Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 6967 of 2026
Lal Gyan Ranjan Nath Shah Deo, S/o Sri Lal Chintamani Nath Shah
Deo, aged about 39 years, Resident of Girwar Bhawan, Sukhdeo
Nagar, Ratu Road, Ranchi, P.O. Hehal, P.S. Sukhdeo Nagar, District
Ranchi, Jharkhand
...
Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, Government
of Jharkhand, At- Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi, P.O. and P.S.
Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand
2. The Principal Secretary cum Legal Remembrancer, Department of
Law, Government of Jharkhand, At- Project Building, Dhurwa,
Ranchi, P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand
3. The Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative
Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand cum Member,
Search Committee, At- Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi, P.O. and
P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand ... Respondents
With
W.P.(PIL) No. 6148 of 2026
Rajeev Kumar Singh, S/o Ram Prasad Singh, Aged about 51 years,
Resident of Sapphire Garden, Block - A, Flat No- 3A, Rama Nagar,
Mukchund toli, Chutia, Near Aangan Palace, Ranchi, G.P.O, P.O.
GPO, P.S. Kotwali, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
...
Petitioner
Versus
1. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND, through the Chief Secretary,
Government of Jharkhand, having its office situated at Project
Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District -Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
2. THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW (JUSTICE), Government of
Jharkhand,
through
the
Principal
Secretary-cum-Legal
Remembrancer, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, having its office situated at
Project Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3. THE OFFICE OF THE ADVOCATE GENERAL, State of
Jharkhand, having its office at Block-2, High Court Campus, P.O. &
P.S.-Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. THE SECRETARY, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of
Jharkhand, having its office situated at Project Building, Dhurwa,
P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District - Ranchi, Jharkhand
...
Respondents
With
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
W.P.(Filing) No. 9721 of 2026
Young Lawyer's Association, Jharkhand High Court, a non registered
Association of practising Advocates of the High Court of Jharkhand
not currently, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860,
having its office at Jharkhand High Court Campus, Dhurwa, Ranchi834004, represented through its General Secretary, Venkatesh
Kumar, S/o- Kamlesh Kumar, aged about 27 years, R/o 403-B Block,
Vikramshiva Vatika, Chesiree Home Road, Bariyatu, P.O. and P.S.
Bariyatu, District Ranchi, Jharkhand-834009.
...
Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, Government
of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. + P.S. - Dhurwa,
District-Ranchi, Jharkhand.
2. The Principal Secretary cum Legal Remembrance, Department of
Law, Government of Jharkhand, At- Project Building, Dhurwa,
P.O. + P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3. The Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative
Reforms and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand cum Member,
Search Committee, At- Project Building, P.O. + P.S. - Dhurwa,
District-Ranchi, Jharkhand.
...
Respondents
--------CORAM:
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
--------For the Petitioners:
Ms. Ritu Kumar, Advocate
Mr Navin Kumar, Advocate
Mr Samavesh Bhanj Deo, Advocate
(In W.P. (C) No. 6967 of 2026)
Mr Binod Singh, Advocate
Mr Anmol Deepak, Advocate
(In W.P. (PIL) No. 6148 of 2026)
M/s. Venkatesh Kumar, Wazid Ali, Shashi
Ranjan,
Akhouri
Sankalp,
Sheyakur
Rehman, Shahfaisal Khan & Bhasat
Prakash, Advocates
(In W.P. (Filing) No. 9721 of 2026)
For the Resp.-State:
Ms Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advocate
(Through V.C.)
Mr Rohitashya Roy, A.G.
Mr Achyut Keshav, Sr. A.A.G.
Mr Vibhor Mayank, A.C. to A.G.
Mr Rahul Saboo, G.P.-II
-------Page 2 of 74
-
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Reserved on: 05.10.2026
Pronounced on: 27/10 /2026
Per M. S. Sonak, C.J.
1.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2.
Rule in each of these petitions. The rule is made returnable
immediately, at the request of and with the consent of the
learned counsel for the parties.
PRELIMINARIES
3.
The learned counsel for the parties agree that this Court may
dispose of these petitions by a common judgment and order, as
the issues raised are identical. They further agree that W.P. (C)
No. 6967 of 2026 may be treated as the lead matter.
4.
The petitioner, a practising Advocate, has challenged the
Jharkhand Law Officer Engagement Rules, 2026 (Annexure-1),
hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Rules’, on the ground that
they are ultra vires Articles 14, 19, 162, 165 and 217 of the
Constitution of India and Section 30 of the Advocates’ Act,
1961.
5.
The petitioners have challenged Notifications dated 24.07.2026
(Annexures 3 and 4), which determine the number of Law
Officers to be appointed in each specified category, abolish the
post of “Associate Counsels”, and, to the extent they determine
the fees/monthly retainership payable to various categories of
Law Officers, inter alia, on the ground of arbitrariness and
breach of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
the case of State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Brijeshwar Singh
Chahal & Anr., (2016) 6 SCC 1.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
6.
In addition, the petitioners have also challenged the Notice
Inviting Online Applications (Annexure-6) for the appointment of
Law Officers in the office of the learned Advocate General,
issued in accordance with the said Rules, on the ground that it
has not been issued by the learned Advocate General himself
or his office but by the Principal Secretary-cum-Legal
Remembrancer, Department of Law, which degrades the office
of the learned Advocate General and is an affront to the high
office held by him.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTIONS
7.
The learned counsel for the petitioners first contended that the
Rules purport to have been enacted under the proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution of India. They submitted that Article 309
regulates the recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts connected with the
affairs of the Union or of any State. They further submitted that
Law Officers are not employees of the State Government and
that the post of Law Officer is not connected with the affairs of
any State. Accordingly, they submitted that, under the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution, the Rules could never have been
framed. They submitted that, on similar grounds, the Hon’ble
Patna High Court struck down similar Rules in Vijay Kumar
Vimal v. The State of Bihar & Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Pat
1541.
8.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the said
Rules, insofar as they provide legal practice of 15 and 12 years
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
respectively as eligibility conditions to be considered for
appointments to the posts of Senior Additional Advocate
General (Sr. A.A.G.) and Additional Advocate General (A.A.G.),
are ultra vires Articles 165(1) read with Article 217 of the
Constitution.
9.
They submitted that, for appointment as Advocate General or
even as a Judge of any High Court, the Constitution requires
only 10 years of legal practice. Therefore, they contended that,
for posts much lower in the hierarchy, starting from the post of
the Advocate General, the eligibility condition of more than 10
years of legal practice could never have been fixed. They
submitted that, to that extent, the said Rules are ultra vires
Article 165(1) read with Article 217 of the Constitution. They
again relied on Vijay Kumar Vimal (Supra), contending that a
similar Rule was struck down by the Hon’ble Patna High Court.
10.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Rule 9 of
the said Rules, which deals with appointments to the post of
“Law Research Officers”, provides that such Law Research
Officers shall be engaged only to assist the Law Officers in
research, drafting, etc., but that they will neither be entitled to
appear in the Courts nor shall they accept engagement or act
for any private party during the period of their engagement by
the State. They contended that the prohibition on appearing
before the Courts or practising privately violates Article 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution and Section 30 of the Advocates’ Act, 1961.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
They further contended that a similar rule was struck down by
the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Vijay Kumar Vimal (Supra).
11.
Learned counsel for the petitioners challenged Rule 3(7) of the
said Rules on the ground that it impinges on the autonomy of
Boards, Corporations, and other authorities funded and run by
the State Government. They submitted that the rule was vague
and that, by executive fiat, the statutory provisions guaranteeing
the autonomy of such Boards, etc., could not have been
overridden. They pointed out that, in some cases, the interests
of such Boards, Corporations, etc. would conflict with the
interests of the State. Therefore, vesting the power to appoint
lawyers in the Advocate General, or restricting the choice to a
panel prepared by the State or its Advocate General, would be
ex facie illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable, and null and void.
12.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Rules
and the Advertisement inviting online applications for the posts
of the Law Officers under those Rules degrade or weaken the
institutional representation of the esteemed office of the learned
Advocate General of Jharkhand. They submit that the Notice
Inviting Online Applications should have been issued by the
office of the learned Advocate General, not by the second
respondent. They further submit that issuing such a notice
breaches the law laid down by the Allahabad High Court in U.P.
