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( 2026:HHC:15034 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMP No.27640 of 2025 in
CWP No.1816 of 2018 & CMP
No.27641 of 2025 in CWP
No.1817 of 2018.
Reserved on: 23.04.2026
Decided on: 06.05.2026
1.
CMP No. 27640 of 2025 in CWP No.1816 of 2018
L&T Himachal Hydro Power Limited
...Petitioner/non-applicant.
versus
Government of Himachal Pradesh and another
...Applicants/Respondents
2.
CMP No. 27641 of 2025 in CWP No.1817 of 2018
L&T Himachal Hydro Power Limited
versus
...Petitioner/non-applicant.
Government of Himachal Pradesh and another
...Applicants/Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr.Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the petitioner(s):
Mr.Viplav
Sharma,
Senior
Advocate with Mr.Pratham,
Advocate and Mr.Dalip Kumar,
Advocate.
1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
For the respondents:
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
Mr.Gagan
Anand,
Special
Senior Standing Counsel for
Government
of
Himachal
Pradesh
with
Mr.Ramanjit
Singh, Ms.Simran Arora and
Mr.Karan Singh, Advocates.
Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge
The
respondents-State/applicants
have
preferred
these applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1996’),
seeking direction to refer the parties to mediation in view of
Clause 53 of the Pre-Implementation Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as ‘PIA’) dated 15.03.2011, thereby upholding the
sanctity of the Arbitration Agreement voluntarily executed
between the petitioner and the respondents/applicants.
2.
For the sake of convenience and for deciding both
applications, the facts of CWP No.1816 of 2018, are taken.
3.
Before considering the application for referring the
dispute to the Arbitrator, the prayers made in the writ petition are
reproduced hereunder:-
“a) Issue a writ of mandamus declaration or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction holding the action of
the respondents in failing to decide the representation
dated 16.09.2017 of the petitioner seeking withdrawal
from the Reoli-Dugli Hydro Electric Power Project in
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
District Lahaul & Spiti, Himachal Pradesh as violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and;
(b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ,
order or direction declaring that the Reoli-Dugli Hydro
Electric Power Project in District Lahaul & Spiti,
Himachal Pradesh has become techno-economically
unviable and consequently direct the respondents to
refund the petitioner the Upfront Premium Deposit of
INR 84,00,00,000/- (Rupees Eighty Four Crores) as
deposited by the petitioner on 08.11.2011 along with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of
deposit till the date of refund.
c)
4.
To pass a writ of mandamus directing the respondents
to refund the upfront premium of Rs. 84,00,00,000/(Rupees Eighty Four Crores) so deposited by the
petitioner and quashing and setting aside the impugned
Annexure P-B dated 23.11.2019 issued by respondent
No.2 being illegal, unjust, arbitrary and against the
provisions of natural justice.”
This Court had issued notice in the writ petition on
06.08.2018 to the respondents/applicants and the status quo as
on that day was ordered to be maintained.
5.
The respondents/applicants filed reply to the petition
on 22.09.2018, and raised preliminary objection that the petition
is not maintainable as the petitioner has not exhausted the
remedy available to it, under Clause 53 of PIA, which provides
that “any difference and/or disputes arising any time between the
parties out of this PIA/IA or interpretation thereof shall be
endeavored to be resolved by the parties hereto by mutual
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
negotiations, failing which, the matter shall be referred to the
Arbitrator to be appointed as per provisions of the Act, however,
all disputes shall be settled within the jurisdiction of Courts of
Himachal Pradesh.”
6.
The record shows that the matter was heard by this
Court on different dates and on 21.03.2024, learned senior
counsel for the petitioner had concluded his arguments and at the
request of learned counsel for the respondents/applicants, the
matter was adjourned to 05.04.2024. Thereafter, on numerous
occasions, the respondents/applicants sought time to argue the
matter.
However,
instead
of
arguing
the
matter,
the
respondents/applicants filed application on 10.11.2025 seeking
direction to refer the parties to arbitration, in view of Clause 53 of
‘PIA’ dated 15.03.2011.
7.
It has been averred in the application that the
petitioner is seeking refund of upfront premium of Rs.84 Crores
deposited on 08.01.2011 along-with interest @18% per annum
and as per order dated 21.03.2024, this Court had allowed the
petitioner to amend the prayer clause, thereby permitting it to
also seek the quashing of termination letter dated 23.11.2019, on
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
the ground that the same is illegal, arbitrary and violative of the
principles of natural justice.
