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2026:HHC:6206
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2792 of 2025
Reserved on: 26.02.2025
Date of Decision: 09.03.2026.
Lakhwinder Kumar
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr Umesh Kanwar, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 127 of 2024, dated 27.10.2024,
registered at Police Station, Damtal, District Kangra, H.P., for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 27A
and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (NDPS Act).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police apprehended Kamaljeet on 27.10.2024 with 262 grams of
heroin. Kamaljeet revealed during the interrogation that he had
purchased the heroin from Rajesh Kumar, and it was to be
delivered to Rajat Kumar. The police arrested Rajesh Kumar,
who disclosed that one Vishal Kumar resident of Dubai, used to
send heroin to him. He also disclosed that he used to collect the
money and hand it over to Raj Kumar @ Sethi. Raj Kumar
handed over the money to the petitioner. The police arrested the
petitioner, who disclosed during the investigation that he had
deposited money with Gagan Sarna, the owner of Gaurav
Jewellers. The petitioner has nothing to do with the contraband.
He had not sold or delivered the contraband to any person. The
petitioner is the first offender. The police have filed the
chargesheet before the Court, and the petitioner’s further
detention is not justified. He would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party apprehended Kamajeet Singh
2026:HHC:6206
with a carry bag containing 262 grams of heroin on 27.10.2024.
The police seized the heroin and arrested Kamaljeet. Kamaljeet
revealed during the interrogation that he had purchased the
heroin from Rajesh, and he was to deliver it to Rajat Kumar. The
police checked call details records and found that Rajesh and
Rajat Kumar had been in touch with each other. The police
apprehended Rajesh, who revealed that Vishal, a resident of
Dubai, supplies the heroin to him with directions to further
supply it to the persons named by him. He used to hand over the
money to Rajesh Kumar alias Sethi. The police apprehended
Rajesh Kumar alias Sethi.
Rajesh Kumar alias Sethi revealed
during the interrogation that he had handed over the money to
Lakhvinder Singh (petitioner) as per the directions of Vishal.
The police apprehended Lakhvinder, who revealed that he had
deposited the money into his account and handed over some of
the money to Mohit Singh, an employee of Gaurav Jewellers. He
had also handed over about three crores rupees to Gagan Sarna,
owner of Gaurav Jeweller. The police arrested Mohit Singh and
recovered the gold ornaments, currency notes, and the
investment documents. The police also arrested Mohit, who
revealed that Lakhwinder had handed over cash, 67 grams of
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gold jewellery, 97 grams of silver jewellery and a mobile phone
to him. The police seized the jewellery, mobile phone, insurance
bonds and currency notes worth ₹4,90,000/-. The petitioner
had deposited about ₹4,90,000/-, 67.93 grams of gold, 95.45
grams of silver, and insurance bonds with Mohit Singh. He had
also deposited a cash amount of ₹1,15,00,000/-, 1 kg 25 grams
gold and 4 grams of silver with Gagan Sarna. This money was
generated by the sale of the heroin. The challan was filed before
the Court, and the matter was listed before the learned Trial
Court on 19.12.2025. Hence, the status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Umesh Kanwar, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr
Umesh
Kanwar,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. As per the prosecution, the drug money was
deposited with the petitioner, which may attract the provisions
of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, but does not attract
the provisions of the NDPS Act. The co-accused have been
released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the
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principle of parity. The petitioner would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
6.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner
was involved in the drug trade. He abetted the sale and purchase
of heroin. The quantity of heroin recovered by the police is
commercial, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply
to the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380:(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
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trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under:
(SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise
polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional
but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences
while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on
the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
(emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep
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in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour,
means and standing of the accused, circumstances
which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility
of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind
that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature
has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing”
instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as
to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima
facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis
supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted
as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this
Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion
in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An
order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be
sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant
of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the
accused in the society, though it may be considered by
itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant
of bail, and the same should always be coupled with
other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The
nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations
for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime,
the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
2026:HHC:6206
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of
the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which
ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail
have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is
well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
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(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine
Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine
Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar,
(2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para
35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time
while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations
against an accused and the facts that have a bearing
in the case, particularly, when the accusations may
not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are
supported by adequate material brought on record so
as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of
bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to
the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused,
if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged
against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)
9.