State Law Officers Ministerial Staff Association, High
Court, Allahabad and Anr. Vs. The State of U.P. & others,
2023:AHC: 219833-DB.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
13.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the said
Rules and the Notifications thereunder have reduced the
strength of the Law Officers by more than 50 per cent. They
point out that the posts of Senior Standing Counsel, Standing
Counsel (Mines), Standing Counsel (Land and Ceiling), and
Government Advocates have been abolished or substantially
reduced. They also point out that the posts of “Associate
Counsel” have been abolished. Against the present total
working strength of 145 Law Officers and Associate Counsel,
the said Rules or the Notifications issued thereunder provide for
hardly 80 Law Officers. This includes 15 Law Research
Officers, who are not even allowed to appear before Courts of
Law. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that this
exercise
was
undertaken
arbitrarily,
ignoring
relevant
considerations, including the law laid down in State of Punjab
& Anr. Vs. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal and analogous cases,
(2016) 6 SCC 1.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
notification
dated
24.07.2026
arbitrarily
reduces
the
pay/monthly retainership fee and the daily appearance fee of
the Law Officers. They submitted that the retainership fee of the
Additional Advocate General is fixed at par with that of the Law
Research Officers, who are the most junior in the category of
Law Officers and require 2 to 5 years’ practice to be considered
for appointment to the post of Law Research Officers. He
pointed out that the retainership fee for Standing Counsel,
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Government Pleader, and Government Advocate is even lower
than that of the Law Research Officers, who are not even
allowed to appear before the Courts or accept any private
briefs. He submitted that even the pay of a Legal Research
Officer is less than the minimum wages of a very skilled
labourer in the State of Jharkhand. For all these reasons, he
submitted that the notification dated 24.07.2026 must be set
aside.
RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS
15.
Ms Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel, appeared with
Mr Rohitashya Roy, learned A.G.; Mr Achyut Keshav,
Sr. A.A.G.; Mr Rahul Saboo, learned G.P.-II; and Mr Vibhor
Mayank, learned A.C. to A.G., on behalf of the State of
Jharkhand, and submitted that the said rules and the impugned
notifications were legal, valid, and not ultra vires.
16.
At the outset, Ms Arora admitted that Article 309 of the
Constitution would not apply to the engagement of Law Officers
and the said rules relate to the exercise of executive power
under Article 162 of the Constitution. She, however, submitted
that mere non-mention or incorrect mention of a statutory or
constitutional provision does not invalidate a legal instrument if
the power otherwise exists and can be traced to a statute or the
Constitution.
17.
Accordingly, she submitted that the said rule cannot be struck
down because of an incorrect reference to the proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution. She relied on State of U.P. and others
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Vs. U.P. State Law Officers Association and others, (1994) 2
SCC 204; M.T. Khan Vs. Government of A.P., (2004) 2 SCC
267; and State of Karnataka Vs. Muniyalla, (1985) 1 SCC
196, in support of her contention.
18.
Ms Arora submitted that the said rules, insofar as they provide
15 and 12 years of legal practice, respectively, as eligibility
conditions for appointment to the posts of Senior Additional
Advocate General (Sr. A.A.G.) and Additional Advocate General
(A.A.G.), are not ultra vires Article 165(1) and Article 217(2)(b)
of the Constitution, because they operate in different fields. She
further submitted that the two articles provide only a minimum
qualification, not a maximum qualification. She submitted that
merely because the said rules require more than 10 years of
legal practice to be considered for appointment, such
requirement is in no manner violative or ultra vires Article 165(1)
and 217(2)(b) of the Constitution.
19.
Ms Arora submitted that prescribing experience in legal practice
has a rational nexus with the object the said rules seek to
achieve. Prescribing such qualifications is essentially a policy
decision, and the scope of judicial review is minimal. She further
submitted that the classification between different experience
requirements for different posts is not only reasonable but also
has a rational nexus with the object the said rules seek to
achieve. Accordingly, she submitted that the said rules have no
legal or constitutional infirmity.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
20.
Ms Arora submitted that Rule 9 is not ultra vires Section 30 of
the Advocates Act, 1961. She submitted that the bar on
appearing before Courts or accepting private briefs is coextensive with a voluntary paid retainer. She submitted that the
enrolment of a Legal Researcher is not cancelled, and
accordingly the right under Section 30 is not withdrawn. On
disengagement, the Legal Researcher can resume practice as
before. She submitted that the requisition considered by the
Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Vimal
(Supra) was quite different. She submitted that there was no
violation of Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) of the
Constitution, and she cited Modern Dental College and
Research Centre Vs State of M.P. (2016) 7 SCC 353 to
support her contention.
21.
Ms Arora submitted that the bar applies to Legal Researchers
practising before Courts and operates only during their
engagement. The object of the bar is to secure unconflicted
assistance to the State. Rule 7 already imposes analogous
discipline on arguing Law Officers, who are prohibited from
accepting
any
private
criminal
briefs
or
professional
engagements adverse to the State’s interest. Accordingly, she
submitted that no unconstitutionality or conflict with Section 30
of the Advocates Act, 1961, was involved.
22.
Ms Arora submitted that determining the strength of the cadre is
primarily a policy matter, and the scope of judicial review ought
to be minimal. She further submitted that, in such matters, the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
State ought to be given free play in the joints. In any event, she
submitted that the exercise suggested in Brijeshwar Singh
Chahal (supra) regarding the assessment of workload and
other parameters was duly undertaken by the State. The rules
provide for Committees to undertake such an exercise. The
Committees make such an assessment in consultation with the
Advocate General. Accordingly, the State did not breach the
guidelines prescribed in Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (supra).
23.
Ms Arora submitted that the petitioners challenged the State's
policy decisions and that the policy embodied in the said rules
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. She relied on State of
U.P. and others vs U.P. State Law Officers Association and
others, (1994) 2 SCC 204, where the Government’s abolition of
the brief holders’ scheme and its appointment of special
counsel for special cases in its place were approved.
24.
Ms Arora submitted that the office or position of the learned
Advocate General was in no manner compromised by the said
Rules or the fact that notice inviting online applications for filling
up the posts of Law Officers was not issued from the office of
the learned Advocate General. She pointed out that, under the
said rules, the learned Advocate General was involved in the
selection process.
25.
Ms Arora submitted that the notification dated 24.07.2026
providing for fee revisions is also a matter of economic policy
coupled with other relevant considerations. She submitted that
nothing in the fee structure prescribed by the said rules or the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
notification dated 24.07.2026 was arbitrary or unreasonable.
She submitted that it was also proper to clarify that an
adjournment should not be regarded as an appearance. She
submitted that, based on its experience, the State has
formulated the fee structure, and there was no scope to
interfere with it.
26.
Ms Arora pointed out that, under the impugned notifications, the
arguing Law Officer is allowed Rs 7000/- per month to engage
an Advocate’s Clerk. Further, financial incentives are provided
for every 25 reported judgments in six months. Travel and
accommodation for Law Officers appearing before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court for Courts outside the State of Jharkhand
continue as a gesture of goodwill. This entire exercise is
consistent with what was set out in Brijeshwar Singh Chahal
(supra).
27.
Ms Arora submitted that Rule 3(7) is merely a coordination
mechanism between the State and the entities it creates or
funds. She submitted that the Government could control the
Boards, Corporation, and other authorities it funds regarding the
engagement of lawyers and the payment of fees. She submitted
that vesting such powers in the State Government was neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable. She submitted that Rule 7(3), read
with Rule 13 of the said rules, adequately addresses situations
in which the interests of Boards, Corporations, etc. might
conflict with the interests of the State Government. She
submitted that no actual instance of conflict was pointed out.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Accordingly, she submitted that the challenge is merely
academic and should not be considered in these petitions.
28.
Ms Arora submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
explained the nature of the appointment of Law Officers in its
various decisions. She submitted that Law Officers are not
Government
employees
or
Government
servants.
She
submitted that, since such appointments are professional
engagements, the State is at liberty to formulate the eligibility
criteria. She submitted that prescribing the eligibility criteria was
not arbitrary and that the selection process was fair and
transparent. She submitted that under these circumstances no
relief should be granted to the petitioners.
29.
Ms Arora submitted that some of the petitioners are not even
practising Advocates. She further submitted that no pleadings
show that any of the petitioners applied for the advertised posts
of Law Officers. Accordingly, she submitted that the petitioners
lack locus standi to maintain these petitions and that the
petitions should be dismissed on that ground.
30.
Finally, Ms Arora submitted that the Constitution presumes
validity and that the petitioners bear the burden of establishing
that the said rules are ultra vires and unconstitutional. She
submitted that the said rules constitute a transparent scheme
which would not promote any ad hocism. Therefore, she urged
that these petitions be dismissed.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
EVALUATION OF RIVAL CONTENTIONS
31.
The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
32.
Since the petitioners have challenged the validity of the said
Rules, scanned copies of the Notification dated 25th June 2026
(containing the said Rules), the Notifications dated 24th July
2026,
and
the
Notice
Inviting
Online
Applications
for
engagement as Law Officers are appended to this judgment as
Annexure-I,
Annexure-II,
Annexure-III,
and
Annexure-IV,
respectively, for the ease of reference. All the annexures shall
form an integral part and parcel of this judgment and order.