8.
It has further been averred that in the year 2008, the
respondents/applicants had invited bids for setting up of 420 MW
Hydro Electric Power Plant in District Lahaul & Spiti, Himachal
Pradesh on BOOT basis vide advertisement dated 08/09.06.2008
and after careful scrutiny of the documents, the same was
allotted to the petitioner. Thereafter, ‘PIA’ was entered into
between the parties on 15.03.2011. As per terms of the ‘PIA’, the
petitioner was permitted to incorporate a Special Purpose Vehicle
having its registered office in the State of Himachal Pradesh for
the implementation of Reoli-Dugli HEP Project and thereafter
tripartite
agreement
dated
18.10.2011
was
executed
on
18.10.2011.
9.
On 11.03.2014, the petitioner had submitted Detailed
Project Report (DPR). As per Clause 3(6) of PIA, the petitioner
was required to sign the Implementation Agreement within a
period of two months after submission of DPR. On 05.09.2016,
the respondents/applicants informed the petitioner that since the
policy
guidelines
stand
amended
vide
Notification
dated
17.08.2016, last and final opportunity was granted to it to enter
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
into Implementation Agreement within a period of two months.
On
10.10.2016,
the
petitioner
requested
the
respondents/applicants to execute a Power Purchase Agreement
at tariff determined as per Central Regulatory Electricity
Commission. The petitioner was called for hearing on 18.11.2016
and subsequently after a period of almost 10 months from the
meeting, the petitioner sent a communication dated 16.09.2017
to the respondents/applicants, seeking withdrawal from the
project in terms of Clause 15 of ‘PIA’. On 18.09.2017, the DPR
submitted by the petitioner was modified and submitted to the
CEA for Techno Economic Clearance, which is pending till date.
10.
On 20.06.2018, another meeting was held between
the parties, wherein it was conveyed by the petitioner that it is
facing a number of challenges in implementing the project
including increase in tariff, in accessibility to the project site,
transmission issues, environmental floor release condition, goods
and service tax, land acquisition etc. and sought withdrawal from
the project. Accordingly, on 23.11.2019, the project was cancelled
by the respondents/applicants and was re-allotted to SJVN
Limited for its execution. Consequent upon the decision taken by
the
respondents/applicants,
the
letter
of
allotment
dated
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
30.10.2009 was cancelled and upfront premium of Rs.84 Crores
stood
forfeited
and
reverted
back
to
the
respondents-
State/applicants.
11.
In the application, it has also been averred that the
instant proceedings instituted by the petitioner are unlawful,
gratuitous and not maintainable in law, especially in view of
Clause 53 of the ‘PIA’ dated 15.03.2011. Section 8 of the Act
mandates that, if any, dispute is governed by an arbitration
agreement, then the Court, if the party so requests, to such
effect, shall refer the parties to arbitration. In the present case,
the respondents/applicants have raised a preliminary objection
regarding its maintainability. This objection was grounded in view
of the existence of a binding arbitration agreement under Clause
53 of ‘PIA’ dated 15.03.2011 and the disputes between the
parties fell within the ambit of Arbitration Agreement, thereby
rendering
the
writ
petition
not
maintainable.
Once
the
respondents/applicants have taken an objection regarding the
maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of existence of a
binding arbitration clause, such an objection must be adjudicated
at the threshold, before examining the merits of the case. The
dispute raised by the petitioner is purely contractual in nature and
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
entirely covered by the terms of the ‘PIA’ and there is a dispute
regarding interpretation of Clause 15 and determination as to
which party is in breach of contractual obligations. Such
adjudication necessarily entails leading evidence, examination of
technical materials, commercial considerations, performance
records and financial implications etc.
12.
The petitioner filed reply to the application and
opposed the application on the grounds that the same is misconceived in law and on facts, is grossly belated and is an
attempt to divest this Court of jurisdiction after it has been
consciously and repeatedly exercising jurisdiction in these very
proceedings. This Court has already exercised its writ jurisdiction
at multiple stages and such jurisdiction cannot now be divested at
the behest of the State, once the matter is in seisin. The nature of
dispute is squarely concerns the arbitrary and unconstitutional
forfeiture and withholding of public money by the State, which
raised issues of public law rights under Articles 14, 19, 21, 265
and 300A of the Constitution of India and thus amenable to writ
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the presence of an arbitration clause.
