered professional legal services to the Respondent during the said
period, this Court is unable to conclude that such circumstance, by
itself, satisfies either of the statutory tests contemplated under
Sections 12(3) or 12(5) of the A&C Act.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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109. Insofar as Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule is
concerned, none of the material relied upon by the Petitioner
demonstrates that the relationship between the learned Arbitrator and
the Respondent falls within any of the categories enumerated in the
Seventh Schedule so as to render the learned Arbitrator de jure
ineligible to act. Indeed, the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
was unable to identify any specific entry in the Seventh Schedule
which stood attracted on the basis of the material relied upon.
110. Equally, the Petitioner's case does not satisfy the relevant
entries of the Fifth Schedule dealing with previous professional
engagements. Entries 20 to 24 of the Fifth Schedule contemplate
previous services rendered by the arbitrator to one of the parties or
other professional involvement but significantly prescribe a period of
three years preceding the commencement of the arbitration. The
documents relied upon by the Petitioner pertain to the period between
2008 and 2012, whereas the arbitral proceedings commenced in the
year 2016. Thus, even on the Petitioner's own showing, the alleged
professional engagements fall well beyond the period specifically
contemplated by the Legislature under the relevant entries of the Fifth
Schedule.
111. This Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid temporal
limitation cannot be ignored while assessing whether justifiable
doubts arise. Although the Fifth Schedule is illustrative and serves
only as a guide, the Legislature has consciously prescribed a period of
three years in relation to previous professional engagements, thereby
indicating the degree of proximity ordinarily considered sufficient to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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give rise to justifiable doubts regarding an arbitrator's independence or
impartiality.
112. To disregard this legislative benchmark and hold that every
professional engagement, irrespective of its remoteness in time, is
sufficient to establish justifiable doubts would render the statutory
limitation otiose and defeat the legislative scheme. While the Fifth
Schedule is not exhaustive and circumstances falling outside its
entries may, in an appropriate case, still give rise to justifiable doubts,
where the Legislature has consciously prescribed objective parameters
governing a particular category of relationship, those parameters
cannot ordinarily be ignored in the absence of exceptional facts. No
such exceptional circumstance has been demonstrated in the present
case.
113. At this juncture, this Court also finds it necessary to deal with
the submission advanced on behalf of the Respondent that the
Petitioner's challenge is liable to be rejected merely because the
learned Arbitrator had allegedly rendered professional services to the
Petitioner as well.
114. The said contention cannot be accepted. Neither Section 12 nor
the Fifth or Seventh Schedule draws any distinction based upon the
identity of the party raising the objection. The statutory enquiry is
directed towards the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator
and not towards identifying which party is entitled to raise such
objection. Consequently, the mere fact that the learned Arbitrator may
have rendered professional services to both parties at different points
of time cannot, by itself, preclude the Petitioner from maintaining a
challenge under Sections 12, 13 and 34 of the A&C Act. The
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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maintainability and success of such challenge must necessarily depend
upon whether the statutory requirements are otherwise satisfied.
115. The Petitioner, in support of his assertions, has also placed
reliance upon a typed copy of an alleged reply dated 08.03.2018 stated
to have been filed by the learned Arbitrator before an authority.
116. This Court finds considerable substance in the objection raised
by the learned counsel for the Respondent regarding the evidentiary
value of the said document.
117. The original communication of the same has not been produced
before this Court. Nor has any material been placed on record to
establish that the typed copy is a true and faithful reproduction of any
communication actually issued by the learned Arbitrator. In the
absence of proof regarding its authorship, authenticity and
genuineness, this Court is unable to place reliance upon the contents
thereof for recording findings which may have the effect of
questioning the independence or impartiality of the learned Arbitrator.
Proceedings under Section 12 or Section 34 of the A&C Act are not
intended to permit findings founded upon unproved or doubtful
material, particularly where allegations affecting the integrity of an
arbitrator are involved.
118. Accordingly, despite the elaborate submissions advanced on
behalf of the Petitioner, no material has been brought to the notice of
this Court to demonstrate that, on or before the passing of the arbitral
award, the learned Arbitrator's relationship with either of the parties,
their counsel or the subject matter of the dispute attracted any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the Seventh Schedule so as to render
him de jure ineligible under Section 12(5) of the A&C Act. Equally,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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the Petitioner has failed to establish that the alleged non-disclosure
pertained to any circumstance which objectively gave rise to
justifiable doubts regarding the learned Arbitrator's independence or
impartiality within the meaning of Section 12(3) of the A&C Act.
119. This Court is also conscious of the manner in which the learned
Arbitrator came to be appointed in the present case. The appointment
was made with the participation and concurrence of both parties and
culminated in the passing of what has already been held hereinabove
to be a consent award.
120. This Court is of the considered opinion that the Petitioner's
challenge cannot succeed merely on the ground of the alleged nondisclosure under Section 12(1) of the A&C Act. More importantly, the
Petitioner has failed to establish, on the basis of cogent and reliable
material, either that the learned Arbitrator suffered from any statutory
disqualification contemplated under Section 12(5) read with the
Seventh Schedule or that circumstances existed which objectively
gave rise to justifiable doubts regarding his independence or
impartiality within the meaning of Section 12(3) read with the Fifth
Schedule. Consequently, no case has been made out for holding that
the arbitral award is vitiated on account of bias, lack of independence
or statutory ineligibility of the learned Arbitrator.
DECISION:
I.
O.M.P. 7/2017
121. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons recorded
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the Petitioner
has failed to establish any ground warranting interference with the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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Arbitral Award under Section 34 of the A&C Act. Accordingly, the
present Objection Petition is dismissed.
122. All pending applications also stand disposed of in the above
terms.
123. No Order as to costs.
II.
EX.P. 69/2017
124. In view of the dismissal of the Petition under Section 34 of the
A&C Act, there remains no legal impediment to the continuation of
the execution proceedings.
125. Accordingly, the Execution Petition filed by BDR Builders &
Developers Pvt. Ltd. shall proceed further in accordance with law for
enforcement and execution of the Arbitral Award dated 21.11.2016.
126. List before the learned Roster Bench on 28.10.2026 for further
proceedings.
POST SCRIPT:
127. This Court considers it necessary to add this candid Post Script
since, initially, during the hearing, this Court was of the view that the
Petition should be allowed, but upon closer scrutiny and
circumspection, and consideration of the relevant law, decided
otherwise. This is also one of the reasons why its pronouncement
slightly overshot a period of three months.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 18, 2026/sm/va
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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