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-1NC: 2026:KHC:16370
CRL.P No. 16206 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 16206 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
1.
KUSUMA V,
D/O LATE VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
CEO/OWNER, EDITOR AND ANCHOR OF
PRAJASHAKTI NEWS CHANNEL,
R/AT KOTE,
BEHIND ANJANAIYASWAMY TEMPLE,
NEAR OLD MARKET, CHIKKAPET
TUMKUR - 527 101.
2.
DEEPAK K,
S/O KOTTURAPPA K.C,
REPORTER,
PRAJASHAKTI NEWS CHANNEL,
AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
R/AT KENKERE POST,
HULIYARU HOBLI,
CHIKKANAYAKANAHALLI,
TUMKUR - 572 218.
SANJEEVINI J
KARISHETTY
Location: High
Court of Karnataka
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. TAHIR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
STATE BY NEW EXTENSION P.S.,
REPRESENTED BY
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CRL.P No. 16206 of 2025
HC-KAR
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
ADVOCATE GENERAL OFFICE,
HIGH COURT COMPLEX,
OPPOSITE TO VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2.
CHETHAN KUMAR G,
POLICE OFFICER (PSI),
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
NEW EXTENSION P.S.,
TUMAKURU,
TUMKUR - 572 101.
KARNATAKA.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.ANOOP KUMAR, HCGP FOR R1)
THIS CRL.P. IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528
BNNS)
PRAYING
TO
QUASH
THE
FIR
BEARING
CRIME
NO.162/2025 REGISTERED BY THE NEW EXTENSION P.S. AT
ANNEXURE-A FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCE P/U/S 353(2) R/W
3(5) OF BNS NOW PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDL.CIVIL
JUDGE (SR.DN) AND C.J.M COURT AT TUMKUR WHEREIN THE
PETITIONERS ARE ARRAYED AS ACCUSED NO.1 AND 2.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
-3NC: 2026:KHC:16370
CRL.P No. 16206 of 2025
HC-KAR
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners are
before
this Court, seeking
the
following prayer:
"Wherefore, the Petitioners most humbly prays before this
Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash the FIR bearing crime
no.162/2025 registered by the New Extention PS at
Annexure-A, for the alleged offences under section 353(2)
R/w 3(5) of BNS now pending on the files of ADDL CIVIL
JUDGE (Sr.Dn.) AND CJM COURT, AT TUMKUR, wherein
the petitioners are arrayed as accused no. 1 and 2 in the
interest of justice and equity."
2.
Heard Sri. Tahir, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Sri. Anoop Kumar, learned HCGP appearing for
respondent No.1 and have perused the material on record.
3.
Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:
The petitioners are accused Nos.1 and 2 - Chief Executive
Officer
and
reporter,
respectively
of
the
media
house - Prajashakti TV Kannada. The 2nd respondent is the
complainant. On 01-11-2025, the 2nd respondent finds a link in
the Social Media Monitoring Cell group, which is a video on the
YouTube channel of Prajashakti TV Kannada. The allegation is
that the said video targets one community and incites another.
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CRL.P No. 16206 of 2025
HC-KAR
Therefore,
the
subject
crime
is
registered
against
the
petitioners for the aforesaid offence.
4.