The writ petition seeking refund of amount wrongly retained by
the State instrumentalities are expressly held to be maintainable
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
even where arbitration clauses exist. The invocation of Section 8
of the Act in the year 2025 is ex-facie belated, after the
respondents have filed reply, the petitioner’s rejoinder has been
filed, interim and clarificatory orders have been passed and even
amendment of the writ petition has been allowed. It has further
been averred that Section 8(1) of the Act mandates that an
application for reference to arbitration must be filed ‘not later
than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance
of the dispute’. The respondents/applicants have filed detailed
reply/counter affidavit on 20.09.2018, which constitutes their first
statement on the substance of the dispute. Having submitted to
the jurisdiction of this Court and having participated in the
proceedings for nearly seven years, the respondents/applicants
are now statutorily barred from invoking Section 8 of the Act, at
this belated stage.
13.
The legislative purpose of the 2015 amendment was
to eliminate dilatory tactics and ensure that a party wishing to rely
on an arbitration clause must elect that remedy at the very first
opportunity. The respondents/applicants’ seven years delay is
against this mandate. It has been averred that under the unamended Section 8 of the Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. vs. SBI Home Finance Ltd.
and others (2011) 5 SCC 532, has held that though Section 8
of the Act, did not prescribe a rigid period of limitation, the
scheme of the Act and the provisions of the Section clearly
indicate that the application thereunder should be made at the
earliest. Further, the respondents/applicants have not complied
with the provisions of Section 8(2) of the Act, since the
respondents/applicants have neither filed an original arbitration
agreement nor have placed on record any duly certified copy
thereof.
It has been averred that this Court vide order dated
06.08.2018 had passed the status quo order, recognizing the
need to protect the petitioner’s right pending adjudication. Vide
order dated 18.09.2019, this Court had allowed the applications
filed by the respondents/applicants, seeking clarification/vacation
of status quo only to the limited extent of permitting the State to
proceed with re-allotment and thereafter, the petitioner had been
constrained to move an application bearing CMP No.14610 of
2019, when the respondents/applicants were terminating the PIA
forfeiting the upfront premium vide letter dated 23.11.2019 and
this Court vide order dated 10.12.2019, clarified that forfeiture of
Rs.84 Crores could not be effected during the pendency of the
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
writ petition and the question of forfeiture/refund would abide by
the final outcome of this writ petition. Thereafter, vide order
dated 11.03.2020, this Court had allowed the petitioner’s
amendment application incorporating an additional prayer seeking
challenge to impugned termination. The application filed after
seven years of the writ petition is impermissible and abusive
attempt to oust the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court after
they have submitted to it and obtained orders in their favour.
14.
The respondents/applicants filed rejoinder to the reply
and controverted the submissions.
15.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also
perused the record carefully.
16.
Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be
relevant to reproduce the provisions of Section 8 of the Act after
its amendment, which read as under:"8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where
there is an arbitration agreement –
(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought
in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration
agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration
agreement or any person claiming through or under
him, so applies not later than the date of submitting
his first statement on the substance of the dispute,
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order
of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties
to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid
arbitration agreement exists.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall
not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the
original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy
thereof.
[Provided that where the original arbitration
agreement or a certified copy thereof is not available
with the party applying for reference to arbitration
under sub-section (1), and the said agreement or
certified copy is retained by the other party to that
agreement, then, the party so applying shall file such
application alongwith a copy of the arbitration
agreement and a petition praying the Court to call
upon the other party to produce the original
arbitration agreement or its duly certified copy before
that Court.]
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made
under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending
before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be
commenced or continued and an arbitral award
made."
17.
A perusal of Section 8 of the Act, clearly provides that
if a party to the Arbitration Agreement or any person claiming
through or under him, so applies not later than the date of
submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, to
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
seek reference of the parties to arbitration. Admittedly, in the
present case, the writ petition was instituted before this Court on
03.08.2018 and this Court had issued the notice to the
respondents/applicants on 06.08.2018 and thereafter various
orders have been passed by this Court as mentioned above. No
doubt, when the written statement/reply was filed by the
respondents, an objection has been taken regarding the
maintainability of the writ petition on the plea that the petitioner
has not exhausted the remedy available to it under Clause 53 of
the
‘PIA’,
but
no
pro-active
steps
were
taken
by
the
respondents/applicants to file an application under Section 8 of
the Act, before this Court. When the respondents/applicants had
passed the office order dated 23.11.2019, to forfeit the upfront
premium amount of Rs.84 Crores deposited by the petitioner,
without any liability of the Government, subject to the decision of
this Court, no steps were taken even thereafter also to file an
application for referring the dispute. Thereafter, this Court had
heard the matter on 21.03.2024 and the senior counsel for the
petitioner had concluded his arguments and no arguments were
advanced by the respondents/applicants on the plea that the
learned Advocate General is not available on account of pre-
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
occupation in some other Court and the matter was adjourned to
05.04.2024.