33.
Before evaluating the challenges to the Rules, we believe that
the grounds raised by the petitioners to challenge the impugned
Rules and Notifications must be tested primarily against two
fundamental issues, namely, first, the intrinsic legal nature of
the State’s engagement of a lawyer, and second, the
recognised contours and limits of this Court’s power of judicial
review in matters pertaining to such professional engagements.
In addition, we must address the constitutional challenges
posed by the petitioners.
NATURE OF ENGAGEMENT OF STATE LAW OFFICERS
34.
Accordingly, this Court must first consider the nature of
engagement of the various categories of Law Officers referred
to in Rule 3 of the said Rules.
35.
Rule 3(6) of the said Rules provides that the Government shall
be the engaging authority for Law Officers belonging to the
various categories of posts under the said Rules, and such Law
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Officers shall hold those posts during the pleasure of the
Government.
36.
The nature of the engagement of State law officers, such as
those in these petitions, is no longer res integra. In U.P. State
Law Officers Association (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, inter alia, considered the important question of the status
of Law Officers engaged by the State Government to conduct
cases on its behalf in the High Court. It also considered
questions bearing on the profession of the lawyer, his
relationship with his client, and, by extension, the relationship of
the Government, and, by extension, all public bodies that
engage lawyers to conduct their matters.
37.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that these are predominantly
professional contractual engagements between a professional
and a client for a specified or unspecified period. Although
some contracts may prohibit lawyers from accepting private
briefs, that does not transform a professional engagement into
employment. A lawyer of the Government or a public body is
not an employee but a professional practitioner engaged to
perform the specified work. This remains true today, even
though lawyers on the full-time rolls of the Government and
public bodies are described as their law officers. For this
reason, in the case of such law officers, the saving clause of
Rule 49 of the Bar Council of India Rules waives the prohibition
on a lawyer accepting full-time employment.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
38.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the relationship
between the lawyer and his client is one of trust and confidence.
The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons and is at
liberty to leave him for the same reasons. He is under no
obligation to give reasons for withdrawing his brief from his
lawyer. The lawyer, in turn, is not an agent of his client but his
dignified, responsible spokesman. He is not bound to tell the
court every fact or to urge every proposition of law which his
client wants him to do, however irrelevant it may be. He is
essentially an adviser to his client and is rightly called a counsel
in some jurisdictions. Once acquainted with the facts of the
case, it is the lawyer's discretion to choose the facts and the
points of law which he would advance. As a responsible officer
of the court and an important adjunct of the administration of
justice, the lawyer also owes duties to the court and to the
opposite side. He must be fair to ensure justice is done. He
demeans himself if he acts merely as a mouthpiece of his client.
This relationship between the lawyer and the private client
applies equally to his relationship with public bodies.
39.
Noting that the public sector has grown considerably over the
years, and with its expansion, the number of lawyers engaged
in the public sector has increased so much that it can truly be
said that there is now a public sector in the legal profession as
well. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the
expansion
of
public
sector
activities
has
necessitated
maintaining a permanent panel of lawyers. Some lawyers are
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
also employed full-time by public institutions as law officers. The
profile of the legal profession has thus changed.
40.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the Government or
the public body represents public interests, and whoever
oversees its affairs is no more than a trustee or custodian of
those interests. Protecting public interests to the maximum
extent and in the best possible manner is its primary duty.
Public bodies are therefore under an obligation to society to
take the best possible steps to safeguard public interests. This
obligation requires them to engage the most competent
servants, agents, advisers, spokesmen, and representatives to
conduct their affairs. Hence, in selecting their lawyers, they
must make earnest efforts to find the best available at the time.
This is especially so because claims by and against public
bodies are generally substantial in monetary terms and socially
crucial, with far-reaching consequences.
41.
Regarding the appointment of lawyers to public bodies, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the mode of appointment must
conform to the obligation to select the most meritorious. An
open invitation to lawyers to compete for the posts is by far the
best method of selection. But sometimes the best may not
compete, or a competent candidate may not be among the
competitors. In such circumstances, public bodies may resort to
other methods, such as inviting and appointing the best
available, even if he has not applied for the post. Whatever
method is adopted, it must be shown that the search for the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
meritorious was undertaken and that appointments were made
solely on merit, not for any other consideration.
42.
In State of U.P. and another vs Johri Mal, AIR 2004 SC 3800,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that only when good and
competent counsel are appointed by the State can the public
interest be safeguarded. Good administration of justice is
imperative and, in turn, directly affects the sustenance of
democracy. Thus, no appointments of public prosecutors or
district counsel should be made either to pursue a political
purpose or to confer an undue advantage on a section of the
people. The State's retention of its counsel must be weighed
against the public interest.
43.
Thus, when evaluating the challenges raised to the rules
governing the State’s engagement of law officers, the intrinsic
nature of such engagements cannot be lost sight of. Such
engagements
are
predominantly
professional
contractual
arrangements between a professional and a client for a
specified or unspecified period. Although some contracts may
prohibit lawyers from accepting private briefs, that does not
transform a professional engagement into employment. A
lawyer of the Government or a public body is not an employee
but a professional practitioner engaged to perform the specified
work. The relationship between the lawyer and his client is one
of trust and confidence. This relationship between the lawyer
and the private client applies equally to his relationship with
public bodies.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
44.
However, because the Government or public body represents
public interests, and whoever oversees its affairs is no more
than a trustee or custodian of those interests, this obligation
requires it to engage the most competent servants, agents,
advisers, spokesmen, and representatives to conduct its affairs.
Hence, in selecting their lawyers, they must make earnest
efforts to find the best available at the time. Whatever method is
adopted for such engagements, it must be shown that the
search
for
the
meritorious
was
undertaken
and
that
appointments were made solely on merit, not for any other
consideration.
SCOPE AND CONTOURS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MATTERS OF
PROFESSIONAL ENGAGEMENT AND POLICY
45.
Further, to evaluate the challenges raised against the rules
governing the State’s engagement of law officers, the scope of
judicial review, both generally and in the context of such
professional and contractual engagements, also needs to be
appreciated.
46.
The general principle is that judicial review predominantly
concerns not the decision itself but the decision-making
process.
47.
In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC
651, the Court held that it does not sit as an appellate court
over administrative decisions, and that its role is confined to
examining the manner in which the decision was taken, not the
merits of the decision itself. An administrative decision may be
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
tested on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural
impropriety. This formulation derives from Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] AC
374, and the principle of unreasonableness from Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation,
[1948] 1 KB 223.
48.
In the context of judicial review of the State’s engagements or
appointments of law officers, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated in Johri Mal (Supra) that engaging lawyers, even by
the State, is a professional engagement, and that courts are
normally
chary
of
overturning any
decision
unless
an
exceptional case is made out. The question of whether the
State is satisfied with the performance of its counsel is primarily
a matter between the State and its counsel.
49.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the choice rests with the
Government and that no one can claim a right to appointment,
as the position is one of great trust and confidence. The Court
may intervene where the State fails to discharge its public duty
or acts in defiance of the principles of law. It may also intervene
where the legal policy laid down for such appointments is
departed from, or where mandatory provisions of law are not
complied with.
50.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned that the power of judicial
review “is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the
robes of the omnipresent”. It was held that courts do not sit in
appeal over the decisions of administrative bodies, and that a
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
mere wrong decision, without anything more, is not enough to
attract judicial review. It was further held that the Court shall not
ordinarily interfere with a policy decision of the State. It also
observed that the modern trend points to judicial restraint in
administrative action and that the court is more concerned with
the decision-making process than with the merit of the decision.
51.
The same restraint applies to policy matters, particularly when
policy is said to be reflected in statutory rules or even executive
instructions. In Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216, and Balco Employees’ Union
v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 333, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that courts do not examine the wisdom or soundness
of an executive policy. Courts intervene only where the policy is
shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or contrary to a
constitutional or statutory provision. The same principle is
reflected in the observations in the cases of Zahoor Ahmad
Rather v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad, (2019) 2 SCC 404,
Unnikrishnan C.V. v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 546,
Shifana P.S. v. State of Kerala, (2024) 8 SCC 309, and, more
recently, Santosh B. Naik v. State of Goa, 2026 INSC 1089.
52.
Therefore, when evaluating challenges to the said rules or the
impugned notifications, we must be guided by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court’s decisions on the nature of State law officers'
engagements and the scope of judicial review in such matters.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 309 AS THE SOURCE OF POWER:
WHETHER FATAL?
53.
The first challenge rests on the fact that the Rules state they
were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution
of India. The Law Officers the State Government proposes to
engage under the Rules are neither employees of the State
Government nor, strictly speaking, will they hold any posts
connected with the affairs of the State.