The entire issue is now triggered by registration of
the complaint against the petitioner. Therefore, I deem it
appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows:
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°APï C£ÀÄß N¥À£ï ªÀiÁr £ÉÆÃqÀĪÁUÀ CzÀgÀ°è ¥ÀæeÁ±ÀQÛ n« PÀ£ÀßqÀ JA§
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EgÀĪÀÅ¢®è JAzÀÄ ªÀgÀ¢ ¤ÃrgÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
-5NC: 2026:KHC:16370
CRL.P No. 16206 of 2025
HC-KAR
DzÀÝjAzÀ ¥ÀæeÁ±ÀQÛ n« PÀ£ÀßqÀ JA§ AiÀÄÆlÆå¨ï ZÁ£É¯ï £À°è ©ÃqÁr zÀ£ÀzÀ
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¥ÀæZÉÆÃzÀ£ÉUÉÆ¼À¥Àr¹ ¸ÁªÀðd¤PÀ ªÀ®AiÀÄzÀ°è ªÉÊgÀ, zÉéõÀ ªÉʪÀÄ£À¸ÀåzÀ ¨sÁªÀ£ÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß
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ªÀÄzsÉå ¥sÀæw¨sÀl£É, UÀ¯ÁmÉUÀ¼ÁUÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvɬÄgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ F ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ©üvÀÛj¹zÀÄÝ,
EzÀjAzÀ JgÀqÀÄ PÉÆÃªÀÄÄUÀ¼À ªÀÄzsÉå ¥sÀæw¨sÀl£É, UÀ¯ÁmÉUÀ¼ÁUÀĪÀ ¸ÁzsÀåvɬÄgÀĪÀÅzÀjAzÀ
F ªÀgÀ¢AiÀÄ£ÀÄß ©üvÀÛj¹zÀ ¥ÀæeÁ±ÀQÛ n« PÀ£ÀßqÀ JA§ AiÀÄÆlÆå¨ï ZÁ£É¯ï ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÀÄ,
PÁAiÀÄðPÀæªÀÄ ¤gÀƦ¹zÀ ¤gÀÆ¥ÀPÀgÀÄ, ºÁUÀÆ ªÀgÀ¢UÁgÀ£À gÀªÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ jÃvÁå
PÀæªÀÄ dgÀÄV¸À®Ä oÁuÁ ªÉÆ.£ÀA 162/2025 PÀ®A 353(2), 3(5) BNS jÃvÁå ¸ÀéAiÀÄA
¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR°¹gÀÄvÉÛãÉ."
(Emphasis added)
5.
Learned HCGP submits that a perusal of the
complaint would clearly indicate the ingredients of the offence
punishable under Section 353 of the BNS, which was Section
505 of the earlier regime - the IPC and would submit that
investigation in the least must be permitted to be continued.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
issue in the lis stands answered by the judgment rendered by
this Court in Crl.P.No.12267/2024 dated 12.12.2024, wherein it
is held as follows:
"10. The afore-narrated link in the dates and chain
of events are all in public domain. The crime is registered
against the petitioner under Section 353(2) of the BNS.
Section 353(2) of the BNS reads as follows:
“353. Statements conducing to public
mischief.—(1) Whoever makes, publishes or
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HC-KAR
circulates any statement, false information,
rumour, or report, including through electronic
means—
(a)
with intent to cause, or which is likely to
cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or
airman in the Army, Navy or Air Force of
India to mutiny or otherwise disregard
or fail in his duty as such; or
(b)
with intent to cause, or which is likely to
cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any
section of the public whereby any person may
be induced to commit an offence against the
State or against the public tranquillity; or
(c)
with intent to incite, or which is likely to
incite, any class or community of persons to
commit any offence against any other class
or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) Whoever makes, publishes or
circulates any statement or report containing
false information, rumour or alarming news,
including through electronic means, with intent
to create or promote, or which is likely to
create or promote, on grounds of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, caste or
community or any other ground whatsoever,
feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between
different religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities, shall be
punished with imprisonment which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(3) Whoever commits an offence specified in
sub-section (2) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious
worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception.—It does not amount to an
offence, within the meaning of this section,
when the person making, publishing or
circulating
any
such
statement,
false
information, rumour or report, has reasonable
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grounds for believing that such statement,
false information, rumour or report is true and
makes, publishes or circulates it in good faith
and without any such intent as aforesaid.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 353 is Section 505 of the earlier regime of
IPC. Section 353(2) punishes a person who makes,
publishes or circulates any statement or report
containing false information, rumour or alarming
news, including through electronic means with
intent to create or promote disharmony, enmity,
hatred or ill-will between different religions with
certain exceptions. ….
….
….
….
The tweet is posted; tweet is clarified; and tweet is
deleted. Therefore, it is ununderstandable as to how the
ingredients of Section 353(2) of BNS are met in the case
at hand. The interpretation of Section 353(2) need not
detain this Court for long or delve deep into the mater.