When the matter was listed before the Court on
05.04.2024, a prayer was made to file reply to the amended
petition and the Court had granted two weeks’ time to do the
needful, but had specifically observed that the matter came to be
adjourned at the behest of respondents-State/applicants. It was
observed that there appears to be no reason to grant further
time, but, by way of indulgence, the matter is adjourned to
08.05.2025, on which date, the matter shall be heard finally and
no request for adjournment shall be entertained. On 08.05.2024,
on the vehement request of learned Advocate General four weeks’
time was granted to place on record copy of DPR in electronic
form and the matter was ordered to be listed on 10.06.2024.
Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on various dates i.e.
13.06.2024, 17.07.2024, 24.08.2024, 12.12.2024 and 04.03.2025.
The application under Section 8 of the Act for referring the parties
to arbitration came to be filed by the respondents/applicants on
10.11.2025.
18.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents/applicants
vehemently argued that once the respondents had specifically
pleaded in the written statement/reply filed to the writ petition
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
that the petition is not maintainable, since the petitioner has not
exhausted the remedy available to it, under Clause 53 of the ‘PIA’,
coupled with the fact that this Court cannot look into the issue,
which is purely technical in nature, it cannot be construed that
there is delay in filing the application for referring the matter to
arbitration. To buttress his submissions, he placed reliance upon
the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Morgan
Securities & Credit (P) Ltd. vs. Modi Rubber Ltd., (2006)
12 SCC 642, Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. vs. SBI Home
Finance Ltd. and others (2011) 5 SCC 532, Surya
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. State of India, 2025 SCC Online
Bom 1133, Pratap Singh vs. Bhagwan Singh, 2025 SCC
Online HP 1121, M/s Sawariya Filling Station vs. Union of
India and others, 2018 SCC Online P&H 7772 and Triom
Hospitality, through its Partner, Mr. Sanjay Sharma vs.
J.S. Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC Online Del
8647, to contend that once the objection regarding jurisdiction
has been taken and the provisions of Section 8 of the Act do not
prescribe any time limit for filing an application to seek the matter
referred and only states that the objection under Section 8 of the
Act, should be taken by the party not later than the date of
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
submitting of the first statement of the substance of dispute. In
the case of respondents/applicants, they had specifically pleaded
in the written statement/reply to the writ petition filed by them at
the first statement on the substance of the dispute that this Court
had no jurisdiction and the petition be dismissed.
19.
Learned counsel placed much reliance on the
judgment passed by this Court in CMPMO No.322 of 2024,
titled, Pratap Singh vs. Bhagwan Singh, decided on 1st April,
2025. He argued that this Court has categorically held that
normally with respect to a suit, the first statement on the
substance of the dispute would be the written statement and
once in the written statement, it is brought to the notice of the
Court that there exists an arbitration agreement between the
parties, which embraces the subject matter of the suit, there
would be complete compliance with the mandate of the law and
the Court would be obliged to refer the parties to arbitration. The
absence of any formal request for referring the dispute to
arbitration makes no difference.
20.
I have gone through the judgments passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court and other High Courts referred to by the
learned counsel. In Morgan Securities & Credit (P) Ltd. case
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with
the judicial authority and held that in ordinary parlance ‘judicial
authority’, would comprehend a Court defined under the Act, but
also Courts, which would either be a Civil Court or other authorities,
which perform judicial functions or quasi-judicial functions.
21.
In another judgment Booz Allen’s case (supra) , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that Section 8 of the Act does
not prescribe any time limit for filing an application, but only
states that the application under Section 8 of the Act should be
filed before submission of the first statement of dispute. In the
present case, the application has not been filed before submission
of the first statement of dispute. Further, it has been held that if a
party who willingly participates in the proceedings in the suit and
subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Court cannot
subsequently turn around and say that the parties should be
referred to arbitration in view of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. The relevant para 29 of the judgment is reproduced
as under:“29. Though section 8 does not prescribe any time limit
for filing an application under that section, and only states
that the application under Section 8 of the Act should be
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
filed before submission of the first statement on the
substance of the dispute, the scheme of the Act and the
provisions of the section clearly indicate that the
application thereunder should be made at the earliest.