54.
The petitioners are therefore justified in contending that the
reference to the exercise of powers under the proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution is an obvious error. In M.T. Khan
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Rules
governing the appointment of Additional Advocate Generals
derive from the State’s power under Article 162 of the
Constitution. This, of course, is in the absence of any legislation
to that effect. Such lawyers or Law Officers, even if some are
designated as Additional Advocate Generals, are not authorised
to perform any constitutional or statutory functions, since their
appointments are an exercise of the State’s executive power,
not its constitutional power.
55.
The State Government acknowledged this error in its counteraffidavit, stating that the said Rules for engagement of various
categories of Law Officers draw their authority from Article 162
of the Constitution, which deals with the extent of the State's
executive power. Considering the said Rules for engagement of
various categories of law officers by the State, we are satisfied
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
that the source of the State’s power to enact the said Rules can
be traced to Article 162 of the Constitution and not to the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.
56.
However, the question is whether the said Rules can be struck
down because they refer to the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution as their source of power. Though referring to the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution as the source of power
for making the said Rules is obviously erroneous, in our
judgment, such an error is not a sufficient ground to strike down
the said Rules as ultra vires or otherwise legally untenable or
impermissible. Once it is held that the said Rules derive their
authority from Article 162 of the Constitution, the omission to
refer to Article 162, or the error in referring to the proviso to
Article 309, cannot be a sufficient ground for striking down the
said Rules.
57.
In M.T. Khan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
that it is now a well-settled principle of law that an order is not
invalidated by the non-mention or incorrect mention of a
provision of law, provided the power exists. In State of
Karnataka v. Krishnaji Shrinivas Kulkarni, (1994) 2 SCC
558, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that quoting the wrong
provision does not divest jurisdiction, provided the source of the
sub-jurisdiction can be traced to another legal provision that
may not have been referred to. In Union of India vs Tulsiram
Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that mentioning the wrong provision, or
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
omitting the provision that confers the power, will not invalidate
an order where the source of the power exists.
58.
Therefore, solely on the ground that the said Rules refer to the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution as their source of
power, or because there is no reference to the actual source of
power, i.e., Article 162 of the Constitution, the said Rules
cannot be declared ultra vires or struck down.
59.
The position before the Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of
Vijay Kumar Vimal (supra), was slightly different. There, the
State of Bihar, after acknowledging that reference to Article 309
in the Rules for engaging Law Officers was erroneous, filed a
supplementary affidavit stating that the Rule could be rectified
as enacted under the proviso to Article 309 read with Article 162
of the Constitution. Accordingly, directions were issued to rectify
the said Rules as proposed by the State itself. The issues of
whether the omission to state the correct provision, or the effect
of mentioning a wrong provision, were never decided.
60.
In any event, having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in several of its decisions referred to above, we
are satisfied that the said Rules cannot be struck down solely
on the ground that they purport to derive their authority from the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, or because they do
not refer to the actual source of authority for enacting such
Rules, i.e. Article 162 of the Constitution. The first challenge to
the said rules, therefore, fails.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
WHETHER RULE 6 OF THE RULES CONTRAVENES ARTICLES 165
AND 217 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
61.
The next challenge is directed against Rule 6 of the said Rules
to the extent it provides for the requirement of legal practice of
not less than 15 years or designation of a Senior Advocate of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court or any High Court for appointment
as Senior Additional Advocate General and Additional Advocate
General; legal practice of not less than 20 years or designation
as Senior Advocate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court or any High
Court for appointment as Senior Additional Advocate General
and Additional Advocate General for the Hon’ble Supreme
Court; legal practice of not less than 15 years in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court for appointment as a Standing Counsel in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India; legal practice of not less than
12 years for being appointed as a Standing Counsel for the
Jharkhand High Court and legal practice of not less than 20
years for being appointed as an arguing counsel in the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India.
62.
The argument is that, when Article 165(1), read with Article 217
of the Constitution, requires only 10 years of legal practice for
appointment as an Advocate General of the State or even as a
Judge of the High Court, the Rule providing for more than 10
years of legal practice for appointment to the various posts of
Law Officers would be ultra vires and manifestly arbitrary.
63.
Again, on this ground, Rule 6 is not liable to be struck down.
Unlike the posts of Advocate General or Attorney General, the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
posts the said Rules govern are not constitutional posts. They
are only professional engagements, made by exercising powers
under Article 162 of the Constitution, which deals with the
State’s executive powers as a post-constitutional power.
Therefore, the State's requirement of more than 10 years of
legal practice as an eligibility condition for engagement as
Standing Counsel or Senior Additional Advocate General is
neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional. [ See M.T. Khan (supra)]
64.
Once it is accepted that the nature of the posts of Standing
Counsel or Additional Advocate General, etc. is in the nature of
a professional engagement and the holders of such posts are
not employees of the Government or Government servants,
there is nothing wrong or manifestly arbitrary in the State
prescribing legal practice of more than 10 years as one of the
eligibility conditions for such engagement.
65.
The State Government’s prescription of qualifications or
eligibility conditions falls squarely within its policy domain when
proposing to engage various categories of Law Officers.
Therefore, if such requirements are not manifestly arbitrary or
entirely unrelated to the proposed appointment or engagement,
the scope of judicial review by Courts would be minimal.
66.
In J. Rangaswami v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1990)
1 SCC 288, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is not for the
Courts to evaluate the qualifications prescribed for a post, to
assess the comparative merits of one qualification against
another, or to issue directions as to what those qualifications
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
ought to be. Similarly, in Chief Manager, Punjab National
Bank v. Amit Kumar Das, (2021) 12 SCC 80, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the employer must determine the
relevance and suitability of qualifications for any post and be
accorded greater latitude in prescribing them. The Courts are
not fit instruments to gauge the experience or utility of such
prescriptions unless, of course, the employers act arbitrarily or
fancifully.
67.
Moreover, in U.P. State Law Officers Association (supra),
Johri Mal (supra), and State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma
(2016) 15 SCC 289, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that
the engagement of a lawyer by the State or a public body is
purely contractual and based on mutual trust and confidence.
The State, like any private litigant, retains the freedom to select
or discharge counsel in whom it reposes trust, subject only to
the constitutional imperative that its choice is not arbitrary and
does not defeat the administration of justice.
68.
Besides, neither Article 165 (1) nor Article 217 of the
Constitution provides that 10 years’ legal practice is the
maximum period that can be prescribed for appointment as an
Advocate General or a Judge of a High Court. These Articles
only prescribe a minimum of 10 years’ legal practice before a
person can be appointed as an Advocate General of a State or
a Judge of a High Court. The petitioner’s argument rests on the
premise that the two Articles set a ceiling of 10 years’ practice
and that the State, therefore, cannot insist on more than 10
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
years’ legal practice if it wishes to appoint any Additional
Advocate Generals, Standing Counsels or other categories of
Law Officers. We believe this is yet another fallacy in the
petitioner’s contention.
69.
In this case, the Rules set out graded requirements for legal
practice, depending on the category of Law Officers. For
example, a Senior Advocate General or an Additional Advocate
General must have 15 years’ practice or have been designated
a Senior Advocate by the Hon’ble Supreme Court or any High
Court. At the Supreme Court level, the requirement is at least
20 years’ legal practice. The extent of legal practice obviously
has a nexus with the State’s engagement of various categories
of Law Officers.
70.
Given that the scope of judicial review in such matters is
minimal, as discussed hereinabove, and that the graded
practice prescribed has a rational nexus with the nature and
objective of engaging various categories of Law Officers by the
State, we are unable to accept the contention that Rule 6 of the
said Rules is ultra vires or unconstitutional simply because it
requires more than 10 years of legal practice for the
engagement of some of the categories of Law Officers referred
to therein.
71.
Further, with respect, we do not read the judgment of the
Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Vimal
(supra) as laying down a blanket proposition that, because the
constitutional requirement for appointment as an Advocate
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
General or a Judge of the High Court is 10 years’ legal practice,
the State cannot prescribe a requirement of more than 10 years’
legal practice for the engagement of Additional Advocate
Generals, Standing Counsels, Government Advocates, etc.
That does not appear to be the import of the decision cited by
the Petitioners.
72.
However, if, as the petitioners insist, the Hon’ble Patna High
Court's decision is to be construed as laying down such a
blanket proposition, we, with respect, disagree with that
construction.
WHETHER RULE 9 OF THE RULES VIOLATES ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF
THE CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 30 OF THE ADVOCATES ACT,
1961?
73.
The next challenge concerns Rule 9 of the said Rules, which
places an embargo on Law Research Officers appearing before
Courts of Law and further stipulates that Law Research Officers
shall neither accept briefs nor act on behalf of any private party
during the currency of their engagement. It is argued that this
restriction violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and S. 30 of
the Advocates Act, 1961.