11. The Apex Court has interpreted Section 153A
which is ingrediantly identical to an offence under Section
505(2) IPC or 353(2) BNS as is alleged in the case at
hand in the cases of JAVED AHMAD HAJAM v. STATE
OF MAHARASHTRA1and SHIV PRASAD SEMWAL v.
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND2. The Apex Court in the case
of JAVED AHMAD HAJAM has held as follows:
“10. Now, coming back to Section 153-A,
clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 153AIPC is attracted when by words, either spoken
or written or by signs or by visible
representations or otherwise, an attempt is
made to promote disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill will between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities. The promotion of
disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill will must be
on the grounds of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, caste, community or any
(2024) 4 SCC 156
(2024) 7 SCC 555
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other analogous grounds. Clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 153-AIPC will apply only
when an act is committed which is prejudicial
to the maintenance of harmony between
different religious, racial, language or regional
groups or castes or communities and which
disturbs or is likely to disturb the public
tranquillity.
11. Now, coming to the words used by the
appellant on his WhatsApp status, we may note here
that the first statement is that August 5 is a Black
Day for Jammu and Kashmir. 5-8-2019 is the day on
which Article 370 of the Constitution of India was
abrogated, and two separate Union Territories of
Jammu and Kashmir were formed. Further, the
appellant has posted that “Article 370 was
abrogated, we are not happy”. On a plain reading,
the appellant intended to criticise the action of the
abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
He has expressed unhappiness over the said act of
abrogation. The aforesaid words do not refer to any
religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,
caste or community. It is a simple protest by the
appellant against the decision to abrogate Article
370 of the Constitution of India and the further steps
taken based on that decision. The Constitution of
India, under Article 19(1)(a), guarantees freedom of
speech and expression. Under the said guarantee,
every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the
action of abrogation of Article 370 or, for that
matter, every decision of the State. He has the right
to say he is unhappy with any decision of the State.
12. In Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed
Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 :
(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] , this Court has read
“intention” as an essential ingredient of the said
offence. The alleged objectionable words or
expressions used by the appellant, on its plain
reading, cannot promote disharmony or feelings of
enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious,
racial, language or regional groups or castes or
communities. The WhatsApp status of the appellant
has a photograph of two barbed wires, below which
it is mentioned that “AUGUST 5 — BLACK DAY —
JAMMU&KASHMIR”. This is an expression of his
individual view and his reaction to the abrogation of
Article 370 of the Constitution of India. It does not
reflect any intention to do something which is
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prohibited under Section 153-A. At best, it is a
protest, which is a part of his freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).
13. Every citizen of India has a right to
be critical of the action of abrogation of Article
370 and the change of status of Jammu and
Kashmir. Describing the day the abrogation
happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of
protest and anguish. If every criticism or
protest of the actions of the State is to be held
as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy,
which
is
an
essential
feature
of
the
Constitution of India, will not survive.
14. The right to dissent in a legitimate
and lawful manner is an integral part of the
rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Every
individual must respect the right of others to
dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest
against the decisions of the Government is an
essential part of democracy. The right to
dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a
part of the right to lead a dignified and
meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21. But
the protest or dissent must be within four
corners of the modes permissible in a
democratic set up. It is subject to reasonable
restrictions imposed in accordance with clause
(2) of Article 19. In the present case, the
appellant has not at all crossed the line.
15. The High Court has held [Javed
Ahmed Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2023
SCC OnLine Bom 819] that the possibility of
stirring up the emotions of a group of people
cannot be ruled out. The appellant's college
teachers, students, and parents were allegedly
members of the WhatsApp group. As held by
Vivian Bose, J., the effect of the words used by
the appellant on his WhatsApp status will have
to be judged from the standards of reasonable
women and men. We cannot apply the
standards of people with weak and vacillating
minds. Our country has been a democratic republic
for more than 75 years. The people of our country
know the importance of democratic values.
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the
words will promote disharmony or feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill will between different religious groups.
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The test to be applied is not the effect of the
words on some individuals with weak minds or
who see a danger in every hostile point of
view. The test is of the general impact of the
utterances on reasonable people who are
significant in numbers. Merely because a few
individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will
not be sufficient to attract clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 153-AIPC.