2026:HHC:6206
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
As per the prosecution, the drug money was being
handed over to the petitioner, who deposited it with Mohit Singh
and Gagan Sarna. It was submitted that this amounts to
financing of the drugs, attracting the provisions of Section 27A
of the NDPS Act. This submission cannot be accepted. The term
financing was explained by the Bombay High Court in Rhea
Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248 as under: “66. Section 27A is much wider if sub-clause (iv) of
Section 2(viiia) is taken into account. This sub-clause (iv)
of Section 2(viiia) takes in its sweep all the remaining
activities which are not mentioned in sub-clauses (i),(ii)
& (iii). This covers just about every activity that can be
described as dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances. The interpretation of Section 27A should not
be stretched to the extent of rendering the classification
of sentences depending on the quantities in penal
Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 otiose.
67. Sub-clause (viiia) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act is an
inclusive definition. The inclusive part mentions
financing, abetting, conspiring and harbouring. The
financing and harbouring parts are specifically made
punishable under Section 27A.
68. The activities mentioned in Section 2(viiia)(iii) and
Section 8(c) refer to sale, purchase, export, import, etc. All
these activities involve monetary transactions. For every sale
or purchase, there can be a use of money. But that will not
mean that either of the parties has “financed” the
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transaction. Such sales and purchases are separately
prohibited and made punishable under Section 8(c), read
with Section 20 and other similar Sections. Therefore,
“financing” is something more than just paying for
purchases and other activities involving contraband as
defined under Section 8(c). Contravention of that Section and
indulging in activities mentioned in Sections 20, 21, 22 and
23 incur punishment depending on the quantity of the
contraband.
69. For interpreting Section 27A harmoniously with the
Scheme of the Act and other Sections, it is necessary to go
to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for incorporating
this Section in the Act w.e.f. 29.5.1989. The Statement of
Objects and Reasons of the 1989 Amendment, which is
reproduced hereinbefore, mentions that India was facing
a problem of transit traffic in illicit drugs. The spillover
from such traffic was causing problems of abuse and
addiction. Therefore, a need was felt to amend the Law to
further strengthen it.
70. Thus, the aim was to control the traffic in illicit drugs
as the spillover from such traffic was causing problems of
abuse and addiction. The Legislature wanted to attack the
basic cause of the illicit traffic of drugs. The prohibitory
Section 8 already existed at that time. Therefore, a
separate Section 27A was introduced to check these
activities, which were the root cause of illicit traffic.
“Financing” and “harbouring” such activities were,
therefore, specifically mentioned under Section 27A.
71. “Financing” is not defined under the Act. The Concise
Oxford Dictionary defines the word “finance” as “(1) the
management of (esp. public) money, (2) monetary
support for an enterprise, (3) (in pl.) the money resources
of a state, company, or person, to provide capital for (a
person or enterprise)”.
72. Black's Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word
“finance” as “to raise or provide funds”.
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73. Thus, “financing” as generally understood is offering
monetary support or providing funds.
74. Therefore, simply providing money for a particular
transaction or other transactions will not be financing of that
activity. Financing will have to be interpreted to mean to
provide funds for either making that particular activity
operational or for sustaining it. It is the financial support that
directly or indirectly causes the existence of such illicit traffic.
The word “financing” would necessarily refer to some
activities involving illegal trade or business
75. The allegations against the Applicant of spending
money in procuring drugs for Sushant Singh Rajput will
not, therefore, mean that she had financed illicit traffic.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.