Obviously, a party who willingly participates in the
proceedings in the suit and subjects himself to the
jurisdiction of the court cannot subsequently turn round
and say that the parties should be referred to arbitration
in view of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Whether a party has waived his right to seek arbitration
and subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
depends upon the conduct of such party in the suit.”
22.
In
the
present
case,
no
doubt,
the
respondents/applicants have taken objection in the written
statement/reply to the writ petition regarding maintainability,
since the petitioner has not exhausted remedy available under
Clause 53 of the ‘PIA’, but did not take any proactive steps for
moving an application under Section 8 of the Act for referring the
dispute for arbitration. The mandate of law as propounded is to
apply to refer the matter to arbitration not later than the date of
submitting the first statement on the substance of the dispute by
the party. The other judgments cited by the learned counsel for
the respondents/applicants are also not attracted in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the present case, especially when the
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
respondents/applicants were submitting before this Court and
thus, they have waived off their right to apply for seeking
reference to arbitration. The record shows that at one point of
time, matter was argued on behalf of the petitioners and the
respondents/applicants had sought time to make submissions on
their behalf and thus, the application filed at this belated stage,
cannot be allowed and the matter cannot be referred to
arbitration. The plea taken that an objection was taken in the
reply to the writ petition does not satisfy the mandate of law. The
party requires to apply not later than the date of submitting the
first statement of substance of the dispute. If the party has not
applied, it has waived off the right to seek reference of dispute to
arbitration.
23.
So far as the judgment passed by this Court in
Pratap Singh’s case (supra) is concerned, no doubt, the Court
has noticed that once the plea has been taken in the first
statement on the substance of dispute in the written statement
that there exists an arbitration agreement between the parties,
which embraces the subject matter of the suit, there would be
complete compliance with the mandate of the law and the Court
would be obliged to refer the parties to arbitration. But the
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
judgment in Booz Allen’s case (supra), passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was not brought to its notice, wherein it has been
held that though there is no time-limit to file an application under
Section 8 of the Act, but it should be filed before submitting the
first statement on the substance of the dispute and further, once
the party willingly participates in the proceedings in the suit and
subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Court cannot
subsequently turn around and say that the parties should be
referred to arbitration.
Furthermore, the Court has considered
the old provisions of Act and not the amended provisions of
Section
of
the
Act.
In
the
present
case,
the
respondents/applicants had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Court and reply to the writ petition was filed on 22.09.2018 and
application to seek to refer the dispute on 10.11.2025 after more
than seven years of filing the reply to the writ petition.
24.
There is no murmur in the entire application that why
did the respondents/applicants earlier not filed the application to
seek reference of the dispute. Once this Court was not brought to
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which is binding on
this Court, the law laid down by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
is of no help to the respondents/applicants.
25.
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SCG
Contracts (India) Private Limited vs. K.S. Chamankar
Infrastructure Private Limited and others, (2019) 12 SCC
210 to contend that since the respondents/applicants have not
filed the application within the time of submitting of the first
statement on the substance of the dispute, the same cannot be
entertained at this belated stage of more than seven years of
filing the first statement on the substance of the dispute. He also
placed heavy reliance on the judgment passed by the Delhi High
Court in SSIPL Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd. vs. Vama Apparels India
(P.) Ltd. and another 2020 SCC Online Del 1667 to contend
that since the application has not been filed at the time of filing
the reply to the petition, the same cannot be entertained at this
stage. He argued that that though there is no limitation period
prescribed for filing an application under Section 8 of the Act, but
it has to be filed not later than the date of submitting the
statement on the substance of the dispute. Further, keeping in
view the amendment carried out in the Act in the year 2015, the
legislature has now made a conscious change by using the
language that if a party to the arbitration agreement so applies
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
‘not later than the date of submission of his first statement’. The
use of the word date itself signifies precision and the application
has to be filed not later than submitting the first statement on the
substance. The purpose behind incorporating the amendment was
to tighten the time limit within which arbitration proceedings
should commence and conclude. Earlier, under Section 9 of the
Act, there was no limitation fixed for commencement for invoking
arbitration after seeking interim relief, however, in the amended
provisions, within 90 days after the interim order is passed the
arbitral proceedings have to be commenced.