16. As regards the picture containing
“Chand” and below that the words “14th AugustHappy Independence Day Pakistan”, we are of the
view that it will not attract clause (a) of sub-section
(1) of Section 153-AIPC. Every citizen has the right
to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other
countries on their respective Independence Days. If
a citizen of India extends good wishes to the citizens
of Pakistan on 14th August, which is their
Independence Day, there is nothing wrong with it. It
is a gesture of goodwill. In such a case, it cannot be
said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or
feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different
religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed to the
appellant only because he belongs to a particular
religion.
17. Now, the time has come to enlighten and
educate our police machinery on the concept of
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the extent of
reasonable restraint on their free speech and
expression. They must be sensitised about the
democratic values enshrined in our Constitution.
18. For the same reasons, clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 153-AIPC will not be attracted
as what is depicted on the WhatsApp status of the
appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the
maintenance of harmony among various groups as
stated therein. Thus, continuation of the prosecution
of the appellant for the offence punishable under
Section 153-AIPC will be a gross abuse of the
process of law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court in the case of SHIV PRASAD SEMWAL
has held as follows:
“…
…
…
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21. It may be noted that the entire case as
set out in the impugned FIR is based on the
allegation that the Facebook news post uploaded by
one journalist Mr GunanandJakhmola was caused to
be published on Parvatjan news portal being
operated by the appellant.
22. Thus, essentially, we are required to
examine whether the contents of the news report
constitute any cognizable offence so as to justify the
investigation into the allegations made in the FIR
against the appellant.
23. For the sake of ready reference, the
contents of the disputed news article are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“GunanandJakhmola
17-3-2020 at 30.05
Trivender Uncle what amazing things you are
doing?
Uncle you are laying foundation stone of Art
Gallery which is going to construct by acquiring
government land.
Uncle you are associating the mafias who are
violating the decisions of Modi Government.
Don't trap yourself with mafias, have you forgot
the problems arisen out of marriage of Gupta
brother's.
Uncle you were not like this, what
happened to you? Was the troubles arisen out of
marriage of Gupta Brothers was not enough that
you are now going to laying foundation stone of
the Art Gallery which is going to construct by
acquiring government land. Just think over it, or
take report from LIU and other agencies about this
Art Gallery which is going to construct on the
acquired government land. This is a government
land which is dismantled by mafias and your
officers. Uncle you are innocent, anybody can use
you. Advisers and officers surrounding you they
are cunning.
This cunning persons have brought you
forward against the decisions of Modi Government.
Uncle let I inform you for your knowledge
that Modi Government means your honour has
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given sanction to planning for Singtali Project near
Rishikesh. This project will reduce the distance
between Kumau and Garhwal and also it will
arrange sources of employment in mountains.
World Bank is also giving money, but the program
of Mafias in which you are going to participate on
20 March, that is an enemy of mountains. It has
no concern with the wellbeing of mountains. It is
against the proposed project of Modi Government
and your officers and advisers are in collusion with
that. Please inquire it and then only you go.
Note: Kindly see the invitation card given by
mafias.”
24. As per the counter-affidavit filed on
behalf of the State, after investigation, two
substantive offences
were
retained
by
the
investigating officer against the appellant, which are
Sections 153-A and 504 read with Sections 34 and
120-BIPC.
25. From a bare reading of the language
of Section 153-AIPC, it is clear that in order to
constitute such offence, the prosecution must
come out with a case that the words “spoken”
or “written” attributed to the accused, created
enmity or bad blood between different groups
on the ground of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, etc. or that the acts so
alleged were prejudicial to the maintenance of
harmony.
26. Upon careful perusal of the offending
news article, reproduced (supra), it is crystal clear
that there is no reference to any group or groups of
people in the said article. The publication focuses
totally on the complainant imputing that he had
encroached upon public land where the foundation
stone laying ceremony was proposed at the hands of
Hon'ble Chief Minister of Uttarakhand.