74.
Again, under the said Rules, a Law Research Officer is
engaged primarily to assist Law Officers with legal research and
drafting in matters in which the State is a party or otherwise
interested. In that capacity, such an officer is privy to the State’s
sensitive and confidential files, notes, and litigation briefs, and
works closely with the Advocate General and other Law Officers
discharging constitutional and statutory functions.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
75.
If the State perceives that a practitioner who remains at liberty
to simultaneously accept private briefs cannot be expected to
maintain the undivided loyalty and absolute confidentiality that
such an engagement inexorably demands, we do not think that
there is anything arbitrary or unreasonable in such a perception.
The State, as a litigant, is entitled to reasonably expect that the
Law Research Officers it engages would devote their time and
energies to assisting the Law Officers in legal research,
drafting, etc. (except appearances in courts). The question is
not whether the petitioners or, for that matter, this Court agrees
with such a perception. The focus must be on whether, under
the circumstances, the perception entertained by the State is
irrational or arbitrary. Since no such case is made out, we do
not accept or uphold the challenge.
76.
Furthermore, such a restrictive covenant is by no means novel
or peculiar to this State. Analogous provisions govern Law
Officers across diverse jurisdictions, as exemplified by Rule
8(1)(a) of the Law Officers (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1987,
and Rule 14 of the Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment
and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1999, as well as the standard
terms under which public sector undertakings retain standing
counsel.
77.
Moreover, identical conditions are likewise embodied in the
schemes under which the Hon'ble Supreme Court and various
High Courts engage Law Researchers, including the Scheme
governing Law Researchers in this Court, which explicitly
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
debars a Law Researcher from practising as an advocate or
accepting any other professional assignment during the tenure
of engagement. All such regulatory restrictions stem from a
single public policy rationale: a person entrusted with sensitive
and confidential legal work for a public authority must assist in
public litigation without the distraction, or even the semblance,
of a conflicting private brief.
78.
Crucially, Rule 9 does not operate as an absolute prohibition on
practising the legal profession per se; rather, it is merely a
condition precedent to a specific professional engagement,
which an advocate remains entirely free to accept or decline.
Having voluntarily accepted the engagement along with the
honorarium attached thereto, the appointee is bound “ex
contractu” by its terms. Even on the anvil of Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution of India, the impugned condition is a
reasonable restriction saved by Article 19(6), necessary to
safeguard the confidentiality of the State's legal work and avert
conflicts of interest.
79.
Ms Arora, learned Senior Advocate for the State, submitted that
the embargo or the bar imposed by Rule 9 is co-extensive with
a voluntary, paid retainer. She submitted that on being engaged
as a Law Research Officer, the lawyer’s enrolment is not
cancelled. The right under Section 30 of the Advocates Act,
1961 is not withdrawn. On disengagement, the Advocate
practices as before.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
80.
In U.P. State Law Officers Association (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court clarified that the Government or public bodies'
engagement of lawyers is purely contractual and professional,
not an employment relationship. Even when Law Officers are
engaged full-time or restricted from accepting private briefs,
they
remain
professional
practitioners,
not
employees.
Accordingly, the saving clause in Rule 49 of the Bar Council of
India Rules exempts such Law Officers from the general
prohibition against advocates taking up full-time employment.
81.
Ms Arora also pointed out that the applicant for the position of
Law Research Officer applies or is expected to apply after
having full notice of the requirements in Rule 9. Note-I to the
application form deems the applicant to have read the said
Rules. The argument based on Article 19(1)(g) read with Article
19(6) also does not stand.
82.
Applying the fourfold test laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre
(supra),
we
note
that
the
legitimate
aim
of
the
restriction/embargo is to secure exclusive attention to State
Research and Drafting, coupled with the absence of a
competing private brand during the period of engagement when
the Law Research Officer is paid from the public exchequer.
The rational connection is that a Law Research Officer whose
work is mainly desk-based is served by a clean and
unambiguous bar. A partial or unambiguous bar would not
redress the conflict that Rule 9 was enacted to prevent.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
83.
On the aspect of necessity, we cannot say that the bar or the
embargo is not wider than the engagement. Firstly, the
Advocate need not accept the position of a Law Research
Officer. Secondly, the State’s perception is not unreasonable
that lesser restrictive alternatives would not secure undivided
research time, which is the object of enacting such a Rule.
Finally, on the aspect of balance, we note that this is a
temporary condition of voluntary engagement, against the
State’s interest of securing unconflicted assistance. Rule 7 of
the said Rules imposes analogous discipline on arguing Law
Officers. Such arguing Law Officers cannot accept private
criminal briefs or appear in matters adverse to the interest of the
State.
84.
In Vijay Kumar Vimal (supra), the Hon’ble Patna High Court
considered a Rule that engaged assisting counsel and then
forbade them from arguing for the Government independently
after the pleadings were complete. In that context, the Patna
High Court found the Rule unreasonable and struck it down.
Under the said rules, a Law Research Officer is not engaged to
appear for the Government or others. The exclusion of
appearance is part of the definition of the post, not a disability in
Court for an arguing counsel. This post exists or has been
created so that arguing Law Officers are not dependent on an
unregulated pool of associate counsel.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
85.
For the above reasons, we do not find sufficient grounds to
strike down Rule 9 of the said Rules on the ground of violation
of Article 19(1)(g) or Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE 3(7) OF THE RULES?
86.
The next challenge concerns Rule 3(7) of the said Rules. This
provides that the engagement of counsel to represent the
Boards, Corporations, and other authorities funded and run by
the funds of the State Government before the Courts and
Tribunals in the State of Jharkhand and elsewhere shall be
made on a case-to-case basis by the Advocate General only.
87.
Further, such engagement shall be from the panel of Law
Officers engaged by the State in terms of the said Rules, after
taking into consideration the recommendation, if any, of the Law
Department of the concerned Board, Corporations and other
authorities. In addition, the payment of such remuneration for
such counsel shall not exceed the fee paid in terms of Rule 12
and shall be commensurate with the fee paid to Law Officers
having similar qualifications.
88.
Rule 3(7) also provides that, for non-litigational assignments,
the Law Department of the Boards, Corporations and other
authorities funded and run by the State Government shall
engage counsel only from the panel of Law Officers engaged by
the State under these Rules, on a case-by-case basis. The
remuneration for such counsel shall not exceed the fee paid
under Rule 12 and shall be commensurate with the fee paid to
the Law Officers with similar qualifications. Further, these Rules
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
provide that there shall be no retained counsel for such bodies
“in during department of State Government”.
89.
The Boards, Corporations and other authorities funded and run
by the funds of the State Government are usually statutory
Boards or statutory Corporations, which are governed by the
statutes under which they are established and operated. The
expression “other authorities” in Rule 3(7) is not defined under
the said Rules. Therefore, it would include cooperative or other
societies funded by the State or run by State Government
funds. It would also include local self-government bodies such
as
Municipal
Corporations,
Municipal
Councils,
Nagar
Panchayats, Village Panchayats, etc., because it could be
argued that they also receive funds from the State Government.
90.
Normally, in the case of statutory corporations, the statute
under which such corporation is established provides for a
governing body or board of directors to govern its affairs. The
same applies to government companies and bodies such as
municipal corporations, municipal councils, and panchayats.
91.
Now that it is admitted that the said Rules are nothing but an
exercise undertaken under Article 162 of the Constitution, i.e.,
that they are only executive instructions, we wonder how such
executive instructions can impose any fetters on the Boards,
Corporations and other authorities when it comes to engaging
counsel to represent them before Courts and Tribunals.
92.
For instance, assuming that Rule 3(7) is intended to apply to
Municipal Corporations, reference can be usefully made to
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Section 523 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, which, inter
alia, provides that the Municipal Commissioner or the executive
officer may obtain, for any of the purposes mentioned in the
foregoing provisions of this Section, or to secure the lawful
exercise or discharge of any power or duty vested in, or
imposed upon, any Municipal Authority or any officer or other
employee of the municipality, such legal advice and assistance
as he may, from time to time, consider necessary or expedient,
or as he may be required by the counsel or the standing
committee to obtain.
93.
This
statutory
power
conferred
upon
the
Municipal
Commissioner or the Executive Officer cannot be whittled down
by a
mere executive instruction
issued
by the
State
Government. Further, there may be instances where the
interests of such Boards, Corporations and authorities would
conflict with the interests of the State Government. To insist that
the Boards, Corporations and other authorities nevertheless
engage counsel chosen by the Advocate General, and that too
from the panel of Law Officers engaged by the State under the
said
Rules,
would,
in
our
opinion,
be
arbitrary
and
unreasonable. Similarly, preventing such Boards, Corporations
and other authorities from retaining any counsel by executive
fiat would also be, ex facie, arbitrary and unreasonable.