26.
Learned counsel has also laid emphasis on the
judgment in Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc’s case (supra) to
contend that once the party who willingly participates in the
proceedings in the suit and subjects himself to the jurisdiction of
the Court cannot subsequently turn around and say that the
parties should be referred to arbitration in view of the existence
of an arbitration agreement.
27.
Learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs.
Tantia Construction Private Ltd. (2011) 5 SCC 697 to
contend that the petition on account of arbitration clause cannot
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
be construed an absolute power to the invocation of the writ
jurisdiction by the High Court.
28.
As already noticed above, after the amendment
carried out in the Act in the year 2015, if the party applies not
later than date of submitting the first statement on the substance
of the dispute, the Court has to refer the matter for arbitration in
view of the arbitration agreement. However, in the present case,
the application has been filed after seven years of submitting the
first statement of substance. No doubt, the plea has been taken
in the reply to the writ petition, but the same is not enough, to
get the matter referred for arbitration. Not only this, there is no
plea ever raised before the Court to refer the matter to arbitration
and thus, once the respondents/applicants have submitted before
the Court and did not file an application at the time of submitting
reply to the writ petition, which would be first statement on the
substances of dispute, the plea raised at this belated stage cannot
be countenanced and thus, the same is rejected.
29.
Furthermore, the judgments cited above by the
learned counsel have culled out the principles that the party has
to take proactive steps for institution of an application to refer the
dispute to arbitration not later than the date of submitting his first
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
statement on the substance of the dispute and once the
respondents/applicants
have
willingly
participated
in
the
proceedings and subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court, cannot
take plea at this belated stage to refer the matter to arbitration in
view of the arbitration clause in the agreement. There is a
purpose to engraft Section 8 of the Act by specifically mentioning
to apply not later than the date of submitting first statement on
the substance of the dispute. If the objection is taken in the
reply/written-statement, but no application is filed to seek
reference of the dispute, the party once participated/submitted to
jurisdiction has waived off its right to apply later to refer the
dispute. In case any other view is taken, it would result to rewrite
the provision of Section 8 of the Act. The Courts have to give
literal meaning to the provisions of the Act. Once the language of
Section 8 of the Act clearly mentions that if the party applies not
later than the date of submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute, the Court cannot interpret that even if
the objection is taken in the reply/written statement, it means the
party had sought reference of the dispute. It is settled law that
the Courts cannot re-write the provisions of the Act and
reference, in this regard is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
Supreme Court in Manmohan Das Shah and others vs.
Bishun Das AIR 1967 SC 643. The relevant paragraph of the
judgment reads as under:6…………..The ordinary rule of construction is that a
provision of a statute must be construed in accordance
with the language used therein unless there are
compelling reasons, such as, where a literal construction
would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the
manifest intention of the legislature from being carried
out. There is no reason why the word "or" should be
construed otherwise than in its ordinary meaning. If the
construction suggested by Mr. Desai were to be accepted
and the word "or" were to be construed as meaning "and"
it would mean that the construction should not only be
such as materially alters the accommodation but is also
such that it would substantially diminish its value. Such an
interpretation is not warranted for the simple reason that
there may conceivably be material alterations which do
not, however, diminish the value of the accommodation
and on the other hand there may equally conceivably be
alterations which are not
material alterations but
nevertheless would substantially diminish the value of the
premises. It seems to us that the legislature intended to
provide for both the contingencies and where one or the
other exists it was intended to furnish a ground to the
landlord to sue his tenant without having to obtain the
previous permission of the District Magistrate. The
( 2026:HHC:15034 )
construction of clause (c) placed by the High Court is
therefore not correct.”
30.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. vs. Jayesh H. Pandya and
another (2003) 5 SCC 531 to contend that since the
respondents have not filed the original arbitration agreement or
duly certified copy thereof with the application, the matter could
not be referred. Since the respondents have placed on record the
copy of PIA along-with the rejoinder, the said objection taken by
the petitioner, is rejected.
31.
Resultantly, I do not find any merit in these
applications and the same are accordingly dismissed.
32.
th
List CWP Nos.1816 and 1817 of 2018 on 28.05.2026.
6 May, 2026
(naveen)
( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj )
Judge
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