In the present case, the prosecution alleged that
Lakhwinder had deposited money generated from the sale of the
heroin in a joint account. This prima facie does not amount to
financing the drug trade, but getting the benefits from the trade,
and the allegations do not constitute financing attracting the
provisions of Section 27A of the NDPS Act.
12.
Therefore, prima facie, the prosecution has failed to
establish the offence punishable under Section 27A of the NDPS
Act against the petitioner.
13.
It was submitted that the petitioner was an abettor
as he had received the money from the drug dealer. This
submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Gujarat
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High Court in Lalitbhai Vikramchand Parekh vs. State of Gujarat
and Ors. (10.04.2015 - GUJHC): MANU/GJ/0165/2015 that the
abettor is a person who instigates the commission of the
offence. It was observed:
13. As the expressions "abetment" and "abettor" have
been legislatively defined, the ordinary dictionary
meaning of the expressions would not be determinative
of their import. It may, however, be useful to have a look
at the dictionary meaning of the expression "abet".
According to Webster, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, Vol. I, the expression "abet", means to incite,
encourage, instigate, or countenance, usually used
disparagingly. According to Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th
ed., "abet" means to stir up or excite, to maintain or
patronise: to encourage or set on, and the "abettor" is an
instigator or setter on, one who promotes or procures a
crime to be committed. Stroud, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary,
4th ed., has given various meanings of the expression
"aid" or "abet", based on judicial pronouncements in
England, in the context of different statutes. Thus,
according to Hawkins, 51 L J.M.C. 78-R. v. Coney, J., "To
constitute an aider or abettor, some active steps must be
taken, by word or action, with intent to instigate the
principal or principals. Encouragement does not, of
necessity, amount to aiding and abetting. It may be
intentional or unintentional. A man may unwillingly
encourage another in fact by his presence, by
misinterpreted gestures, or by his silence or noninterference; he may encourage intentionally by
expressions, gestures, or actions, intended to signify
approval. In the latter case, he aids and abets; in the
former he does not." Stroud also cites the case of Du Cros
v. Lambourne, 1907 (1) K.B. 40. in which it was held that
"the owner in, and in control of, a motor car which is
being driven at an improper speed by a driver who is not
2026:HHC:6206
his servant, "aids or abets" in the offence if he (the
owner) does not interfere." It is further noticed on the
basis of decision in the case of Rubie v. Faulkner, 1980 (1)
K.B. 571: "For a supervisor of a learner driver to see that
an unlawful act is about to be done and to fail to prevent it
is he can is for him to aid and abet." It is further noticed,
on the authority of the decision in the case of Callow v.
Tillstone, 83 L.T. 411, that "A man does not by negligence
aid and abet a person to expose unsound meat for sale." It
is further noticed, on the basis of the decision in the case
of Ackroyds Air Travel v. Director of Police Prosecutions,
1950 (1) All. E.R. 933 and Thomas v. Lindop, 1950 (1) All. E.R.
966, that "If a person knows all the circumstances which
constitute the offence he will be guilty of aiding and
abetting whether he knew that they did in fact constitute
the offence or not " Stroud also quotes Lord Goddard C J.
in Ferguson v. Weaving, 1951 (1) K.B 814, that "it is well
know that the words 'aid and abet are apt to describe the
action of a person who is present at the time of the
commission of an offence and takes some part therein."