27. Apparently, the post was aimed at
frustrating the proposed foundation stone laying
ceremony on the land, of which the complainant
claims to be the true owner. The post also imputes
that the person who was planning the foundation
stone ceremony was an enemy of mountains and
had no concern with the well-being of the
mountains.
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28. The learned Standing Counsel for the
State tried to draw much water from these
lines alleging that this portion of the post tends
to create a sense of enmity and disharmony
amongst people of hill community and the
people of plains. However, the interpretation
sought to be given to these words is farfetched and unconvincing. The lines referred to
supra only refer to the complainant, imputing
that his activities are prejudicial to the hills.
These words have no connection whatsoever
with a group or groups of people or
communities. Hence, the foundational facts
essential to constitute the offence under
Section 153-AIPC are totally lacking from the
allegations as set out in the FIR.
29. In Manzar
Sayeed
Khan v. State
of
Maharashtra [Manzar
Sayeed
Khan v. State
of
Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)
417], this Court held that for applying Section 153AIPC, the presence of two or more groups or
communities is essential, whereas in the present
case, no such groups or communities were referred
to in the news article.
30. The other substantive offence which
has been applied by the investigating agency is
Section 504IPC. The said offence can be
invoked when the insult of a person provokes
him to break public peace or to commit any
other offence. There is no such allegation in the
FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post
attributable to the appellant, the complainant
was provoked to such an extent that he could
indulge in disturbing the public peace or
commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks
the necessary ingredients of the said offence
as well.
31. Since we have found that the
foundational facts essential for constituting the
substantive offences under Sections 153-A and
504IPC are not available from the admitted
allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua
the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and
120-BIPC would also be non est.
32. The complainant has also alleged in the
FIR that the accused intended to blackmail him by
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publishing the news article in question. However,
there is no allegation in the FIR that the accused
tried to extract any wrongful gain or valuable
security from the complainant on the basis of the
mischievous/malicious post.
33. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , this Court examined the
principles governing the scope of exercise of powers
by the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and under Section 482CrPC
seeking quashing of criminal proceedings and held
as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation
of the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and
sufficiently
channelised
and
inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein
such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
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(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do
not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR
or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or
the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned
Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance
of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
34. Tested on the touchstone of the above
principles, we are of the firm view that allowing
continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the
impugned FIR bearing No. 31 of 2020 registered at
PS Muni Ki Reti, District Tehri Garhwal against the
appellant is nothing but gross abuse of process of
law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do
not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable
offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all
proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant
are hereby quashed and set aside.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court did not permit further investigation even
in a crime before it. The FIR itself was quashed, as the
High Court of Uttarakhand had rejected the petition which
challenged the FIR.
12. Much earlier to the afore-quoted judgments in the
cases of JAVED AHMAD HAJAM and SHIV PRASAD
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SEMWAL, the Apex Court in the case of PATRICIA
MUKHIM v. STATE OF MEGHALAYA3 interpreting both
Sections 153A and 505(2) of the IPC, which is 353(2) of
the BNS has held as follows:
“8. “It is of utmost importance to keep all
speech free in order for the truth to emerge and
have a civil society.”—Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of
speech and expression guaranteed by Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a very valuable
fundamental right. However, the right is not
absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on
the right of free speech and expression in the
interest of sovereignty and integrity of India,
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order, decency or morality or in
relation to contempt of Court, defamation or
incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable
under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion of enmity
between different groups on grounds of religion,
race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. and
doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony is
punishable with imprisonment which may extend to
three years or with fine or with both under Section
153-A. As we are called upon to decide whether a
prima facie case is made out against the appellant
for committing offences under Sections 153-A and
505(1)(c), it is relevant to reproduce the provisions
which are as follows:
“153-A. Promoting
enmity
between different groups on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence,
language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial
to
maintenance
of
harmony.—(1)
Whoever—
(a) by words, either spoken or written,
or by signs or by visible representations or
otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote,
on grounds of religion, race, place of birth,
residence, language, caste or community or
any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or
feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between
different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities, or
(2021) 15 SCC 35
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(b) commits any act which is
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony
between different religious, racial, language
or regional groups or castes or communities,
and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the
public tranquility, or
(c) organises any exercise, movement,
drill or other similar activity intending that
the participants in such activity shall use or
be trained to use criminal force or violence or
knowing it to be likely that the participants in
such activity will use or be trained to use
criminal force or violence, or participates in
such activity intending to use or be trained to
use criminal force or violence or knowing it to
be likely that the participants in such activity
will use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence, against any religious, racial,
language or regional group or caste or
community and such activity, for any reason
whatsoever causes or is likely to cause fear
or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst
members of such religious, racial, language
or regional group or caste or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Offence committed in place of worship,
etc.—(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in
sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious
worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years
and shall also be liable to fine.