94.
If the State Government, by virtue of its funding, has a majority
control over the governing bodies of such Boards, Corporations
or other authorities, and those governing bodies themselves
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
resolve to engage counsel proposed by the Advocate General
from the panel of Law Officers engaged by the State, that would
perhaps not be objectionable, because it would then be the
decision of the governing body of such Boards, Corporations or
other authorities. However, by means of an executive fiat, for
the State to insist that the choice of the governing bodies of
such Boards, Corporations and other authorities would be
curtailed and that the Boards, Corporations and other
authorities would have no option other than to engage counsel
proposed by the Advocate General from the panel of Law
Officers engaged by the State would, in our opinion, be arbitrary
and unreasonable.
95.
Besides, executive instructions or rules framed under Article
162 of the Constitution must yield to statutory or constitutional
provisions. Therefore, if any statute empowers the Boards,
Corporations and other authorities to engage counsel of their
choice to represent them before Courts and Tribunals, then this
statutory power cannot be nullified or even diluted by the said
Rule, which the State Government admits is only executive in
nature.
96.
Additionally, we find that Rule 3(7) suffers from several
ambiguities, and its scope and application are unclear. The
expression “Boards, Corporations and other authorities” admits
several interpretations. Similarly, the expression “funded and
run by the funds of the State Government” is also ambiguous
and admits of different interpretations. The last sentence of
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Rule 3(7), which provides that “there shall be no retained
counsel for such bodies in the department of the State
Government” is utterly incomprehensible and vague.
97.
For the above reasons, Rule 3(7) attracts the doctrine of
vagueness (or “void for vagueness”), a well-settled principle of
Indian constitutional law and an integral facet of Article 14. It is
a fundamental canon of constitutional jurisprudence that a
statutory provision or subordinate legislation is liable to be
struck down if its language is so inherently ambiguous or
uncertain that it fails to provide fair notice or guidance to those
subject
to
it,
while
simultaneously
vesting
uncanalised
discretion in the administrative authority, thereby inviting
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
98.
The genesis of this principle is traceable to State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court invalidated the operative provisions of
the Central Provinces and Berar Goondas Act, 1946, on the
ground that the definition of the expression “goonda” lacked any
intelligible test, thereby casting the implementing authorities into
a boundless sea of uncertainty.
99.
This principle was authoritatively affirmed by a Constitution
Bench of the Hon’ble SC in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India,
(1970) 2 SCC 780, which held that where a law admits of no
reasonable construction consistent with legislative intent,
leaving those who apply it in uncertainty while prima facie
encroaching upon guaranteed rights, the provision must be held
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
to offend the Constitution, as the invalidity springs from the
inherent probability of misuse.
100. This doctrine was subsequently reiterated in Kartar Singh v.
State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, and decisively applied in
the seminal ruling of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015)
5 SCC 1, to strike down Section 66A of the Information
Technology Act, 2000, on the primary ground that statutory
expressions such as “grossly offensive” and “annoying”
provided no objective or manageable standard either for the
citizen or for the enforcement agencies.
101. Mrs Arora’s arguments that Rules 7(3) and 13 address the
issues raised by the petitioners cannot be accepted. Rule 7(3)
provides that Law Officers shall not appear for, or give legal
advice to, private persons, or in matters where the person's
interests are likely to be adverse to the Government or its
officials. This Rule has nothing to do with the issue at hand,
namely, interference with the choice of Boards, Corporation and
other authorities to engage counsel of their own choice.
102. Similarly, Rule 13 of the said Rules, which begins with a non
obstante clause, confers discretion upon the Advocate General
to engage any Advocate for the Government as a special public
prosecutor or a special counsel who is not a Law Officer under
the said Rules in cases involving important issues for the
Government, especially revenue or in the public interest. Again,
even this Rule does not address the issue of the autonomy of
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Boards, Corporations and other authorities to engage counsel
of their own choice.
103. Based upon such a vague and ambiguous Rule, and without
indicating any source of power under which such sweeping
directions can be issued to Boards, Corporations and other
authorities, the said Rule cannot be permitted to deprive
Boards, Corporations and other authorities of the choice to
engage counsel of their own choice and to pay to them the fees
as such Boards, Corporations and other authorities may deem
appropriate.
104. Ms Arora argued that, because the Boards, Corporations and
other authorities to which Rule 3(7) applies are funded by the
Government, the Government has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that such funds are not misappropriated by the
Boards, Corporations and other authorities through the
engagement of several Advocates or by making exorbitant
payments to such Advocates.
105. If this is the apprehension, then surely there are powers
conferred upon the Government to take action against the
governing bodies of such Boards, Corporations and other
authorities under the statutes that have created such Boards,
Corporations and other authorities, or under the statutes that
empower the Government to exercise some control over such
Boards, Corporations and other authorities. By mere executive
fiat, the Government cannot impose such restrictions on the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Boards, Corporations and other authorities merely because they
might be funded or run out of State Government funds.
106. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that
Rule 3(7) is manifestly arbitrary, incurably vague, and violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution and deserves to be struck down.
However, we also find that the provision operates as an
independent, standalone mechanism. Therefore, such striking
down of the severable portion would not affect the constitutional
validity of the remaining provisions of the said rules.
107. Applying the doctrine of severability, its invalidation does not
impair or disrupt the remaining framework of the impugned
Rules. Rule 3(7) is, therefore, clearly severable. Consequently,
we strike down Rule 3(7) of the impugned Rules as ultra vires,
arbitrary, unreasonable, and null and void.
CHALLENGE TO NOTIFICATION DATED 24.07.2026 DETERMINING
RETAINERSHIP FEES PAYABLE TO LAW OFFICERS BY THE STATE OF
JHARKHAND
108. The next challenge is to the notification dated 24.07.2026
determining their monthly retainer fees payable to various
categories of Law Officers.
109. The determination and payment of monthly retainership fee is
essentially a matter of policy. Unless the policies are ex facie
unreasonable and arbitrary, the scope of judicial review in such
matters is minimal, as discussed hereinabove. The Court
ordinarily does not decide whether the retainership fees the
State Government should pay to its Law Officers are
reasonable.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
110. On evaluating the impugned notification, we believe that we
would not be justified in striking down the notification dated 24th
July 2026 to the extent that it concerns the monthly retainership
fee payable to the Advocate General, the Additional Advocate
General and other categories of Law Officers referred to in the
said Rules. In our judgment, the fact that the monthly
retainership fee or the maximum monthly limit was previously
higher cannot be a ground for striking down the notification
dated 24.07.2026.
111. However, we do have some prima facie reservations about
paying only Rs. 20,000/- as monthly retainer fees to Law
Research Officers. Being mindful of the limits of judicial review
in such matters, we have refrained from striking down the
notification dated 24th July 2026; still, we think that the State
should reconsider its decision to pay only Rs 20000 per month
as a retainer fee. The reasons for such prima facie reservations
are briefly discussed hereafter.
112. Although, in our judgment, Rule 9 of the said Rules is not
constitutionally infirm, we note that, under the impugned
notification dated 24.07.2026, the monthly retainer fees payable
to a Law Research Officer are only Rs. 20,000/-.
113. The scope for judicial review in determining the monthly retainer
fees would be extremely limited; however, we note that Rule 9
prescribes that Law Research Officers must have 2 to 5 years
of legal practice. Such Law Research Officers are expected to
assist the Law Officers in research, drafting, etc. (except
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
appearing in courts). Such Law Research Officers are
prevented from accepting briefs or acting for any private party
during their engagement with the State; Despite all this, their
monthly retainer fee is pegged at Rs. 20,000/- and no more.
114. Ms Arora argued that the monthly retainer fee is a matter of
policy. She further submitted that several applicants have
applied despite the fixed monthly retainer fee. She submitted
that the Law Research Officers also gain invaluable experience.
Therefore, she contended that fixing the monthly retainer fee at
Rs. 20,000/- for Law Research Officers is not unreasonable.
115. The fact that several Advocates may have applied for
engagement as Law Research Officers, even though the
monthly retainer fee is pegged at only Rs 20,000/-, perhaps
reflects the struggles a fledgling Advocate faces in the initial
years of practice. Rs 20,000/- per month may be better than
nothing. But we believe that the State, which is expected to be a
model employer or engager, should not base its determination
on such a factor. Given the unemployment figures and the
travails of a junior lawyer, the number of applicants is not
surprising.