14. It may be useful to refer to some of the early English
decisions, dealing with different ways of taking part in a
felony. It was recognised that a felony may be committed
by the hand of an "innocent agent" who, having no
blameworthy intentions in that he did, incurred no
criminal liability by doing it. In such a case, the man who
"instigates" this agent is the real offender; his was the
last mens rea that preceded the crime, though it did not
cause it "immediately but mediately". "Thus, if a
physician provides a poisonous draught and tells a nurse
that it is the medicine to be administered to her patient,
and then by her administration of it the patient is killed,
the murderous physician-and not the innocent nurse-is
the principal in the first-degree murder. 52 (T.A.C.)." In
English Law, as it stood before the later developments, "a
principal in the second degree is one by whom the actual
perpetrator of the felony is aided and abetted at the very
time when it is committed; for instance, a car-owner
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sitting beside the chauffeur who kills some one by overfast driving, or a passenger on a clandestine joy-riding
expedition which results in manslaughter 1930 (22) Cr,
App. R. 70: 144 L.T. 185, "or bigamist's second 'wife' if she
knows he is committing bigamy, or even be spectators if
they actively encourage such a contest even by mere
applause. "But a spectator's presence at a prize-fight
does not of itself constitute sufficient encouragement to
amount to an aiding and abetting 1882 (8) Q.B.D. 534." It
was also recognised that a man may effectively "aid and
abet" a crime and at the very moment of its perpetration,
without being present at the place where it is perpetrated.
"To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a person must either
render effective aid to the principal offender or else must
be present and acquiesce in what he is doing. Before a
person can be convicted of aiding and abetting the
commission of an offence, he must at least know the
essential matters which constitute the offence 1951 (1) All.
E.R. 412(414). "But acquiescence sufficient to constitute
the offence may be established by evidence of the accused
person’s motive and of his subsequent conduct 1951 (1)
All. E.R. 464."
In the category of "accessory before the fact" comes a
person who "procures or advises" one or more of the
principals to commit the felony. This "requires from him
an instigation so active that a person who is merely
shown to have acted as the stakeholder for a prize-fight
which ended fatally, would not be punishable as an
accessory, 1875, 2 C.C.R. 147." "The fact that a crime has
been committed in a manner different from the mode
which the accessory had advised will not excuse him from
liability for it. But a man who has counselled a crime does
not become liable as an accessory if. Instead of any form
of the crime suggested, an entirely different offence is
committed, 1936 (2) All. E.R. 813." Kenny, Kenny's
Outlines of Criminal Law, New ed. by J.W.C. Turner, p. 88,
points out that it is not always easy to decide whether or
not the crime actually committed comes within the terms
2026:HHC:6206
of the "incitement." to make the inciter legally
responsible for it. He further observed that the courts in
some of the older cases tended to "take a strict view of the
facts" and refers by illustration to the case of R. v.
Saunders, Kel. 52 (T.A.C.) and Archer in 1578. referred to in
Plowden.
xxxxx
16. Halsbury, in Halsbury's Law of England, 4th ed. Paras. 42
to 44 notice some of the English decisions in the matter of
classification of offence and complicity in the crime.
Thus, a person who "assists the perpetrator at the time of
its commission, or if he assists or encourages the
perpetrator before its commission, was held liable 1970, 2
Q.B. 54. According to R.V. Gregory (1867) L.R.I. C.C.R. 77
"any person who aids, counsels or procures the
commission of an offence, whether an offence at common
law or by statute, and whether indictable or summary, is
liable to be tried and punished as a principal offender."
Mere presence at the commission of the crime is not
enough to create criminal liability, nor is it enough that a
person is present with a secret intention to assist the
principal should assistance be required. Some
encouragement or assistance must have been given to the
principal either before or at the time of the commission of
the crime with the intention of furthering its commission.
Presence without more may, however, afford some
evidence of aid and encouragement. It is an indictable
offence at common law for a person to incite or solicit
another to commit an offence. For an incitement to be
complete, there must be some form of actual
communication with a person whom it is intended to
incite. Where, however, a communication is sent with a
view to inciting, but does not reach the intended
recipient, the sender may be guilty of an attempt to incite.