***
505. Statements conducing to public
mischief.—(1) Whoever makes, publishes or
circulates any statement, rumour or report—
***
(c) with intent to incite, or which is
likely to incite, any class or community of
persons to commit any offence against any
other class or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.”
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9. Only where the written or spoken
words have the tendency of creating public
disorder or disturbance of law and order or
affecting public tranquility, the law needs to
step in to prevent such an activity. The
intention to cause disorder or incite people to
violence is the sine qua non of the offence
under Section 153-AIPC and the prosecution
has to prove the existence of mens rea in order
to succeed. [Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]
10. The gist of the offence under Section
153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of
enmity or hatred between different classes of
people. The intention has to be judged primarily by
the language of the piece of writing and the
circumstances in which it was written and published.
The matter complained of within the ambit of
Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot
rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for
proving the charge nor indeed can one take a
sentence here and a sentence there and connect
them by a meticulous process of inferential
reasoning
[Manzar
Sayeed
Khan v. State
of
Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)
417] .
11. In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of
A.P. [Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997)
7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094] , this Court
analysed the ingredients of Sections 153-A and
505(2)IPC. It was held that Section 153-A
covers a case where a person by “words, either
spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
representations”, promotes or attempts to
promote feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will.
Under Section 505(2) promotion of such
feeling should have been done by making a
publication or circulating any statement or
report containing rumour or alarming news.
Mens rea was held to be a necessary ingredient
for the offence under Sections 153-A and
505(2). The common factor of both the
sections being promotion of feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill will between different religious or
racial or linguistics or religious groups or
castes or communities, it is necessary that at
least two such groups or communities should
be involved. It was further held in Bilal Ahmed
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Kaloo [Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.,
(1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094] that
merely inciting the feelings of one community
or group without any reference to any other
community or group cannot attract any of the
two sections. The Court went on to highlight
the distinction between the two offences,
holding
that
publication
of
words
or
representation is sine qua non under Section
505. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment
of
this
Court
in Ramesh v. Union
of
India [Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC
668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] in which it was held
that words used in the alleged criminal speech
should be judged from the standards of
reasonable,
strong-minded,
firm
and
courageous men, and not those of weak and
vacillating minds, nor of those who scent
danger in every hostile point of view. The
standard of an ordinary reasonable man or as
they say in English law “the man on the top of
a Clapham omnibus” should be applied.
12. This
Court
in Pravasi
Bhalai
Sangathan v. Union
of
India [Pravasi
Bhalai
Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) 11 SCC 477 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 400] had referred to the
Canadian Supreme Court decision in Saskatchewan
(Human
Rights
Commission) v. William
Whatcott[Saskatchewan
(Human
Rights
Commission) v. William Whatcott, 2013 SCC OnLine
Can SC 6 : (2013) 1 SCR 467] . In that judgment,
the Canadian Supreme Court set out what it
considered to be a workable approach in interpreting
“hatred” as is used in legislative provisions
prohibiting hate speech. The first test was for the
Courts to apply the hate speech prohibition
objectively and in so doing, ask whether a
reasonable person, aware of the context and
circumstances, would view the expression as
exposing the protected group to hatred. The second
test was to restrict interpretation of the legislative
term “hatred” to those extreme manifestations of
the emotion described by the words “detestation”
and “vilification”. This would filter out and protect
speech which might be repugnant and offensive, but
does
not
incite
the
level
of
abhorrence,
delegitimisation and rejection that risks causing
discrimination or injury. The third test was for the
Courts to focus their analysis on the effect of the
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expression at issue, namely, whether it is likely to
expose the targeted person or group to hatred by
others. Mere repugnancy of the ideas expressed is
insufficient to constitute the crime attracting penalty.