116. Therefore, the State’s determination of the monthly retainer fee
of only Rs 20,000/- for the Law Research Officers is rather
disturbing. Although a higher retainer fee does not guarantee
undivided and unconflicted assistance, setting a monthly
retainer of only Rs. 20,000/- for Law Research Officers still
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
appears perilously close to the State exploiting the unfortunate
plight of young Advocates entering the profession.
117. The State of Jharkhand issued a notification dated 25.05.2026
under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Therein, the Ranchi
Municipal Corporation area has been classified as a Category-A
district/area. For such Category-A districts/areas, the minimum
wage prescribed for a highly skilled worker is Rs. 21,336/-. This
comprises the basic wage fixed as on 11.03.2024, i.e., Rs.
19,396/-, and variable Dearness Allowance effective from
01.04.2026, i.e., Rs. 1,940/-.
118. Therefore, at least prima facie, it does not stand to reason that
Law Research Officers must be paid a fee even less than the
minimum wages prescribed for highly skilled labour in the
Ranchi Municipal Corporation area of the State of Jharkhand.
Ms Ritu Kumar and others, Advocates for the petitioners,
submitted that paying such a paltry monthly retainer fee would
encourage corruption and other nefarious activities, thereby
frustrating the very object of engaging Law Research Officers
and availing their undivided and unconflicted assistance
119. Accordingly, while we are not striking down the impugned
notification dated 24th July 2026 insofar as it determines the
monthly retainership fee payable to Law Research Officers, we
urge the State Government to reconsider this aspect.
120.
Despite our reservations about the policy of paying only Rs.
20,000/- per month to Law Research Officers, we have stopped
short of striking down the fee structure or substituting it with a
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
higher one. We trust that better conscience will prevail and that
the State will recognise that it is dealing with the future of young
Advocates or Advocates who are young in the profession
(having practised for not less than 2 years and not more than 5
years). Merely because the State Government has received
several applications, it should not take advantage of or exploit
such applicants’ plight and offer them remuneration that is even
lower than that offered to highly skilled labourers in the Ranchi
Municipal area.
121. Therefore, while we reject the challenge to the notification dated
24th July 2026 determining the monthly retainership fees
payable to various Law Officers, having regard to the
reservations expressed above, we consider it appropriate to
direct the State Government to reconsider the monthly
retainership fee payable to Law Research Officers.
CHALLENGE TO NOTIFICATION DATED 24.07.2026
RESTRUCTURING LAW OFFICER POSTS BY THE STATE OF
JHARKHAND
122. The petitioners have also challenged another notification dated
24th July 2026 determining the cadre strength of Law Officers.
The petitioners argued that in fixing the cadre strength, the
State Government has ignored the law laid down in Brijeshwar
Singh Chahal (supra).
123. In Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that no lawyer has a right to be appointed as State
Government counsel or as a public prosecutor at any level, nor
does he/she have a vested right to claim an extension of the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
term for which he/she is initially appointed. Further, such
appointments should be based on merit and not influenced by
any political or extraneous considerations.
124. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following
observations in paragraph 49 regarding the mechanism for
considering
candidates
seeking
appointment
as
State
Government counsel or a public prosecutor:
“49. The question is what should be the mechanism for
such consideration. There are in that regard two major
aspects that need to be kept in mind.
49.1. The first is the need for assessment and
requirement of the State Governments having regard to
the workload in different courts. As noticed earlier,
appointments appear to have been made without any
realistic assessment of the need for State Counsel at
different levels. Absence of a proper assessment of the
requirement for State Counsel leads to situations that
have been adversely commented upon by CAG in his
report to which we have made a reference in the earlier
part of this judgment. The problem gets compounded by
those in power adding to the strength of Government
Advocates not because they are required but because
such appointments serve the object of appeasement or
private benevolence shown to those who qualify for the
same. CAG has in that view rightly observed that there
ought to be a proper assessment of the need before such
appointments are made.
49.2. The second aspect is about the process of
selection and assessment of merit of the candidates by a
credible process. This process can be primarily left to the
State Government who can appoint a Committee of
officers to carry out the same. It will be useful if the
Committee of officers has the Secretary to Government,
Law Department, who is generally a judicial officer on
deputation with the Government as its Member-Secretary.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
The Committee can even invite applications from eligible
candidates for different positions. The conditions of
eligibility for appointment can be left to the Government or
the Committee depending upon the nature and the extent
of work which the appointees may be effected to handle.
The process and selection of appointment would be fair
and
reasonable,
transparent
and
credible
if
the
Government or the Committee as the case may be also
stipulates the norms for assessment of merit and
suitability.”
125. Finally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court disposed of the matter by
issuing the following directions:
“51. In the result, therefore, we dispose of Transfer
Petition No. 1073 of 2015 and the civil appeal arising out
of SLP (C) No. 8416 of 2016 (CC No. 5470 of 2014) with
the following directions:
51.1. The States of Punjab and Haryana shall undertake
a realistic assessment of their need in each category in
which State Counsel are proposed to be appointed.
51.2. Based on the assessment so made, the States
shall constitute a Selection Committee with such number
of officers as the State Government may determine to
select suitable candidates for appointment as State
Counsel. The Secretary, Department of Law in each
State shall be the Member-Secretary of the Selection
Committee.
51.3. The Committee shall on the basis of norms and
criteria which the Government concerned may formulate
and in the absence of any such norms, on the basis of
norms and criteria which the Committee may themselves
formulate conduct selection of Law Officers for the State
and submit a panel of names to the Chief Justice of
Punjab and Haryana who may set up a Committee of
Judges to review the panel and make recommendations
to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice may, based on
any such recommendations, record his views regarding
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
suitability of the candidates included in the panel. The
Government shall then be free to appoint the candidates
having regard to the views expressed by the Chief
Justice
regarding
their
merit
and
suitability.
The
procedure for assessment of merit of the candidates and
consideration by the High Court will apply in all cases
where the candidates are already working as State
Counsel but are being given an extension in the term of
their appointment. Having said that we must hasten to
add that we are not interfering with the appointments
already made in the States of Punjab and Haryana which
can continue to remain valid for the period the same has
been made but any extension or reappointment shall go
through the process indicated by us in the foregoing
paragraphs.
51.4. The writ petitioners shall also be free to offer
themselves for consideration before the Committee
appointed by the State Government in which event their
claims may also be considered having regard to their
merits, suitability and performance as State Counsel for
the period they have worked as State Counsel.
51.5. We make it clear that nothing said by us in the
foregoing paragraphs of this judgment shall affect the
right of the State Governments to appoint any person
eligible for such appointment as the Advocate General of
the State in terms of Article 165 of the Constitution of
India.
51.6. We further clarify that although we are primarily
concerned with the procedure regarding selection and
appointment of Law Officers in the States of Punjab and
Haryana and although we have confined our directions to
the said two States only yet other States would do well to
reform their system of selection and appointment to make
the same more transparent, fair and objective, if
necessary, by amending the relevant LR Manuals/Rules
and Regulations on the subject.”
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
126. In this case, the petitioner’s contention that the directions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (supra)
have been observed only in breach cannot be accepted. Rules
3(4) and 3(5) empower the State Government to fix and/or
modify, from time to time, the number of Law Officers to be
engaged in each category, as may be required, based on the
Government's assessment in consultation with the Advocate
General.
127. In particular, Rule 3(5) provides that, while making an
assessment under Rule 3(4), the Government may take into
consideration various aspects, including but not limited to the
workload of legal cases involving the Government, the total
number of Courts (sanctioned and working), the nature of the
work involved, specialisation in subject matters, and any other
relevant material or aspect as it deems fit.
128. In addition, Rule 4 provides for the constitution of a Search
Committee, with the Advocate General as Chairperson and the
Principal Secretaries of the Personnel, Administrative Reforms
and Rajbhasha Department and the Department of Home as
members.
129. Rule 4(2) requires the Search Committee to prepare a panel of
Advocates, not exceeding twice the number determined under
Rules 3(iv) and 3(v) of the said Rules, based on the eligibility
criteria set out under the said Rules and on their experience,
integrity, reliability, reputation, merit and suitability, and to
submit its recommendations to the Selection Committee
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
through the Law Department for the engagement of such
Advocates as Law Officers in the Jharkhand High Court and the
Supreme Court of India.
130. Rule 5 provides for the composition of the Selection Committee,
which
comprises
the
Minister/Minister-in-charge,
Law
Department, as Chairperson; the Advocate General; the Chief
Secretary;
and
the
Principal
Secretary-cum-Legal
Remembrancer, Law Department, as Member Secretary. Rule 5
(iv) deals with the appointment of Government counsel for
Tribunals and other adjudicatory bodies constituted by or under
any State or Central Act, except Civil Courts. Rule 5 (5) deals
with the engagement of Law Officers for Civil and Criminal
Courts. The said Rules provide for consultation with the
Principal District and Sessions Judge.