Incitement is complete though the mind of the person
incited is unaffected, and notwithstanding that person
incited intends to inform on the inciter; but there can be
no incitement unless one person seeks to persuade or
2026:HHC:6206
encourage another. Halsbury's Laws of England, Paras. 42
to 44.
xxxxx
18. Some later decisions arising out of other instances of
instigation throw further light on the question. In the
case
of
Parimal
Chatterjee
and
others
MANU/WB/0073/1932: A.I.R 1932 Cal. 760, a Division Bench
of the Calcutta High Court observed that the word
"instigate" literally means to goad or urge forward or to
provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act. A person
may, however, not only instigate another, but he may cooperate with him, and his Co-operation may consist of a
conjoint action, and that would amount to abetment. In
the case of State of Bihar v. Ranen Nath and other
MANU/BH/0096/1958: A.I.R. 1958 Patna 259, a Division
Bench of the Patna High Court was construing Section 27
of the Industrial Disputes Act which uses the expressions
Instigation and incitement' and observed that the words
"should be read to signify something deeper than a mere
asking of a person to do a particular act. There must be
something in the nature of solicitation to constitute
instigation or incitement" and it was held that the words
seem to convey the meaning "to goad or urge forward or
to provoke or encourage the doing of an act." It was
further observed that what acts should amount to
instigation or incitement within the meaning of that
section will depend upon the "particular facts of each
case", and that in some circumstances a "throw of a
finger" or "a mere turning of the eye' may give rise to an
inference of either "incitement or instigation", and yet in
others even "strong words, expressly used, may not mean
that the person using them was stimulating or suggesting
to anyone to do a particular act." The court expressed the
view that there must be something "tangible" in evidence
to show that the persons responsible for such action were
"deliberately trying to stir up other persons to bring
about a certain object". According to a division bench of
the Calcutta High Court, a person abets the doing of a
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thing when he or she, inter alia. "instigates any person to
do that thing." The other modes of abetment, besides
instigation, are "conspiracy and intentional aid". The
word "instigation" literally means "to goad or urge
forward to do an act." "It is something more than cooperation." In the case of Shri Ram and another,
MANU/SC/0207/1974: 1975 (2) S.C.R. 622, the Supreme
Court observed that in order to constitute abetment, the
abettor must be shown to have "intentionally" aided the
commission of the crime. "Mere proof that the crime
charged could not have been committed without the
interposition of the alleged abetter is not enough
compliance with the requirements of Section 107". A
person may, for example, "invite another casually or for a
friendly purpose and that may facilitate the murder of the
invitee". But unless the invitation was extended "with
intent to facilitate the commission of the murder", the
person inviting cannot be said to have abetted the
murder. It is not enough that an act on the part of the
alleged abettor "happens to facilitate the commission of
the crime". "Intentional aiding and therefore active
complicity is the gist of the offence of abetment under the
third paragraph of Section 107.”
14.
The prosecution asserted that the petitioner had
received the drug money and deposited it with different person,
which will not prima facie fall within the definition of abetment,
and he cannot be held liable under Section 29 of the NDPS Act.
15.
In view of the above, there is no reasonable ground to
believe that the petitioner has committed an offence punishable
under Section 27A of the NDPS Act or had abetted the possession
2026:HHC:6206
of a commercial quantity of heroin. Hence, his further detention
is not justified.
16.
Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and
the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions:(I)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses,
nor will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II)
The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for
a continuous period of seven days without
furnishing the address of the intended visit to the
SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and
the Trial Court.
(IV)
The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from
the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social
Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile
number or social media accounts, the same will be
intimated to the Police/Court within five days from
the date of the change.
17.
2026:HHC:6206
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to
file a petition for cancellation of the bail.
18.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District and Air
Correctional Home, Dharamshala, District Kangra, HP and the
learned Trial Court by FASTER.
19.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the case's merits.
9th March, 2026
(Nikita)
RAVINDER KUMAR
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA,
Phone=35ecb6f93c6891a7dae90f163e34d7ecaa420b13af1363204ab0e0f5c87077dc, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh,
SERIALNUMBER=f6cc63c55495d14ce1f8623eacdb6cb9ef2c553803537a2f53c4ee637cbebaff, CN=RAVINDER KUMAR
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
Date: 2026-03-09 14:23:25
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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