13. In the instant case, applying the
principles laid down by this Court as mentioned
above, the question that arises for our
consideration is whether the Facebook post
dated 4-7-2020 was intentionally made for
promoting class/community hatred and has the
tendency to provoke enmity between two
communities. A close scrutiny of the Facebook
post would indicate that the agony of the
appellant was directed against the apathy
shown by the Chief Minister of Meghalaya, the
Director
General
of
Police
and
the
DorbarShnong of the area in not taking any
action against the culprits who attacked the
non-tribals youngsters. The appellant referred
to the attacks on non-tribals in 1979. At the
most, the Facebook post can be understood to
highlight the discrimination against non-tribals
in the State of Meghalaya. However, the
appellant made it clear that criminal elements
have no community and immediate action has
to be taken against persons who had indulged
in the brutal attack on non-tribal youngsters
playing basketball. The Facebook post read in
its entirety pleads for equality of non-tribals in
the State of Meghalaya. In our understanding,
there was no intention on the part of the
appellant to promote class/community hatred.
As there is no attempt made by the appellant to
incite people belonging to a community to
indulge in any violence, the basic ingredients of
the offence under Sections 153-A and
505(1)(c) have not been made out. Where
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint,
even if they are taken on their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused, the FIR is liable to be
quashed [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .
14. India is a plural and multicultural
society. The promise of liberty, enunciated in
the Preamble, manifests itself in various
provisions which outline each citizen's rights;
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they include the right to free speech, to travel
freely and settle (subject to such reasonable
restrictions that may be validly enacted)
throughout the length and breadth of India. At
times, when in the legitimate exercise of such
a right, individuals travel, settle down or carry
on a vocation in a place where they find
conditions
conducive,
there
may
be
resentments,
especially
if
such
citizens
prosper, leading to hostility or possibly
violence. In such instances, if the victims voice
their discontent, and speak out, especially if
the State authorities turn a blind eye, or drag
their feet, such voicing of discontent is really a
cry for anguish, for justice denied — or
delayed. This is exactly what appears to have
happened in this case.
15. The attack upon six non-locals,
carried out by masked individuals, is not
denied by the State; its reporting too is not
denied. The State in fact issued a press release.
There appears to be no headway in the
investigations. The complaint made by the
DorbarShnong, Lawsohtun that the statement
of the appellant would incite communal tension
and might instigate a communal conflict in the
entire State is only a figment of imagination.
The fervent plea made by the appellant for
protection of non-tribals living in the State of
Meghalaya and for their equality cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, be categorised as hate
speech. It was a call for justice — for action
according to law, which every citizen has a
right to expect and articulate. Disapprobation
of governmental inaction cannot be branded as
an attempt to promote hatred between
different communities. Free speech of the
citizens of this country cannot be stifled by
implicating them in criminal cases, unless such
speech has the tendency to affect public order.
The sequitur of above analysis of the Facebook
post made by the appellant is that no case is
made out against the appellant for an offence
under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c)IPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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Therefore, in the light of the interpretation of Section
353(2) of BNS / Section 505(2) or even 153A of the IPC
as the case would be, by the Apex Court in the aforequoted judgments, permitting further investigation in the
case at hand, when there is nothing to investigate would
become an abuse of the process of law. Even if the facts
narrated are considered to become the ingredients, it
would not make out an offence."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the order passed by this Court quoted
supra, and finding no ingredients of the allegations and to
prevent miscarriage of justice, I deem it appropriate to exercise
my jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and obliterate
the crime qua the petitioners.
7.
For the aforesaid reasons, the following
ORDER
(i)
The Criminal Petition is allowed.
(ii)
The impugned crime in Crime No.162/2025 pending
before the Addl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) & CJM Court,
Tumkur stands quashed qua the petitioners.
SD/(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
SJK
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 18
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