131. Considering the elaborate mechanism provided under the said
Rules for assessing the requirement of Law Officers, preparing
a panel of eligible Advocates and selecting suitable candidates
through a prescribed process involving the Advocate General
and other designated authorities, we cannot accept the
petitioner’s contention that the directions issued by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Brijeshwar Singh Chahal (supra) have
been observed only in the breach or that the exercise
contemplated therein has not been undertaken.
132. As to determining the strength of the Law Officers, we again
believe that the scope of judicial review in such matters is
minimal. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Government, it transpires that the strength of the Law Officers is
now 81, of which 66 are arguing counsel and 15 are Law
Research Officers. It has also been pointed out that, compared
with the earlier sanctioned strength of 29 arguing counsels, the
strength has now increased to 66. It is also pointed out that
specialised posts such as Standing Counsel (Mines and Land
and Ceiling) have been surrendered only to subsume them into
the positions of Government Pleaders.
133. Again, as discussed hereinabove, the scope of judicial review in
such matters is minimal, because Courts do not decide how
many Law Officers the State Government should appoint,
unless of course
a case of manifest arbitrariness or
unreasonableness is made out and the very administration of
justice suffers. These are matters for the State Government to
decide, and as long as the State Government’s decisions are
reasonable, judicial review is not warranted.
134. Besides, Ms. Arora has already stated that the determination of
the strength of the Law Officers is not static. If, in the future, the
situation warrants it, the State would revise that determination
and perhaps increase the number of posts. This pragmatic
approach adequately addresses the dynamic nature of litigation
volume in the High Court, leaving the executive sufficient
latitude to reassess its staffing needs periodically. As long as
the framework established by the State meets the core
benchmarks of institutional necessity, transparency, and non-
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
arbitrariness, the executive must retain discretion over the
precise operational details.
135. In U.P. State Law Officers Association (supra), the High
Court struck down the discontinuance of the brief-holders’
system in U.P. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reversed
the High Court’s decision, holding that the Government could
not be faulted for abolishing that system and appointing special
counsel for special cases in its place. Even here, Rule 13
empowers the Advocate General and the Law Department, in
consultation with the administrative department, to engage
special counsel or Special Public Prosecutors outside the panel
where the situation so requires.
136. For the reasons above, we find no good and sufficient grounds
to strike down the impugned notification dated 24 July 2026
determining the strength, structure and methodology for
engagement of law officers by the State.
THE CHALLENGE TO THE NOTICE INVITING APPLICATIONS FOR
ENGAGING STATE LAW OFFICERS
137. The argument that the notice inviting applications for various
posts of Law Officers violates Article 165 of the Constitution, or
that it allegedly degrades the office of the Advocate General, is
misconceived and deserves rejection.
138. Merely because the Notice Inviting Applications was issued by
the Principal Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer, it neither
infringes Article 165 of the Constitution nor, in any manner,
degrades the office of the learned Advocate General. The office
of the learned Advocate General is not so fragile as to be
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
degraded by such matters. It rests on surer constitutional
foundations.
139. The Notice Inviting Applications was issued by the Principal
Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer because, under the said
Rules, this officer is the Member Secretary of the Selection
Committee and the Nodal Officer for the establishment.
Besides, the mere issuance of a Notice Inviting Applications
does not constitute engagement. Engagement follows the
recommendation of a committee of which the learned Advocate
General is very much a member. By issuing the Notice Inviting
Applications, the Principal Secretary-cum-Legal Remembrancer
or the Law Secretary is not conferred with any functions
reserved by Article 165 of the Constitution exclusively to the
office of the Advocate General.
140. In M.T. Khan (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
explained that designation and engagement of other State
counsel, i.e. Additional Advocate General, Standing Counsel,
Government Pleader, etc., is in exercise of executive power
under Article 162 and may, in the absence of legislation, be
regulated by the executive instructions.
141. The decision in U.P. State Law Officers Ministerial Staff
Association (supra), delivered by the Allahabad High Court,
does not lay down any blanket proposition that the notice issued
by the Secretary would be invalid, nor that in every case the
Advocate General must, under his signature, issue such an
advertisement. However, even if, as the petitioners insist, the
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
said decision does lay down such a blanket proposition, then,
with utmost respect, we disagree with the Hon’ble Allahabad
High Court's view.
142. Accordingly, the challenge to the impugned notice inviting
applications to engage the various Law Officers fails and is
hereby rejected.
PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY & LOCUS STANDI
143. The challenge in these matters was not to some primary
legislation or statutory rules. The challenge was to executive
instructions framed under Article 162 of the Constitution.
Therefore, we have doubts as to whether the presumption of
constitutionality applies, or would apply, with the rigour it applies
to primary legislation or statutory rules. [ See Bihar Rajya
Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar 2025 SCC
OnLine Sc 1882; Indian Express Newspapers v. UOI 1985(1)
SCC 641]
144. In any event, by adhering to the principle of judicial restraint in
reviewing policy matters, we have rejected most challenges to
the said rules. As discussed above, while examining the limited
contours and scope of judicial review, executive policy framed
under Article 162 lies squarely within the State Government's
domain. So long as such executive policies or administrative
rules
do
not
suffer
from
manifest
arbitrariness,
unreasonableness, or statutory infraction [as we believe was
the case with rule 3(7) of the said rules], this Court, in the
exercise of its writ jurisdiction, will not substitute its view for that
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
of the executive or strike down provisions merely because a
different policy choice was plausible.
145. Therefore, we do not wish to deliberate further on the
contention that any alleged presumption of constitutionality
applies to executive instructions under Article 162 of the
Constitution.
146.
Ms Arora’s objection to the locus standi of the petitioners, on
the ground that some of the petitioners were not practising
Advocates and that no one pleaded that any of them had
applied for the advertised posts, also cannot be accepted.
147. The petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 6967 of 2026 is a practising
Advocate, and the petitioner in W.P. (Filing) No. 9721 of 2026 is
an association of practising Advocates of this Court. The Rules
and Notifications set out the strength, eligibility criteria, and
terms of engagement for Law Officers who appear for the State,
and therefore directly affect members of the Bar.
148. Moreover, challenging the legal efficacy of statutory rules
governing public engagements, as well as Rule 3(7), which
directly affects the autonomy of statutory bodies, raises
questions of substantial public interest.
149. A public-spirited advocate or association need not necessarily
apply for the
extraordinary
advertised
writ
posts
jurisdiction
to
invoke
this
Court's
under
Article
of
the
Constitution to ensure adherence to the rule of law.
150. The preliminary objection as to maintainability and locus standi
is, therefore, hereby rejected.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
CONCLUSIONS
151. For all the above reasons, we dispose of all these petitions by
making the following order:
(a)
We reject the preliminary objection raised by the State
regarding the locus standi of the petitioners.
(b)
We reject the challenge to the said Rules because they
refer to the proviso to Article 309, not Article 162 of the
Constitution, as their source of power.
(c)
We hereby reject the challenges to the eligibility
conditions prescribed under Rule 6, as well as to the
professional restrictions imposed under Rule 9 of the said
Rules.
(d)
However, the challenge to Rule 3(7) of the said Rules is
upheld. Rule 3(7) of the said Rules, being incurably
vague,
manifestly
arbitrary,
and
an
impermissible
encroachment upon statutory autonomy, is hereby
severed and struck down as ultra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution and declared null and void.
(e)
The challenges to the impugned Notification dated 24th
July 2026 (determining cadre strength) are hereby
rejected.
(f)
The challenges to the impugned Notification dated 24th
July 2026 (determining the fee structure) are hereby
rejected subject to (g) below.
(g)
However, while declining to quash the Notification dated
24th July 2026 regarding the quantum of fees payable to
law officers, we direct the State Government to reconsider
the quantum of the monthly retainer fee payable to Law
Research Officers and to take a decision thereon within
three months from today.
(h)
The
challenge
to
the
impugned
Notice
Inviting
Applications issued by the Principal Secretary-cum-Legal
Remembrancer is hereby rejected.
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
152. W.P.(C) No. 6967 of 2026, W.P.(PIL) No. 6148 of 2026 and
W.P.(Filing) No. 9721 of 2026 are disposed of in the above
terms without any orders for costs.
153. The Rule is made absolute in part to the extent indicated above
and is otherwise discharged. Pending interlocutory applications,
if any, are disposed of. Interim orders, if any, are hereby
vacated.
154. All concerned may act on an authenticated copy of this
judgment and order.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Manoj Prasad, J.)
October 27, 2026
A.F.R.
APK/VK
Uploaded on 27.10.2026
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Annexure-I
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Annexure-II
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Annexure-III
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
Annexure-IV
2026:JHHC:31402-DB
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review